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In recent years, as China has continued to rise as an economic, political and 
military power, there has been increasing interest in the U.S. in developing a strategic 
relationship with India in response. Most have seen this as a relatively recent framework 
for building U.S.-India relations after five decades of viewing the bilateral relationship 
either through a U.S.-India-Pakistan lens, or through a Cold War lens with India seen as a 
leader of the non-aligned movement and subsequently a de facto ally and security partner 
of the Soviet Union. A much-debated question among academics and policymakers has 
been whether India and the U.S. will ally or partner against China in the future. One set 
of answers asserts that a China threat-driven U.S.-India partnership is inevitable; a second 
contends that a China-driven U.S.-India alignment or partnership is highly unlikely, if not 
impossible.  
This dissertation shows that China has played an important role in shaping U.S.-
India relations since the People’s Republic of China came into existence in 1949. It 
explores past US-Indian interactions vis-à-vis China between 1949-1979 and makes 
evident that a US-India partnership against China is neither inevitable nor impossible. 
India has partnered, one could argue even allied, with countries against China—with the 
US in 1962 and the USSR in 1971. On the other hand, at other times, even when Indian 
 ix 
and US policymakers have considered China to be threat number one, the countries’ 
partnership has not been sustainable.  
The two countries have come together against China, but only when certain 
conditions are in place. This dissertation shows that they have partnered against China 
when they have agreed on (a) the nature of the threat, (b) the urgency of the threat, and 
(c) how to deal with the threat. In laying out this argument, this dissertation offers 
insights related to the future of the China-India-U.S. strategic triangle. More broadly, it 
also emphasizes that in considering when countries ally or partner, it is insufficient just to 
focus on threat itself or even perceptions of threat; it is also necessary to consider means: 
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…if in 10 or 15 years—or sooner, but 10 or 15 years—China begins to act 
aggressively externally and in a hostile way, these two countries [India and the 
US] will come together naturally. So they do not have to plan for it; they’ll come 
together…So they don’t have to plan for it; it will happen, it seems to me, because 
they are natural allies… 
– Robert Blackwill, former US Ambassador to India, 20061 
But engagement with the United States is essential in the world that we live in. 
This is not an alliance; this is not a military alliance. This is not an alliance 
against any other country…I wish to dispel this illusion and I do say so with 
respect because it is an illusion. We are not part of any military alliance and we 
are not ganging up against any other country, least of all against China…I wish to 
dispel this opinion which may exist that what we have done with the United States 
is at the cost of China or any other country. 
– Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, 20052 
We have always prided ourselves on preserving our strategic autonomy, and this 
is an article of faith for us. India is too large a country to be boxed into any 
alliance or regional or sub-regional arrangements, whether trade, economic or 
political. 
– Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, 20103  
 
In recent years, as China has continued to rise as an economic, political and 
military power, there has been increasing interest in the US in developing a strategic 
relationship with India in response. Most have seen this as a relatively recent framework 
for building US-India relations after five decades of viewing the bilateral relationship 
either through a US-India-Pakistan lens, or through a Cold War lens (with India seen as a 
                                                
1 Robert D. Blackwill, “Journalist Roundtable on India,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 23, 2006 
(http://www.cfr.org/publication/9954/journalist_roundtable_on_india_rush_transcript_federal_news_servic
e_inc.html). 
2 Manmohan Singh, “Reply to the Lok Sabha debate on his US visit,” New Delhi, August 3, 2005 
(http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp?id=160). 
3 Manmohan Singh, “Excerpts of address by the PM at the Combined Commanders' Conference,” New 
Delhi, September 13, 2010 (http://www.pmindia.gov.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=926). 
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leader of the non-aligned movement and subsequently a de facto ally and security partner 
of the Soviet Union).4 Similarly, in India today there are discussions of potentially allying 
with the US against China or, at least, using Indian relations with the US as leverage with 
China. But, in fact, China has played an important role in shaping US-India relations 
since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) came into existence in 1949.  
The present discussion arises from enhanced interest in the future of the China-
India-US triangle, and in questions similar to those Harry Harding posed in relation to the 
China-Japan-US triangle: 
Will it be a concert of powers, in which the three great nations share enough 
common values and common interests to work together to promote peace and 
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region? Will it be a firm alliance of two against 
one—an alignment in which the United States and Japan work together to contain 
the expansion of Chinese power? Will it be a balance of power, in which Japan 
tries to mediate a ‘new Cold War’ between China and the United States? 
Conversely, will the United States attempt to mediate an emerging rivalry 
between China and Japan in Asia? Or will the triangle be highly fluid, with each 
pair of countries working together on some issues, but finding themselves in 
disagreements on others, without forming any firm or enduring alignment?5  
With the growing power and influence of China and India, the changing context 
of the three countries’ relations, and their increasing interactions in East and South Asia, 
across the globe and in multilateral forums, these questions have assumed greater 
importance—not just in academic departments, op-ed columns, or think tanks around the 
world, but also in the corridors of power in China, India and the US. Indeed, in India, a 
                                                
4 For the views of administration officials and external experts, see Josh Rogin, “U.S. and India take their 
relationship beyond South Asia,” The Cable, November 15, 2010 
(http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/15/the_us_and_india_take_their_relationship_beyond_so
uth_asia; accessed November 16, 2010). 
5 Francine Frankel and Harry Harding, ed. The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to 
Know (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 322 
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recent government-sponsored assessment identified the management of the China-India-
US triangle as the key challenge that policymakers will face.6  
In relation to the triangle, one of the questions that receives the most attention is 
whether India and the US will ally or partner against China. While there has not been a 
great amount of theoretical work on the US-India relationship, theoretical frameworks 
have implicitly or explicitly formed the basis of certain assumptions and arguments about 
the relationship made in both academia and the policy world.7 This is true in the case of 
analyses of the impact of the China factor on the US-India relationship as well, with 
assessments tending to emerge through a realist or a constructivist lens.  
One set of answers asserts that a China-driven US-India partnership is inevitable. 
This sentiment is based on realist assessments such as those of Robert Blackwill, the 
former US ambassador to India, reflected in the quote above. For this group steeped in a 
realist perspective, the assumption of an inevitable, automatic alignment forms the basis 
for the argument that the US and India should form a deeper and broader strategic 
partnership. It leads to assertions such as these: “India and the United States are uniquely 
suited for strategic partnership. Both harbor growing anxieties about China’s increasing 
military power and regional assertiveness.”8 Shared anxiety is seen as eventually leading 
to alignment. This belief is not restricted to some circles in India and the US. Half of 
                                                
6 See Rajiv Kumar and Santosh Kumar, In the National Interest: A Strategic Foreign Policy for India (New 
Delhi: Business Standard Books, 2010). The Indian Ministry of External Affairs commissioned the study. 
7 See T.V. Paul, “Integrating International Relations Studies in India to Global Scholarship,” International 
Studies, Vol. 46, Issue 1&2, (India, 2009), pp. 129-145 for how these concepts can both explicitly and 
implicitly filter through to policy frameworks. Also see that article for some explanations of why there has 
been limited international relations theoretical work on (and in) India. For further explanation, as well as 
statistics on the relative paucity of such work, see Rajesh M. Basrur, “Scholarship on India’s International 
Relations: Some Disciplinary,” International Studies, Vol. 46, Issue 1&2, (India, 2009), pp. 89-108. 
8 Tim Sullivan and Michael Mazza, “Shaping the Future of U.S.-India Defense Cooperation,” CDS 
Strategic Briefing (Washington, DC: AEI, 201), September 27, 2010. 
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those surveyed in a poll in China in 2005, too, felt that the US and India would come 
together in an anti-Chinese alliance.9 
A second perspective holds that China-driven US-India alignment or partnership 
is highly unlikely, if not impossible. This sentiment has been evident in Indian Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh’s stated views such as the one quoted above that indicate that 
because of its strategic culture, India does not “do” alliances. Others such as Matthew 
Rudolph offer a more “eclectic” explanation, arguing that “India will not bandwagon 
with the US against China because it will be difficult to do so for material reasons 
(geography), because it is unlikely to be in India’s commercial interest to do so, and 
because to do so would not accord with India’s identity.”10 Some analysts in China, 
indeed, take succor in the Indian emphasis on strategic autonomy, arguing that it will 
prevent a US-India tag-team containment strategy.11 
An exploration of past US-Indian interactions vis-à-vis China, however, makes 
evident that a US-India partnership against China is neither inevitable nor impossible. 
India has partnered, one could argue even allied, with countries against China—with the 
US in 1962 and the USSR in 1971. On the other hand, at other times, even when Indian 
and US policymakers have considered China to be threat number one, the countries’ 
alignment has not been sustainable. The two countries thus have come together against 
China, but only when certain conditions are in place.  
                                                
9 On the other hand, 33 percent said they did not think such an alliance would be formed. Survey conducted 
in 2005. Quoted in J. Mohan Malik, “India’s Response to China’s Rise in Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro 
Sato eds. The Rise of China and International Security: America and Asia Respond (Oxford, UK: 
Routledge), p. 183. 
10  See Matthew C.J. Rudolph, “Asia's New Strategic Triangle: US-China-India Relations in Eclectic 
Perspective,” Presented at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, 
Philadelphia, PA, September 1, 2006. 
11 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing Dong Yuan, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict? (Boulder, 
CO: Lynn Rienner, 2003), p. 102. 
 5 
What are these conditions? When does China successfully drive the US and India 
into each other’s arms? Thus far, neither these conditions nor China’s role in shaping US-
India relations has been explored in any great detail. This subject is much speculated 
about, but it has been little studied. This dissertation seeks to correct that imbalance and 
address the questions: What role has the China factor played in the relationship between 
India and the United States? When does the China factor bring the US and India 
together? By doing so it intends to contribute to addressing a broader question: What 
confluence of conditions has shaped Indian and the US proclivities to pursue alignment 
with each other?  
To explore and disentangle the impact of the China factor on US-India relations 
and the conditions when it succeeds or fails in bringing about an alignment—or even 
when it causes estrangement—between the US and India, it is necessary to consider many 
other sub-questions. How have Delhi and Washington perceived Beijing? What has 
affected these perceptions of China and whether it poses a threat? What has shaped 
Indian and US policy towards China? How have these two countries’ perceptions and 
policies interacted? Under what conditions has China had an impact on the US-India 
relationship? What kind of impact has it had—an adverse or an ameliorative one?   
This is not a narrative that easily fits into any single theoretical international 
relations paradigm. Pure balance of power and balance of threat explanations do not fully 
provide answers. Nor do constructivist approaches such as those emphasizing India’s 
strategic culture. Perhaps the paradigm that comes closest to addressing the question is 
neoclassical realism, which suggests, “intervening unit-level variables can deflect foreign 
policy from what pure structural theories might predict.”12 But even that lens does not 
                                                
12 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, Volume 51 Issue 
1 (1998), p. 168.  
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inherently provide an explanation of what those variables might be or how they might 
interact, and it assumes that a state’s behavior is first and foremost derivative of systemic 
conditions. Finally, while it might explain behavior on one side, it is not necessarily an 
accurate representation of the dynamics on both sides. 
In order to understand how the China factor interacts with various factors 
operating in the US-India context—at the ideational, domestic political, and systemic 
level—to produce key shifts in that bilateral relationship an empirical explanation is 
required. This dissertation undertakes to provide that explanation, considering the role 
China played in shaping the US-India relationship—an aspect that has been neglected in 
the existing literature—during an illustrative period: 1949-1979.  
This chapter lays out the empirical explanations offered in the existing literature 
on the US-India relationship, as well as assessments of the China factor. It then outlines 
the key arguments of the dissertation, as well as the purpose this study aims to serve. 
Finally, it presents an outline of each dissertation chapter. 
THE STORY THUS FAR  
Theoretical frameworks have implicitly or explicitly formed the basis of certain 
assumptions and arguments made about the US-India relationship in both academia and 
the policy world. In his book on US-India relations, for example, Dennis Kux posed the 
question “Why was it that these democracies seemed to have so much trouble in getting 
along?”13 The assumption implicit in the question is that, as democracies, the US and 
India should have got along during the Cold War. On the other end of the theoretical 
                                                
13 Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941-1991 (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University Press, 1992), p. xi. Also, see Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power: 
Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-1982 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1984), p. 72, which 
emphasizes the “divergence in strategic perspectives which prevented the formation of an otherwise logical 
partnership.” 
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spectrum, realism also would suggest that the two countries would have cooperated with 
each other, if not formed an alliance, especially vis-à-vis China during the first half of the 
Cold War. These two theoretical paradigms, which predict a more consistently 
cooperative US-India relationship, continue to form the basis of the assertion that the two 
countries are “natural allies.”14 
On the other hand, application of an ideational paradigm has highlighted 
American and Indian ideological and cultural differences. One strand of this argument 
would suggest that while American decision makers were acting on the basis of “the Cold 
War [which] was a structure of shared knowledge that governed great power relations for 
forty years,”15 decision makers in India were acting on the basis of a different structure of 
knowledge—one shared with other post-colonial or non-aligned countries. Another strand 
of this argument puts the emphasis on the two countries’ cultural differences, causing 
them to perceive (or misperceive) each other and the world from very different—possibly 
irreconcilable—lenses. This paradigm, which approximates to a constructivist one, would 
predict a more conflictual bilateral relationship. But reality has belied this prediction, as 
well as the concept of India and the US being natural allies either because the nature of 
the two states dictates it or the balance of power in the international system does. 
On the empirical side, compared to the US-China relationship, for instance, there 
has been somewhat limited scholarship about the US-India relationship. The studies on 
                                                
14 Some form of the term has been used in both countries. Former Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari 
Vajpayee used the term (Atal Behari Vajpayee, “Address at the U.S. - India Business Summit,” New York, 
N.Y., September 13, 2000, 
http://www.indianembassy.org/indusrel/pm_us_2000/pm_us_india_bus_september_13_2000.htm). The 
2008 Democratic Party Platform used the term “natural strategic allies” (Democratic National Convention 
Committee, “Renewing America’s Promise,” August 25, 2008, p. 39). The term “natural partners” has also 
been used (a few years ago, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, for example, stated, “As two great 
democracies, we are natural partners in many ways” (Manmohan Singh, “Address to the Joint Session of 
the U.S. Congress,” Washington, D.C., July 19, 2005).   
15 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security, Summer 1995, v20, n1, 
p. 74. 
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US-India relations that exist have tended to focus on the role of Pakistan or the former 
Soviet Union, the role of personalities, the role of economics, the role of culture, or the 
role of the two countries’ foreign policy traditions or ideologies in shaping bilateral 
relations.16   
Mirroring the general trend in scholarship on diplomatic history, one of the most 
recent works on the history of the bilateral relationship emphasizes the impact of culture. 
Andrew Rotter in his book Comrades at Odds considers the two countries’ strategic 
cultures, beliefs about governance, and positions on and perceptions of race, religion, 
gender and class.17 Rotter argues that the culturally determined views of Americans and 
Indians on these issues shaped the countries’ diplomatic relations. While he shows 
effectively that Indians and Americans (or, rather, Westerners—he tends to conflate the 
two at times) held stereotypes of each other, he fails to present a convincing case that 
these stereotypes determined policymaking. For example, he asserts that the motive for 
the US looking toward Pakistan as a partner rather than India during the Eisenhower 
administration was that US policymakers “were impressed with the allegedly manly, 
martial qualities of the Islamic nation’s political leaders and soldiery.”18 But Rotter 
neither shows that this was what spurred the decision to lean toward Pakistan, nor refutes 
alternate explanations. In this particular instance, his interpretation ignores evidence that 
indicates that a South Asian version of “empire by invitation” might have been playing 
out in the region in the 1950s—that while a number of US policymakers wanted to 
                                                
16 There has been very limited work applying theories to US-India relations, especially compared to that on 
U.S.-China or East Asian relations. Examples of the latter include Thomas Christensen’s Useful 
Adversaries that considered U.S.-China relations, and Victor Cha’s Alignment despite Antagonism, which 
explored Japan-South Korea relations. 
17 Andrew J. Rotter, Comrades at Odds: Culture and Indo-US Relations, 1947-1964 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2000). 
18 Rotter, p. xxiii. 
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partner with India to balance China, Delhi remained unwilling to sign up to such a 
partnership, while Karachi expressed a strong interest in developing a deeper political 
and military relationship with the US, lobbying hard for it.19  
Sulochana R. Glazer and Nathan Glazer’s edited volume Conflicting Images: 
India and the United States also emphasizes the effect of culturally-shaped perceptions as 
an influence on the foreign policy of the countries toward each other.20 H.W. Brands, in 
his book India and the United States: The Cold Peace,21 surveys the geopolitical, social, 
cultural and political factors involved in shaping the relationship but also places special 
emphasis on the differing perceptions the two countries held of each other and of 
themselves. He argues that both the US and India saw themselves as role models. This 
self-image caused friction when each country did not see its role acknowledged or 
understood by the other. Archival evidence from India and the US, however, suggests 
that policymakers in both countries more often than not did understand the other 
country’s perspective and its role—sometimes, they just believed that that perspective 
was wrong; at other times, though, they did not just acknowledge the other’s crucial role, 
but saw it as critical in their own strategic framework.  
Focused largely on the US perspective, as most scholarship on the US-India 
relationship has been, a volume edited by Harold Gould and Sumit Ganguly considers 
each US administration’s policy toward India, identifying ideological differences as the 
main cause of the ups and downs in the US-India relationship. Many of the authors in the 
                                                
19 Taking on traditional arguments that emphasized the US role in shaping alliance dynamics in post-war 
Western Europe, Geir Lundestad made the case, for example, that the Europeans’ played a greater role in 
the formation of NATO (and more broadly in keeping the US involved in Europe) than had previously been 
thought. Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952,” 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 23, No. 3, 263-277 (1986).  
20 Sulochana R. Glazer and Nathan Glazer ed., Conflicting Images: India and the United States (Glenn 
Dale, MS: The Riverdale Co., 1990). 
21 H.W. Brands, India and the United States: The Cold Peace (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990). 
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book stress that while US policymakers saw situations through the lens of anti-
communism, Indian policymakers saw them through a post-colonial lens that emphasized 
nationalism and sovereignty, causing tension between the two countries. 
M. Srinivas Chary also explores the bilateral relationship in The Eagle and the 
Peacock by looking at different US administrations’ attitudes toward India, but he 
emphasizes the effect of personalities as well as the influence of economics, especially in 
the 1940s and 1950s. He argues that US interest in India was heavily influenced by 
policymakers trying to “open doors.” When the Indian government would not open up its 
economy to large-scale foreign investment, he argues, American policymakers lost 
interest in the country.22 In considering the relationship up to the Kennedy administration, 
Dennis Merrill in Bread and the Ballot also considers the economic angle but asserts that 
there was little American interest in trade or investment in India.23 The main economic 
element involved was American aid to India, which was seen by key decision-makers in 
Washington as the means toward the end of keeping India away from communism, and 
thus China and the Soviet Union. 
While there seems little doubt that economics, culture, ideology and personalities 
played a role in the US-India relationship, these factors suggest continuity but do not 
really explain change. Most of the books mentioned above consider the economic, 
ideological, and cultural trends as being consistent, or at least slow to change, but 
simultaneously recount how the bilateral relationship went through many ups and downs. 
Personalities, for their part, can explain some turns in the relationship, but not all: for 
example, it becomes difficult to explain how and why US President Richard Nixon and 
                                                
22 M. Srinivas Chary, The Eagle and the Peacock: U.S. Foreign Policy toward India since Independence 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995). 
23 Dennis Merrill, Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947-1963 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990) 
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National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger damaged and subsequently started to rebuild 
the bilateral relationship in the space of a few years if one turns mainly to a personality-
based explanation (in this case, that Nixon disliked India, and more specifically Indira 
Gandhi). A better explanation of their role might be that the personalities involved in the 
relationship facilitated cooperation or exacerbated conflict that was driven by other 
factors. 
Strategic factors have provided a more compelling—yet still incomplete—
explanation for the periods of continuity and change. In the scholarship on the strategic 
drivers of the US-India relationship, most scholars have traditionally focused on the 
linkage between the US bilateral relationships with India and Pakistan or between India’s 
bilateral relationships with the Soviet Union and the US. Robert McMahon, considering 
the relationship from 1947-1965 in Cold War on the Periphery, effectively highlights the 
Cold War as a major factor in the relationship, emphasizing the effect of the Pakistan and 
Soviet factors. McMahon’s approach is US-centric, however, and overstates the role of 
the US in shaping the situation in South Asia—even blaming persisting India-Pakistan 
problems on the US rather on the actions of the two South Asian countries. His account 
also underestimates the role of India and Pakistan in exploiting the geopolitical situation, 
crediting them with little agency.24  
Dennis Kux, in his sweeping narrative diplomatic history Estranged 
Democracies, provides a more comprehensive look at the relationship, seeking to include 
some of the dynamics on the Indian side as well. Kux outlines three sources of 
estrangement in the relationship—US efforts to combat communism, Indian non-
alignment, and mutual misunderstanding. Like McMahon, Kux stresses that the Cold War 
                                                
24 Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan (New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press, 1994). 
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framework, specifically the US tilt towards Pakistan and India’s tilt towards the Soviet 
Union, shaped the relationship.25  
There have been multiple reasons for scholars emphasizing the link between the 
US relationships with India and Pakistan and identifying Pakistan as the country 
determining the state of US-India relationship. For one: the historical, mostly 
antagonistic, relationship between the two neighbors. In addition, policymakers in India 
and Pakistan have themselves made the connection and considered—in rhetoric if not in 
reality—their relationships with third countries to be a zero-sum game. Furthermore, in 
policymaking structures around the world both countries generally fall into a single 
foreign affairs bureau, while other sections cover China. Finally, the manner in which 
area studies departments have been structured wherein India and Pakistan are more likely 
to be studied together than China and India. 
Overall, in these studies, consideration of the role of the other elephant—or, 
perhaps more appropriately, dragon or tiger—in the room has been thus far largely 
missing, even by those who highlight strategic factors. The connection between US 
relations with China and India, and the Indian relationships with China and the US has 
been not been explored in any great detail. Some scholars have indeed dismissed the 
China factor. Writing recently, for example, Kux, discussing US relations during the Cold 
War, stated, “Washington’s policy toward India and Pakistan had its own trajectory that 
                                                
25 Dennis Kux, India and the United States. Kux boils his argument down as “Washington and New Delhi 
fell out because they disagreed on national security issues of fundamental importance to each. In the late 
1940s, India decided to pursue a neutralist foreign policy, staying apart from the two power blocs then 
emerging; then, after 1954, the US decided to arm India's enemy Pakistan as part of a global policy of 
containing communism through a system of military alliances; finally, in the late 1960s and especially after 
the 1971 Treaty of Friendship, India decided to establish a close political-security relationship with the 
Soviet Union. India was thus lined up with America's principal foe while, at the same time, Washington 
was itself aligned with India's major enemy.” (p. xiii) 
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followed a different and separate path from that of US-China policy.”26 A few scholars 
have considered how the China factor shaped the relationship, but those who have either 
tend to focus on a limited period or event—for example, in the case of the China-India 
war of 1962 or the Tibetan revolt in the 1950s.27 Other observers have considered China’s 
role very briefly as part of a broader study.28 Yet others have focused on projecting into 
the future and predicting how the China-US-India triangle might play out. Their 
projections have tended to be based on realist or constructivist assumption.29 Some 
projections have emphasized the fluidity of the triangle, but not really examined in detail 
the conditions under which the nature of the relationships within the triangle changes. 
THE EASTERN SHADOW: THE CHINA FACTOR AND THE US-INDIA RELATIONSHIP  
In sum, the existing literature provides a fair amount of insight into the US-India 
relationship. But it does not provide an entirely satisfactory explanation of the quality of 
the relationship: why the countries did not get along when they did not get along, and 
why they did get along when they did. The literature tends to neglect certain key aspects 
                                                
26 Kux, “Review of Robert McMahon’s ‘U.S. Policy toward South Asia and Tibet during the Early Cold 
War,’ Journal of Cold War Studies 8:3 (Summer 2006): 131-144,” H-Diplo Article Review, October 15, 
2007. 
27 The 1962 war, because of US intervention, gets coverage in each of the books mentioned above. 
McMahon’s ‘U.S. Policy toward South Asia and Tibet during the Early Cold War,’ Journal of Cold War 
Studies 8:3 (Summer 2006): 131-144” covers the Tibetan issue in greater detail, as does S. Mahmud Ali, 
Cold War in the High Himalayas: the USA, China, and South Asia in the 1950s (Richmond, England: 
Curzon Press, 1999). Mansingh has also noted the impact of Sino-Indian relations on India’s other 
relationships as well. Mansingh, India’s Search for Power, p. 193. 
28 William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers (New York, NY: Praeger, 1972). 
29 Amitabh Mattoo, “Shadow of the Dragon: Indo-U.S. Relations and China,” in Gary K. Bertsch ed., 
Engaging India: U.S. Strategic Relations with the World’s Largest Democracy (New York, NY: Routledge, 
1999), p. 213. In this chapter Mattoo takes a down-the-road look, perceiving China as posing a long-term 
threat to both the U.S. and India and arguing that the U.S. should woo India, which can be part of a U.S.-
Japan-India partnership – a similar argument to the one that the Bush ’43 administration made on entering 
office and that some Japanese policymakers who argue for an arc of freedom and prosperity have more 
recently made. Matthew Rudolph explores “how India will behave in the China-India-U.S. triangle,” 
arguing that India will not “bandwagon with the U.S. against China” in Rudolph, “Asia's New Strategic 
Triangle.”  
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including domestic imperatives, the Indian perspective, and the China factor. 
Furthermore, current scholarship offers more explanation for continuity than change, and 
for estrangement than engagement.30 This study, while spotlighting the China factor, also 
highlights and contextualizes more of the Indian perspective, domestic drivers in both 
countries, as well as the causes of change and engagement. It does not argue that the 
China factor was the only one that mattered and, therefore, also seeks to put the China 
factor in the context of other factors at play—thus, for example, it re-conceptualizes the 
role of Pakistan. 
This study builds on and uses the existing scholarship, as well as related 
secondary works. Moreover, it is based on a study of Indian and US archival material. 
One reason for the greater attention paid to the American perspective in the existing 
literature has been the greater accessibility to US official documents. This study indeed 
uses the reports, official correspondence, telephone conversations, and memoranda 
available in presidential libraries, the State Department files at the national archives, and 
document collections such as the Foreign Relations of the United States series. These 
documents continue to be available in greater quantity than those from the Indian side. 
But access to documents in India has increased over the last decade, and this study makes 
use of those that have been made available.  
This dissertation explores the still small number of papers of India’s ministry of 
external affairs that are available at the National Archives of India. It also examines the 
significantly greater quantity of documents accessible through the personal papers of 
senior policymakers available at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in Delhi. 
There remain gaps in availability—the papers of India’s prime ministers remain 
                                                
30 The latter emphasis is evident in the titles of books about the bilateral relationship, eg. Unfriendly 
Friends; Impossible Allies; Estranged Democracies; Democracies at Loggerheads; Comrades at Odds. 
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unavailable—but those papers that are available allow a better reconstruction of the 
Indian perspective than has been possible in the past. The papers that are available 
include those of a number of Indian ambassadors to the US – Vijayalakshmi Pandit 
(1949-1952), GL Mehta (1952-1958), MC Chagla (1958-1961) and TN Kaul (1973-
1976); senior bureaucratic aides to Indian prime ministers – especially Subimal Dutt 
(foreign secretary under Jawaharlal Nehru in the second half of the 1950s and early 
1960s) and PN Haksar (senior aide to Indira Gandhi during her first half decade in office 
and described by former foreign minister Natwar Singh as the “[m]ost powerful civil 
servant of independent India);”31 diplomats such as KPS Menon (Indian ambassador to 
the Soviet Union for most of the 1950s); and some cabinet ministers such as TT 
Krishnamachari (minister of economic and defense coordination). The Dutt and Haksar 
files are especially useful, containing as they do reports and correspondence from a 
number of diplomatic posts, and accounts of deliberations among senior Indian 
policymakers and between Indian policymakers and their foreign counterparts. The 
offerings are by no means complete, but they do provide insight into the Indian 
perspective. Another useful primary source is the document collection The Selected 
Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, which—in the context of little or no availability to the 
Nehru papers—provides access to some of Nehru’s speeches, official correspondence, 
and internal memos. 
American and Indian views of China or of each other were not monolithic. For 
example, in the first phase that this study covers, just as there were disagreements about 
perception of and policy toward China between the two countries, there was dissonance 
within each country as well. Some Indian policymakers—politicians and bureaucrats—
                                                
31 See footnote in K. Natwar Singh, Yours Sincerely (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2010), p. 39 
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agreed with the dominant US view of China as hostile and called for explicit 
containment. Similarly, some in the US agreed with elements of Nehru’s China 
perception and policy. But, the dominant US and Indian perceptions of China and their 
China policies were in conflict during this period. And it is these dominant perceptions 
prevalent among the key decision-makers that the dissertation refers to as the perceptions 
of “India” or the “US.” 
The purpose of this research is five-fold. First, it aims to shed light on the 
conditions under which China has brought the US and India together. The dissertation 
argues that perception of external threat from China is a necessary but insufficient 
condition to cause US-Indian alignment. The US and India’s proclivity to pursue such an 
alignment requires agreement on not just the actual or perceived existence of a threat but 
also agreement on the nature of the threat, the urgency of the threat and how to approach 
the threat. Thus, it is not just necessary for the two countries’ diagnoses of the case to 
match but also their prescriptions. 
The key elements in the debate about approach included whether engagement or 
containment was the best strategy towards China. Relatedly, whether the use of force or 
diplomacy—and in what proportion—was most appropriate. Also, whether Pakistan was 
perceived as part of the problem or the solution. Furthermore, how best to distribute 
resources between defense and development, based on assessments of whether internal or 
external balancing was the best approach. Finally, whether collective security—through 
alliances or strategic partnerships—was the preferred means or a diversified and wide-
ranging set of partnerships.  
The dissertation will also offer insight into how strategic frameworks, competing 
priorities, domestic politics, existing capabilities, history (interpretations of the past 
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successes and failures and the lessons learned), as well as Chinese behavior interacted to 
shape US and Indian perceptions of China and their approaches toward that country.  
Second, this study intends to bring China back into the story of US-India 
relations—not just in a cameo appearance, but in the leading role that better reflects the 
part China actually played. This study argues that the ups and downs of the US-India 
relationship cannot fully be explained without systematically considering the role China 
played in shaping the US-India relationship. China was at times a source of tension in the 
relationship, but it also plays a large part in explaining why the two countries continued 
to engage with each other, despite what an Indian official called a “range of irritants” in 
the relationship and all the reasons for estrangement that scholars have outlined.  
A study of the China factor thus serves as a tool to explore this particular bilateral 
relationship and to illustrate the countries’ attitudes and approaches towards each other, 
China and the world more broadly. It also serves as a vehicle to test the applicability to 
this particular case of theories that predict the nature of state interaction.  
Third, this dissertation hopes to contribute to the emerging debate on Indian 
foreign policy. In the vein of more recent literature—and as part of the process of what K. 
Subrahmanyam has called “shedding shibboleths”—it questions the characterization of 
Nehru as an idealist, extraordinarily naïve about China. It offers another way of 
conceptualizing non-alignment: as a strategy Indian leaders, acting from weakness and 
operating under political and economic constraints, used to expand their options by 
diversifying their dependence. It also emphasizes the continuity of this element of 
diversification in India’s strategy across time. Furthermore, it reassesses when and how 
changes occurred in Indian foreign policy, for example, by questioning the neat break in 
the Indian foreign policy continuum in 1962. Moreover, it intends to break down the 
billiard ball called India—building on the contention that while there might have been 
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dominant views in Indian foreign policy, there has never been a consensus view.32 
Finally, it seeks to question the myth that India does not “do”` alliances. 
Fourth, when assessing the nature and scope of the US-India relationship—and 
the degree of alignment or partnership—it seeks to emphasize the importance of 
including not just military, but also economic ties. The stove piping of dimensions of the 
relationship—military, economic, technological—or the horizontal focusing either on the 
first, second, or third images provide an incomplete picture. 
Finally, the dissertation hopes to offer insights for present and future 
policymakers. It uses a historical approach to engage with an important dimension of 
international relations with global implications, and with the statecraft that has affected 
policymaking in the past and will do so in the future. This dissertation offers historical 
context for many of the challenges and opportunities related to the bilateral and trilateral 
relationships facing Indian and US policymakers today. This study can also offer 
lessons—of caution, possibilities and limitations—from past experience that can inform 
current policies. Finally, the dissertation can help answer questions about the future of the 
China-India-US triangle. 
A note on what this dissertation is not: it is not a study of China as an actor in the 
US-India relationship, but of when and how the China factor shaped the relationship. 
Whether and how Chinese policymakers actively sought to shape US-India relations are 
no doubt questions that merit further study. But, given the already large scope of this 
study, as well as the limited work that exists on this subject alone, this dissertation 
focuses on one crucial aspect of the triangular dynamics—with the hope that this will 
contribute to further explorations that focus on or include the Chinese perspective. 
                                                
32 C. Raja Mohan, “The Re-Making of Indian Foreign Policy: Ending the Marginalization of International 
Relations Community,” International Studies 46: 1&2 (2009), p. 149. 
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Furthermore, the study does cover the debates about China and India policy in 
Washington, and China and US policy in New Delhi, but it is not an in-depth study of the 
domestic roots of the bilateral relationships. Finally, while the study includes information 
on public opinion and its impact wherever available, the perceptions that it focuses on are 
those of the policy elite rather than those of the public. 
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION  
This dissertation examines the impact of US and Indian perceptions of and policy 
toward China on US-India relations between 1949-1979. The onset of this period was 
when the PRC came into existence; 1979 marked the formal US recognition of China, as 
well as when India officially normalized relations with China. The time-span covers 
multiple American and Indian administrations. It also spans periods of US-Indian 
engagement and estrangement, as well as when (a) Sino-Indian relations were neutral to 
positive while Sino-US relations were negative; (b) both Sino-Indian and Sino-US 
relations were negative; (c) Sino-Indian relations were strained, while Sino-US relations 
improved; and (d) both Sino-Indian and Sino-US relations were warming. The 
dissertation is organized to reflect these different states of the Indian and the US 
relationships with China and explore their impact on the US-India relationship in each 
period. 
Chapters One and Two, titled as all the chapters are using Economist article titles 
from the time, focus on Indian and US perceptions of and policies towards China and the 
impact on US-India relations in the period 1949-1956. India’s relations with China during 
this time were neutral to positive; Sino-US relations were negative. During this period 
China cast a relatively dark shadow on the US-India relationship. Both the US – led by 
Truman and then Eisenhower – and India – led by Jawaharlal Nehru – came to see the 
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other’s attitude and actions towards China as, at best, hindering or, at worst, harming 
their major strategic priorities. American and Indian and policymakers’ differences on the 
nature of the China threat, the urgency of the threat and how to deal with the threat posed 
a major challenge for US-India relations. The two countries’ differences over perception 
and approach were evident on questions such as the recognition of China, in the 
discussions over what to do about Tibet, as well as the debate over China’s role in the 
Korean War.  
Chapters Three and Four examine Indian and US attitudes and actions towards 
China between 1956-1962 and the effect those had on how Delhi and Washington dealt 
with each other. During this period there was a convergence in the two countries’ views 
on the nature and urgency of the China threat, as well as on the means to dealing with it. 
The second Eisenhower administration and Kennedy administration came to see China 
not just as a direct security threat, but also a symbolic and psychological threat to US 
interests. The Indian leadership, which had earlier believed that any potential threat from 
China would be symbolic/psychological, came to see China as a more traditional security 
threat just as US policymakers did. Moreover, the two countries agreed on what was 
required to meet such a threat: close partnerships with each other, and the strengthening 
of not just India’s defense apparatus, but also its development effort.  
Chapters Five and Six consider the period 1963-1968 when Delhi and 
Washington saw China as threat number one. It analyzes the impact of that threat 
perception on the US-India bilateral relationship. It shows that while threat perceptions 
matched to a great extent, the two countries’ assessment of what means to use to tackle 
the threat once again diverged. Their common interest in containing China kept their 
disillusionment from resulting in complete disengagement. But while the countries’ 
agreement on ends laid the basis for cooperation, US and Indian disagreement on 
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means—how to contain China—stalled the alignment. The two countries disagreed about 
the optimum balance of resources that should be devoted towards Indian development 
and defense to strengthen the country against China. In a role reversal, the US led by 
President Lyndon Johnson believed that the China threat called for more Indian 
investment in and US aid to India’s development rather than its defense effort. On its 
part, the Indian leadership led by first Lal Bahadur Shastri and then Indira Gandhi had 
come to desire greater defense expenditure than before. Furthermore, the US believed 
that with China as the primary threat, India should seek a rapprochement with Pakistan. 
India, however, believed Pakistan to be part of its China problem, rather than a means to 
solving it. Finally, India’s preferred strategy of diversifying its dependence proved to be 
an obstacle to deeper US-India relations. 
Chapters Seven and Eight focus on the period 1969-1972 and examines the 
impact of the shift in US and Indian perceptions of and policy toward China on the US-
India relationship. The changing US attitude towards China became a source of major 
tension in the US-India relationship. Initially, this was caused by a divergence in threat 
perception. On the US side China started sliding down the threat list, while it remained 
the major threat on India’s horizon. With the reduced need to counter China, India’s 
importance to the US decreased as well. Then, the US came to see India as hindering 
Sino-US rapprochement. On the Indian part, Sino-US rapprochement occurred in the 
midst of a crisis, Indian policymakers saw the US ranged against India on China’s side. 
They turned another way to tackle the threat from China, seeking an alignment with the 
Soviet Union. 
Chapter Eight covers the period between 1973-1979, a time of developing détente 
between each of the countries in the triangle. Post-Sino-US rapprochement, the new US 
framework for Asia reduced, if not eliminated, the US desire and need to seek an Indian 
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role as counterweight or contrasting model to China. This rapprochement and wariness of 
over-dependence on the Soviet Union caused India to seek to improve its relations with 
China, while the Indian leadership simultaneously pursued a nuclear weapons program. 
The US and India sought to re-establish and maintain a working relationship to limit the 
Soviet role in India, but, with China no longer looming as large, the US and India slid 
down the others’ priority list for rest of the Cold War. 
The conclusion offers a summary of the main arguments of the dissertation. It also 
concludes with policy implications, as well as avenues for related future research. 
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Chapter 1: The Orientation in the Orient (1949-1952) 
Divergencies [sic] between United States and Indian views toward China and 
Indochina are serious foreign policy conflicts blocking closer understanding with 
India. 
– Department of State Policy Statement, December 1, 19501 
In October 1949, a US president and Indian prime minister met for the first time 
in Washington, DC. A few days before, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Mao 
Zedong had announced the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As 
historic events unfolded in China, that country intruded into the agenda of the meeting 
between Harry Truman and Jawaharlal Nehru. Over the next three decades, in direct and 
indirect ways, China would continue to affect the US-India relationship. Over the next 
few years, China cast a dark shadow on the relationship. From 1949-1956, American and 
Indian policymakers differed over the nature of the China threat, the urgency of the threat 
and how to deal with the threat—differences that posed a major challenge for US-India 
relations. US policymakers came to see China as hostile and sought to contain it. The 
dominant view in India, on the other hand, was that in the short-to-medium term China 
did not pose an external threat and Delhi thus sought to engage Beijing. This chapter 
explores those differences, which were evident during the Truman years—on the 
questions of whether India would or would not serve as a bulwark against China; the 
recognition of China; the Chinese role in the Korean War; the Chinese takeover of Tibet; 
and India’s role as intermediary between China and the US—as well as the impact they 
had on the US-India relationship. 
                                                
1 Department of State [DoS] Policy Statement: India, December 1, 1950 in Foreign Relations of the United 
States 1950, Volume V: The Near East, South Asia and Africa (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1978) [hereafter cited as FRUS 1950 Vol. V], p. 1480. 
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The US and India’s different perceptions of and policy towards China need not 
have mattered, but for the fact that each country came to see the other’s position on China 
as, at best, hindering or, at worst, harming, its own strategic priorities. Furthermore, as 
the US focused more on Asia and India played a larger role on the global—and especially 
Asian—stage, the two countries crossed paths frequently on the China plane. 
Simultaneously, however, each country’s strategic framework—and China strategies—
envisioned a role for the other; this prevented the strain resulting in a complete break in 
the US-India relationship. 
From the US perspective, there were two key aspects of the impact China had on 
the US-India relationship. On the one hand, communist China’s emergence made India a 
bigger blip on Washington’s radar—one that stood out because of its size, potential and 
democratic government. On the other hand, Delhi’s disagreement with US policy on and 
perception of China made India a troublesome blip. Disagreements over China 
contributed significantly to tensions in the US-India relationship and, especially, 
negative-to-indifferent views of India in the US Congress during the period this chapter 
covers. The strain their China policies caused spilled over into various facets of the 
relationship.  
China also shaped the US-India relationship in two key ways from India’s 
perspective. On the one hand, the differences in perception and approach negatively 
affected Indian views of the US. Key Indian policymakers came to see the US more as 
part of the problem in Asia than as part of the solution. Nehru thought US actions and 
attitude towards China were making Asia—and, consequently, India—more insecure. 
The resultant lack of peace and stability would potentially require higher Indian defense 
expenditures and disrupt India’s development, which was a key priority for his fledgling 
government. But, on the other hand, in terms of that economic development—which 
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Nehru believed was also essential for India’s long-term security against China—the 
Indian leadership saw the US as an indispensable part of the solution. 
CHINA AND INDIA: THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON (1947-1949) 
In 1947, while the elements of what came to be called containment were falling 
into place in the US, the Truman administration was preoccupied with Europe. Asia was 
generally an afterthought. The idea of strongpoint defense—“concentration on the 
defense of particular regions and means of access to them, rather than on the defense of 
fixed lines”—had taken hold in the administration. It did not believe that the loss of the 
swath of Asian territory that included India to communism would make the US insecure. 
Besides, as Under-Secretary of State Lovett argued, the US did not have the means 
available to “underwrit[e] the security of the whole world.”2   
In the context of limited means, US officials such as State Department Director of 
Policy Planning George Kennan stressed the need for the US to differentiate between 
vital and peripheral interests. In listing the centers of the world that were vital for 
American national security neither China nor India found mention. Administration 
officials such as Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Kennan judged a country’s value 
in terms of possession of “skilled manpower and industrial potential capable of 
significantly altering the balance of world power.” If the Soviet Union directly or 
indirectly took over countries that were valuable according to these criteria, it would 
adversely affect US interests. Japan met these criteria in Asia; China and India did not.3 
India was even less important than China. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
report in September 1947 placed it in the group ranked fourth and last in a list of areas of 
                                                
2 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security 
Policy during the Cold War (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 22, pp. 57-59. 
3 Gaddis, Strategies, p. 75. 
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importance to the US.4 India had neither industrial-military capacity nor skilled 
manpower. The country’s raw materials gave it some value, but the administration did 
not consider India’s resources indispensable.5 
With the Soviet Union considered the major threat in the early years of Indian 
independence, Pakistan was the country in South Asia that had more apparent value, 
especially according to some early military and intelligence assessments. It neighbored 
the Soviet Union and was also nearer to the oil-rich Middle East, the defense of which 
was considered critical. Thus, as far as South Asia was concerned, if there was a goal it 
was stability, and American and British diplomats believed that “a Kashmir settlement 
was the sine qua non” to achieve it—a belief that caused serious differences with India.6 
At that stage, India did not even have the symbolic role in the US framework that 
it came to play in the future. The nature of a country’s government was not on the list of 
characteristics that made a country important to the US. Thus India’s fledgling 
democratic experiment only gave it minimal symbolic value. At that time, administration 
officials such as Kennan believed that the type of government within states was not 
                                                
4 The report also reflected the similar views of the policy planning staff. See McMahon, The Cold War on 
the Periphery, p. 14.  
5 The criteria that helped to differentiate between vital and peripheral interests: “presence of industrial-
military capacity, together with necessary sources of raw materials and secure lines of communication” 
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(McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, p. 16). 
6 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, pp. 17-18; also see p. 68. In late 1948, acting secretary of 
state Robert Lovett stated that resolution of Kashmir was “essential to the peace of the Indian 
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necessarily relevant in determining the US response to or relationship with it. It was in 
US interests to have at least some nations remain democratic, but the US itself could 
serve to demonstrate the benefits of democracy. Economic recovery in the democratic 
countries of Western Europe could further serve to prove that democracy and economic 
progress could co-exist.7  
The lack of interest in India came with a relative lack of concern about its foreign 
policy, even India’s “avowed intention to pursue an independent but cooperative 
policy.”8 There was also little concern that communists would gain much ground within 
India in the summer of 1947. Thus most US policymakers, lacking the time, expertise and 
interest, were satisfied with Britain showing them the way on policy towards India.9  
Developments in Asia, however, soon brought the continent, in general, and India, 
in particular, to Washington’s attention. Two events in late 1949—the “loss” of China to 
communism and the Soviet nuclear test—shook the faith that strongpoint defense would 
be sufficient to ensure US security. Asia seemed more vulnerable because of China going 
communist, and Western Europe because of the weakening of the US nuclear deterrent. 
Kennan’s view that China was not vital became less resonant. At a time when it was 
difficult to judge Soviet intentions or even actual capabilities, the perceived shift in the 
power balance caused by these two “shocks” counted.10  
Initially in 1949, as the Guomindang (GMD) regime had been collapsing in China 
under the weight of the communist onslaught, Truman and Acheson had perceived no 
good options. They had continued to aid the GMD. But they had no desire to increase aid 
                                                
7 Gaddis, Strategies, pp. 30-43; p. 51.  
8 Secretary of State [S/S] George Marshall to AmEmb India, January 22, 1947, quoted in Merrill, Bread 
and the Ballot, p. 23. 
9 Ibid, p. 22, p. 25. Also see McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, p. 18. 
10 Gaddis, Strategies, pp. 82-83. 
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that they believed was unlikely to help the situation, which was partly of the GMD leader 
Jiang Jieshi’s making. In the summary of a report on US-China relations released in July 
1949, Acheson had concluded, “…it is abundantly clear that we must face the situation as 
it exists in fact. We will not help the Chinese or ourselves by basing our policy on 
wishful thinking.”11 So, the secretary of state had considered fostering a wedge between 
the Soviet Union and the Chinese communists, partly by continuing contacts with the 
latter.12 While there was public opposition to recognizing the communists as China’s 
leaders, there had been little or no strong opposition among the public to this cautious 
policy.13 
Growing agitation in the US Congress in the summer and fall of 1949 on the 
administration’s China policy had complicated this approach. Opposition had stemmed 
from personal, strategic or partisan motivations. It was loudest from members of the 
China bloc in Congress who formed part of the China lobby—a motley crew of 
academics, businessmen, diplomats, labor, media persons, military officials—that 
strongly advocated support for Jiang, increased aid and even direct US military 
intervention. But their views had not gained the traction they would after the onset of 
McCarthyism and the Korean War.14  
                                                
11 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, NY: W.W. 
Norton, 1969), p. 303. 
12 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition 
Controversy, 1949-1950 (New York, NY, 1983), pp. 13-17. 
13 Leonard A. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America’s China Policy, 1949-1979 (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 1984) pp. 23-24. 
14 Acheson noted the political dimension, partly tracing the agitation to “bitter frustration” on the part of 
Republicans because they had not been able to win majorities in 1950 (Acheson, Present at the Creation, 
pp. 344-355). Tucker has noted that a number of Republicans also joined the chorus of opposition, sensing 
a potential way to attack the administration. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, pp. 11-12; also see pp. 80-99.  
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But India did gain traction with the “loss” of China.15 Even while China was in 
the process of “falling” to communism, there had been rhetoric linking China and India 
from both the liberal and conservative ends of the political spectrum. Supporters of the 
GMD like Senator William Knowland (R-CA) and Maj. Gen. Chennault had warned that 
if China fell—and the senator had argued that the Truman administration’s “do-nothing 
policy” had been hastening this eventuality—then all of Asia, even India, would fall to 
communism.16 Among others, the idea of India as part of the solution to the Asia problem 
had also taken hold. Some in this subgroup had asserted that the US should not only 
increase aid to the GMD, but also offer military assistance to countries like Burma and 
India. Others had argued that instead of considering more aid to the GMD, the 
administration should consider other approaches in Asia that included India—a Pacific 
Pact, for example, or increased economic assistance to India, where communists were 
“pressing hard.”17 Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) had noted that democratic India was 
“the logical choice” for a “new start” in Asia.18 The media had hailed Nehru as “Asia’s 
greatest statesman and diplomat, a man with vast qualities of courage and leadership…If 
                                                
15 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, p. 50. The Economist noted the increased American 
commentary on the role of “India as a bulwark against Asiatic Communism” (“Notes of the Week,” The 
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16 See Transcript of Conversation between Retd. Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault (chairman, China Civil Air 
Transport) and Dean Rusk (assistant secretary of state [AS/S] for Far East Asian affairs [FEA]), May 11, 
1949, FRUS 1949, Volume IX: The Far East: China (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974) [hereafter cited as 
FRUS 1949 Vol. IX], p. 520. Also see “Bridges Condemns Acheson on China,” The New York Times 
[hereafter NYT], April 16, 1949. Others in the China bloc, including Rep. Walter Judd (R-MN) and in the 
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“Christianity held Sole Hope for Asia,” NYT, May 11, 1949, p. 24, Felix Belair, Jr., “Bullitt Asks US 
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$700,000 Fund for China at Once,” NYT, May 4, 1949, p. 1. 
17 Marquis Childs, “Washington Calling: Discredited China Formula,” The Washington Post [hereafter 
WP], August 11, 1949, p. 9. 
18 Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) to Blair Moody (Moderator, Meet Your Congress), April 26, 1949. 
Quoted in Merrill, Bread and the Ballot, p. 35. 
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we can find the right formula for joining our strength with his, the future of Asia and the 
world will become much brighter.”19 
At the end of summer 1949, with the “fall” of China imminent and the 
administration reluctant to prop up Jiang, within the administration, too, Truman noted 
that India had become “key to the whole Asian situation.” Two years after a CIA report 
had designated India among the group of least importance, a report from the agency and 
another one from the State Department highlighted India’s importance as the only 
potential competitor to China in Southeast Asia. India’s “political stability, its economic 
and military potential, and [its] relative security from overland aggression” made it an 
asset. A special consultative committee on Asia advocated US support for potentially 
stable, independent governments and noted that “India and particularly Nehru” were “the 
most solid element with which the United States can associate itself for the promotion of 
its general policy in the area.” From Moscow, the US ambassador added that instead of 
wasting resources and energies trying to take on the communists in China, the US should 
build up countries like India and Japan “where we still have good chance [to] stem [the] 
Communist tide.”20 
India had now been assigned a role in the US strategic framework—a role that 
was highly derivative of that of China. This came with benefits. After China’s “fall” in 
October 1949, the media held Nehru up as the “hope of Asia;” the “strongest figure in a 
troubled continent.” India was “potentially a great counterweight to China.”21 Along with 
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public adulation, there were other consequences. Some scholars have argued that India’s 
new value also “led to a growing number of administration strategists to accept India’s 
intransigence [on issues like Kashmir] with equanimity.”22  
The “fall” of China also ensured that Indian aid requests got “a more thorough 
hearing” in Washington.23 As Merrill has noted, in the early years of Indian independence 
most Indian requests for economic aid from the US “either went unanswered or were 
turned down.” The overarching reason had been that policymakers did not see aid to 
India as “significantly advanc[ing]” US interests.24 Assessing the economic picture in 
India in summer 1947, an interagency report had noted, “The situation in India is not 
now, nor likely to be within the next five years, so critical as to necessitate special 
appropriations of American public funds in order to safeguard United States security by 
extraordinary measures of financial aid to India.”25 But, by early October 1949, on the 
grounds that it would help develop India as “a stalwart and worthy champion in Asia in 
collaboration with the West,” the US ambassador to India, Loy Henderson, proposed to 
Washington an economic assistance package for India totaling $500-million over five 
years.26  
Everyone within the administration did not share this enthusiasm. Some, 
including a key South Asia hand, were skeptical about India’s ability to play the role 
envisioned.27 But, juxtaposed against China, overall there was agreement that India had 
                                                
22 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, p. 35. 
23 Merrill, Bread and the Ballot, p. 36. 
24 Ibid, pp. 19-20. 
25 Ibid, p. 25. 
26 Loy Henderson (US ambassador in India) to James Webb (Under Secretary of State [US/S]), October 3, 
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the potential to be “a powerful and valuable Asiatic friend.” The bigger question was 
about India’s willingness: “Would Nehru join the free nations of the world in a concrete 
policy aimed at containing further Communist aggression?”28 The US awaited a visit by 
Nehru in October 1949 to hear the answer. 
CHINA AND THE US: THE VIEW FROM DELHI (1947-1949) 
For many US policymakers, one of the key lessons of the Second World War had 
been that aggressors should be confronted, not appeased. Nehru, who as prime minister 
and foreign minister had a dominant role in and influence on foreign policymaking in 
India,29 highlighted other aspects of that war: the way India had become entangled in a 
war not of its choosing; the consequences for India’s development; and the adverse 
impact on many countries’ economies. Furthermore, Nehru did not think either of the 
world wars had “settled” the situation—rather they had created more problems.30 
Newly independent India did not need more problems as its leaders focused on 
nation building. As tensions rose in the world in the late 1940s, Nehru feared that if war 
broke out, “all our schemes of progress would have to be pushed aside for many, many 
years.” India would not be able to stay aloof. It was likely to get “entangled” by virtue of 
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its independence, its integration with the world and its “potential power in world affairs.” 
Even if the country managed not to get “directly involved, it will still be powerfully 
affected.”31 
The Indian leadership’s priorities were political, social and economic 
development, for which India needed peace.32 This assessment connected India’s 
domestic imperatives and its ultimate external objective. It also shaped India’s perception 
of and policy towards China.  The Indian leadership watched the developments in China 
carefully. Toward the end of 1948, officials expected China to split. Nehru did not 
believe a communist victory in China would lead to “any immediate results in the rest of 
Asia,” but he did think it would “encourage…communist elements elsewhere.”33 As the 
communists consolidated their gains in China, the Indian prime minister reassessed the 
consequences for the region and India. A communist Chinese victory, he believed, would 
have  
far-reaching results all over South East Asia and ultimately in the world. India 
will naturally be affected by it, though there is no reason to fear any direct 
conflict. The future of Tibet may become a subject for argument. Indo-China and 
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Siam, both of which have large numbers of Chinese, will be powerfully affected. 
So also Burma.34 
Whatever Jiang’s view of Nehru, the Indian prime minister’s relations with the GMD 
leader had been friendly.35 But when the GMD’s collapse became imminent, Nehru 
argued that India could not continue with the status quo “merely because of the past.” 
Nehru’s diagnosis of the GMD’s failure and prospects echoed those of Acheson, and the 
overall prescription, at least, seemed to match as well: “We have to take facts as they 
are…”36 
The Indian prime minister believed that Delhi had to deal with the government in 
Beijing that existed in fact, not the one it wished existed.37 Additionally, “if we stood up 
for the bankrupt government in China now, we would be condemned in India and this 
would give a fillip to communism in India, strange as that sounds.”38 Beyond pragmatic 
and domestic reasons, the prime minister’s view also stemmed from a liberal 
internationalist perspective that it was important to integrate and bind China into the 
international community. Furthermore, Nehru’s view of China flowed to a degree from 
mirror imaging, which would continue to affect his perception of China over the next 
half-decade. Nehru and key officials thought nationalism, rather than communism was 
the key driving force in China.39 Like the Indian government, Nehru asserted that a 
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communist Chinese government would focus on internal issues, especially economic 
development—and it would do so in a pragmatic, rather than an ideological way.40 
Finally, India’s limited capabilities influenced the prime minister’s view about 
India’s China policy options. While he was uncertain about China’s external intentions, 
he was certain that India could not afford to provoke its northern neighbor. Thus, he 
noted, “[O]ur general attitude to the new China should be a friendly expectation and 
waiting to see what happens.”41 Nehru’s wariness about any provocation showed in his 
furious reaction to an article in an Indian tabloid newspaper suggesting Indian interest in 
Tibet, which the communist Chinese press criticized.42 It was also evident in his negative 
reaction to discussions about a US-sponsored Pacific Pact—which would include India—
to counter China’s potential “loss.”  
Nehru often saw pacts as provocative; as in the world wars they entangled 
countries and exacerbated rather than prevented conflict. Furthermore, alliances restricted 
freedom of action.43 Nehru had earlier noted India’s interest in developing a “regional 
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understanding on a broad basis” with Australia, New Zealand and Southeast Asia.44 But 
he had no desire to include India in any grouping that came together on an anti-
communist basis. He had outlined why  
As [a] realist, one has to recognize that Communists control greater part of China 
and may, before long, control the whole of that country. In [the] broader interest 
of international peace, it is not desirable that we should do anything that would 
make cultivation of normal friendly relations with the new China difficult, if not 
impossible.  
Any suggestion of Indian participation in an anti-communist grouping “can only rouse 
suspicion and hostility of new China.”45 He thus dismissed any notion that he was going 
to discuss a Pacific Pact on the visit he was scheduled to make to the US in October 
1949.46  
While Nehru had no interest in a Pacific Pact, he welcomed another of the ways 
that US policymakers were contemplating to support India to play a central role vis-à-vis 
China: economic assistance. When it came to aid, Nehru believed that the three most 
important countries for India were Britain, the Soviet Union, and the US. And Nehru 
noted to the Indian deputy prime minister that, at that stage, “The USA [was] of course, 
most important” and India needed to “take full advantage of our friendship” with the 
US.47 
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Taking full advantage included Indian officials using the China factor to elicit 
support for aid to India.48 Internally, an Indian official elaborated one way that India 
could capitalize on developments in China:  
The China situation will alter the balance in Asia and it seems to me that this is a 
good time to take up seriously the question of opening trade talks with the USSR. 
One result will be to stir up the Ang[l]o-Americans who have been treating our 
requests for capital goods rather cavalierly.49 
As McMahon has noted, the use of this tactic could be quite blatant. In December 
1948, an Indian diplomat appealed for US economic aid, implying that developments in 
China had increased Indian concerns about the potential spread of communism in India, 
which could only be prevented through economic development.50 Officials such as 
Nehru’s senior-most foreign policy aide Girja Shankar Bajpai indicated to American 
interlocutors that “following the collapse of China,” American aid was indispensable to 
maintain India as the “chief stabilizing influence in Asia.”51 Using similar logic, Bajpai 
had earlier also broached the subject of military assistance from the US.52 Nehru, too, 
                                                                                                                                            
equipment as well as industrial backing for them…Without some kind of cooperation with an industrialized 
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noted in a pitch to George Marshall for economic assistance that, “in working for itself 
India was working for all of Asia, especially in view of the tragic course in China.”53  
Indian policymakers did not just see the China factor as instrumental, useful in 
extracting aid. They had their own concerns about communism, believing that 
communists operating in India were “dead-set against [the] government and trying to 
create trouble in every direction.”54 Furthermore, after March 1948, the Indian 
communists’ policy had been “completely allied with violence.”55 Nehru considered the 
communists to be one of the two most disruptive elements in India. They were creating 
problems not just in India, but also in Burma and Malaya. He believed that any 
communist attempt to instigate trouble needed to be “nipped in the bud and not allowed 
to grow.” Thus, despite concern about India’s image and Soviet reaction, Nehru approved 
crackdowns against the communists.56 Reacting to criticism about this crackdown, Nehru 
was blunt: “in moments of a crisis, for a State, security becomes the most basic thing 
after which only liberty can come.”57  
But Nehru asserted that crackdowns only dealt with the symptoms of the problem; 
they did not address the underlying cause of it. He believed that communism thrived 
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where governments “could not deliver the goods.”58 Nehru considered that, “in Asia at 
any rate, communism flourished only where the economic standards of the people were 
indefensibly low; and the positive answer to the Communist threat was to remedy those 
conditions.”59 He believed that the GMD had failed in China because it had not delivered 
and lost the faith of the Chinese people.60 If his government did not deliver, it, too, would 
be vulnerable to dismissal—and the country vulnerable to communism—especially once 
China demonstrated an alternate model.61 The development race was not just a “wholly 
Western construction,” as some have argued, but also on the minds of Indian 
policymakers.62  
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The prime minister consistently perceived India’s main vulnerability as internal; 
its primary problem as economic.63 His government’s aim was “achieving good results as 
rapidly as possible.” The consequences of not delivering or delivering too slowly would 
not just be bad for India’s stability, but for regime stability, since “[a] Government which 
goes about telling people that ‘we are very sorry we cannot feed you’ or ‘we cannot 
clothe or house you’ will not last very long in the modern age.”64  
Nehru realized that his government alone could not deliver—an assessment that 
his rhetoric about self-sufficiency has tended to obscure. He acknowledged that rapid and 
efficient development required assistance from abroad. A lack of foreign aid would result 
in delays in economic development, “and delay in promoting the economic development 
of India would encourage the spread of communism and create grave social and political 
problems.”65 Thus not only would his government not prevent foreign help, but it would 
“welcome it.”66  
Nehru especially welcomed aid from the US.67 He outlined why: “The USA is 
among the best countries that have at their disposal the wherewithal needed to implement 
India’s [industrial and agricultural development] plans.”68 The Indian finance minister 
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made efforts to gauge US interest in aiding India.69 The importance of aid from the US 
even had Nehru contemplating a “tilt,” reportedly saying to close confidante and then 
Indian High Commissioner in London V.K. Krishna Menon, “Why not align with the 
United States somewhat and build up our economic and military strength?”70  
Another reason to look primarily to the US was that the Soviet Union was not 
really an option.71 In the initial years of Indian independence, Nehru reached out to 
Moscow, seeking to diversify India’s relationships—and thus any potential dependence—
and maximize the country’s options in terms of sources of aid.72 But there had been 
“progressive deterioration” in the Indo-Soviet relationship. Nehru resented Soviet 
accusations that his government was a “stooge of the Anglo-American bloc.” He believed 
that India’s Communist Party, which had become steadily more extremist and hostile, had 
been operating under Moscow’s guidance.73 Additionally, Nehru was critical of “Russia’s 
active expansionism” and “her apparent lack of any sense of ethics in international 
affairs.”74 Moreover, Indian policymakers had few avenues to talk with officials from the 
Soviet Union or its satellites, making it harder to deal with differences.75 Finally, Soviet 
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offers and terms of assistance fell short.76 It was in this context that Delhi looked to 
Washington. 
COLLIDING POSITIONS77 (1949-1952) 
Red China or New China?: Comparing Notes (1949-1950) 
McMahon has noted that Nehru’s visit to the US in October 1949 revealed 
“fundamental” differences between India and the US—on the Soviet Union, China and 
communism.78 China was indeed one of the key subjects of discussion between American 
and Indian policymakers. Nehru laid out both his perception of and preferred policy 
toward China. He contended that even with a communist victory in China, nationalism 
rather than communism would be the “governing force” there. He asserted “India’s 
proximity to China put India in a somewhat different position from that of other countries 
and indicated a leaning toward early recognition.”79 Nehru believed that Washington, on 
its part, could create a wedge between Beijing and Moscow, not by loud condemnations 
of communism, but by working with China. Acheson disagreed that the communists 
controlled all of China or that they had the backing of the Chinese people—both of which 
were required before the US would even consider recognition. Furthermore, he believed 
that any recognition would constitute a sign of US rejection to those still resisting the 
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communists. Finally, the Chinese government needed to make clear its “international 
obligations” before expecting recognition.80  
US policymakers had been aware of Nehru’s attitude towards China. Even before 
the visit, some voices within the administration had noted, “there is little hope that Nehru 
will dramatically announce that he has seen the light.”81 In a survey of elite Indian 
opinion on China, Henderson had noted that the majority of the leadership shared 
Nehru’s views.82 Furthermore, US diplomats’ reports of their conversations with Indian 
officials in Delhi and Nanking had made evident that American and Indian attitudes and 
approaches towards the Chinese communists did not fully overlap.83 But Nehru’s visit 
and his public pronouncements—including hints that India was close to recognizing the 
communist regime in China84—made clear to the public what had been previously 
apparent to some observers within the administration:85 the US might have assigned India 
a role in its strategic script, but India was not willing to play that role in the way the US 
wanted.86 As the British ambassador in Washington noted, the visit “made abundantly 
clear to the American public that they could not look to India as a ready-made 
replacement for China [in] the cold war against Communism.”87 Nehru had told the US 
Congress, “where freedom is menaced…or where aggression takes place, we cannot and 
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shall not be neutral.”88 But as an article in the New York Times lamented, Nehru 
“significantly declined to encourage the slightest hope” that the US would have an “ally” 
in India.89 The “fall” of China had created a constituency for India in Washington among 
the public and Congress; Nehru’s visit limited its hopes and membership.  
Within the administration, the visit clarified the view that India was not 
necessarily the “logical choice,” certainly not one that would justify half a billion dollars 
of aid at a time when resources were limited, Congressional support was uncertain, and 
the Truman administration’s focus remained on Europe.90 There was also a developing 
change in emphasis in US policy from economic to military assistance. In the week after 
the visit, Henderson’s proposal for a large aid package to India was set aside.91  
There were some concerns about the desirability and feasibility of India as a 
counterweight to China beyond Washington as well. At a meeting of US chiefs of 
mission in the Far East, officials expressed doubts about the wisdom of building up Japan 
or India as dominant powers to counter China and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, 
officials questioned whether India and Japan could form effective counter-balances. India 
had not shown “constructive leadership,” after all, and it was preoccupied with internal 
matters. Finally, some officials believed that any such assigned leadership would stir up 
countries like Pakistan or Sri Lanka.92 
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As McMahon has noted, the visit—and Nehru’s attitude—served to limit the US 
view of India’s importance.93 The shift in the administration’s attitude was evident in the 
National Security Council staff’s December 1949 position paper on Asia policy. The 
paper, NSC-48, reflected the sense that since communism was global, rather than 
regional or local, the solution to the communist problem was not necessarily regional or 
local. Thus, it would be “unwise” for the US to look towards India, as a “bulwark” 
against communism in Asia.94  
Moreover, the evolving strategic framework conceived of not just India as worthy 
of consideration, but South Asia. This affected US policy in at least two ways that caused 
dissension with Delhi. First, as McMahon has noted, US policymakers put an even higher 
premium on stability in South Asia. While Nehru would not have argued with this 
objective, the American assessment that the Kashmir dispute was one of the key threats 
to that stability—and required greater US involvement—came to be a major source of 
tension between the US and India.95 British officials had been warning that the “loss” of 
China would make a Kashmir solution even more “essential;” they now had more 
adherents to this view in Washington.96 Second, even though India was the bigger 
domino in most US policymakers’ eyes, it had become important to prevent not just India 
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from falling to communism, but also Pakistan.97 And, in spring 1950, Pakistani Prime 
Minister Liaquat Ali made clear that, while India might resist playing a role in the US 
script for Asia, his country was ready to play its part.98 
NSC 48/2 also, however, reflected an area of US-India agreement on China. One 
aspect of Nehru’s prescription—pursuing a wedge strategy—had “impressed” some in 
the State Department.99 And NSC 48/2 advocated exploiting “rifts” between the 
communist giants. This did not lead to US-India convergence, however, because of 
differences over means. Some US policymakers like Kennan believed that Titoism—
communists governing without Soviet control—would emerge in China.100 In the fall of 
1949, China watchers at Foggy Bottom argued against assuming Soviet control of the 
Chinese communists and stressed that Mao could act independently. Much like Nehru, 
the American embassy in Moscow believed that US recognition of the communist 
government in Beijing could help create a wedge with the Moscow. Acheson, too, argued 
that attempting to detach Beijing from Moscow would not constitute appeasement. 
Truman endorsed this goal through NSC-48/2.  
But, as Gaddis has noted, while this US objective had been defined, the means 
were not quite as clear.101 Officials like Kennan believed that a US “hands off” policy 
was the best method. Acheson, on the other hand, considered cautiously trying to detach 
Beijing from Moscow, but not until “the Chinese Communists follow Tito in stopping 
active abuse of us.”102 This would become a continuing point of difference with Nehru: 
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who would take the first step, China or the US. Furthermore, publicly, the US 
administration continued to treat international communism as a monolith and condemn 
communism generally.103 To Nehru, this was counterproductive to the objective of 
facilitating a Sino-Soviet split and was hardly a step that would reassure Beijing. 
To Recognize or Not to Recognize  
Nehru was, on the other hand, willing to take the first step with China by offering 
to establish relations with the People’s Republic in late December 1949. This grated in 
Washington. Other countries, including US allies like Britain, had made clear that they 
would soon recognize the communist Chinese government. But, US policymakers and 
legislators watched India’s decision particularly carefully because, as McMahon has 
noted, Nehru was thought to have broader influence, especially among other developing 
countries.104  
Nehru had long stressed the need to acknowledge developments in China. 
Nonetheless, through most of 1949 the Indian prime minister had been in “no hurry to 
recognize Communist China.”105 He had wanted to “wait and watch developments” in 
China before India took such a step.106 Furthermore, he had not wanted “too abrupt a 
break” with Jiang.107 In addition, throughout that year, communist Chinese news outlets 
had continued to condemn his government as a “lackey” of the Western “imperialists.”108 
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Finally, there was no consensus in India about recognition. Before and after the 
declaration of the PRC, there was a lively debate about whether to recognize China in the 
press. Politicians of all stripes debated the issue as well. Some supported recognition on 
idealistic or pragmatic bases; some opposed it as disloyal to Jiang or on the grounds that 
it would divide the US and India. Yet others called for conditional recognition, seeking 
guarantees from China in return. Within the government, Indian representative in China 
KM Panikkar, former Indian agent general in China and then foreign secretary KPS 
Menon and Krishna Menon argued in favor of recognition. Others such as governor-
general C. Rajagopalachari, deputy prime minister Sardar Patel and some junior 
diplomats advocated a “go slow” approach.109 
Nehru had not decided on the how and when of recognition on the eve of his visit 
to the US.110 In public, while avoiding a direct answer, he had made clear that recognition 
was in the offing.111 The prime minister subscribed to his representative to China’s view 
that recognition would put India in a “better position to protect [its] interests vis-à-vis 
China than isolating it.112 He believed that indefinite delay or conditional recognition 
would likely push China and the Soviet Union together, and strengthen the hands of those 
in Beijing pushing for such a communist tag-team.113 Bajpai noted another reason when 
he stated that India was not “flirt[ing]” with communists, but could find her own role in 
                                                
109 Saksena, pp. 179-192. Also see Telegram from Sebald (acting political adviser in Japan) to Acheson on 
conversation with Indian First Secretary, October 7, 1949, FRUS 1949 Vol. IX, p. 105. 
110 JLN, Remarks at a meeting with the staff members of the United Press Association, New Delhi, 
October 1, 1949, SWJN SS, Vol. 13, p. 270. Also see Letter from JLN to the PoPs, October 2, 1949, SWJN 
SS, Vol. 13, p. 207. 
111 JLN, Speech at the Overseas Press Club, New York, NY, October 18, 1949, Ibid, p. 326. 
112 Telegram from Donovan (US chargé in India) to Acheson on conversation with Panikkar, November 7, 
1949, FRUS 1949 Vol. IX, p. 178.  
113 Cable from JLN to BN Rau, September 25, 1949, SWJN SS, Vol. 13, p. 269. 
 49 
Asia adversely affected if other Asian countries recognized China and India did not.114 
The Indian government had also watched carefully the American and British attitudes 
towards recognition. And Patel—who made clear his concerns about recognition to the 
US chargé—later noted that Nehru’s decision was hurried along by indications that 
Britain and the US were just waiting for a good time to recognize China. Nehru wanted to 
pre-empt them so that Beijing would see him as a leader rather than a follower on this 
front. Thus, on December 10, the Indian foreign secretary informed the US ambassador in 
Delhi that India had decided to recognize Mao’s government. On December 30, India 
made a public announcement that it would be willing to recognize the communist 
Chinese government.115 
There was little immediate reaction from Beijing following Indian recognition. 
The response India did get was not as enthusiastic as Nehru might have expected. A 
foreign ministry official later noted that the reaction even seemed hostile.116 In the US, on 
the other hand, the reaction to India’s move was evident and ranged from frustrated to fed 
up and angry. An American official in China had worried in summer 1949 that India was 
considering recognizing the communist government “fairly promptly after ‘decent 
interval.’”117 In China and India, directly and through British officials, US officials had 
sought assurances from the Indian government that it would coordinate or at least consult 
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with other western states on the matter of recognition.118 But it had been fairly evident by 
that fall that it was just a matter of time before India recognized Mao’s regime.119 At a 
briefing on Nehru’s upcoming visit, the first question asked of Acheson in the senate 
foreign relations committee (SFRC) was whether Nehru was indeed favoring 
recognition.120 During the visit, the Indian prime minister’s comments to Acheson had 
made it clear that he was, as had those of the Indian foreign secretary who had noted to 
the US chargé in Delhi that recognition was “inevitable” though there was “no reason for 
haste.”121 American officials based in Britain, China, India and the US had then focused 
their efforts on delaying recognition, emphasizing that indeed there was no reason for 
haste on the part of India.122  
The Indian announcement about recognition and the failure of these efforts 
exacerbated the Truman administration’s problems—especially politically. In early 
December 1949, a news article had commented, “China is only a pang, though a large 
one, in the global headache which afflicts Mr. Acheson’s conduct of foreign policy.”123 
Mao’s visit at the time to the Soviet Union made that pang larger. Indian recognition of 
China later that month and impending British recognition—which Acheson later noted 
the Indian decision partly spurred124—made the pang more acute, especially with the 
China bloc in Congress breathing down the administration’s neck.  
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There had been little support in the administration for getting involved in the 
Chinese civil war on behalf of Jiang. Acheson indeed asserted to the senior military 
leadership in late December that instead of trying to prop up Jiang militarily, the US 
should consider focusing on strengthening China’s neighbors by supporting the 
nationalist governments there and helping build their internal stability and prosperity—a 
strategy with which Nehru would have concurred. But, that’s where the concurrence 
ended, since there was little support in the administration for recognition of the 
communists.125 As Acheson had told his British and French counterparts, recognition 
would serve no purpose and would only worry US partners in Asia.126 Despite many 
allies leaning towards recognition, the administration agreed with members of Congress 
that the US should not recognize Mao’s regime at that stage. Chinese maltreatment of US 
nationals, including diplomats,127 and responses to Acheson’s request for the views of US 
missions in Asia about recognition only reinforced this view.128 Even Henderson, while 
noting that the Indian leadership would vociferously criticize the US for not recognizing 
China, asserted that the US should not do so—it would adversely affect US credibility 
because countries in the region would see it as a sign of weakness.129 
At home, the administration received little credit from China hawks for not 
extending recognition to the communists. Sen. Knowland criticized the administration for 
not doing enough to stop or at least delay Indian recognition.130 China bloc criticism only 
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increased when Truman and Acheson made clear publicly in early January 1950 that the 
US would neither defend Taiwan militarily nor significantly increase aid to Jiang’s 
regime. Some members of the SFRC were unhappy that not only was the administration 
declining to increase military aid to the GMD but that, despite the rhetoric, it was not 
willing to do more for countries like India to build them up.131 If countries like Japan and 
India were the crucial ends of the “crescent of countries” around China—as Acheson was 
asserting to senators132—and if the administration’s policy was containment of 
communism in Asia—as Acheson had argued to the joint chiefs—the administration was 
not laying out how it was going to achieve this.133 Sen. Styles Bridges (R-NH) said the 
situation begged the question whether Americans were “men in Europe and mice in 
Asia.”134 
Criticism of India was not lacking as well. Through a senior foreign policy 
official, Nehru had expressed the hope that the US “would not take amiss” India’s early 
recognition.135 But this was wishful thinking. Recognition reinforced the growing sense 
in Washington that India might not be the hoped-for solution to the China conundrum. 
Before Indian recognition, a map of Asia in the New York Times outlining the spread and 
threat of communism had highlighted India as a “non-communist strong point” with a 
label that read “West counts on Nehru for support in long run.”136 A month later, post-
recognition, in a similar map that statement had turned into a question: “Will India 
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Supply Effective Anti-Communist Leadership?”137 Commentators lamented that India 
“h[eld] the key” to any defense of Asia and yet its attitude was “dangerous.”138  
Other incidents in early 1950 only exacerbated the negative feeling towards India 
in the US. Nehru publicly criticized the American attitude towards China as 
unnecessarily confrontational.139 India’s membership of the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) at the time further highlighted US-India differences, this time on the issue of 
Chinese representation.140 Then, India declined to recognize Bao Dai’s regime in 
Vietnam. American commentators labeled this a “great pity” because Nehru could have 
led the way for other Asian countries. All this left observers commenting that Nehru was 
being “less than fair” and his views of China and Asia were “less than wise.”141  
Indian policymakers were not unaware of the consequences of the shift in mood 
in the US towards India because of its China policy. Bajpai tried to assure US officials 
that India was not appeasing China.142 Internally, diplomats discussed the need to take 
action “to correct the misrepresentation to which India is being subjected.”143 It was 
important to do so because India needed the US—it wanted “a charge account” from 
America.144 But Acheson was blunt; aid could only be “forthcoming when there is Indian 
receptivity and our own ability, and constructive purpose to be served.”145 At a time when 
the first two elements were limited, and the latter was not evident—given India’s lack of 
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willingness to play a role—there did not seem to be much appetite for aiding India. 
Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the Indian ambassador in Washington, noted that this US attitude 
towards aid and its Asia policy, in turn, were the reason for growing criticism of the US 
in India.146 
But the bigger China-related stumbling block in US-India relations was yet to 
come. After all, other US friends and even allies such as Britain had recognized 
communist China. It was US-India interactions over the Korean War that drove home the 
disconnect between US and Indian perceptions of China, as well as their preferred 
method of dealing with that country. 
The Korean War: Seeing Each Other as Spoilers (1950) 
McMahon has noted that the Korean War set off a chain of events that “further 
aggravated” US-India tensions.147 Initially, however, the war increased India’s 
importance. This was partly a result of a strategic reconsideration that found expression 
in NSC-68. The document represented a more all-encompassing view of US strategy, 
blurring lines between vital and peripheral interests. Drafted in the first half of 1950, the 
document asserted that, “in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of 
free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.” This turned Lovett’s assertion on its 
head: the US was now opening the door to underwriting the security of the whole world. 
Threats were not just physical, but psychological as well. A country’s importance was 
derivative not just of its military potential, economic capacity and geographical position, 
but also of how its loss could affect perceptions of US credibility and prestige, and thus 
the balance of power.148  
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Europe had remained “the main center of activity” for the Truman administration. 
US policymakers had accepted the possibility of the loss of certain areas outside 
Europe—indeed Acheson had said as much in a January 1950 speech. The Soviet Union 
remained the main threat; China was a secondary one. There had still been consideration 
of the possibility of creating a wedge between the Soviet Union and China. But NSC-68 
envisioned international communism rather than the Soviet Union as the threat, with no 
possibility of “fragmentation” in the short-term. Furthermore, an ongoing reassessment of 
China policy in the State Department in spring 1950 replaced earlier reluctance to oppose 
the communists taking over Taiwan—on the grounds that this would push China closer to 
the Soviet Union—with an argument for the need to assess the impact of such a takeover 
on perceptions of the global balance of power.149  
As Gaddis has noted, NSC-68 might have had little impact had it not been for the 
Korean War. But, the outbreak of the war “validate[d] several of NSC-68’s most 
important conclusions.”150 Furthermore, with the focus on Korea, Asia—including China 
and India—came into the spotlight.  
Initially, in the aftermath of the North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 
25, 1950, the US and India seemed to be on the same page. India voted for the US-
sponsored UNSC resolution demanding the withdrawal of North Korean troops from the 
south. Two days later, India abstained on a resolution that asked UN members to provide 
assistance to South Korea, causing consternation in Washington. But Nehru soon noted 
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publicly that India supported the second resolution; Delhi had just not had time to relay 
instructions to the Indian delegation at the UN.151 
Differences between India and the US, however, soon emerged, and they often 
revolved around China. Washington insisted that China was hostile and it needed to be 
confronted. Nehru, however, insisted that China’s actions during the initial phase of the 
war stemmed from insecurity and Washington needed to reassure, not isolate or provoke 
Beijing.152 Motivated by fear of expanded war, Nehru argued that China and the Soviet 
Union could be part of the solution—indeed, no solution was possible without Beijing 
and Moscow. This led him to suggest to Acheson that the PRC be allowed to take the 
Chinese seat at the UN.153 The US administration, however, thought Beijing was part of 
the problem and should not be rewarded for its part in the invasion with a UN seat.154 
Furthermore, officials argued that there was little “practical benefit” in allowing China to 
take the UN seat and it was a distraction from the main issue.155  
There were also differences on the Truman administration’s linkage of the Taiwan 
and Indochina issues to the Korean situation. Following the onset of the war, the 
administration had announced an increase in aid to anti-communist forces in Indochina 
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and its intention to defend Taiwan in case of a communist attack.156 India disagreed with 
this linkage, believing that it would only further destabilize the region and be 
counterproductive to India’s objective—peace. Nehru had earlier asserted, “If there is 
war in any part of Asia it has some close effect on India.”157 And the Korean War had 
already disturbed the peace and stability in Asia that India needed.158 American actions 
such as the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait in June—even if they were 
meant to be defensive—would unnecessarily provoke China.159 Panikkar, the Indian 
ambassador in Beijing, had noted that the Chinese leadership was differentiating between 
Korea, where China did not want to get involved in the fighting, and Taiwan, where it 
would not back down.160 Furthermore, Indian officials thought the US policy toward 
Taiwan would only bring Beijing and Moscow closer—a view shared by some in the US 
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like Kennan.161 Even those in India who did not subscribe to Nehru’s perception of 
China, like Bajpai, believed that this policy was counterproductive.162  
India took on what became a recurring role, urging China and the US to reassure 
the other. The Indian government asked the US to ratchet down its rhetoric and reassure 
China about US intentions, especially with regard to Taiwan.163 Indian officials tried to 
convince their US interlocutors that China saw US actions as aggressive.164 They passed 
on Panikkar’s assessment that even though its fears might be “groundless,” China saw the 
US defense relationship with Thailand, US policy in Indochina, General MacArthur’s 
visit to Taiwan in July 1950, and the US stance at the UN as signs of hostile American 
intentions. Insecurity made Beijing lash out—which the US could prevent by alleviating 
Chinese fears.165 
Acheson dismissed the Indian analysis. He asserted that if Indian and British 
officials pushed for a settlement of Taiwan, it would unnecessarily create “sharp 
differences” in US bilateral relations with these countries.166 MacArthur argued that 
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Nehru would achieve nothing with “appeasement.”167 American officials reiterated that 
the US would give China no assurances till there was danger from China or Russia; 
Beijing should already know that the US would not attack the mainland as long as China 
did not attack Taiwan or another place in Asia.168 There was also criticism of Indian 
linkage of the Korean and Chinese representation at the UN issues.169 Acheson insisted 
that China’s hostile words and actions drove the US attitude towards China. It was this 
hostility—directed towards a number of countries—and not US objections that kept 
communist China out of the UN. Occasional statements that China wanted peace were 
not borne out by Chinese behavior. Furthermore, it did not seem that Beijing was acting 
independently of Moscow. Instead of Washington, Beijing was the one that needed to 
reassure others if it wanted to elicit a change in perceptions of China.170  
Throughout that summer and fall, India indeed had tried simultaneously to get 
China to temper its actions in order to reassure the US. Nehru had instructed Panikkar to 
inform Chinese officials that India, even if it sympathized with China’s claims, would not 
support or ignore any Chinese attempt to take Taiwan by force. India would judge 
China’s intentions from the way it behaved vis-à-vis Taiwan. At other times, the Indian 
government urged China to decrease or cease its anti-US activities if it wanted to receive 
a fairer hearing at the UN. Delhi tried to convince Beijing to stop its threats to use force 
against Taiwan and Tibet in order to convince others that it was interested in peace. 
                                                                                                                                            
should be cautious on Jiang, since he had the potential to be a liability and could adversely impact the 
attitude of countries like Britain and India on anti-communism [Memo from Harriman (special assistant to 
the president) to Truman, August 1950, quoted in Harry S. Truman, Memoirs Vol. 2: Years of Trial and 
Hope (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1956), p. 352]. 
167 Memo from Harriman to Truman, August 1950, quoted in Truman, Memoirs Vol. 2, p. 352. 
168 Telegram from Henderson to Acheson, August 24, 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. VI, pp. 446-448. 
169 Letter from Bajpai to Pandit, July 30, 1950, NMML, VLP (I), SF No. 56. 
170 Telegram from Acheson to AmEmb India, September 1, 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. VI, pp. 478-480. 
 60 
Indian calls for restraint in Beijing, however, were met with the retort that the US was to 
blame.171  
While it might not have seemed that way in Washington, the Indian leadership did 
not always give China the benefit of the doubt at the expense of the US. Indian officials 
occasionally acknowledged US steps that seemed conciliatory. They also realized that 
some Chinese actions were not helping Beijing’s cause or the broader efforts towards 
peace.172 
Tibet: Lost by Default? (1950-1951) 
Among the Chinese actions raising doubts in Delhi was the Chinese move into 
Tibet in October 1950. A year before, in September 1949, Nehru had predicted that China 
would invade Tibet, possibly within the year, bringing China to India’s doorstep.173 Over 
the next year, Indian officials had continued to expect matters to “come to a head” in 
Tibet.174 Thus, while there had been debate about the timing and nature of a Chinese 
takeover, the invasion itself was not unexpected in India.175  
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Key Indian foreign policymakers had crystallized India’s Tibet policy—and 
conveyed it to US officials—by January 1950. The policy basically involved “leav[ing] 
the matter alone.” Officials had made clear that India would not take the initiative on 
Tibet with China. If Beijing accepted Tibetan autonomy, Delhi would recognize Chinese 
authority over Tibet. In the meantime, India would continue and possibly expedite its sale 
of small arms to Tibet and even train Tibetan officers there, but it would not welcome the 
establishment of a Tibetan liaison office in India. Officials had also emphasized that India 
would not take any military action in the case of a Chinese attack on Tibet.176 
Furthermore, India resisted Anglo-American pressure to increase aid to Tibet. Finally, 
officials discouraged US involvement on the grounds that it would convince Beijing of a 
US-India anti-China conspiracy and expedite the Chinese takeover of Tibet.177  
Acheson had wanted to use the communist threat to Tibet to convince India to 
move away from its “unrealism [and] semi-detached attitude” towards the Chinese 
threat.”178 But, without British and Indian help forthcoming, the US had had no desire to 
get embroiled by holding out the prospect of aid to Tibet—despite Truman’s later 
inclusion of the Chinese invasion as part of Beijing’s “challenge to the Western 
world.”179 In Delhi, Henderson had made clear to Indian foreign secretary KPS Menon 
that the US neither wanted to make it harder for the Indian government to persuade 
Tibetan officials to accept autonomy, nor expedite a Chinese invasion. Washington, 
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nonetheless, had continued to look for signs of change in India’s attitude and to probe the 
Indian government for its potential reaction to a coordinated US-UK-Indian effort—with 
India “bear[ing] primary responsibility”—to meet Tibet’s defense requirements.180  
Delhi, on its part, had continued to eschew any covert or overt actions that Beijing 
might see as provocative or part of a joint US-India effort to counter China. India did not 
want to provoke China. Furthermore, Indian officials did not believe that the country had 
the ability to offer effective resistance because of Tibet’s inaccessibility and India’s 
limited resources. Finally, there were serious doubts about Tibetan willingness to resist. 
Thus, the Indian government had encouraged Tibetan officials to negotiate with China, in 
India if necessary.181 
The outbreak of the war in Korea had increased US interest in supporting Tibet. 
While clarifying that US support would not extend to direct involvement if China 
invaded Tibet, US officials suggested that Tibetan officials ask the Indians to facilitate 
US aid. But the war had not made Indian policymakers any more likely to help. Delhi did 
not think it could deter a Chinese invasion of Tibet.182 But India had tried to delay it.183 
Officials had pursued the issue on “on firm [but] friendly lines” in Beijing. Bajpai had 
given Henderson the gist of a message delivered to Chinese officials, which noted that 
India had gone out of its way to establish friendly relations with China, even though this 
had been to the detriment of its other bilateral relations; a Chinese invasion of Tibet 
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might make India reassess its view of Chinese intentions, as well as its support for 
Beijing’s entry into the UN.184  
After the invasion in October 1950, officials like Henderson blamed India, 
believing that Tibet had “lost heart” because of India’s reticence. Nonetheless, while 
urging India to do more, and suggesting that the US wanted to be helpful, Acheson made 
clear that the US did not want to pressure India too much lest Delhi blame Washington 
for any consequent Sino-Indian complications.185  
Henderson had hoped that an invasion would result in an Indian reevaluation of 
Chinese intentions. Acheson, too, believed that the invasion, Chinese aid to Ho Chi Minh 
and “duplicity in dealing with GOI re Korea” would make India “reassess its views re 
character” of the regime in Beijing. Nonetheless, the US ambassador warned Washington 
against giving the impression that it was trying to use the events to sell India on 
alignment with the US. He further asserted, “If rift should come [between Communist 
China and India]…it should clearly come through force of events and not with help of 
outside powers.” US officials, including Acheson, were subsequently careful not to 
appear to be trying to create a wedge between China and India.186 
China’s Tibet policy did not create a deep wedge between China and India, but it 
did have an impact within India. A diplomat noted the “deep anger” engendered by the 
invasion. In parliament, from sections of both the opposition and treasury benches, 
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anxiety about Chinese intentions and Indian preparedness accompanied the anger. Even 
socialist politicians like Minoo Masani and Ram Manohar Lohia became disillusioned 
with China.187 Within government, officials like Bajpai admitted that they had altered 
their assessment—the invasion of Tibet showed that China did not really care about what 
India said or did. With Nehru’s approval, Bajpai instructed Panikkar to tell Beijing that 
its use of force was harmful for Sino-Indian relations, as well as China’s international 
position. Suggesting that China had misled India, India sent an official note calling the 
Chinese action “deplorable.”188 After India received an accusatory response from China, 
Delhi responded defensively, denying that it had any ambitions in Tibet, but asserting 
that it had certain rights there.189   
The invasion made the debate about China in the Indian government more 
pronounced. The contours of the debate on China were perhaps most evident in the 
contrasting views of Nehru and Patel, perhaps the second most powerful person in the 
government. Their expressions at the time highlighted their different perceptions of 
China—including whether it posed a threat to India or not—as well as their proposed 
strategies towards that country.   
Patel laid out in a letter to Nehru his view—closer to the dominant view in the 
US—that the invasion showed that China represented both an internal and external threat 
to India. He argued that China’s leaders were hoodwinking their Indian counterparts. 
Furthermore, he insisted that China did not see India as a friend despite India’s 
recognition of the communist regime, and its efforts to facilitate Beijing’s seating at the 
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UN. Patel argued that it was unlikely that anything India did to convince China of its 
good intentions would change the minds of the Chinese leadership, which was hostile 
towards India. Finally, he asserted that China’s behaviour—more important to focus on 
than its rhetoric—suggested that it was a “potential enemy,” which was no longer 
separated by a Tibetan buffer and which had territorial ambitions that included parts of 
India’s northeast and Burma.  
Patel was critical of the government’s approach—arguing that it had been too 
placatory and weak in its response to the Chinese invasion—and concerned about India’s 
capabilities. He thought that accommodation would be seen as a sign of weakness; that 
complacency and vacillation would increase the threat from China. Instead, Patel 
advocated “enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy.” He called for a 
threat assessment, analysis of India’s existing and needed defence capabilities, 
reconsideration of Delhi’s support for Beijing at the UN, strengthening of India’s 
northeast and of Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim, internal security measures in India’s border 
states, improvement of transport and communication lines to the border, manning of key 
border posts, reassessment of India’s Tibet presence and its position on the McMahon 
Line, and, finally, a re-examination of India’s external relations—including with the 
US.190  
Despite Patel’s stature, Nehru was the ultimate decision-maker on foreign 
policy.191 In the initial aftermath of the invasion Nehru, expressed disappointment, briefly 
questioning broader Chinese intentions. But, as Henderson had correctly predicted, Nehru 
decided to stay the course after receiving what he interpreted as a less antagonistic note 
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from China that—coupled with a Chinese military pause at the Sinkiang-Tibet border—
seemed to leave the door open for Sino-Tibetan negotiations.192 
Detecting a change in tone in Chinese correspondence, Nehru commented in an 
internal note that he saw as significant the lack of a demand for complete withdrawal of 
Indian interests in Tibet. He believed that China desired India’s friendship and that Delhi 
should respond. Nehru stressed the need to keep in mind the long-term perspective—the 
Chinese communist regime was going nowhere and Delhi needed to establish a working 
relationship with it. He reiterated that India lacked the military capacity to prevent the 
takeover of Tibet. Any attempt at stopping the Chinese advance would likely fail and 
would lead to Chinese hostility towards India and constant insecurity at India’s borders. 
Nehru sought instead a more limited, what he considered feasible, goal—Tibetan 
autonomy—arguing that India could not help achieve even this if Sino-Indian relations 
were bad. 
Nehru did not think there would be any “real” Chinese military invasion of India 
in the “foreseeable future.” For one, this would likely spark a world war. Also, China 
needed to defend its other borders and would hardly be able to divert the troops required 
for a major attack on India. Nehru did, however, potentially expect “gradual infiltration” 
across the border and Chinese occupation of disputed territory. This required improving 
connectivity to India’s tribal areas in the north-east, which were not well integrated with 
the country.193 The government also needed to prepare to prevent any Chinese 
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infiltration. Furthermore, India needed to tackle the other real threat from China—the 
“infiltration of…ideas”—with ideas of its own.  
Nehru believed that visible military strengthening was neither desirable nor 
feasible on the scale Patel envisioned. Any attempt to build up India’s military on the 
Sino-Indian border would likely reinforce Chinese insecurity and be counterproductive—
instead of preparation acting as a deterrent, it would serve as provocation. Furthermore, 
Nehru asserted that India did not have the financial and military resources to prepare for 
an unlikely attack. The prime minister asserted that Pakistan was the major potential 
threat to India and diverting significant resources to the Sino-Indian border would 
undermine Indian defence vis-à-vis Pakistan. He believed, additionally, that Pakistan 
would take political or military advantage of tensions in Sino-Indian relations. Even if 
India enhanced its defence capabilities or looked abroad for military supplies it would 
then be left in a strategically “unsound” position with two major enemies. 
Nehru did not rule out the possibility that the Chinese communists would be 
expansionist, but he did not believe this was inevitable. It depended on a number of 
factors, including the development of both countries and how communist China really 
became. Sino-Indian conflict would be destructive to both and allow external actors to 
take advantage. Given this assessment and the level of India’s capabilities, while India 
should prepare for contingencies, Nehru continued to believe that the best approach was 
reaching “some kind of understanding” with China, as long as Beijing desired the 
same.194 This belief underlay India’s subsequent Tibet and China policy.  
Post-invasion, Acheson had hoped that, at the very least, India would take part in 
proposed UN action on Tibet—seen as having a propaganda purpose. Participation might 
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lead Delhi to realize how difficult it was to deal with Beijing and Moscow. This could 
make India “less neutral and more realistic about Communism in general” and more 
supportive of the US on other issues, which, in turn, could lead to better US-India 
relations.195 But, despite having earlier indicated that it would participate,196 India 
demurred after receiving the more conciliatory note from Beijing.197 Some officials such 
as Bajpai were “suspicious and cynical” about the note and doubted that it signified a 
change. But, he too, did not think a UN debate would be helpful at that time.198 India did 
not want any such debate to jeopardize the efforts it was making towards a ceasefire in 
Korea.199 Patel’s death in December 1950 only made Nehru’s voice more dominant on 
Tibet.200 By January 1951, India seemed to wash its hands off the issue.201 
Henderson, who had been urging joint US-UK-India action to stall China in Tibet 
or at least UN action that could bring attention to the issue to highlight China’s 
“aggressive attitude,” alleged that Indian interpretations were “wishfully warped” to fit 
their “inclination to do nothing which might offend China.”202 While some US officials 
argued that such joint support would buoy Tibetan spirits, Indian officials made clear that 
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they believed that the Tibetans were merely trying to postpone—rather than resist—a 
Chinese takeover.  
Despite appearances, however, Indian officials were hardly disinterested—but 
their interest in Tibet did not translate into support for US initiatives. Indian policymakers 
were chagrined about the idea of China taking over Tibetan border defense.203 Bajpai 
acknowledged that the Sino-Tibetan agreement signed in May 1951 would have an 
impact on India’s position vis-à-vis Bhutan, Burma, Nepal and even Korea. India had 
already taken some steps to protect its position. Before Eisenhower and Dulles’ 
“pactomania,” Nehru and his officials had devised their own version. In 1949, Bhutan 
and India signed a treaty, allowing India to “guide” Bhutan in its external relations. The 
Treaty of 1950 between Nepal and India was also the result of Indian strategists’ 
“reconsider[ation]” of India’s northern frontier. Finally, another treaty in December 1950 
made Sikkim a protectorate, giving Delhi control over Sikkimese foreign and security 
policy.204  
There was also an effort to strengthen and integrate India’s northeast. Nehru had 
appointed a military committee to consider what the disappearance of a buffer state 
meant for the defense of India’s northeastern and eastern borders after the initial invasion. 
The committee had recommended strengthening border posts, transport and 
communications infrastructure, and alleviating the neglect of the area and its residents. 
But militarily, India had limitations—even Bajpai acknowledged this—and could do little 
                                                
203 Telegram from Henderson to Acheson on Kennedy (Deputy Director, Office of South Asian Affairs) 
and Steere (Counselor, AmEmb India)’s conversation with Menon, March 27, 1951 in FRUS 1951 Vol. VII-
2, p. 1609. 
204 Valentine J. Belfiglio, “India's Economic and Political Relations with Bhutan,” Asian Survey, Vol. 12, 
No. 8 (August 1972), p. 680; John W. Garver, “China-India Rivalry in Nepal: The Clash over Chinese 
Arms Sales,” Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 10 (October, 1991), p. 956. Also see Garver, Protracted Contest, 
pp. 140-141 and p. 170. 
 70 
to assist countries like Burma.205 Therefore, to key decision-makers in Delhi, the 
disappearance of the buffer and the Sino-Tibetan agreement only made it more necessary 
to keep China in good humor.206  
The US chargé in Delhi remained concerned that Tibet was being “lost by 
default.” He believed that the impact of the loss on India would be even more 
consequential than in Tibet itself because China could “constantly menace” India from 
there. He argued that the US should convince India that the Sino-Tibetan treaty was not 
in its interests and that Delhi should encourage the Dalai Lama to reject it and flee to 
India.207  
But, on its part, while Washington was willing to give the Dalai Lama asylum and 
encourage the Tibetan regime and its autonomy in spirit, it was unwilling alone to 
provide military or financial assistance or appoint official representatives to Tibet. 
Acheson maintained that India had primary responsibility to help Tibet. In addition, the 
US had no desire to upset Jiang by announcing support for Tibetan sovereignty.208 
Furthermore, like Britain and India, the US was conscious of the affect on the Korean 
situation—though US officials denied to Tibetan interlocutors that one had anything to do 
with the other. Finally, any unilateral US action in Tibet would only serve to push India 
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towards China—it would “lessen Indian resentment toward CPG which may develop as 
Chi Commie control over Tibet consolidated.”209  
By the fall of 1951, the Truman administration was reconciled to the fact that 
Tibetan officials were unlikely to reject the Sino-Tibetan agreement. The Far East Asia 
desk at the State Department continued to advocate US use of “Tibet as a weapon for 
alerting GOI to the danger of attempting to appease any Communist Govt and, 
specifically, for maneuvering GOI into a position where it will voluntarily adopt a policy 
of firmly resisting Chinese Communist pressure in south and east Asia.”210 And there 
were still some attempts to get India to assure the Dalai Lama that he would be given 
asylum in India. But with India unwilling to take the initiative and a new US ambassador 
in Delhi—Chester Bowles—less enthusiastic about pressuring India on this issue, such 
efforts petered out. So did hope that India would change its China policy. 
Chinese Intervention in the Korean War: The Blame Game (1950-1951) 
In the fall of 1950, there had been some hope in the US that the invasion of Tibet 
would make the Chinese communists’ aggressive intentions in Asia apparent to countries 
like India. These hopes had only escalated when the Chinese subsequently intervened in 
the Korean War.211  
Even though its initial efforts in summer and early fall 1950 had met with little 
success, the Indian role as intermediary between China and the US had continued, as it 
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would for a number of years. India’s non-aligned policy and its relations with China, 
which the US usually considered a liability, were assets when the US needed a channel to 
China. Since its ambassador in Beijing had access to Chinese officials, India was a 
potential conduit.212 Britain, a US ally, also had a presence in Beijing. But, India was an 
Asian country with credibility in Asia and in the rest of the non-aligned world. Nehru 
exerted “moral authority and political leadership” among these countries that no British 
leader could hope to emulate.213 And India was willing to take on this role. Thus, from 
the start of the war, Indian officials had briefed US officials on the messages they 
received from Panikkar. In turn, India had passed on US messages to China, including 
warnings intended to deter China.214 But, the fact that India was not an ally—and 
followed an independent China policy that seemed to US policymakers as primarily 
designed to avoid provoking China—resulted in US policymakers doubting India’s role 
as an honest broker. This added to the strain in the US-India relationship.  
US doubts about the messenger were partly responsible for skepticism about 
messages from Beijing via Delhi in September and October that China would intervene 
directly in the war if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel.215 Some policymakers saw the 
accompanying Indian warning in light of their assessment that Nehru prized peace at any 
cost. Skepticism of Panikkar, who passed on the Chinese messages, affected others’ 
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views.216 Yet others, like Truman, believed that China was trying to influence a vote 
pending at the UN and the messages were either just Chinese propaganda or “a bald 
attempt to blackmail the UN.” MacArthur further assured the president that there was 
little likelihood that China would intervene.217 There was concern among allies, as well 
as in American military and political circles about the Chinese reaction and potential 
escalation. But the concerns about credibility (global and domestic) and military demands 
that had led Truman to sanction operations across the parallel even before the Indian 
warnings had persisted. Thus, despite Indian—and other—warnings, Truman declined 
from rescinding his earlier approval.218 On October 7, US forces crossed the parallel. 
Twelve days later, Chinese troops started moving into Korea.219 
Expectations in the US that subsequent Chinese entry into the war would lead 
India to see the light assumed that India would interpret Chinese actions the same way 
the US did. Instead, the intervention increased Nehru’s frustration with the US rather than 
with China. He believed that the UN move across the 38th parallel had provoked China 
into retaliation, heightening the prospect of a larger war, which Nehru—dreading that 
India would get dragged into such a war—had been trying to prevent.220 To avert even 
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further escalation, India sponsored a resolution, backed by Britain, in January 1951 that 
called for a ceasefire and then talks between the stakeholders. The US grudgingly 
supported the resolution, with Acheson hoping that China would reject the resolution.221 
Beijing complied. Its negative response led to criticism in Indian newspapers and 
disappointment in the Indian government. Writing from Moscow, an Indian official noted 
that Chinese “intransigence” seemed to be following “the Soviet line” and Delhi thus 
should curtail hopes of an “Asiatic Tito.” But, publicly, the Indian government asserted 
that the Chinese reply was not an “outright rejection.”222  
Parallel US efforts toward a General Assembly resolution blaming China as the 
aggressor proved to be another source of tension between the US and India. Nehru 
vociferously criticized the resolution as another example of the US not facing facts. 
Taking on US assertions, he argued that rather than Chinese aggression being 
responsible, “All the troubles in the Far East arise from the failure of the rest of the world 
to adjust itself to the changes which have taken place in Asia.”223 Moreover, Nehru 
believed he was better than US policymakers at assessing Chinese intentions. The US had 
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made a “major error” in crossing the 38th parallel despite Chinese warnings and “further 
complications ensued.” With the resolution, the US was only shutting the door to 
negotiations and compounding its mistakes.224 
Washington disagreed. It was not as if there had not been similar concerns in the 
US about escalation and discussions about limiting US actions in the Korean theatre.225 
But Truman was blunt in his response to Indian criticism, noting, “I believe in calling an 
aggressor an aggressor.”226 US commentators called Nehru’s views a “misappraisal” and 
dismissed his assertion that the isolation of China, rather than Chinese aggression, had 
led to the situation in Korea. Worse, he was playing into Chinese hands by “sowing 
confusion and mistrust.” Chinese behavior was not evidence of a move toward a 
settlement—as India and US allies such as Britain believed—but as actions designed to 
divide the non-communist countries.227 
Once again, the different lessons learned from the last war played a role in 
shaping US and Indian views of the correct approach, with US officials arguing that 
collective failure to combat aggression would lead to more of it, eventually resulting in a 
larger war.228 Acheson asserted that he could not understand “what means India would 
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propose [to] use to check aggression.” Bajpai contended that the means would “depend 
upon form and character of aggression and upon effect which such means might have 
upon world peace.”229  
The differences over means—including the question of balance between force and 
diplomacy—were broader. NSC-68 and subsequent policy seemed to reflect the US belief 
that the need to counter an existential threat did not just make “all interests vital;” it also 
made “all means affordable, all methods justifiable.” But for Nehru, as a contemporary 
put it, “the end rarely justified the means.” In the US, moreover, the Korean War had 
only strengthened the view expressed in NSC-68 that active military resistance was more 
appropriate than passively waiting for the emergence of nationalist resistance—as Nehru 
seemed to prefer.230 These different views of the best means were perhaps partly 
influenced by the two countries’ capabilities. While there was a sense in the Truman 
administration that rather than divide the resource pie, one could expand it to justify 
larger defense spending, Indian policymakers like Nehru did not believe it was feasible to 
expand the small pie they had.231 
These differences had an adverse impact on the relationship. Henderson hoped 
that differences over tactics would not overpower a common interest in peace and 
security. But Acheson emphasized that tactics mattered, noting “it was not [Nehru’s] 
objectives so much as way in which he said and did things which had caused us lots of 
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trouble.”232 Nehru would later acknowledge that the main difference between the US and 
India was “in the method of approach.”233 And he thought the US approach was harmful 
to peace and stability in Asia—a key Indian objective that would allow the country to 
consolidate and develop. As Gaddis has noted, for US policymakers “frustrating the 
Kremlin design,” rather than the means to an end, had became an objective itself.234 
Nehru believed this blurring of means and ends was making it harder to achieve the 
objective of peace. Fear motivated both American and Indian policymakers, but Nehru 
believed that the US approach—with an emphasis on military instruments—was self-
defeating and only likely to increase fear.  
The consequence—especially as the situation in Korea deteriorated after the 
Chinese intervention—was strain in the US-India relationship. As McMahon has noted, 
India’s China policy sparked condemnations in the US.235 Indian officials like Bajpai and 
Pandit recognized that Indian statements on China interpreted in the US as defending 
Chinese intervention, India’s early recognition of the communist government in Beijing, 
US linking of the Korea and Taiwan issues, US rejection of Nehru’s proposal regarding 
overtures to China in July 1950, the crossing of the 38th parallel, and the resolution 
branding the Chinese as aggressors had widened the “rift” between India and the US. 
Pandit was concerned about the “considerable hostility” towards India in US government 
circles. Bajpai lamented that as a consequence, “for the time being, at any rate, we are 
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isolated, and that over Kashmir and other issues, Pakistan and our enemies will exploit 
our isolation to the full.”236  
The friction over China contributed and exacerbated the doubts and lack of trust 
in the US-India relationship. Beyond disillusionment, a more visible impact was evident 
in the reaction to India’s first major formal request for bilateral assistance from the US in 
December 1950. An Indian request for food aid had followed closely on the heels of 
Chinese entry into the Korean War. There was debate within the administration about 
aiding India economically—not so much on the desirability of it, but on the feasibility 
given the cost and Congressional attitude. While there was a series of issues on which 
India and the US disagreed, including India’s “muted criticism of the Soviet Union [and] 
uncooperative policies toward Indochina and Japan,”237 Acheson told the Indian 
ambassador frankly that Congress would basically watch India’s approach on two 
matters: (1) Kashmir and (2) Korea, especially India’s response to greater Chinese 
involvement.238  
Given direct US involvement, India’s attitude toward the Korean War evoked 
greater reaction in Congress than Kashmir, as assistant secretary of state George McGhee 
learned when he reached out to SFRC chairman Tom Connally (D-TX) to facilitate 
passage of an aid bill in January 1951. The senator bluntly noted that sentiments towards 
India—deeply affected by its China policy—would make the task difficult. He refused to 
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move quickly on Indian food assistance, referring the question to a subcommittee.239 In 
the subcommittee McGhee tried to argue that the grant would have a “strong conditioning 
effect on Nehru’s policies, and indeed the feelings of the people of India toward us,” but 
that if the US did nothing and large numbers died,  
at that time the people of India will know the people are dying; they will know we 
had the grain; they will know they made the request; and they will know at that 
time that Mr. Nehru and we were on the outs over the question of Communist 
China, and an inference will be very strong to them that we denied this request 
because we did not like the political attitude Mr. Nehru expressed.  
But Connally asserted, “You spoke about it being necessary to do this for our relations. 
Our relations with India now are not very good, are they? Nehru is out giving us hell at 
the time, working against us and voting against us. Is this a proposition to buy him? He 
won’t stay bought, if you buy him.” Sen. Gillette (D-IA) said he did not want to do 
anything to stabilize Nehru’s position. And Sen. Fulbright (D-AK) said that India should 
either pay for the foodgrains or the administration should turn down the request, adding 
that he did not like what seemed like blackmail with India arguing “Give it to us or we 
will go Communist.” McGhee argued that the US had already lost China and could not 
afford to lose India too, but when Fulbright asked if India, especially given its attitude, 
was “more important than the Ruhr and Japan” the assistant secretary had to admit 
“Strategically, no.”240 
US officials noted to their Indian counterparts that Indian statements and 
actions—seen as defending the Chinese attack against UN forces—made the aid request 
harder to get through Congress.241 The New York Times predicted further delays 
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“probably…due to irritation caused by Mr. Nehru’s refusal to go along with the United 
States and its policy toward Communist China.”242 A former chairman of the Republican 
National Committee asserted that India’s “cooperation with aggressors” made the case 
for aid weak.243 
President Truman nonetheless decided to proceed with a request to Congress that 
February. At first there seemed to be bipartisan support for food aid to India on 
humanitarian grounds; some even used a Cold War framework to argue for it. Many 
members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee agreed that it was important to aid 
India. The bill, however, stalled in Congress for months as representatives debated 
whether to give India aid and—since Delhi was not going to support or aid US foreign 
policy—whether to demand resources in return.244 The debate also gave members a 
forum to criticize repeatedly and vociferously India’s China policy.  
The India-bashing on Capitol Hill and in the columns of newspapers resulting 
from India’s China policy had repercussions in India. Congressional criticism and linkage 
between India’s foreign policy and US food assistance adversely affected Indian views of 
the US.245 As Nehru had noted, “we are a sensitive people and we react strongly to being 
cursed at and run down…Our general reaction, whenever any pressure is sought to be 
applied upon us by any country, is to resent it and may be to go against it.”246 Anti-Indian 
rhetoric in the US generated louder self-sufficiency rhetoric in India. Nehru insisted 
publicly that conditional aid would not be welcome. Nehru’s criticism, in turn, sparked 
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further criticism on the Hill, finally leading the prime minister to state that India would 
prefer a loan rather than a grant.247 Six months after India had requested aid, Truman 
finally signed a food assistance bill. The US ended up helping fill Indian stomachs, but 
having done so after “extended haggling in the Congress and the outburst of anti-Indian 
sentiments,” it seemed to have lost the battle for Indian hearts and minds.248 Meanwhile, 
others received credit—while the debate had raged in Congress, China and the Soviet 
Union had offered India grain on a barter basis. Later China also offered—and India 
accepted—foodgrains on a sale basis.249 
India as a Channel to China: Only Hurting Itself? (1951-1952)  
Feeling burned by the US attitude, Delhi had taken a backseat on the Korean war 
in spring 1951, limiting its intermediary role.250 But, in the summer of 1951, Indian 
officials undertook efforts in Beijing and Delhi—quietly coordinating action with British 
and Swiss representatives—to secure the release of American prisoners being held in 
China.251 Different US and Indian perceptions were, however, evident again. In the early 
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stages of talks with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, Panikkar interpreted the premier’s 
responses positively; British officials, on the other hand, did not share his optimism and 
their views seemed to be taken more seriously in Washington. There were also 
differences on tactics. American officials thought that public representations on behalf of 
the US would make evident to China how many countries disapproved of their attitude 
towards foreign nationals. Indian officials, on the other hand, believed that explicit 
association with the US—or Britain and Switzerland—would reduce Indian influence in 
Beijing.252 
Indian officials had mixed feelings about the intermediary role—which continued 
on the Korean issue as well, even as China and the US undertook armistice talks after 
summer 1951 in Kaesong and then Panmunjom. That role had an adverse effect on the 
US-India relationship.253 Furthermore, the experience itself was frustrating. China and the 
US mistrusted each other’s intentions and, therefore, insisted that the other take the 
initiative in giving reassurance. Chinese officials told their Indian counterparts that Mao 
did not believe the US wanted a peaceful settlement in Korea. Western intermediaries, in 
turn, asked the Indian representative to the UN what could convince Mao that had not 
already been said or done by the US.254 Acheson asserted that the US first wanted 
reassurances from China that it would not renew its aggression. Assistant Secretary of 
State for Far East Asian affairs Dean Rusk told Indian officials that the US did not 
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believe that China was thinking about a negotiated peace.255 An exasperated Nehru 
commented that China and the US both “express their desire for settlement, but neither is 
prepared to give in…and wants the other to do so.”256  
Nehru’s disapproval of the US approach led to more frustration with Washington 
than Beijing. After a Chinese u-turn on an in-principle agreement for a settlement in 
summer 1952, the prime minister noted that he did not like the Chinese action, but 
“generally speaking, the way the Americans have behaved in Korea has been 
outrageous.” Even after two years, the US seemed to continue to think that military 
actions would pressure China into negotiations, but it only made Chinese policymakers 
more intransigent. When Krishna Menon indicated his sense that Sino-Indian relations 
had “cooled off” while India-US relations had got closer because of the Chinese u-turn, 
Nehru asserted that he did not think China had been “straight” in its dealings with India 
on the matter, but “in the balance, I think that American policy in the Far East has been 
very much to blame and I have little doubt that it is basically that policy that has come in 
the way of a peace effort.”257   
Nonetheless, Indian frustration was not just directed at the US. At times, Indian 
officials found themselves faced with Chinese officials in a “belligerent frame [of] 
mind.”258 They were often dissatisfied with the lack of progress in negotiations because of 
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Chinese intransigence, deeming officials in Beijing as unreasonable.259 Like their US 
counterparts, there were some Indian officials like Bajpai who questioned whether China 
was feeding India wrong or exaggerated information to pressure the US into negotiations 
on Chinese terms.260 There was additional irritation that China seemed to go back and 
forth about its preferred policy option.261 In July 1952, China backtracked on its in-
principle acceptance of a prisoner repatriation formula that Britain and India had helped 
generate.262 Nehru lamented, “the situation at the China end is more difficult than we 
have imagined.”263 He asserted that any future Chinese proposals should be conveyed in 
writing rather than verbally.264 The prime minister was also disappointed when—despite 
the trouble India had gone through—in November 1952, China rejected an Indian 
proposal on Korean prisoners of war repatriation, criticizing India’s attempts to be the 
“voice of Asia” and dismissing India as a tool of the US. The prime minister wondered if 
this stemmed from Moscow’s influence. But he was also concerned that Chinese 
rejections stemmed from a belief that India had leaned too much towards the UN/US 
side.265  
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Despite concerns about mediating, there was also a sense in Delhi that India’s 
role—and its neutrality—gave it value in the eyes of China. Bajpai noted that while 
China was involved in Korea, it would not trouble India. Rather, China had given India 
assurances regarding the Sino-Indian border, with Zhou indicating that China “had no 
intention [of] making claims to or raising questions about boundary between Chi[na] and 
Ind[ia]” and asserting that China wanted “cultivation [of] friendship [with] Ind[ia] and 
Burma.” Furthermore, China had not asked India to withdraw its trade missions or escort 
forces in Tibet.266 Acheson, too, later noted that China was not taking military action 
against Burma since it would upset India at a time when it was important for Beijing to 
keep on Delhi’s good side.267 Beyond China, some Indian officials like Krishna Menon 
also believed that India’s willingness and ability to play the role of negotiator increased 
its global influence and importance. Nehru, who did not like the term “mediator,” noted 
that India could help because it had a “special position”—the corollary was that India’s 
intermediary role also gave India this position.268 
 US officials continued to have mixed feelings about the Indian role as well. On 
the one hand, some officials believed that India was in the best position to exercise an 
“ameliorating influence” on Beijing.”269 In addition, occasionally they found Indian 
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contacts with Chinese officials to be useful to pass on warnings of potential US 
retaliation if China escalated.270 Furthermore, as long as the US could use multiple 
channels to China, India’s good relations with China and its standing with other Asian 
countries made the continued use of this channel worthwhile.271 Finally, officials like 
Bowles believed that even if US discussions with India did not get through to China (or 
were not heeded by Beijing), it would help convince Delhi that Washington was doing its 
part to seek peace while Beijing was not.272  
On the other hand, some US officials increasingly doubted whether India should 
be used in such a capacity.273 They continued to distrust certain Indian officials, 
especially Panikkar.274 Furthermore, they believed that India was likely to play spoiler 
rather than supporter in any discussions. Some officials also questioned India’s reliability 
and its officials’ judgment about China’s intentions. There was a sense that the Chinese 
leadership was manipulating India.275 In addition, there was unease that Indian officials 
like Panikkar were proposing ideas to Chinese officials that the US did not know about or 
had not approved, while suggesting to Beijing that the proposals had resulted from close 
contact with Washington.276 There were also doubts about whether roving Indian envoys 
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like Krishna Menon were actually keeping Delhi in the loop on US views. Furthermore, 
there was concern that US officials did not know what Delhi was actually saying to the 
Panikkar and what he, in turn, was saying to Chinese officials.277  
Other officials worried that India would compromise principles and ignore US red 
lines in order to achieve any settlement.278 In Congress, Sen. H. Alexander Smith (R-
NJ)—usually moderate on India—worried that India would try to force the US to make 
concessions to China in order to enhance Nehru’s image and influence in Asia.279 US 
officials felt there was a lack of clarity about whether what they were hearing from 
Panikkar and Krishna Menon were their personal views or Chinese ones.280 When China 
seemed to back down from proposals it had apparently made, US officials came to 
question whether the proposals had actually originated from Panikkar instead. Finally, 
Chinese actions on the ground did not seem to reflect the attitudes Panikkar asserted they 
were expressing in Beijing.281  
The experience of dealing with Delhi as an intermediary to Beijing led 
Washington to try to limit India’s role during the rest of the war—which Indian officials 
resented. While Zhou indicated that China wanted India to be included in negotiations, 
the US showed little desire to include India in groups like the Good Offices Committee 
(India, on its part, showed little desire to serve on the latter). And despite British urging, 
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the US resisted consulting India on a 16-nation statement on Korea on the grounds that 
India was not a participant in the military action in Korea, and she had shown every 
desire to disassociate herself from the group that had provided forces for the UN effort. 
The US also made clear its opposition to Indian involvement in any Korean armistice 
conference, despite British and Canadian backing for Indian participation.282 In the case 
of negotiating for the release of American prisoners being held in China, having ruled out 
other alternatives, the US was left with little choice but to turn to India to act as a 
channel.283 But, even in this case, US officials continued to pursue other viable alternate 
channels.284 They also tried to work around the Indian diplomats they neither liked nor 
trusted (Krishna Menon, Panikkar) and work with the ones they did (such as NR Pillai 
and Vijayalakshmi Pandit).285 These efforts to restrict India’s role and influence would 
continue after the Truman administration. 
What Have They Done for US Lately? (1951-1952) 
Menon had expressed the hope that “the differences in our approach to 
Communist China would not lead to mutual embarrassment.”286 But these differences 
continued to have an impact for the rest of the administration. India’s China policy, for 
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example, continued to affect Congressional sentiments about aid to India. This sentiment, 
in combination with the Truman administration’s emphasis on Europe and on military 
assistance and Congressional views on India’s Kashmir stance, led to limited aid to India. 
Furthermore, the aid debates continued to give Congress a chance publicly to criticize 
India. While many Congressional members targeted foreign assistance in general, India 
offered a particularly ripe target for attack, especially for members of the China bloc. 
Focused on aiding allies (that too militarily), in its FY1952 aid request, Truman and 
Acheson thus halved the amount of aid an interagency assessment suggested for aid to 
South Asia. Congress further decreased aid to India from $65 million to $54 million in 
summer 1951.287  
In 1952, Bowles pushed for an expanded aid package for India for FY1953. But 
this effort faltered, in large part because the White House did not think it could get a large 
aid package for India through Congress. The Indian attitude to the Japan Peace Treaty the 
previous year had not helped its case. In fall 1951, India had declined to sign the treaty—
the US administration believed this was primarily on the grounds that China and the 
Soviet Union had not been part of the negotiations.288 Rusk had noted to a House 
subcommittee in spring 1951 that Beijing and Moscow’s decisions could be expected to 
impact Delhi’s decision.289 John Foster Dulles, the US negotiator for the treaty, indicated 
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that Indian opposition stemmed from Nehru’s belief in the communist propaganda line of 
“Asia for Asians.” Even though Nehru publicly rejected the idea of “Asia for Asians,” the 
impression stuck.290  
Bowles unsuccessfully tried to convince administration officials and members of 
Congress that Nehru had lost any illusions about China and supported the US position on 
prisoners of war in Korea “100 percent.”291 He argued that losing India to communism 
would be worse than the loss of China and consequences would include domestic 
political ones.292 He had some support for his advocacy from junior officials on the Near 
East and South Asia desks, as well as liberal legislators like Rep. John F. Kennedy (D-
MA) and Sen. Humphrey on the grounds that aid could ensure that India remained non-
communist and secure. But there continued to be congressional criticism on the grounds 
that India was not being helpful in Korea. Of the $250 million for India that Bowles had 
argued for—$125 in development assistance; $125 in commodity grants—the 
administration only agreed to request $115 million of assistance. Congress 
disproportionately slashed the aid request for India by 70 percent, only approving $45 
million.293 
As McMahon has noted the apathy towards India was widespread in Congress—
where India did not have a major constituency—and among the public, as well as within 
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much of the administration.294 In some sections, there was downright antipathy. Truman 
and Acheson understood the potential threat of the lack of economic development in 
India, but given the administration’s other priorities (Korea, Europe), the lack of an 
imminent threat (of communists taking over in India) and of an opportunity (of winning 
India over), they had no stomach to take on the apathy or antipathy. 
Thus, Acheson and mutual security program director Averell Harriman also 
turned down Bowles’ request in summer 1952 for a special appropriation for India. Given 
congressional views on India, they were concerned that such a request could adversely 
affect foreign assistance more broadly. Deputy director of the mutual security program 
further asked “Is it in our best interests to spend large sums to build strength in a neutral 
India which is thereby able to assume the leadership of the Asian countries?”295 Concerns 
about communism spreading in India, a NSC-68 reappraisal, and cooperation with India 
at the UN eventually led the outgoing administration to agree to suggest an increased aid 
package for India for FY1954 to the incoming Eisenhower administration. But with the 
proposal coming in the lame duck period of the presidency, the chances of it getting 
through unscathed seemed slim.296 
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Chapter 2: Why So Wary? (1953-1956) 
We did not come to an agreement about anything. I don’t mean to say we 
disagreed about everything. We didn’t try to come to an agreement… 
– John Foster Dulles on his meeting with Jawaharlal Nehru in May 19531 
It was obvious that we did not feel in the same way as the American Government 
about communism and the way to combat it…we felt that [the] American reaction 
to the communist countries was not only exaggerated and dangerous but actually 
was likely to produce the very opposite results than those aimed at, more 
especially in Asia. In Asia, one must always remember that our primary urges 
were different….American policy has led the United States to side with colonial 
and reactionary elements in Asia, and as a result of that, had almost presented to 
the communist countries an ideal opportunity to pose as liberating agencies. Mere 
force and threats of war might frighten people for a while, but would never 
succeed in convincing people. 
– Jawaharlal Nehru to George Allen, April 24, 19542 
In 1953, the administration changed in Washington, but US-India differences on 
perceptions of and policy towards China persisted over the next three and a half years. 
The two countries’ dissimilar attitudes and ideas about the correct approach towards 
China came to the fore in the context of the final stages and the aftermath of the Korean 
war, the situation in Indochina, their evolving partnerships (for the US with Pakistan, and 
for India with China and the Soviet Union), the issue of American prisoners in China and 
the Taiwan Strait crisis. These differences continued to have adverse consequences for 
the relationship—at some times they deepened the rift between the US and India; at other 
times the differences prevented the countries from bridging the gap. This chapter 
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examines those differences, their impact on the relationship, as well as why they did not 
lead to the two countries totally turning away from each other.  
In some ways, President Dwight Eisenhower’s beliefs were more similar to those 
of Nehru than those of the Truman administration had been. Nehru and Eisenhower had 
similar views about the need to strike a balance between defense and development—the 
Indian prime minister agreed with Eisenhower’s and secretary of state John Foster 
Dulles’ view that military strength alone was not important; economic stability was 
essential as well. Furthermore, unlike the previous administration’s idea that it could 
expand the means available, in thinking about how to secure the country’s expanded 
interests Eisenhower—like Nehru—emphasized the need to consider that policymakers 
were operating in the context of limited, not expandable, resources.  
But, there were other views that jarred with those of Nehru, especially 
Eisenhower and Dulles’ assertion that the “free world” could afford no more losses to the 
communist world; that the battlefield was global and any loss would decrease US 
credibility and security. Focusing on ideology publicly, administration officials asserted 
that communism was monolithic—Beijing an affiliate of Moscow—and was 
incompatible with nationalism. The administration saw the process of decolonization, 
which Nehru welcomed, as creating vulnerabilities that the communists could exploit. 
Communists could also take advantage of any cleavages in the “free world”—thus it was 
essential that the “free world” stood tough together. Neutral countries muddied the water; 
furthermore, Dulles believed that they could encourage the formation of rifts in the “free 
world.”  
How key US and Indian policymakers translated their concepts—even the shared 
ones—into practice also differed, at least in most of Eisenhower’s first administration. 
Nehru’s view of containment on the cheap envisioned engagement through negotiations. 
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Given limited means, Eisenhower on the other hand believed that the US alone could not 
pay any price or bear any burden. Thus there needed to be burden sharing through 
alliances, and the use of more cost-effective instruments such as nuclear weapons and 
covert action. Furthermore, while Eisenhower approved of the idea of negotiations, as 
Gaddis has noted, he deferred to his secretary of state on the conduct of them. And Dulles 
asserted that negotiations were desirable when the US was in a position of strength—
otherwise allies and adversaries would see them as a sign of weakness.3 In addition, 
Eisenhower and he saw sabre-rattling—even of the nuclear kind—and heated rhetoric as 
acceptable instruments to portray strength and deter adversaries.4 Nehru thought they 
were provocative and counter-productive. And these different views of preferred means 
did nothing to alleviate tensions in the US-India relationship. 
INTERACTING IN THE EAST (1953-1954)  
Korea: Mediating Once More (1953-1954) 
Eisenhower called the Korean War the most urgent problem facing him when he 
came to office.5 The president and Dulles wanted to find a way to end the war that was 
consuming US resources and concerning American allies. To bring China to the 
negotiating table on US terms, at the start of the administration, they ratcheted up the 
pressure on China and North Korea. Policymakers even considered the use of nuclear 
weapons to end the war. Then, suddenly, in the aftermath of Stalin’s death in March 
1953, there was a Chinese offer to exchange sick and wounded prisoners—as Delhi had 
proposed in 1952 and Washington had suggested the month before—and to move 
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towards a settlement. This spurred debate between Eisenhower and Dulles about whether 
the offer was a genuine attempt towards peace or just a stalling tactic.6 
Nehru, on the other hand, believed that the post-Stalin Soviet leadership did want 
to ease world tension. While he often demurred from answering the question of how 
much influence Moscow had on Chinese decision-making and sometimes even rejected 
that Moscow had any, Nehru believed that the Chinese offer had to have had Soviet 
approval. He did not know the precise reasons behind the change in Beijing and 
Moscow’s attitudes, but he welcomed it. He also welcomed the approach suggested and 
represented by Eisenhower’s chance for peace speech that April, believing it was “a great 
improvement” from the first few months of the administration when escalation seemed to 
be the chosen US approach in east Asia—an approach he had publicly criticized.7 Nehru 
told Dulles when they met in Delhi in May that there were really only two options in 
Korea: a settlement or a war on a “much wider and more intensive scale”—as Dulles had 
himself indicated.8 And Nehru feared that continuing US suspicion of the communist 
countries would prevent a settlement.9   
Dulles, in turn, believed that Nehru was not suspicious enough of China and the 
Soviet Union; that he was “quite naïve” and not “fully grounded as to facts” on certain 
matters.10 This sense contributed to the administration’s attitude on aiding India. It cut the 
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previous administration’s suggested $200 million assistance package to India to $110 
million. Beyond the broader budgetary pressure the administration was facing, Dulles 
asserted that such a high amount could not be “either justified by the facts or…be 
justified to Congress.”11 The administration believed it was worth supporting India to 
ensure it did not lose the China-India race, but only on a “limited” basis.12 Some 
members of Congress wanted further cuts, partly on the grounds that India was not on the 
US side and Nehru had not been “playing fair with us all along.”13 Subsequently the 
legislature, where India had few constituencies, cut the aid amount further to about $90 
million.  
Nehru’s attitude also contributed to the Eisenhower administration’s doubts about 
India’s involvement as an intermediary between China and the US. Washington had 
continued to use India as a channel to China—Dulles, for example, sought to warn 
Beijing through Delhi that, if necessary, the US would “extend the area of conflict.”14 
But, more often than not, the administration, like its predecessor, tried to eliminate or 
limit Indian involvement as a mediator—during the Korean crisis and after. Most of these 
efforts were unsuccessful, however, and US attempts to exclude India only exacerbated 
the strain between the two countries.   
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In the waning stages of the Korean War, as settlement proposals flew back and 
forth between the adversaries, the US unsuccessfully tried to prevent India from getting 
the role of the neutral state that would supervise post-war prisoner repatriation. The State 
Department’s U. Alexis Johnson noted US unhappiness about the prospect of India 
playing the role because “India all too often seemed to consider it necessary to be ‘more 
neutral’ towards the Chinese Communists than towards the UN.”15 When it became clear 
that a group of neutrals—the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC)—would 
take on the supervisory role, General Clark, commander of the UN forces, added that 
India’s neutrality was not “as well defined” as that of some other candidates and 
expressed concern about India having a swing vote in the group.16 Dulles thought India 
would be acceptable, if necessary, as long as the operating procedures and principles 
were set out firmly.17 Sen. Knowland weighed in with the view that Congress would 
oppose India as the neutral member of the commission—he said that till then in Korea 
India had “perhaps 80 percent of the time voted with the Chinese Communists.” Officials 
like assistant secretary of state for far east Asian affairs Robertson suggested that if China 
insisted on India as a neutral, the US could insist that it play that role in conjunction with 
Switzerland and Sweden. He even laid out the excuse that could be put forth—India’s 
lack of resources—to deny India the job alone. But General Collins, US army chief of 
staff, said this was impractical and insulting to India, and he favored India as a neutral 
state.18  
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The US soon found its hands tied. A communist proposal on May 7 envisioned a 
five-nation commission—on the lines India had proposed in November 1952—with 
Sweden, Switzerland, Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as India as the chair. Despite 
pressure from South Korean leader Syngman Rhee to exclude India, the State 
Department’s far east bureau realized the US had been put in a spot by the communist 
move—the communists would use any US exclusion of India for propaganda purposes. 
Eventually, as a result of this—as well as pressure from NATO allies, especially 
Britain—the administration felt it had little choice but to accept Indian chairmanship of 
the commission.19 
But the administration would not acquiesce to other communist demands, 
especially one that called for each commission member to have troops on the ground to 
supervise the prisoner repatriation process—only India, according to a May 13 UN 
command (UNC) proposal, could provide supervisory forces. Nehru believed that the 
new UNC proposal was “most unhelpful” since Beijing would find it unacceptable. It was 
too much of a departure from the May 7 Chinese proposal that Zhou—perhaps to flatter 
India20—had indicated to an Indian official had been based on the Indian one of 
November 1952. The May 13 UNC proposal gave India a crucial role, but Nehru did not 
want India to take on any responsibility that did not also come with Chinese agreement.21 
Beijing’s negative reaction and pressure on the US from allies such as Britain led to 
another revised UNC proposal, which British prime minister Winston Churchill noted to 
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Nehru was more in line with the November 1952 Indian resolution. The UNC made 
concessions to the communists but still insisted that India have sole military supervisory 
authority.22 Nehru believed it would not be enough to secure Chinese acquiescence, but 
Beijing agreed to the US proposals in June. This led Nehru to praise the “very 
statesmanlike attitude” of the Chinese government. He noted publicly that Beijing could 
now return to nation-building, which had been disrupted by a war in which China had 
been reluctantly “brought…in” by the fear of US attack.23 
Nehru’s tendency to give China credit and the benefit of the doubt created 
resentment among US officials. But he was not above giving the US the benefit of the 
doubt at times. When Rhee released prisoners—a move that threatened to torpedo the 
Korean settlement—Nehru did not think Washington had participated in the decision. 
Nehru asked N. Raghavan, his ambassador in Beijing, to tell Chinese officials that he 
believed it to be a unilateral move on the part of Rhee.24 Nonetheless, given Zhou’s 
wavering on the settlement on the grounds that the prisoner release proved that the US 
was “undependable,” he asserted that the US had to take responsibility and assure Beijing 
that it could control the situation. Simultaneously, he urged Zhou not to back out of the 
armistice agreement.25 Subsequently, in order to strengthen Eisenhower’s hands and 
prevent China from backing out of negotiations, Nehru pushed for the reconvening of the 
UN general assembly as soon as possible. This interjection, however, annoyed Dulles 
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who believed that broadening the number of parties in discussions would only complicate 
the matter.26 
As chair of the NNRC, India had a more formal mediating role in the Korean 
situation than it had had in the past. The formality made India’s task more formidable. 
Indian policymakers felt that India was in a “thankless position” with “both sides 
accusing India of partisanship.”27 In the US, observers charged that India accepted 
Chinese and North Korean allegations about Taiwanese instigation of some prisoners, 
while ignoring US allegations about the communists doing the same. Sen. Knowland 
accused India of giving into all Chinese demands; Dulles refused to repudiate these 
accusations, adding that the administration was not pleased with the way the NNRC was 
functioning.28 China, on the other hand, criticized India for not giving into its demands 
that the custodial commission use force to coerce Chinese and North Korean prisoners. 
When the Indian chairman of the commission announced that the NNRC would return all 
unrepatriated prisoners to the captors by January 22, 1954, China vociferously criticized 
the decision. But even some in the US complained that instead of returning the prisoners 
should have said it would release them—a step that the US announced it would 
subsequently take.29 
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The administration also took steps to restrict India’s role in the political 
conference that was to follow the Korean truce—which did not win it any friends in 
India. Nehru had asserted that India would not seek to play a leading role in the 
conference, but he had seemed to expect that India would be asked to participate because 
“[w]e are in the rather special position of being friendly with all the parties involved in 
the dispute.”30 But, despite Australian, British and Canadian support, the US refused to 
endorse Indian participation in the talks largely because of Rhee’s objections that India 
was biased towards the Chinese and North Korean position. The South Korean foreign 
minister accusing India of “trafficking with the Communists,” said that Seoul would only 
accept India’s presence at the conference if it participated on the communist side. In 
Congress, Sen. Knowland and others asserted that India’s “dubious” record should take it 
out of contention for membership. The US representative to the UN publicly announced 
in the general assembly that the US would vote against extending India an invitation. 
China, on the other hand, supported Indian participation and even suggested New Delhi 
as a possible venue for the conference—thus, at the very least, scoring propaganda 
points.31   
To save face and the conference, Nehru withdrew India from consideration. He 
asserted that the US attempt to exclude India was one more example of the west 
excluding Asians from decision-making that affected Asia. He asserted that Asian 
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countries would no longer submit to being “ignored or bypassed, certainly not sat 
upon.”32 Nehru later stated that despite lacking military or financial power, non-aligned 
India could make a difference.33 It was around this time that Indian policymakers also 
started publicly indicating a desire to play a leadership role in Asia—moving away from 
previous denials that India sought such a role.34  
On Washington’s part, in the aftermath of the Korean War, there was an effort to 
downplay any Asian leadership role for India and Nehru—a role many in the US had 
earlier advocated. Sen. Knowland, heavily critical of India for “yielding to the Chinese 
Communists,” dismissed Nehru as the spokesman for all of Asia. Dulles did not want to 
take actions that would “establish Nehru as the leader of all South and Southeast Asia.” 
US diplomats reported with satisfaction when differences between Nehru and other South 
Asian leaders on communism were apparent.35 
India’s formal role in the NNRC and the debate on its participation in the political 
conference had made its role mediating between China and the US more public—and 
thus the impact on India’s image even beyond Washington greater. The Korean War took 
its toll on American public opinion of India. In January 1951, a quarter of those polled 
did not think India could be counted on to cooperate with the US; by April 1954 this 
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number had climbed to 42 percent.36 In January 1952, 57 percent of those polled who had 
an opinion on the matter believed that India was neither on the Russian nor US side; in a 
poll taken in April 1954, only 28 percent thought India was neutral, with 7 percent 
believing the Indian government was communist and 26 percent considering it to be pro-
communist.37 
Indochina: Dueling Approaches (1953-1954) 
By the onset of the Geneva political conference on Korea and Indochina in spring 
1954, India’s stock as an honest broker had plummeted even further in Washington: a US 
policymaker expressed the belief that “the Chinese Communists in a sense hold a veto 
over India.”38 Dulles believed that Indian policymakers had been pushing for the 
conference to “elevat[e]” India’s role as a leader in Asia.39 The US succeeded in 
excluding India officially from the political conference in April, but as Raghavan noted, 
India “was more than present” in the form of Indian envoy Krishna Menon.40  
Nehru sent Krishna Menon to Geneva because he believed that a settlement in 
Indochina was crucial. A year earlier he had asserted that communists were no doubt 
taking advantage of the situation in Indochina, but the root of the situation was 
nationalism. He had admitted that there was no “easy solution.” He was critical of a 
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“purely military approach in aid of a colonial power”—that kind of approach, which 
countries like the US were pursuing, would only make things worse. He understood US 
motivations—anti-communism and the desire not to abandon ally France—but thought 
American support to its ally indeed created the opportunity for communists in 
Indochina.41  
By the time of the Geneva conference, Nehru thought the options in Southeast 
Asia were clear: (a) a settlement that accepted and stabilized the status quo and 
essentially prevented Chinese expansion or (b) a lack of agreement, which meant 
continuation of military activity that would benefit China and the Vietminh. He was 
concerned that US policy was leading to the latter, which, in turn, would eventually lead 
to war. Seeking a settlement, Nehru proposed a peace plan in conjunction with other 
Asian leaders and sought British support for it. Furthermore, egged on by British foreign 
secretary Anthony Eden, Nehru urged Zhou to cease large-scale attacks in Indochina, 
even getting the Chinese premier’s public endorsement in principle of non-interference in 
Southeast Asia.42 
In Geneva, Krishna Menon’s shuttle diplomacy between American and Chinese 
officials need not have exacerbated US-India tensions. After all US and Indian objectives 
in Southeast Asia were not entirely disparate—even with an upswing in Sino-Indian 
relations (see below), India had no interest in seeing greater Chinese influence in the 
region.43 US officials indeed acknowledged that India desired neither a return to 
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colonialism nor a turn to communism in the region nor even “a further consolidation of 
external communist power.”44 But, as a scholar has noted in this context too, “Indian and 
American approaches were mutually exclusive…and led to mutual irritations.”45  
Just before the conference was underway, Nehru’s statement that India would not 
permit foreign forces en route to Indochina to go through or fly over India had led to 
criticism on Capitol Hill. Even before his statement, members of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee had questioned India’s attitude during hearings on the foreign 
assistance program. Rep. Vorys (R-OH) had asserted that India was a “neutral that isn’t 
even neutral.” Rep. Smith (R-WI) had added, “it is very difficult to justify our assistance” 
given “that there are basic fundamental differences in policies between India and 
ourselves.” Reps. Church (R-IL) and Judd (R-MN) commented that continued support to 
India—which did not support the US—adversely affected the US position with friends in 
Asia who did offer that support. Rep. Jackson (R-CA) pointed out that India had actively 
put up “stumbling blocks” for the US.46  
Some in Congress believed that, with his attitude on transit, Nehru was creating 
yet another obstacle. Rep. Bolton (R-OH) asked if Indian policymakers did not realize 
that their attitude on Indochina was going “to bring communism right to their own 
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doors.”47 Sen. Bridges, appropriations committee chairman, and others said the US 
should keep in mind Nehru’s refusal when considering aid to India. Sen. Homer Ferguson 
(R-MI) added that India’s action “to say the least gave aid and comfort to the communist 
world.”48 As the criticism continued, the Democrats in the Senate “sat silent.”49  
US ambassador to India George Allen pointed out that India had followed the 
transit policy consistently since independence, but this did not stem the criticism.50 
Noting the criticism, Nehru said that while “it would be grossly unfair…to judge the 
United States by the speeches of some Senators…inevitably there are reactions in India to 
speeches and writings in the press.”51 Reports indicated that even friends of the US and 
critics of Nehru in India were disappointed by the outburst against India in Congress.52 
The prime minister expressed doubts to his ambassador in Washington about accepting 
US aid since the two countries were at such loggerheads.53 That might not even have 
been a choice had the House not defeated what the New York Times labeled “the no-aid-
to-India-unless-she-gets-off-the-fence amendment” to the foreign assistance bill.54 
The Geneva conference did not alleviate Nehru’s doubts about the US or its 
leaders’ approach. At the conference that began on April 26, unlike Dulles, the prime 
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minister thought Zhou was neither “uncompromising” nor merely following Moscow’s 
lead. He believed that any rigidity on the part of the premier stemmed from US 
behavior—a sense exacerbated by Zhou’s assertion to Nehru that the US attitude 
basically was “to obstruct any settlement in the Conference.”55  
Indeed, Dulles had not just given what came to be called his “massive retaliation” 
speech earlier that year, but had also made clear the US reluctance to participate in the 
conference. Furthermore, in a speech beforehand he had dismissed criticism of the 
country’s China policy, asserting that the US policy of non-recognition was “soberly 
rational” given Beijing’s “consistently and viciously hostile” behavior towards the US. 
He argued that communist promises were unreliable and outlined the administration’s 
preferred alternative of “united action” against the Chinese threat.56  
Nehru had found it “rather odd” and unhelpful that Dulles had given a speech 
emphasizing the communist threat in east Asia and the need for “united action” to meet 
it.57 The move was indeed deliberate—Dulles thought it would serve as a warning to 
China and boost France. At the conference, it could also help the French negotiating 
position that he believed to be very weak, given the imminent fall of Dien Bien Phu. 
Eisenhower and Dulles believed that after the “loss” of China to the communist world, a 
loss in Vietnam—to the China-backed Vietminh—would be crippling. Eisenhower was 
skeptical of the British and French belief in the value of negotiations with the 
communists—and disapproved of the influence India seemed to have with British 
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policymakers on this question. Nonetheless, so as not to break with allies who hoped to 
reach a settlement at Geneva, Eisenhower had agreed to send US representatives to the 
conference. But, as Immerman has noted, Dulles indeed hoped that the negotiations 
would “acrimoniously collapse.”58  
Nehru did not expect much to come from the conference. He was unhappy with 
the US approach, asserting that the US only seemed to be able to “think in terms of war 
or threat of war and massive retaliation” and no solution was possible on that basis.59 But 
by the end of the conference, he was relatively pleased with the result. Krishna Menon’s 
shuttle diplomacy facilitated the achievement of a settlement at Geneva. India 
subsequently agreed to chair the International Control Commission, created to supervise 
ceasefires in Indochina. But Eisenhower and Dulles had already turned to a different 
approach to the problem: collective security—an approach that Allen called the source of 
the “biggest difference” between the US and India.60 Furthermore, Eisenhower declared 
that the US was not bound by the Geneva settlement and the US refused to sign on to the 
agreement. The administration subsequently announced the consideration of a collective 
security organization in Asia—the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)—that 
only further exacerbated US-India tensions.61 
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PROBLEMATIC PARTNERSHIPS (1953-1955)  
Nehru had told Dulles that it was quite natural that the US and India’s attitudes 
and approaches on certain issues were different “because our background, our geography, 
our history, etc., had been different. We had grown up in a certain set of circumstances 
and were naturally influenced by them.”62 The fact that the differences were natural did 
not make the negative impact they had on the relationship any less intense. Like Acheson 
before him, Dulles noted that the US and India did not necessarily have differences on 
ultimate interests. But the secretary of state laid out the real crux of the issue from the US 
perspective: while policymakers might understand that India had a different position, the 
methods India chose and advocated created problems for the US.63 One of these methods 
was the Indian engagement of China. On India’s part, Nehru saw Eisenhower’s preferred 
means, especially collective security—which made Pakistan part of the solution, rather 
than part of the problem as Delhi saw it—as increasing India’s difficulties. 
The US-Pakistan Relationship: Collective Security or Creating Insecurity? (1953-
1954) 
The last few years of the Truman administration had seen the US focused on the 
far eastern part of Asia—which had given India more of a role—but in the early years of 
the Eisenhower administration there was increasing concern about the situation in the 
Middle East. This brought with it attention to and eventually alliance with Pakistan, a 
country that was not just willing, but had been actively seeking to ally with the US. The 
idea of bringing Pakistan into the US-supported network of alliances preceded the 
Eisenhower administration. The Truman administration, however, had shelved plans to 
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include Pakistan in a Middle East Defense Organization.64 US-Pakistan negotiations in 
the Eisenhower era had commenced in the spring of 1953 and reports of the prospective 
partnership had first become public in November that year. Subsequently, in February 
1954, the US announced that it would militarily aid Pakistan.  
A few months later, Pakistan offered to join SEATO and US policymakers 
reluctantly accepted.65 While policymakers were conceptualizing the organization, 
some—including Dulles—advocated for Indian involvement. Dulles was even willing to 
consider including non-aggression principles—of the sort that China and India agreed to 
(see below) and some were arguing for—if it would bring India and Burma into 
SEATO.66 But, the military wanted India excluded and the focus to be on the Pacific.67 
Defense Secretary Wilson thought the US should let Britain and India take the initiative 
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for any Southeast Asian grouping. He and national security advisor Cutler were more in 
favor of an Asian economic grouping rather than a US-sponsored military one, but Dulles 
thought the US had come too far to jettison the latter.68 The US also dropped an idea of a 
dual-track grouping because of the lack of participation of countries like Japan and India 
and the belief that non-aligned countries would not participate in an economic consortium 
associated with the military treaty.69  
Indian reaction to the inclusion of Pakistan into the US strategic script was highly 
negative at both the official and public levels.70 Nehru called it an “intrusion of a new and 
dangerous element in the politics of Asia.” He noted that one need not take “an alarmist 
view,” but nonetheless there needed to be an Indian policy rethink.71 Privately Nehru 
acknowledged that the US was likely to play a restraining role on Pakistan, thus reducing 
the chances of an India-Pakistan war. But, he was extremely anxious about Pakistan’s 
increased access to military equipment and what that would mean for India’s defense 
expenditures.72  
Nehru’s adverse reaction to SEATO stemmed from his overall attitude that pacts 
“brought insecurity.”73 He felt that the motives for SEATO’s creation might have been 
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good—to ease fear of countries in the region—but the approach was wrong. It could only 
be seen as anti-China.74 While the US thought China posed a clear and present danger in 
Southeast Asia, Nehru disagreed that there was such a threat. In another instance of 
mirror-imaging, he asserted that China did not have aggression on its mind; rather, like 
India, it wanted peace to focus internally. Moreover, he disagreed with the Eisenhower 
administration’s military approach, arguing that it created more, rather than less, 
insecurity. He stated that the US should accept Chinese assurances that they would not 
indulge in aggression and, in turn, assure China that there would not be attempts to 
invade China or overthrow the communist regime in Beijing. In what had become a 
familiar retort, Allen, however, argued that China, given its apparent expansionist 
tendencies in Korea and Indochina, needed to reassure the US first.75  
Had India’s China policy affected the US decision to ally with Pakistan? 
McMahon has argued that “American disillusionment with and devaluation of India 
formed a necessary precondition for the American military commitment” to Pakistan.76 
That devaluation had partly stemmed from India’s lack of willingness to play the role vis-
à-vis China that Washington had hoped it would. The role it had played had not been 
helpful. The disillusionment, too, partly emerged from what US policymakers saw as 
India’s lack of understanding of the China threat and the US approach toward China. 
Beyond Delhi’s willingness, questions about India’s ability to stand up against China also 
contributed to the decision to go the collective security route. The idea of alliances and 
partnerships in the region itself partly stemmed from the belief that while India and Japan 
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were potentially considerably strong, at that point they lacked the ability to resist 
effectively. Thus, non-communist Asia needed “protection against Communist attack.”77 
Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai: Peaceful Coexistence or Naïve Nurturing (1953-1955) 
Most Indian policymakers at the time disagreed that India needed protection 
against Chinese attack and even more vociferously disagreed with the way the 
Eisenhower administration was trying to establish that protection in Asia. In mid-1953, 
US intelligence analysts had noted that, of all US anti-communist efforts, the ones that 
seemed to make India most apprehensive were those directed against China.78  
Since there had seemed to be few near-term options to get rid of the communist 
government in Beijing short of a large-scale US commitment, Eisenhower and Dulles’ 
strategy had focused on pressuring China so that the regime would become internally 
unstable. At the same time isolating China would strain Sino-Soviet relations, as Beijing 
would depend more on and demand more of Moscow. The administration could apply 
pressure through trade embargos, covert action and psychological warfare, as well as by 
refusing to recognize Mao’s regime or to support its bid to take the Chinese seat at the 
UN.79  
But Indian policymakers believed that the ways the US sought to pressure China 
were dangerous. Nehru believed America’s China policy was “unrealistic and 
fallacious.”80 He worried about the consequences of the continued American effort to 
keep Taipei in and Beijing out of the UNSC, noting, “an obviously wrong thing [is] 
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perpetuated and a whole castle is sought to be build on an artificial foundation; and then, 
if something goes wrong afterwards, complaint is made.”81 He also remained frustrated 
about the US reluctance to recognize the regime in Beijing.82 He believed that the foreign 
policy of those who would not recognize China had become “topsy-turvy”—since they 
were leaving a “major factor out of reckoning. It is bound to upset the cart.”83 
Furthermore, Nehru had a different idea of how a wedge strategy could work—even 
though by this stage he questioned the desirability of attempting to split Beijing and 
Moscow. He thought persuasion and engagement would eventually lead Beijing to turn 
away from Moscow, as China would have other options.84  
Dulles had replied in the negative when asked if there was any agreement 
between Nehru and him on China.85 He had noted to Rhee that the key difference was on 
tactics—India believed “the methods of appeasement rather than strength would weaken 
the communist world.”86 In the incoming Eisenhower administration, there had been little 
expectation that India would change its approach toward China. Nehru had told Dulles 
that India had to deal with China for reasons of geography and pragmatism—his country 
had a 2000-mile border with China and did not want “trouble for the indefinite future,” 
especially since the Indian leadership wanted to focus on nation-building and wanted 
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peace. The other reasons that some scholars have given as the motivation for Nehru’s 
China policy—“past history and cultural associations with China”—the prime minister 
saw as secondary and only mattering “to some extent.”87  
In the post-Stalin era, US analysts had seen Beijing’s willingness to come to the 
table for talks on Korea as only reinforcing Indian views that China did not intend to 
behave aggressively. US policymakers knew that India wanted to reach and maintain a 
modus vivendi with the regime in Beijing. For that reason, an NSC assessment had 
predicted in early 1954, “It can be expected that India will go to great lengths to win Red 
China’s friendship.”88 Indeed, India was doing just that at the time with negotiations that 
culminated in the signing of the Sino-Indian agreement in April 1954. 
Allen believed that US military aid to Pakistan caused this Indian deepening of its 
relations with China. Merrill has also linked the developing US-Pakistan relationship and 
the increased “militarization of Asia” with India’s stepped up outreach to other countries, 
especially China.89 But India’s desire to deepen its relations with China had preceded the 
announcement of US aid to Pakistan. In March 1953, Burmese Prime Minister U Nu had 
first suggested that Burma, China and India sign a 50-year friendship and non-aggression 
agreement. Nehru had been unsure of the Chinese reaction given Beijing’s adverse 
response to the Indian resolution on Korea at the UN in late 1952 and the resultant 
“coolness” towards India. Nonetheless, Nehru had “welcome[d]” the idea, but only if it 
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was not “anti” any country. He also thought the duration too long, recommending instead 
a decade-long agreement with the possibility of renewal. He had suggested that rather 
than a trilateral agreement, the countries aim for a series of bilateral ones. He urged U Nu 
to take the initiative, but not to commit India. Nehru wanted any steps to be taken with 
great care because he expected that any such agreements would have a “powerful” 
impact, especially on the US. He also did not want Beijing to think Delhi might be 
interested in such an agreement out of weakness—China “did not respect those who show 
weakness,” so India should be “both friendly and firm.”90 
After Stalin’s death and end of Korean war, Nehru had hoped that fear and 
suspicion would abate. By fall 1953, given the lack of agreement on holding a political 
conference that could have helped alleviate global and regional tension, he had been 
“more doubtful of any permanent settlements in the near future.”91 This made it even 
more important for India to seek peace with China.92 Thus, Nehru sought to avoid steps 
that China would see as unfriendly.93 And he had moved to settle issues that could cause 
tension between the two countries—especially Tibet—announcing in September 1953 
that his government had reached out to Beijing seeking talks.94 
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Despite the slight easing of general tensions following Stalin’s death and the truce 
in Korea, there had been continuing strain in the Sino-Indian relationship through 1953 
because of India’s role in the NNRC. But, even though Sino-Indian relations “were not 
quite happy”—and, indeed, because they were not—the two countries began discussing 
the status of Tibet at the end of December 1953-the beginning of January 1954.95 In 
spring 1954, Indian officials told their US counterparts to expect “some kind of statement 
of mutual desire…to maintain peace between [the] two countries” if the Sino-Indian 
negotiations over Tibet were successful.96 What emerged was the Sino-Indian agreement, 
signed in April 1954, through which India implicitly recognized Chinese sovereignty 
over Tibet. Explicitly, it laid out rights for trade and pilgrimages between India and Tibet, 
as well as Indian promises to withdraw its military missions in Tibet and reduce its 
overall footprint there. Finally, it contained the five principles of peaceful coexistence or 
Panchsheel, including clauses on mutual respect for territorial integrity and non-
interference in other’s internal affairs.97 
Some US analysts (and others subsequently) saw the Indian desire for reaching an 
accommodation with China as stemming from “legendary bonds of friendship and 
culture” and “psychological ties arising from the fact that the Chinese as a colored race 
and as Asians have asserted themselves against the West.”98 But, from the Indian 
perspective, there were other motivations as well. Nehru believed that India’s importance 
increased because of her “intimate relations” with China. This “enabled [Delhi] to make 
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approaches to [Beijing] and to say things which many other nations could not.”99 For 
Nehru, there was also a more important reason. While he did not think there was any 
“immediate likelihood,” it was not inconceivable that India’s relations with China would 
deteriorate. It was possible that there could be a new phase of Chinese expansionism, and 
the only feasible solution for India was to “fashion our policy to prevent [China] coming 
in the way of our interests or other interests that we consider important.” The agreement 
might not be “a permanent guarantee,” but it was a useful insurance policy at that 
stage.100 This was especially desirable for a leadership that did not want to enter an 
alliance to ensure the country’s security. 
In the US, the New York Times declared, “Peiping Gets Indian Gift.” On Capitol 
Hill, Rep. Bolton called the agreement the “first step toward the communization of 
India.” Allen tried to explain that the “favorable Indian attitude toward China is not 
because China is Communist, but in spite of the fact that it is Communist.” He 
acknowledged that the agreement might not be a good deal, but said Indian policymakers 
accepted it as “the best deal they could get.”101 
The agreement was one of the major steps in Nehru’s attempt to “encircle and 
contain China in a ring of pledges.”102 Nehru traced the criticism of the agreement that 
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emerged abroad and in some quarters in India to lack of awareness of this bigger picture. 
An alternate approach was neither feasible nor desirable. What India had lost—rights in 
Tibet—it could not have held on to, and, moreover, what India gained from China 
outweighed any loss: “a friendly frontier and an implicit acceptance of that frontier.”103 
India did not have the ability to act within Tibet; it could merely tolerate, without 
encouraging, the Tibetan movement in India—which he assumed the US was 
supporting—if it was “peaceful and unobtrusive.”104 Finally, Nehru contended that 
“assum[ing] an aggressive role” would only lead to trouble.105  
After the treaty was signed, in mid-June 1954, Zhou Enlai suddenly accepted a 
pending invitation to visit India, pleasantly surprising Nehru.106 In the US, the New York 
Times reflected public disapproval of Zhou’s visit, noting with chagrin that it took place 
on the fourth anniversary of the Chinese-“aided and abetted” North Korean invasion of 
South Korea.107 In India, Zhou was well received. Nehru and the premier did not discuss 
potentially contentious issues like the Sino-Indian border—Nehru indeed thought that the 
very act of bringing the subject up might suggest doubt about India’s frontiers, which he 
asserted were settled.108 S. Radhakrishnan, the Indian vice president, later noted Zhou’s 
reasonableness about every subject, with one exception—the US.109  
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US policy towards China was a key subject in the Sino-Indian discussions and—
just as US and Indian policymakers differed about China—differences in the Chinese and 
Indian perceptions of and policy toward the US were evident. The Chinese premier 
wanted China and India to be on the offensive, asserting that if the Panchsheel principles 
were put in effect between more countries, this would help stop the spread of the US 
military bloc in Asia. But, while highly critical of the US in internal correspondence—
Nehru asserted to the Indian ambassador in Washington that US policy with regard to 
China was “wrong” and “wholly lacking in realism”110—in conversations with Zhou, 
Nehru was more circumspect. He admitted that US-India relations were “not good,” but 
declined Zhou’s suggestion that China and India try to corner or isolate the US. 
Furthermore, Nehru tried to explain the motivation behind US policy towards China, 
stating that it partly stemmed from domestic politics. He noted, moreover, that the US 
was acting out of fear; resultantly, it was encircling and creating fear in China and the 
Soviet Union.111  
In order not to exacerbate US fear or further harm US-India relations, Nehru 
ensured that the Sino-Indian joint statement emerging from the visit did not condemn the 
US or any other country. Furthermore, just as he had in the case of a US-sponsored 
Pacific Pact and would in the case of SEATO, he emphasized his lack of interest in what 
he interpreted as Zhou’s suggestion for a grouping or pact of Southeast Asian countries; 
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instead, he urged Zhou to pursue bilateral understandings with Southeast Asian countries 
to reassure them.112  
US intelligence assessments viewed Zhou’s visits to India and Burma as part of a 
Chinese reassurance tour to split the non-communist countries and to buy time while 
simultaneously continuing to subvert non-communist regimes and building up Chinese 
military capability. After the visit, some Western diplomats worried that Nehru had been 
sold on China’s “peaceful intentions” line. They lamented that as long as Nehru had 
“blind faith” in China’s good intentions he would not even help guarantee Burma’s 
security—let alone do more. There was also concern about the impact on the Indian 
public’s perceptions of China and the US. In India, Zhou had publicly offered 
reassurances about China’s intentions. He had also expressed Chinese concern about 
American encirclement and regime change efforts, “thus endeavoring to avert picture of 
China as aggressor to picture of China as victim of United States aggressive designs.”113 
Indian officials believed that Zhou’s trip had been designed to reassure as well, 
and also to show Beijing’s independence from Moscow.114 After the visit, Nehru 
admitted that Zhou’s assurances could have been part of a “clever strategy looking to the 
distant future.”115 But, nonetheless, at that point, he was convinced that Chinese leaders 
did not want war because it would disrupt their efforts to improve conditions within 
China. The only thing, he believed, that would provoke them was fear of attack. He was 
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impressed by Zhou’s questions about what might reassure Southeast Asian countries—
enough that he seemed convinced that China wanted peaceful settlements with them. He 
saw the lack of an attack on Burma—even though GMD operations from there gave 
Beijing a pretext—as evidence of China’s desire for peace. He also saw it as support for 
his belief that China was focused on settling its internal problems rather than invading 
Burma, Indochina or Thailand.116 Asked by an American correspondent about Zhou’s 
continued insistence that China had the right to take Taiwan by force, Nehru said he 
disagreed with that contention, but dismissed it as directed towards a domestic audience. 
Finally, he saw as a good sign the Chinese leadership’s indication that it would make 
people of Chinese origin in other countries choose a nationality.117  
Assured about China’s near-term intentions, Nehru seemed even more convinced 
that Washington’s China policy was obstructive. He noted that he was not alone in 
thinking that US non-recognition of the regime in Beijing was unhelpful, pointing to the 
Australian foreign minister’s private and New Zealand foreign minister’s public 
statements. He saw US behavior at Geneva at the time—and, later, the formation of 
SEATO—as exacerbating the situation.118  
Some Indian policymakers believed that the state of Sino-Indian relations proved 
that the Indian approach was better than that of the US. The Indian ambassador to China 
noted that the Sino-Indian agreement showed that Beijing was willing to be a “reasonable 
negotiator.” Nehru asserted that India could not agree with the US attitude that 
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communists would never stick to their agreements so it was better to pulverize rather than 
parley with them. US policy represented a “record of repeated failure.” His understanding 
with Zhou suggested a better way than military alliances to “restrain and resolve 
conflicts.”119  
The US watched closely when Nehru travelled to China in October 1954, coming 
as it did after the Manila Pact creating SEATO.120 Just as US-India talks repeatedly 
featured China, the US was again an element in Sino-Indian discussions—especially 
since the visit took place as the first Taiwan Strait crisis was unfolding (see below). Once 
again, there were differences; once again, Nehru tried to inject moderation into Beijing’s 
attitude towards the US. He insisted that the US position was not as monolithic and 
hostile as China believed. But Zhou questioned US intentions, asserting that 
Washington—unlike Delhi or Beijing—did not want to ease global tensions. The US was 
not just out to protect its interests, as Nehru insisted, but wanted to enlarge them through 
hostilities. Trying to convince Nehru of this interpretation, Zhou argued that the US was 
encouraging Pakistan to be expansionist. He drew a contrast with China’s willingness to 
reassure countries in the neighborhood, noting that the US was doing the opposite. The 
discussion left Nehru commenting that Zhou’s preferred approach toward the US—
insistence on preventing American expansion, on isolating Washington and on not 
appeasing the US—mirrored what he would hear in Washington about Beijing.121 
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Mao reiterated to Nehru why the US was a threat. When Nehru tried to explain 
that fear influenced US policies, the chairman retorted that he could not understand what 
a country like the US had to fear. On Mao’s prompting, Nehru contended that, while the 
growing influence of the Defense Department in policymaking was problematic, most 
Americans, including many in government, did not want war to attain US goals. He 
stated his belief that Eisenhower did not want war, but the president’s opinion was not 
consistent since he was “so completely in the hands of third rate advisers.” Nehru 
disagreed with Mao’s contention that though war should be avoided, it should be 
welcomed if it came.122  
Dulles had initially hoped that Nehru’s visit to China might be “on balance, 
advantageous to the West.” He believed that Nehru’s China policy was “one based on 
considerations of admiration and fear in about equal proportions.” He hoped that the visit 
would increase the latter—in that it would heighten Nehru’s concerns about the 
“implications for India of Chinese Communist policies and strength.”123 But, after his 
trip, Nehru publicly dismissed Dulles’ assertion that there was no proof that China had 
changed intentions, contending that Beijing had given many indications of its peaceful 
intentions. He asserted this view privately as well, stating that he had “no doubt at all that 
the Government and the people of China desire peace and want to concentrate on 
building up their country during the next decade or two.”124  
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Publicly, Nehru denied reports that Zhou and he had “sharp differences,” noting 
that, while in some cases the two countries’ basic approaches were different, there were 
no disagreements during the talks.125 Nehru hoped that the differences that they did have 
would not preclude cooperation.126 He emphasized that just because the two countries 
were following different paths, it did not need to result in conflict.127  
The US, on the other hand, tried to facilitate dissension. With interagency 
assessments outlining the long-term Chinese objective as eliminating “Western power 
and influence” in the region,128 there was concern in Washington about the impact of 
improved Sino-Indian relations. The administration tried to create a wedge issue by 
suggesting that India replace China on the UNSC.129 But, Nehru opposed this, primarily 
on the grounds that it was intended to disrupt the Sino-Indian relationship. He eventually 
acknowledged that it might also be a way for the US to alleviate its problem of how to 
include Beijing in the UN general assembly without excluding Taipei, but he remained 
opposed because he thought the result would be a break with China—which India could 
not afford.130 
In the aftermath of Nehru’s visit to China, on Dulles’ urging, Eisenhower wrote to 
Nehru stressing that “differences in approach [did not] constitute any bar to growing 
friendship and cooperation” between the US and India, since there was a great amount of 
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“common ground on which we can work out mutual problems and minimize differences.” 
Nehru agreed saying differences in approach were “natural,” but “should not be allowed 
to come in the way…”131 Good intentions, however, were not enough to overcome the 
tensions engendered by differences over methods. 
One source of that tension—Indian engagement with China—continued, with a 
year of Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) culminating in China’s 
coming-out party at the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in April 1955.132 Publicly, 
Dulles said the conference was of no direct concern to the US. Privately, however, an 
American official noted to the Indian ambassador to the US that the inclusion of China at 
the conference was not “well received” in the US. But Nehru dismissed these objections 
and US pressure on other organizers, insisting that China needed to be invited.133 Garver 
has argued that the prime minister saw the conference was another way to “creat[e] 
political constraints” that would hinder any Chinese violation of its agreements.134 Thus, 
Nehru resented what he believed to be US encouragement to Pakistan and Turkey to toe 
the American line at the conference and be obstructive. In contrast, he saw Zhou as 
“accommodating.”135 
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The Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954-1955) 
Having spent the previous few months dealing with the first Taiwan Strait crisis, 
accommodating was not a word the Eisenhower administration would have associated 
with the Chinese leadership. In September 1954, while negotiations for SEATO were 
underway, China had started shelling Taiwan-held offshore islands, intensifying these 
actions over time. There was no love lost on the part of Eisenhower or Dulles for Jiang 
and they had concerns that he would try to force their hand as he tried to make a move 
onto the mainland. But for reasons of credibility, as well as domestic politics, the 
Eisenhower administration could not jettison the GMD leader.136 Thus, following the 
shelling, it had expanded the presence of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. It had 
also sped up discussions between Taiwan and the US on a Mutual Defense Treaty 
(MDT), which was eventually signed in December 1954.137 The administration saw the 
MDT as “a way to simultaneously support and control [J]iang.”138  
When the US had been considering the MDT, the State Department’s near east 
bureau had expressed concern that a MDT would drive India “closer” to China. It would 
“further antagonize” India, which would see it as provocative and indicative of the lack 
of desire on the part of the US to settle with China. An intelligence assessment had added 
that India would see it as “further evidence of US imperialistic interference in Asian 
affairs.”139 
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But Nehru’s reaction—expressed in the context of his concern about potential 
escalation of the crisis—was more nuanced. He believed that earlier in his administration, 
Eisenhower had altered Truman’s stance of restraining Taiwan from attacking China. 
This had heightened Chinese insecurities and destabilized the situation. To Nehru, if a 
MDT indicated that the US would restrain Taiwan from attacking the mainland, it would 
be “commend[able]” and “useful” in the long term even if Beijing was not immediately 
convinced of US sincerity.140 Unbeknownst to Nehru at the time, in a related exchange of 
letters, the US did get Taipei to commit not to unilaterally attack China.141   
On his visit to Beijing, as the crisis continued, Nehru stressed the importance of 
diplomacy to Chinese officials, emphasizing to Zhou that negotiations were the best 
method to solve issues related to Taiwan and Southeast Asia, “instead of using armed 
force as [China did] now.” Nehru stressed that a diplomatic approach would pave the way 
toward easing China’s isolation—Beijing’s lack of engagement with the world only 
caused China to lack understanding of countries outside the communist bloc. Chinese 
officials, however, thought Nehru was “naïve” about US intentions. Internally, they 
dismissed his contentions that the US did not want war and that the American military 
presence around the world was for defensive purposes.142 
As the situation escalated, towards the end of January 1955, Eisenhower sought 
and received congressional authorization to use force to protect Taiwan. Actions such as 
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these that Eisenhower and Dulles saw as part of brinkmanship to deter China, Nehru saw 
as bullying, provocative and “indefensible.” Rather than stabilizing the region, as 
Eisenhower and Dulles claimed, they would exacerbate the situation further. Moreover, 
he thought they would prove ineffective.143 Believing that China was “[l]ogically 
entitled” to take possession of the offshore islands, he came to see Dulles’ speech on 
providing a shield for the offshore islands as just making things worse.144 
At the same time, Nehru did comprehend the danger and the delicacy of the issue 
“because two great countries with high ideas of their own prestige and ‘face’ and with a 
good deal of passion are at logger-heads.”145 He instructed his ambassador in the Soviet 
Union to urge Moscow to find a way to reduce the tension.146 Given how explosive the 
situation was, Nehru did not want to make any public statements that would add to the 
problem. Otherwise quick to participate in multilateral efforts, he declined the Burmese 
premier’s suggestion that the Colombo powers issue a declaration.147 When U Nu 
suggested to Zhou that China, India, the Soviet Union and the UK meet to discuss 
Taiwan, Nehru agreed with British foreign secretary Anthony Eden that such a meeting 
was impractical since, of the stakeholders, only China would be present and there was no 
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“basis for agreement.”148 Furthermore, as Krishna Menon noted, it was “unrealistic” to 
“ignore American sentiment.”149 
Nehru understood Mao’s motives—fear of joint US-Taiwan action against the 
mainland.150 But he did not approve of the Chinese leader’s means. Through his 
ambassador in Beijing, Nehru urged China to be constructive and accept an invitation to 
the UNSC or show some inclination to discuss the crisis. He was disappointed with the 
negative Chinese response. He thought it was “uncompromising” and not “adequate or 
proper.” India, in theory, recognized the mainland’s claims to Taiwan, but Nehru noted 
that “however justified it might be, it is not practical politics at present to ask US to 
withdraw completely. No great power can act in that way.” What China could aim for, 
and India could help with, was the offshore islands, beginning of direct or indirect 
negotiations on the issue, prevention of deepening US-Taiwan relations, and recognition 
of the Beijing regime.151 Nehru later noted to Austrian and Soviet interlocutors that 
Taiwan “ultimately” had to go to China, but peacefully, not through war.152 
Whether through direct negotiations or the good offices of others, Nehru thought 
it essential that China and the US find a way to lessen tensions.153 He noted to the 
Commonwealth prime ministers that if the US sufficiently assured China that it would 
not use Taiwan as a base to attack China, Beijing would not resort to war to try to 
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takeover the island.154 After the discussions in London, he became aware that the US had 
not given Jiang assurances on the offshore islands. But Nehru worried that the US stance 
on the offshore islands was ambiguous.155 Indeed, that was the US intention in order to 
keep China guessing.156  
By March, Beijing’s continued assertiveness worried the administration—as did 
concerns about the impact on US credibility with allies and adversaries.157 Eisenhower, 
Nixon and Dulles publicly implied that the US would not rule out the use of nuclear 
weapons in the case of war in the Strait—not just as a message to Beijing, but also to 
Moscow and perhaps to prepare the ground domestically in case of war.158 These public 
statements did not help their cause with Nehru. Indian policymakers were aware of US 
concerns about credibility.159 And the prime minister was not entirely unsympathetic to 
Eisenhower’s difficulties related to dealing with Jiang.160 But he continued to believe that 
Washington’s China policy was “basically wrong” and eventually would have to be 
jettisoned—the longer it took to change, the harder the change would be.161  
By mid-April, Nehru felt that the US attitude on the offshore islands had “toned 
down a little.” Nehru disapproved of Dulles’ indication that the issue should be brought 
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up at the UN, seeing it—as it turns out correctly162—as an American attempt to bring its 
allies on board and tie their hands. He did believe, however, that the US was restraining 
Jiang from attacking the mainland and had the sense that the US would not attack 
either.163 Interestingly, this was when Eisenhower and Dulles, after considering and 
dismissing the idea of persuading Jiang to withdraw his forces to Taiwan and the 
Pescadores, were proposing a plan with Taipei that would result in Taiwanese withdrawal 
from the offshore islands—in exchange for a US blockade and mining of the Strait and 
placing of nuclear weapons in Taiwan.164 Before those US-Taiwanese discussions bore 
any result, however, Zhou made a surprising move. 
At Bandung in April, Zhou, while declining to renounce unilaterally the use of 
force to reclaim Taiwan, suggested that he was willing to talk to US officials directly 
about the issue.165 Despite his belief in the correctness of the Chinese position, Nehru had 
been frustrated with the “good deal of stubbornness” on Beijing’s part.166 This changed to 
approval after Zhou’s overture. Nehru believed the offer was the effect of Bandung—and 
validation of the Indian approach.167 Dulles later claimed that it was the result of US 
sabre-rattling, especially of the nuclear kind.168  
Dulles’ response to the Chinese initiative reiterated US support for Taiwan and 
expressed uncertainty about China’s intentions, but noted that the US was open to finding 
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out if the Chinese were sincere.169 Nehru thought the initial US response was unhelpful 
but, nonetheless, a step forward. He later told Soviet leaders that he believed that 
Eisenhower, at least, wanted to respond positively to the Chinese overture.170 He noted 
the president’s lack of encouragement to Jiang and was impressed that the US did not 
reject the Chinese overture outright. Furthermore, Nehru appreciated that Eisenhower and 
Dulles agreed to see Krishna Menon who the prime minister dispatched to Washington 
with the “main task” of encouraging the US leadership to respond favorably to the 
Chinese invitation. He approvingly noted Krishna Menon’s observation that Eisenhower 
was “very receptive” and even Dulles was “a little receptive.”171  
These meetings seemed to have a more beneficial effect on Nehru than on 
Eisenhower and Dulles, who did not think that Krishna Menon, at least, had understood 
or accepted the US viewpoint. Despite the US desire for clarity from China on the 
possibility of a ceasefire and a peaceful Taiwan solution, Dulles had never been keen on 
Krishna Menon visiting the US in June after a trip to Beijing. While he was interested in 
the Sino-Indian talks on the subject in May, Dulles certainly did not want Krishna Menon 
to be an “intermediary.”172 Furthermore, there were key differences between the 
administration and Krishna Menon on potential negotiations with China, including on 
potential subjects of discussion. Krishna Menon recommended that China and the US 
discuss the big issues (Taiwan, offshore islands) and then turn to smaller ones (including 
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American airmen being held in China). Eisenhower disagreed, noting that the question of 
imprisoned American airmen was not a minor issue for the US and had to be addressed 
first.173 
The Problem of Prisoners: Major or Minor Issue? (1954-1956) 
India was no stranger to the prisoner question—it had acted as intermediary in 
late 1954. Like its predecessor, the Eisenhower administration had not welcomed the 
Indian role. The administration tried to side-step India, working through the UN 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold instead.174 Dulles had not believed that Indian 
officials like Krishna Menon understood the US position.175 Furthermore, Canadian 
officials had seconded the US perspective that India was too sympathetic to China on the 
issue.176 Zhou’s indication that India was one of the two countries that China would 
accept as an intermediary—the other was the Soviet Union—did nothing to alleviate this 
impression.177 The Indian attitude toward Hammarskjold’s trip to Beijing to try to secure 
the release of the prisoners had only cemented this view. Worried that China would think 
India was taking the US/UN side, Nehru turned down Hammarskjold’s suggestion that an 
Indian official accompany him. The Indian ambassador in Beijing then asserted that 
                                                
173 Memcon of Meeting between Eisenhower, Dulles and Krishna Menon, Washington, June 14, 1955, 
FRUS 1955-57 Vol. II, p. 594. 
174 Some US officials like Henry Cabot Lodge even resisted UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold’s 
suggestion that he consult Nehru on his mediation trip to Beijing. Lodge assumed that Nehru would think 
the trip was a bad idea [Telegram from Lodge (US Representative at the UN) to the DoS, December 11, 
1954, FRUS 1952-54 Vol. XIV-1, p. 1016.  
175 Memcon of Meeting between Dulles and Krishna Menon, December 3, 1954, Ibid, pp. 985-986. 
176 Memcon of Meeting between the Canadian ambassador and Jenkins (Officer in Charge of Chinese 
Political Affairs), Washington, December 14, 1954, Ibid, p. 1029. 
177 Telegram from Wadsworth (Deputy Representative at the UN) to DoS on Hammarskjold-Zhou 
conversation, February 11, 1955, FRUS 1955-57 Vol. II, p. 267.   
 135 
China would make concessions only if it did not look like it was capitulating to pressure, 
so the US needed to cease its “bluster.”178  
In early 1955, when the US led condemnation of China at the UN for holding the 
prisoners, Indian policymakers had told US officials the move was unhelpful.179 But 
Nehru understood from his own officials, as well as other world leaders that the US was 
serious about the prisoner issue.180 So the prime minister had urged Zhou to meet with 
Hammarskjold.181 Krishna Menon, too, had come to understand the resonance of the 
issue in Washington after meeting Eisenhower and Dulles in March 1955. He had 
recommended that Delhi suggest to Beijing that it release some, if not all, the prisoners as 
a goodwill gesture.182 Indeed, Nehru had directly brought up the issue in conversations 
with Zhou in Bandung.183 
US officials had, nonetheless, remained unconvinced about India’s role as 
intermediary. When India had announced after the Bandung conference that Krishna 
Menon would visit Beijing to discuss the issue, US officials had tried to ensure that he 
did not get the impression that he had a “mandate” to speak for the US.184 After Krishna 
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Menon’s visit to Beijing, China agreed to release four of the airmen, Nehru took credit.185 
Krishna Menon speculated that China did not release all the airmen because of public 
opinion and the desire to assess the response to that first step.186 
It was in this context that Krishna Menon urged the US to take steps to reassure 
China when he met with Dulles and Eisenhower in June. Dulles noted that the US had 
already offered to take steps that should have reassured China. Dulles pointed out that 
even during the Korean War the US had ceased fire first, despite some domestic 
opposition. Furthermore, since then, the US had facilitated the Taiwanese withdrawal 
from one of the offshore islands, ensured that the MDT did not cover the offshore islands, 
and restrained Taiwan from attacking airbases on the mainland. Washington was also 
considering changing operating instructions for US aircraft so that their flights were less 
provocative, and trying to make repatriation for Chinese students easier. Dulles stressed 
that the US did not want war with China. A war was not desirable—it would not be 
limited, would involve the Soviet Union and the use of nuclear weapons, and even if the 
US did emerge victorious, it would then be left holding the bag in China.  
Krishna Menon thought, however, that the US could take a few more steps to 
create conditions conducive to negotiations: allow US citizens to visit China; urge 
Taiwan not to follow a “scorched-earth” policy on the offshore islands; and not set 
preconditions for negotiations, asserting that there was little harm in such negotiations. 
But even though Dulles admitted that he had detected a change in Chinese attitude, the 
secretary insisted that the US did not want to negotiate prematurely. He noted that China 
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was using American prisoners as bargaining tools and expected to be rewarded for bad 
behavior. If Washington acceded, the image of China in the US would only deteriorate.187  
Krishna Menon’s mediation attempts seemed to follow a familiar path. He tried to 
convince Dulles that China wanted to improve relations with the US. Dulles insisted that 
the US had seen scant evidence of this desire. In the absence of talks, the Indian envoy 
urged at least discussions on the basis for talks. Dulles clarified that the US did not have a 
precondition regarding the release of the prisoners before talks; just that the talks would 
be more successful if prisoners were released.188 
These Indian efforts had an unintended impact—it partly resulted in Eisenhower 
and Dulles coming to see a Sino-US exchange of “commissioners” as a good option. 
They wanted to find a way to establish communications between China and the US 
without using third party representatives. Krishna Menon had only “mix[ed] up the 
channels of communication” and “crossed wires” causing the situation to 
“slip…backwards.”189 US concern only intensified when different messages seemed to 
emanate from Beijing from the multiple channels being used; Washington did not know 
who to believe.190 And the urgency only increased with the possibility of tension flaring 
once again in the Taiwan Strait, and the Soviet Union insisting on including China in the 
four-power summit due to be held in July in Geneva. By July, Dulles declared that he was 
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“fed up with all the intermediaries;” it was less dangerous to indulge in direct talks than 
to continue to use middlemen who were not effective, clear or trustworthy.191 
When Dulles mentioned to Krishna Menon the possibility of direct Sino-US 
contact in Geneva with a change in the level and scope of discussions, the Indian envoy’s 
reaction was that success would depend on the subjects up for discussion. Krishna Menon 
did not think the absence of Taiwan as a subject would be a deal-breaker, but at some 
point he believed that China and the US would have to discuss the “general 
relations[hip].”192 Concerned that Krishna Menon would “warp” in his interactions with 
Chinese officials what the US was proposing in Geneva, Dulles asked Eisenhower to 
send a clarifying message to Nehru.193 
Nehru, too, was not optimistic about the Chinese reaction if the US did not widen 
the scope of the talks. He believed that the US had not gone far enough and worried that 
the US wanted the Taiwan “question to remain unsettled and the tension to continue.”194 
Acting on Nehru’s concerns and British foreign secretary Harold Macmillan’s urging, 
Dulles agreed to phrase the US proposal for talks less restrictively.195 Despite his 
pessimism, Nehru suggested that China accept the US proposal to hold ambassadorial 
talks, noting that he believed that US opinion had changed and “a realistic approach” to 
the Strait crisis was possible. Nonetheless, he was somewhat taken aback when he heard 
that Zhou’s response was “quite friendly.” He declared, “I hope this does not lead UK or 
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USA to think that we are stronger advocates of Chinese position than [the] Chinese 
themselves.196 
Dulles believed that Nehru’s pessimism had stemmed from his desire to keep 
Krishna Menon involved as an intermediary between China and the US.197 But, by June 
1955, Nehru had come to believe that direct—preferably informal—Sino-US negotiations 
were the only effective option. He disagreed with Soviet and Chinese policymakers, who 
had called for a six-power conference to discuss far eastern issues, because he had come 
to believe that large conferences involved too much back and forth on issues like 
participation.198 Furthermore, big issues like Taiwan were best dealt with bilaterally and 
informally. There was little chance of a Taiwan solution in the offing, but, at the very 
least, direct talks could possibly alleviate tensions related to the offshore islands. Even if 
no issues were solved, “the barrier could be broken and a better atmosphere created.”199 
Finally, Nehru believed there was a limit to how much India could achieve; he was 
frustrated with the Chinese attitude on American prisoners, believing that their continued 
detention gave the Eisenhower administration an excuse to rile up anti-China opinion.200  
There was another reason for Indian reticence to get involved again—the impact 
on US-India relations. In his talks with Dulles, Krishna Menon repeatedly asserted that 
Indian policy toward China was not anti-American; instead, India actually wanted to 
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“help increase and promote the prestige of the United States throughout Asia.” He 
vehemently asserted that he did not want differences over China, and India’s mediation to 
affect negatively the US-India relationship or result in the US questioning India’s 
motives.201  
Some members of Congress were, at the very least, questioning India’s wisdom. 
There was discussion and frustration about India’s naïveté regarding China, as well as 
invocation of Munich analogies and metaphors about lambs lying down with lions. 
Others asked if India did not realize that growing Chinese strength would decrease 
India’s “prestige” in Asia.202 There was annoyance that India’s actions and attitude had 
increased China’s global respectability.203 There were questions about Nehru’s attitude 
toward the world—Sen. Smith asserted that the prime minister’s neutrality seemed more 
pro-communist than pro-US.204 Sen. Fulbright went further, noting Nehru’s “antipathy to 
the West.”205  
India’s improving relations with China and later the Soviet Union also gave critics 
of aid to India more ammunition in 1955. As it is, on Capitol Hill, “India served as a 
lightning rod for…critics of Eisenhower’s mutual security program.”206 That summer 
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while advocating for aid to India, Allen acknowledged, “There are important differences 
in views between ourselves and India on the best means of preserving the peace of Asia 
and the free world.” He admitted that these differences resulted in India being 
“considered one of the most controversial countries insofar as [the administration’s 
FY1956] aid program is concerned.” Rep. Vorys (R-OH) bluntly asked administration 
officials “what do we get out of” aiding India? Rep. Adair (R-IN) asserted that the US 
should not be as generous with India as those countries that were “avowedly our friends.” 
Mutual security program director Stassen had to point out that the administration was 
only asking for a “modest amount.” But Congressional leaders like Sens. Knowland and 
Bridges argued that even that was too much, asserting that aid only be given to those who 
“cooperate[d] fully” with the US.207 Rep. Judd noted, “every year to get the appropriation 
for India is the biggest fight of any of them.”208 That year, at the end of the fight, 
Congress approved only $60 million of the $90 million requested for India.   
Concern about such impact gave India another reason to step back from 
mediating. Thus, once Eisenhower privately indicated to Nehru in July 1955 that 
ambassadorial talks in Geneva could begin, the prime minister handled India’s role 
carefully. He approvingly noted that the US publicly gave India and Burma credit209—in 
contrast with the US playing down India’s role a month earlier when it had helped secure 
the release of the American airmen.210 Then, he instructed Krishna Menon to keep his 
distance from the talks so that neither Chinese nor US officials thought that India was 
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interfering. Furthermore, while he kept Krishna Menon informed, Nehru told him that 
Delhi would handle things from that point.211 That fall, India did get involved once again, 
but only when China and the US requested India’s help with the return of any Chinese 
citizens in the US who wanted to return to China.212  
At the onset of the Sino-US ambassadorial talks, Nehru had been encouraged by 
reports that even Dulles was thinking flexibly about negotiations with China. He had felt 
that the talks and the four-power conference in Geneva lessened tension even if nothing 
substantive was achieved and the scope of talks was limited.213 But, by October 1955, the 
Sino-American talks seemed to have stalled.214 The Indian ambassador in Washington 
suggested to Dulles that to discuss larger issues China and the US should consider talks at 
a higher level. But Dulles questioned the reliability of Chinese promises since nineteen 
American prisoners remained in China. Furthermore, despite US acceptance to discuss 
other issues, the only one China proposed was foreign minister level talks.215 A 
concerned Nehru also tried to clear roadblocks, suggesting to Chinese officials via his 
ambassador that the release of more American prisoners would result in progress with the 
                                                
211 See fn 2 re Telegram from JLN to Krishna Menon, July 29, 1955, Ibid, p. 380. Also see Cable from 
JLN to Krishna Menon, August 1, 1955, Ibid, p. 381. 
212 Letter from JLN to U Nu, September 6, 1955, SWJN SS Vol. 30, p. 402. 
213 Cable from JLN to Raghavan, July 31, 1955, SWJN SS Vol. 29, p. 380; JLN’s Note on Impressions of 
Tour of USSR and Other Countries-II, August 1, 1955, SWJN SS Vol. 29, p. 301. Also see Letter from JLN 
to Eisenhower, Cairo, July 11, 1955, SWJN SS Vol. 29, p. 358. The Indian embassy in Beijing speculated 
that the easing of the Chinese attitude was due either to a change in policy, desire for negotiations leading 
to a settlement, the result of the conference, or “a slow recognition of the futility of bellicosity—a result of 
Indian influence [Raghavan, Report for the month ending July 31, 1955, August 1, 1955, NAI, File No. 2 
(4)-FEA/55]. 
214 Memcon of Meeting between Dulles and Krishna Menon, October 15, 1955, Foreign Relations of the 
United States 1955-57, Volume III: China (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986) [hereafter FRUS 1955-57 Vol. 
III], pp. 129-131. Also see Goldstein, pp. 209-214. 
215 Note from Mehta to Pillai on meeting with Dulles, Washington, October 3, 1955, NAI, File No. 70-
2/55-AMS; and Memcon of Meeting between Dulles and Krishna Menon, October 15, 1955, FRUS 1955-
57 Vol. III, pp. 129-131. 
 143 
US on various matters.216 Nehru believed that neither side wanted to terminate the talks. 
Nonetheless, as a new year rolled around, he remained concerned that there had been 
little progress and the talks were in danger of failing.217 
More Problematic Partnerships (1955) 
India’s receding intermediary role reduced one source of tension between the US 
and India, other irritants emerged, especially related to their partnerships with others. 
Negotiations over the Baghdad Pact in 1955 exacerbated Indian concerns about US aid to 
Pakistan’s military—even though the US was not a member.218 Nehru believed that, like 
SEATO, the group might just end up having “more bark…than bite,” but the potential 
consequences made it problematic for India.219 He reminded senior American and British 
officials that India had to “guard a very long frontier,” including a two thousand-mile 
border with China and Tibet where India needed to maintain check-posts.220 At a time 
when his government was focused on development, neither getting into an arms race with 
Pakistan nor diverting resources to the India-Pakistan border was desirable.   
That fall, the US relationship with another ally—NATO member Portugal—also 
“seriously strained” the US-India relationship.221 Dulles, in a joint statement with the 
Portuguese foreign minister in December 1955, referred to Goa as a Portuguese province 
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instead of a Portuguese colony as India labeled the territory.222 The statement had 
followed Chinese and Soviet declarations supporting India’s stance on the issue. The US 
ambassador later clarified that Dulles’ statement neither indicated a final US position on 
Goa nor that Goa fell within NATO’s purview. But, as scholars have noted, the damage 
to the US image in India had already been done.223  
The deteriorating US-India relationship stood in stark contrast to the developing 
Indo-Soviet one. Some have argued that improving US-Pakistan relations pushed India 
into Soviet arms.224 Indeed, India’s ties with the Soviet Union did increase in the 
aftermath of the US-Pakistan agreements. But, the improvement in Indo-Soviet relations 
would have likely taken place even in the absence of US military assistance to Pakistan. 
Delhi, for one, had been trying to improve relations with Moscow since independence. 
But the Soviet Union had given India short shrift. What had changed in the early 
Eisenhower years was the willingness of the Soviet Union to improve relations with 
India. 
As the US had before it, post-Stalin Soviet Union had come to assign India a role 
in its drive to counter its adversaries’ power and influence.225 To encourage and enable 
India to play that role, it offered assistance and acceptance. The new bonhomie had been 
evident during Nehru’s visit to the Soviet Union in June 1955, and was on display when 
Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India in November-December 1955. Soviet leaders 
offered India not only improved diplomatic relations, but more economic assistance at 
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better terms, certain kinds of aid, especially scientific and technical aid that Moscow 
seemed less inhibited about giving than Washington, large infrastructure projects, 
including in the state-owned sector, as well as trade, offers of military equipment, and 
support for India’s position on Kashmir and its claim to Goa.226 Importantly, the 
availability of the Soviet option also allowed the Indian leadership to diversify the 
country’s dependence. Finally, Nehru sensed that while there would be “angry reaction” 
in the US, it would also create “a feeling that India being even more important than they 
thought, far greater efforts should be made to win her on their side.”227  
US policymakers indeed kept a close eye on Indo-Soviet interactions, observing 
them with “unease.” As McMahon has noted, they were realistic about how far this 
friendship could go, but saw this improvement in relations as “a set-back to our 
objectives with regard to India.”228 Within some sections of the government, there was 
skepticism about propping up through aid an “unfriendly” Indian government that tended 
to support Chinese and Soviet policies.229 Returning from a study mission to India just 
after the Soviet leaders’ trip, Rep. Byrd (D-WV) said the trip only highlighted that India 
was not a dependable country. He said that while he had previously supported aid to 
India, it was time to “let Mr. Nehru and his people know that those who like to run with 
the hare and hunt with the hounds just can’t get American aid.” Rep. Adair agreed, 
criticizing the China-India development race arguments that American and Indian 
officials were making to urge assistance for India. But by spring 1956, those arguments 
started to gain more adherents. China bloc members like Judd noted the importance of 
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not jettisoning India, whose five-year plans were “succeeding due in no small degree to 
American assistance; it is really phenomenal.” In addition, another view started to gain 
traction—not necessarily that the US should try to win India over, as Nehru had 
anticipated, but that it should, at the very least, try to maintain the very Indian non-
alignment that had previously created trouble in the relationship. Rep. Zablocki (D-WI), 
who had led the congressional study mission, vocalized this sentiment, noting “India is 
slowly but definitely falling further to the left…Discontinuing or stopping future 
assistance will only drive India further into the Soviet and Communist orbit.”230  
There also seemed to be some indications of improvement in the interactions of 
policymakers on both sides. When Dulles and Nehru met in March 1956 in Delhi, it was 
evident that differences over issues like recognition of China remained. But, signs of 
change were evident in the conversations that Dulles described as “intimate and animated 
and informal” and Nehru called “long and frank.” While Nehru continued to believe that 
the offshore island problem needed to be sorted out as soon as possible, he admitted that 
the issue of Taiwan could be “deferred” for years. Furthermore, he acknowledged that 
though China was “inherently less aggressive than the Russians,” given that its 
experience with revolution was nearer, it might be “more aggressive.” The tone of the 
Dulles-Nehru conversation also seemed less trenchant than the one they had three years 
before. Both policymakers offered assurances and explanations on key subjects of 
concern to the other (Goa, Pakistan, the Soviet Union). Nehru noted, “Dulles did not 
repudiate all that I said, but brought in the time element and also the need for maintaining 
strength…I said that every country had to maintain its strength, but in view of the new 
situation when war was practically ruled out, it had become essential to try peaceful 
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approaches…” Dulles also passed on Eisenhower’s invitation for Nehru to visit the US, 
which the prime minister seemed inclined to accept.231 By the time that visit would take 
place in December, a number of changes would occur, including in how the two countries 
perceived and sought to deal with China and each other. 
“MUST NOT LEAVE BACKDOOR UNLATCHED”232 
Why did the dissension that the two countries’ China policies create in the US-
India relationship in the Truman and early Eisenhower administrations not lead to a 
complete rupture? For all their differences, the executive authorities in both countries 
faced a dilemma then that they would continue to face over the next decade and a half: 
each country might not like the other country’s policies, but it needed the other country. 
With China-India comparisons becoming commonplace and gaining strength in the early 
1950s, US administrations could not see India fail and/or go communist like China. For 
India, the US was an essential component in its plans for development, which was seen as 
critical for India’s defense, as well as political stability. 
From the Truman administration’s perspective, difficulties with India over China 
notwithstanding, the communists’ takeover of China and their successful military action 
against UN forces in Korea in winter 1950 made it crucial that India did not “go 
communist” just as China had—this, according to Kux, was “Washington’s main concern 
about India.” A State Department policy review in December 1950 noted that, “India has 
become the pivotal state in non-Communist Asia by virtue of its relative power, stability 
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and influence.”233 A NSC reassessment of South Asia policy in January 1951 stated that 
if India was lost, “for all practical purposes all of Asia would have been lost; this would 
constitute a most serious and threatening blow to the security of the United States.”234 
The loss of India would also constitute a political blow to the Truman administration, still 
suffering from accusations that it had lost China. The loss could happen either through 
the lack of economic development, leading to political and socioeconomic instability, or 
through India turning elsewhere for aid because it had not been forthcoming from the 
US.235 Thus, the US needed to aid India’s development.  
Given Indian officials’ public statements, there seemed to be little point in the 
administration arguing to Congress that aid could win India over to the side of the “free 
world.” Instead, the objective as stated bluntly in the administration’s aid requests was to 
prevent India’s loss.236 This formulation was evident in Truman’s message to Congress 
supporting food aid legislation for India in 1951. As presidents after him would, he 
appealed for aid to India for strategic, symbolic and humanitarian reasons. 
Administration officials making the case to Congress did the same. Acheson replied in 
the affirmative when asked by Rep. Javits (R-NY) if the aid was to help “keep India in 
the column of the free people.” Amb. William Pauley, in turn, noted that there were some 
areas in the world where bread and butter rather than guns and bullets worked better to 
contain communism. He further argued that granting India the grain would help 
strengthen the hand of those in the Indian government who were pro-US.237  
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Administration officials worried about the adverse impact of Indian rhetoric and 
actions on congressional support for aid to India and foreign aid more broadly. Making 
the case for India despite what was seen as its intransigence, US officials like McGhee 
argued, “India is too important to us and Nehru too important to India for us to take the 
easy road of concluding that we cannot work with Nehru. We must work with him.”238 
Many in the US public agreed. In October 1951, two-thirds of respondents asserted that 
the US should continue to try to cooperate closely with India despite India’s 
disagreement with America’s China and Korea policy.239 
Because of its need for aid, India had an interest in trying to maintain a working 
relationship with the US as well. With his country requiring US assistance, Nehru tried to 
minimize the impact of differences on his visit to the US in 1949.240 Later, in December 
1950, the Indian finance minister acknowledged that India’s request for food aid 
indicated formal recognition that India needed the US for its major objective: peace and 
stability.241 The food minister bluntly noted to a US official, “we have got to have 
American help.”242 At the time, while the Soviet Union had offered food aid, only the US 
could provide the quantity that India needed, at the speed India wanted, and on terms 
                                                                                                                                            
Acheson, February 20, 1951, Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs - 82nd Congress, 
First Session 1951 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1951), p. 13; and Testimony of Special Assistant to the S/S 
(Pauley), April 16, 1951, SFRC Executive Sessions Vol. III-1 82-I 1951, p. 369, 377. 
238 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, pp. 87-89. 
239 18 percent said it was “not important”; the rest “did not know.” Foreign Affairs Survey, Oct, 1951. 
Retrieved Oct-17-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 
University of Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html.  
240 JLN’s Address to a meeting jointly organized by the East and West Association, the FPA, the India 
League of America and the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, NY, October 19, 1949, SWJN SS, Vol. 
13, p. 339. 
241 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, p. 91. The finance minister was also interested in raising 
funds to aid India’s development from the west more broadly (B.K. Nehru, Nice Guys, p. 239).  
242 Quoted in Proceedings on S. 872 India Emergency Food Aid Act of 1951, April 16, 1951, SFRC 
Executive Sessions Vol. III-1 82-I 1951, p. 373. 
 150 
India preferred.243 Policymakers were also cautious about turning to Beijing for 
assistance since promises of grain repeatedly fell short, either because of China’s terms or 
its domestic needs. Furthermore Beijing’s offers of grain were a double-edged sword for 
the Indian government: it helped the situation to a limited degree, but simultaneously it 
constituted a propaganda coup for China’s alternate system.244 Finally, Indian 
policymakers realized that the acceptance of “red rice” might have an adverse impact on 
its position in the US—this contributed to India’s relative silence on its grain negotiations 
with China. 245  
In spring 1951, as the food assistance bills worked their way through both houses 
of the US Congress, the need for the US also led to Indian government officials trying to 
limit criticism of the US in India. The food minister urged patience in parliament, 
stressing that, like India, the US was a democracy and the food bill was going through a 
democratic process.246 Officials also chose to wait to inform the US about the Indian 
inability to provide troops in Korea till after the passage of the bill.247 Eventually, Nehru 
also agreed to accept conditions attached to assistance.248 Subsequently, so that US-India 
hostility would not get out of hand, India moderated its response to the negative 
American reaction to India’s attitude toward the Japan Peace Treaty. It also helped 
moderate the Rangoon’s reaction to American silence about the presence of GMD troops 
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on Burmese territory.249 Aid from the US was important for not just economic reasons, 
but political ones as well—as an Indian official later noted, “Prime Minister made [a] 
great many promises and history may record it was Americans who made it possible for 
him to keep them.”250  
In support of India’s case for US aid, some Indian commentators also tried to lay 
the groundwork for China-India comparisons—Barbara Ward and later Chester Bowles 
also elaborated on this idea of the two countries as “testing grounds,” “laboratories” or 
“experiments in democracy.”251 Frank Moraes, editor of The Times of India, noted in Life 
magazine as early as 1951: 
China and India are two testing grounds. If India, with her constitution drawing 
inspiration from countries such as the U.S., Canada, Britain and Switzerland, can 
assure her people of economic security and individual freedom, Asia will be won 
for democracy. But if India fails and China succeeds in proving that her present 
way of life offers food and employment for the millions, Asia will be lost to 
Communism.252  
Indian officials even employed the “loss” argument in the military sphere. Officials 
negotiating for the purchase of tanks and jet aircraft from the US, for example, noted that 
it was not in US interest for India to become weak.253 
There were no doubt some in the US who also came to use the China loss analogy 
instrumentally to garner support for India, but there were also true believers. Observers 
                                                
249 Extract from the Record of Conversation between Bajpai and Henderson, September 12, 1951, NMML, 
VLP (I), SF No. 56. 
250 Telegram from Taylor to DoS, Delhi, May 26, 1952, FRUS 1952-54 Vol. XI-2, p. 1646.  
251 Cullather, p. 138  
252 “What Asians think of U.S. Policy,” Life, December 31, 1951, p. 25 
253 Memcon of Meeting between Banerji (Indian military attaché) and DoS South Asia office personnel, 
August 1, 1952, FRUS 1952-54 Vol. XI-2, p. 1659. Bowles used defense against “Commie expansion in 
Asia” and the need to prevent India from turning to another source as reasons for his support of the sale 
(Telegram from Bowles to the DoS, August 13, 1952, FRUS 1952-54 Vol. XI-2, p. 1660). But approval of 
request in mid-1952 for sale of 200 Sherman tanks and, following US indications that 200 jet aircraft would 
not be forthcoming, 54 C-119s (Kux, India and the United States, p. 86). 
 152 
noted that if the US did not support the stability of the Nehru government in India—“the 
last important stronghold of democracy in Asia”—it would be a mistake “almost as 
calamitous as the one we made in China.”254 Spurred by the arguments of Paul Hoffman, 
director of the Ford Foundation, Bowles also took to making explicit China-India 
“economic competition” references to lobby for economic aid for India.255 In early 1952, 
he went on a tour in the US to highlight the test the US faced, arguing that in countries 
like India “plows [were] more important than machine guns and should not be 
overlooked in the defense of Asia.” In an election year in the US, he further asked 
legislators to think about the repercussions for the country (and for them) if the US lost 
India as it had lost China. Bowles argued that the loss of India would be worse than 
China, because “Southeast Asia and the Middle East would be impossible to hold.” To 
bolster his case, Bowles tended to exaggerate the danger of communism, as well as the 
“growing disillusionment” with—and increasing fear of—China in India.256  
But Indian concerns were not entirely non-existent. There was some apprehension 
in India about communists taking advantage of disillusionment with the government’s 
ability to deliver when a coalition of communist and socialist parties made electoral gains 
in a southern state at the expense of the ruling Congress party. In the US, too, there was 
concern that communists and communist-affiliates received a larger share of votes in the 
1952 Indian elections than expected.257 The near east bureau, while noting that it would 
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be difficult to get the amount of aid that Bowles was lobbying for through Congress, 
nonetheless argued that these communist gains showed how important it was for the US 
to tackle through aid the problems that led to communism thriving in India.258 Merrill 
credits concern about these electoral gains as the reason for Bowles managing to 
convince Acheson to increase somewhat the aid request for India for FY1953 that the 
secretary had earlier cut substantially.259  
A reappraisal of NSC-68 in summer/fall 1952 further highlighted the importance 
of the “free world” developing “greater stability in peripheral or other unstable areas.”260 
Attempting to elicit aid for India that fall, some liberals argued that, “China is gone, 
yes…But there are perhaps four years in which we can help save India.”261 As Kux has 
noted, Bowles also continued to link Indian economic development to US security 
interests. The ambassador argued that India’s democracy was still vulnerable to 
communism and if it collapsed, the effect on US interests would be “catastrophic.”262 His 
cause was buffeted by an intelligence estimate that fall that noted, “[C]oming on the heels 
of the Communist victory in China [the loss of South Asia] would create the impression 
throughout non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Europe that the advance of Communism 
was inevitable.”263  
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In India, Nehru tried to do his part by pointedly acknowledging American aid 
publicly, noting that the US had sent assistance with the “very best of motives and 
without strings of any kind.” While Nehru believed that the communists in India were 
weaker than six months before, like Bowles his government remained concerned that 
directly and indirectly Beijing had “done a disturbingly effective job of selling China as a 
new land of milk and honey”—all achieved through communism, rather than 
democracy.264  
In the US, by the time Eisenhower took office in 1953, as Merrill notes, the 
debate was no longer on whether defense (of the US and the “free world”) and 
development (of India and other developing countries) were connected. Some continued 
to argue vociferously against aid for India. But the key point of discussion was on how 
much aid India should receive.265 The lame-duck Truman administration had left office 
suggesting that the new administration allocate over four times the amount of aid India 
had received the previous year. Acheson had argued that it would help keep India on the 
side of the “democratic free world” and make India an example for others.266 The 
Eisenhower administration considered the proposals excessive. But the president worried 
about the vulnerability of states that had recently gained independence.267 Thus, while 
reducing the amount, Dulles still endorsed in Cold War language—outlining the China-
India competition—and elicited from Congress more aid for India for FY1954 than had 
ever been authorized in the past.268 Some members of Congress grudgingly admitted that 
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while they did not like Nehru, it served US purposes to help India prevent communists 
from taking over. Others noted that if they cut aid to India even further, it might have 
negative repercussions on India’s stance in the NNRC.269 
There continued to be debate about the necessity and benefits of aiding India in 
1953-1954. Ambassador Allen and under secretary of state Walter Bedell Smith asked 
whether the US had “gone past the point of diminishing returns in several areas” with 
India. Smith noted that the relationship with India would survive an aid stoppage—
Burma seemed to have fared well even without US aid and Burma-US relations seemed 
to be doing fine as well.270 Dulles disagreed, however, noting that the termination of aid 
would leave the US no way of ensuring stability in India. Furthermore, along with the 
general negative impact on the US-India relationship, such a cut-off would have 
“unfortunate results which would likely take place in connection with discussions of 
Asian problems, UN debates and resolutions, and India’s work as chairman [of] 
NNRC.”271 
Like its predecessor, the Eisenhower administration did not see aid as a way to 
win India over. Administration officials had little-to-no expectation that India would 
                                                                                                                                            
sort of competition going on between India and Communist China…If the Indians fall and collapse it will 
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move closer to the US.272 There was hope in some quarters that eventually India could be 
persuaded to participate in a “common front against communism”273 But the purpose of 
aid to the South Asian countries at the time, as vice president Richard Nixon put it, was 
not primarily “a desire to gain credit or to buy friendship, but rather to build up these 
countries.”274 
India, in turn, had a “desperate” need for foreign aid.275 Nehru noted that it was 
“very important” for India to strive to have a working relationship with the US because 
“What we do or do not do is powerfully affected by our relations with America.”276 The 
importance of American aid in satisfying Indian requirements was evident in India’s 
reaction to the uproar over an Indian shipment of thorium nitrate to China in 1953. Before 
that, when there had been some US concern about Indian exports of another strategic 
material—rubber goods—to China, India had suspended such exports. But, in July 1953 
the US ambassador received reports that a state-owned Indian company was shipping 
thorium nitrate to China. The Battle Act of 1951 made states exporting such strategic 
items to countries like China and the Soviet Union ineligible to receive US aid. When 
broached about US officials’ concerns that the Indian shipments would result in a 
suspension of US aid to India, Nehru argued that he had always made clear that aid had to 
                                                
272 Byroade to Bedell Smith, February 5, 1953. Quoted in McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, p. 
157. Also see NIE: Probable Developments in South Asia, June 30, 1953, FRUS 1952-54 Vol. XI-2, p. 
1074. 
273 Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the NSC (NSC 5409: US Policy Toward South Asia), February 
19, 1954, FRUS 1952-54 Vol. XI-2, p. 1094. 
274 Memo of a Discussion at NSC Meeting, March 4, 1954, Ibid, p. 1129. This view had also been reflected 
in NIE: Probable Developments in South Asia, June 30, 1953, Ibid, p. 1087. 
275 Letter from Hoffman to Dulles, April 28, 1953, Ibid, p. 1320.  
276 JLN Conversation with Norman Cousins, September 3, 1953, SWJN, SS Vol. 23, p. 16. Even on a 
broader basis, Nehru acknowledged that it was important for India to maintain “friendly relations” with the 
US (JLN, Minutes of Discussions with Dulles, New Delhi, May 22, 1953, SWJN, SS Vol. 22, p. 507). 
 157 
come with no strings attached.277 He further noted that even if he could recall the 
shipment, the “political consequences, both internally and in relations between India and 
China, would be so serious as to render [such action] impossible.”278 Nonetheless, despite 
assertions that it was neither desirable nor feasible to stop the shipment, key Indian 
officials—aware of the stakes—tried to do just that, albeit unsuccessfully.279 
Furthermore, an anxious Indian government accepted Dulles’ proposed solution.280 It 
declared that the thorium nitrate was for commercial purposes in China and that India did 
not expect any such future shipments to China or other countries in the Soviet orbit. 
Later, when China and the Soviet Union approached India for more thorium nitrate, 
Indian officials quickly turned to the US to make this purchase instead.281 
In early 1954, NSC 5409—United States Policy toward South Asia—emphasized 
the stakes involved for the US following “the consolidation of communist control in 
China” and the setbacks in Indochina. It reinforced various themes: South Asia as “a 
major battleground in the cold war,” China-India competition, the threat posed by India’s 
internal economic and political vulnerability,  the adverse impact if India—
“potentially…the pivot of the whole area”—was lost. Furthermore, it laid out the key 
problem: “If India does not achieve substantial economic and social progress through 
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democratic processes, and on the other hand, Communist China appears to be moving 
forward through totalitarian methods, the peoples of South Asia may turn to communist 
leadership and methods for solutions to their own problems.” And China seemed to be 
delivering faster.282 Therefore, as Merrill has noted, even though Nehru irked Eisenhower 
and Dulles, they saw the need to help support India and Nehru’s government. Of the 
economic aid requested for underdeveloped countries for 1955—even though it paled in 
comparison to military assistance and aid to allies—the largest request was for India. 
Dulles and other administration officials advocated for this aid using Cold War 
logic, and language that specifically highlighted the China-India economic 
competition.283 Gen. Stewart, the director of the defense department’s office of military 
assistance, stressed that from a military perspective, the loss of India would be a disaster 
for US national security—“equally as great a disaster as the loss of China.” Appealing to 
the China bloc members on the House foreign affairs committee, Stassen noted that the 
US had already made the error of once basing China policy on adverse perceptions of 
Jiang; it should not repeat that mistake by basing India policy on views of Nehru. 
Assistant secretary of state Byroade argued that despite disagreements about perceptions 
and policy toward the communists, the US could not totally give up on India. He asserted, 
“We don’t have a program of helping our friends. We have a program of preserving our 
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way of life in this world.” Furthermore, termination of aid would weaken the hands of 
those in India who were friendly to the US. Allen stated that it was crucial to dispel the 
notion in Asia that the US had only “one string to our bow” i.e. military means to solve 
problems. The US needed to help the democratic Indian government “deliver the 
goods.”284 The administration found support from senators like Smith and Humphrey. 
They managed to convince somewhat senators like Fulbright, who had been skeptical, but 
came to believe that one of the most important questions was “whether or not India, with 
our assistance, is making greater progress than China with the Russian assistance.”285 
The Indian need for that assistance from the US, as intelligence assessments 
noted, meant that India would “seek to avoid a clear-cut break with the US and its allies” 
despite the US announcement of military aid to Pakistan.286 Nehru indeed warned against 
any knee-jerk Indian rejection of US aid in retaliation or any statement about forsaking 
such aid.287 Indian requirements also caused officials to express deep concern about the 
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deterioration in US-India relations in March 1954.288 Furthermore, it partly led to Nehru 
and some officials advising against public ranting against SEATO later that year.289  
In summer and fall 1954 some within and outside the US government continued 
to argue that the US should only give aid to anti-communist states. Others contended that 
the US could not just write off countries like India—the US could not wait for India to 
come to its senses; it needed strengthening now so it could resist communism. Moreover, 
attaching any political or military strings to aid would only help communist 
propaganda.290 A working group formed to consider a large-scale long-term economic 
assistance program for Asia advised that neutral countries be included in such a program. 
Economic aid could serve to counter communist subversion in these countries and was 
part of the “total anti-Communist defense in Asia.”291 Intelligence assessments noted with 
concern China’s economic progress, especially on the industrial front.292 The State 
Department and some other agencies believed that since there was little prospect of 
reducing absolute Chinese power—as some in the Defense Department and the JCS 
desired—the goal should be to reduce its relative power by building up countries like 
India.293 An interagency document also recommended that the US “develop the basic 
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stability and strength of non-Communist countries, especially Japan and India, and their 
capacity and will to resist Communist expansion.”294 
There continued to be some concern within the administration about putting aside 
aid for India on the grounds that India had not been helpful to the US and that Congress 
would not concur. Treasury Secretary Humphrey, for example, argued that the US was 
better off focusing on building up Japan as a counterbalance to China.295 Others asserted 
that, even though Congress made cuts to administration requests, it eventually always 
appropriated some funds for India because Congress, too, realized that “it is in our overall 
interest to see that the Indian Five-Year Plan succeeds, since the alternative to such 
success is judged to be disastrous to US security interests.”296 
By early 1955, the initial stages of the Soviet economic offensive and increased 
Indo-Soviet interaction, combined with the military setback in Indochina, caused the re-
emergence of concern in the US that the West was losing ground in India.297 This led to 
discussions of an expanded foreign assistance program, which Eisenhower called “the 
cheapest insurance in the world.”298 It also led to recognition of the need to deal with 
those with whom one differed. Difficult as it was to deal with Nehru, US policymakers 
accepted that “to deal with India one must deal with Nehru.”299 For Eisenhower, India 
had “special status.”300 Admitting that he did not trust Nehru, Eisenhower nonetheless 
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suggested to the head of media companies that they “not knock down the Indians too 
much,” even if they did not like Nehru: “After all…If they are ever added to the great 
populations that the Communists now control, the free world will be up against it, not 
only in the East but throughout the world…we have got to keep them at least on the 
neutral side if we can…don’t go slamming the Indians.”301 This echoed Acheson’s 
assertion that even though Nehru was “one of the most difficult men with whom I have 
ever had to deal,” he “was so important to India and India’s survival to all of us” that the 
US had little choice.302 
In Congressional testimony in support of aid to India that summer, Dulles 
identified Japan and India as the “keystones” of security in Asia, noting that in both 
countries the most urgent problem was economic rather than military. Stassen noted the 
beginning of Soviet “economic warfare.” Allen argued that the US could not cut and run 
because the Soviets had showed up—as some were arguing—but had to stay and “fight 
the issue out.” Bowles added that it was a time of “competitive co-existence.”303 An 
administration official asserted, “With Russia intensifying its efforts to get a foothold in 
India…and with China developing the show window, I think that it makes the task of 
India and ourselves perhaps, as hard during the coming year as it has been so far.” He 
used the China contrast in Congress to counter other objections on aid to India. When 
Rep. Judd, for example, raised concerns about aiding India that was “socializ[ing],” an 
administration official pointed out that the US should focus on the contrast between 
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AS/S NESA, June 8, 1955, HFAC Hearings 84-1 Congress on MSA 1955, p. 115; and Testimony of former 
ambassador to India (Bowles), May 23, 1955, SFRC Hearings 84-1 Congress on MSA 1955, p. 508. 
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China and India—just as other Asian countries were—rather than between the American 
and Indian systems where there were more similarities. Judd grudgingly acknowledged, 
“It is the philosophy of the lesser evil.”304 
Escalating Indo-Soviet interaction in 1955 only heightened US anxiety. So did 
intelligence assessments that indicated that China’s power and prestige had grown in Asia 
and that, with Soviet assistance, Beijing’s military programs were charging ahead.305 
Soviet efforts changed what Dulles called “the scene of the battle” in a way that would 
eventually come to benefit India.306 But till then, while the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations had supported assistance to India, it was only in a “moderate degree”—
with continuing skepticism about India limiting the amount of aid the executive would 
ask for and receive from the legislature.307   
US assessments of the second half of 1955 indicated that there was a greater 
appreciation of American aid and its value in India.308 This Indian understanding meant 
that the government in Delhi tried to limit public criticism of the US. Nehru tried to 
ensure that any official Indian criticism of the US related to the Baghdad Pact was 
through private channels.309 His efforts at message control hit a bump in the road with the 
Dulles statement on Goa. Nehru was very concerned that, without damage control, the 
negative reaction in the country would escalate, adversely affecting India’s relations with 
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the US and “indirectly…the question of our receiving any help from the US for our 
developmental programme.” He lamented, “Everything that the US might have done to 
India is likely to be forgotten in the anger caused by this.”310  
Furthermore, better Indo-Soviet and Sino-Indian relationships only made it more 
important to maintain India’s relationship with the US. Nehru’s policy called for balance: 
between defense and development, but also between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. For one, this would allow India to play one off against the other. But, more than 
that, Nehru hoped this would allow India to maintain its freedom of action by 
diversifying its dependence. Diversification would allow India to reduce dependence on 
any one country or bloc, as well as to cope with the questionable reliability of 
benefactors. Finally, it was necessary to maintain the US option because of continuing 
Indian concerns about the Soviet Union. This stemmed from Soviet support for the 
communist party of India that was taking India’s government on, as well as the Soviet 
veto of UN membership for newly independent nations. Thus, to maintain balance, when 
the visits of Khrushchev and Bulganin were forthcoming, Nehru extended an invitation to 
Eisenhower.311 During their visit, worried about American and British reaction, he also 
tried to eliminate or limit the Soviet leaders’ public criticism of the US.312 Then, in 
March 1956, India rejected a Soviet offer of aircraft, partly because Dulles had made 
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clear that India was unlikely to receive economic aid from the US if it was spending 
money on Soviet aircraft. 313 
CONCLUSION 
Mutual need—and the reality that neither could ignore the other—had kept the 
US-India relationship from deteriorating into hostility or total indifference. But between 
1949-1956, that need had not been sufficient to overcome their major differences on 
attitudes and approaches towards key issues, including China. Moreover, the two 
countries had not developed the habits of cooperation that allowed the US, for example, 
to overcome policy differences—especially, but not solely, on China—with countries like 
Britain. American and Indian policymakers had little historical experience interacting 
with each other. They had never been in the foxhole together.314 At times, the executive 
leaderships were willing (albeit grudgingly) to give the other the benefit of the doubt, but 
this was not common. Simultaneously, however, in each country expectations for the 
other were—perhaps unrealistically—high. Many in the US expected India to play a role 
in their cold war script. After all, it was a non-communist democracy faced with a 
communist threat at its doorstep. On the other hand, many in India expected the US to 
understand India’s perspective. After all, it was a fellow post-colonial democracy that had 
advocated for India’s independence and had itself experienced the desire not to get 
entangled in power politics.315 But, when these expectations were unfulfilled, it had only 
increased the disillusionment. 
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Chapter 3: The Pandit and The President (1956-1958) 
It was also dawning on America that in a war of ideas or ideologies, India was the 
strongest ‘ally’ in a strategic region of the world not because India had announced 
this alliance, nor that India had signed any treaty, but that India existed and 
continued to grow as a thriving Democratic State. 
– Indian minister (political), Washington, DC on 19591 
It speaks much for the latent strength of Indo-US friendship that the stresses and 
strains of the international crises in 1958 and storms in UN did not cause any 
basic adverse effects on Indo-US friendly relations in spite of the known 
divergencies in outlook. The tendencies in the past which have cast considerable 
doubts and suspicions on the ability of the ‘two largest democracies in the world’ 
to co-operate were not only kept in check but were materially reduced in 
influence. 
– Indian first secretary, Washington, DC on 19582 
By the time Nehru travelled to the US in December 1956, circumstances had 
changed from his previous visit in fall 1949. There was more convergence or at least 
parallelism in American and Indian views than there had ever been before. Between 
1956-1962, Delhi’s perception of China and its policy toward that country would be 
closer to those of the US than previously. There were changes in Washington too—not 
over the question of whether China was a threat, but in the kind of threat that it posed and 
in the means considered best to tackle the China threat. This convergence on China not 
only implicitly eased the strains on the US-India relationship, but also explicitly brought 
the two countries together. 
On the one hand, the US came to see China as much of a symbolic and 
psychological threat as a direct security threat to its interests. On the other hand, the 
Indian leadership, which had earlier thought that any threat from China was symbolic and 
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psychological, came to see China as a more traditional security threat.  Moreover, the two 
countries agreed on what was required to contain and confront such a threat: close 
partnership with each other, and the strengthening of not just India’s development effort, 
but eventually also its defense apparatus.  
Between 1956-1958, Eisenhower partly came around to Nehru’s view of the 
threat from communism and China. His administration worried that along with the 
infiltration of men, the infiltration of ideas and influence could be threatening. For 
Washington, as it watched the battlefield beyond Europe for hearts, minds and stomachs 
unfold through a cold war lens, if Soviet-backed China succeeded while India failed 
economically, this would be a victory for communism. If, on the other hand, the US 
could help India succeed and win the development race versus China, it could 
demonstrate to the uncommitted world that democracy and development could co-exist 
and thrive. Scholars have often said that the US emphasis on global rather than regional 
imperatives when it came to South Asia caused a lack of interest in India.3 By the mid-to-
late 1950s, however, it was those imperatives that caused interest in and brought attention 
to India in the US.  
Nehru had already believed that if there was a short-to-medium term threat from 
China, it was that Beijing might show that its approach was more successful at delivering 
the goods than that of Delhi. This threat became real as his government dealt with 
charges of complacency and stagnation while China seemed to thrive next door and 
communism established an official foothold at home. Nehru’s government had to kick-
start the economy—partly to meet that threat—but this task was near impossible without 
external assistance, especially from the US.  
                                                
3 Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, cited in Mansingh, p. 75. 
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Simultaneously, Nehru started to worry about the threat of the infiltration of men 
and influence from China. This change resulted from growing concern about China’s 
attitude toward the Sino-Indian border, Chinese behavior in Tibet and Beijing’s 
increasing interactions with India’s neighbors. India also increasingly had doubts about 
China’s commitment to peaceful co-existence and non-interference. Indian 
disappointments with China during this period meant that Delhi and Washington more 
often found themselves on the same page with regard to China. Even where there 
continued to be differences, India’s changing attitude toward China made it more 
understanding of the US perspective—and vice versa—thus significantly reducing the 
adverse impact the China factor had on the US-India relationship. Overall, each country’s 
need for the other to play a role in its China strategy was accompanied by a greater 
tolerance of the other’s approach, as well as a reduced emphasis on differences and—
where they continued to exist—a better way of handling disagreements. For India, this 
stood in sharp contrast to the way communist countries seemed to handle disagreements. 
CHANGING DIAGNOSIS, CHANGING PRESCRIPTION: THE INFILTRATION OF IDEAS AND 
INFLUENCE (1956-1958) 
In this period, the US administration still perceived a threat from communism in 
general and from China in particular, but the strategic context and resulting framework 
changed. By the mid-1950s, Eisenhower came to see the Cold War battleground as 
having moved from Europe to the uncommitted world, where “[a]ll of the new nations 
appeared to be more or less in danger of falling to the Communists.”4 The post-Stalin 
Soviet leadership had taken the initiative in wooing these nations and a rival suitor piqued 
US interest and concern. As Merrill has noted, towards the end of 1955 and into 1956, the 
administration was anxious about the Sino-Soviet bloc economic offensive. The CIA 
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highlighted a particular reason for concern—most of the Soviet economic assistance was 
directed at four countries (Afghanistan, Egypt, India and Yugoslavia). Eisenhower 
worried that, unlike Soviet-supplied guns that elicited fear, butter would present a more 
benign and attractive Soviet face in those countries.5 
This concern was not restricted to the White House. A public survey in the US 
asked whether the Soviet drive to win over uncommitted nations should be a cause for 
concern for the US government. Only 12 percent of respondents said it was not a subject 
of concern, while 49 percent thought it was very serious and 32 percent thought it was 
somewhat serious. While 52 percent thought the US was doing what it should to win the 
friendship of nonaligned countries like Burma, Egypt and India, a significant 40 percent 
thought the US should try harder.6 
Furthermore, in the cold war, the battles for territory were giving way to battles 
for not just hearts and minds, but stomachs. The Eisenhower administration believed that 
if the “free world” could not prove that democracy and development could co-exist, it 
would “lose” large sections of the world. Conceptually, officials and observers were 
increasingly juxtaposing the democratic Indian development experiment against the 
communist Chinese one. In what was being described as a “keen competition,” Dulles 
noted in December 1956 that “[a] great deal depends” on India’s success.7 Consequently, 
many officials argued that the US had a stake in facilitating an Indian win in the 
competition against China.  
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7 “Differences with India Minimized,” WP, December 8, 1956, p. A5. 
 171 
Documents such as NSC-68 had referred to the power of example. Many like 
Kennan, however, had believed that the US was a sufficient model to show that 
democracy could deliver security, stability and prosperity.8 By the mid-1950s, however, 
it was becoming apparent that the US was not an adequate model. Countries just 
emerging from colonialism, far behind on the socioeconomic and political development 
ladder, could hardly relate to the superpower. India, on the other hand, was relatable. In 
this regard, an Indian loss to China in the development race would be a setback to the 
“free world” cause—and thus US security.  
There was another related challenge—that of potential Indian failure. Rather than 
outright attacks or invasions, there was a sense that internal subversion in 
underdeveloped or developing countries was more of an imminent threat. Communism 
might win in these countries not through the use of military instruments, but by 
exploiting economic weakness. What made countries vulnerable was the lack of 
economic development. If individuals in non-communists countries felt that their system 
of government would not deliver, they would look to another way of life and thus be 
more susceptible to communism. Thus, the “free world” could lose India if Indians 
looked next door to China and saw it moving ahead under a communist government.  
With the change in diagnosis of threat came a change in prescription—to one that 
matched that of India. The US could strengthen “free world” security and these 
uncommitted countries—especially India—by focusing on development. It could help not 
by giving them military assistance, which a number of them did not want anyway, but by 
providing economic assistance.  
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On these grounds, the US embassy in Delhi, led by Ambassador John Sherman 
Cooper, called for a re-evaluation of American aid policy towards India. He based this 
call largely on the grounds that India, which was in competition with China, could 
demonstrate “the superior capacity of democracy in Asia for economic achievement for 
the people.” Officials proposed a five-year $500 million economic and $300 million food 
assistance package for India to ensure its success and to show that the US did not just rely 
on a military approach.9 India’s ambitious $14.7 billion second five-year plan, which 
envisioned more than double the expenditure of the first five-year plan, left the country in 
need of food assistance and with a foreign exchange gap of $1.7 billion. US officials 
considered this foreign exchange shortage the “most critical immediate problem” in 
implementing the plan.10 The plan, which began in spring 1956, offered the US an 
opportunity to assist India. Subsequently, that spring Dulles directed a State Department 
task force to study the case of India. It eventually suggested a $75 million annual aid 
package for India for five years, as well as $300 million in PL480 food assistance.11  
A key challenge remained: convincing Congress. While advocates within the 
administration such as Dulles wanted the US to move towards a different, more flexible 
and imaginative aid policy, skeptics like Treasury Secretary Humphrey cautioned that 
there was little appetite on Capitol Hill for long-term assistance, especially for India. 
There continued to be serious opposition to foreign assistance in general in Congress.12 
For India in particular, Rep. Byrd (D-WV) predicted a “sufficiently hard time” for 
appropriating even a one-year commitment through Congress.13  
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Administration officials directed their efforts towards convincing Congress 
members about how crucial it was to aid India. They highlighted the importance of the 
demonstrative effect of India’s success vis-à-vis China.14 One official stated, 
The people of Asia are watching the show windows of Communist China and 
India, one displaying the fruits of totalitarianism and the other displaying the 
results of democracy. It is in the interests of the free world that India provide the 
more genuinely successful example. To achieve this goal, India must have outside 
aid.15 
Without American aid, they argued that India would not succeed. If India failed, all of 
Asia would likely fall to communism as had China. Dulles and other officials asserted 
that the US had an interest in preventing India’s fall to communism and even ensuring an 
Indian victory versus China. Given the loss of China, India’s future was especially 
important to US security.16  
Officials and advocates highlighted India’s achievements, adding that US aid had 
already helped India make progress through its first five-year plan. India’s progress was 
“modest,” but, nonetheless, “remarkable.” No other country in Asia, or perhaps even in 
the world, had made as much progress with as little. Dulles also assured members of 
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Congress that Nehru was “fighting the Communists very hard in India” and trying to 
“avoid being absorbed into the Communist bloc.” Eisenhower, in turn, publicly warned 
of the danger of the communist bloc presenting China as a successful model. Other 
administration officials played up Chinese and Soviet economic engagement with India, 
arguing that they were trying to win over and convert India.17  
There were some congressional supporters for aid to India. Some like Sen. 
Humphrey (D-MN) argued that India needed to be given more aid because it was “trying 
to make its economy work in competition with that Red Chinese outfit.” Some like Sen. 
Thye (R-MN) were concerned that the US would lose India. Others such as Rep. Church 
(R-IL) did not want to cut aid to India, but said that Washington should demand that 
Delhi be more sensitive to US interests.18 Yet others like Sen. Fulbright (D-AK), Sen. 
Green (D-RI) and Rep. Smith (R-WI) thought that, overall, the administration was not 
doing enough in the face of the communist economic offensive and, indeed, was still too 
focused on military rather than economic aid.19  
Advocates for aid had their work cut out for them. Some key senators continued 
to have problems with India’s actions that irritated the US, and especially its neutrality.20 
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There also continued to be strong opposition from representatives like Byrd who 
considered Nehru a “menace” and others like Adair (R-IN) who complained about anti-
American sentiments in the Indian press. They pointed to testimony from American 
business leaders who emphasized that foreign aid to India was wasted because India was 
actively siding with communists, especially China.21 
Thus, with some congressional members still talking about cutting a single-year 
aid package to India, the administration put any thoughts of increasing that aid or putting 
it on a multi-year basis on the backburner. Instead, it was relieved that the single-year aid 
package for India emerged from Congress only $5 million lighter at $65 with an 
additional $10 million in technical assistance. Furthermore, in August 1956, the two 
countries also agreed to a three-year $360 million PL480 package.22  
In addition, during the course of the year, the administration continued to re-
examine US aid policy, with assessments linking the “reasonable” success of India’s 
second five year plan with the health of its democracy.23 On the flip side, Cooper 
continued to express concern that if India’s government did not deliver the goods, it 
would adversely affect India’s democratic future, with even Nehru questioning whether 
India could stay abreast with China without resorting to authoritarian means. From the 
US perspective, it would result in India falling behind China. Furthermore, if India did 
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not progress while Nehru was alive, a generation of “more Asia-for Asian minded” 
leaders would take over and follow an authoritarian path to keep up with China.  
In December 1956 in the run up to a visit by Nehru to the US, Cooper argued that 
US and India were now standing at “an open gate [rather] than at crossroads.” He argued 
that India’s need for aid gave the US an opportunity. He believed that India, in turn, 
would see the US as a more attractive option to meet its internal needs for a few reasons: 
the Soviet option had lost some of its luster because of its actions in Hungary; India’s 
need to reduce its dependence on Britain and the Commonwealth; and India’s “uneasy 
political, social and economic rivalry with Red China.” While others were skeptical,24 
Cooper even expected India to alter its external policies to facilitate its internal 
development. He noted that, after all, “India’s foreign policy is to a large extent 
conditioned on India’s need and determination to progress economically as rapidly as 
possible.”25  
As he awaited Nehru’s visit, Eisenhower expected the prime minister’s primary 
aim to be smoothing the way for US assistance. The president had been “inclined to 
think” that the US should give India a “substantial” loan package in the $500 million 
range. The president, nonetheless, heeded Dulles’ warning about making any concrete 
commitments during the visit. Simultaneously, he was concerned about appearing to be 
“too cool.”26 Thus, as advised by Cooper, he brought up India’s development program in 
discussions with Nehru. He stated that the US would give “every possible consideration” 
to an Indian request for assistance. This seemed to make an impression on Nehru who 
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noted that the president “seemed to be greatly interested” in India’s development plans 
that he said he would help “boost.”27 
That previous August, Nehru had detected a change for the better in the west’s 
attitude towards India. He traced it to the “feeling that with China having gone 
Communist, India offered some hope to stem the tide of Communism in Asia.”28 Delhi 
welcomed American assistance, which had become even more crucial because the 
success of the second five-year plan depended on foreign assistance. In the years after the 
Second World War, India had received over half a billion dollars in food and economic 
assistance from the US.29 Now India needed more.  
This time around on his visit Nehru was not as bashful about making India’s 
needs known. There had been criticism in Congress that India did not deign to ask for 
aid.30 Administration officials testifying in Congress had found that members deemed 
insufficient their assurances that India was privately making their need for assistance 
evident.31 While officials did not think a formal Indian request for a long-term package 
was wise at that point, American officials had indicated that Congressional receptivity to 
aid for India would increase if Nehru at least acknowledged previous US assistance 
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publicly.32 Thus, even before his visit, Nehru expressed appreciation publicly for 
American aid, adding that foreign aid was “vital” for India.33 In the US, when asked 
publicly what the US could do to assist India with its economic plans he suggested aid, 
especially loans. To address concerns about Indian socialism that were often expressed 
on the Hill, Nehru also publicly asserted that India’s economic policy was not based on 
dogma, but pragmatism.34 
No More “You’re With Us or Against Us” 
Some have noted that the Nehru visit that December started a “new phase” in the 
relationship.35 It might be more accurate to say that the visit helped and highlighted an 
aspect of the relationship that had been already been improving over the previous few 
months: the increased understanding of, if not convergence with, the other government’s 
approach. This improvement—which would continue over the rest of this period—would 
have a salutary effect on the relationship in general. 
First, there was greater tolerance on the part of Eisenhower for what he called 
neutralism and Nehru called nonalignment. This generally helped the relationship 
because in the administration it led to less criticism and more acceptance of Delhi’s 
desire to diversify its portfolio of partnerships, pursuing relationships with both Moscow 
and Washington. There was a more sophisticated understanding of nonalignment, with 
American assessments seeing it as a strategy that countries perceived as best serving their 
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interests rather than as a rigid ideology.36 In language that Nehru could have used, 
Eisenhower expressed understanding of India’s position and acknowledged that 
“neutrality” in most instances was basically an “aversion to military alliances.”37 While 
there continued to be criticism on the part of some including vice president Nixon, even 
Dulles, who had publicly labeled neutrality as “immoral” in June 1956, refused to make it 
personal against India. He noted that merely holding UN membership removed a country 
from the immoral list since it showed an acceptance of the idea of collective security. 
Dulles’ conceptualization left columnist Walter Lippmann noting that for Dulles, 
“neutrality is immoral but…there are no neutrals who are immoral.”38  
The tolerance was aided by the fact that the administration no longer believed that 
it could bring India into an alliance.39 There was a sense among some that the US should 
not even try. Budget-conscious Eisenhower repeatedly noted that it was actually better 
for the US that India remain nonaligned, because if she sought an alliance with the US, it 
would require the American taxpayer to take on a greater burden and the US military to 
help defend “2000 miles more of active frontier.”40 This attitude was indeed echoed by 
some on the Hill such as Rep. Morano (R-CT) who stated that too much cooperation with 
India might not be advisable because it could prove costly.41 Thus, the goal was not 
necessarily to win India over—or require it to come over—to the US side any more, but 
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to ensure that it was not lost to the other side. This attitude continued through the rest of 
the administration, with little expectation that India would give up its nonalignment.42  
Second, the age and attraction of alliances in the US had faded somewhat. Besides 
the fact that treaties had already been signed with most potential allies, a certain amount 
of alliance weariness had also set in at the White House. Dealing with allies sometimes 
seemed as, if not more, difficult as dealing with adversaries. Interactions with South 
Korean leader Syngman Rhee during the Korean War, and Britain, France and Israel 
during the Suez crisis had contributed to Eisenhower’s exacerbation with allies. By fall 
1956, Eisenhower had directed committees to assess US alliances and propose ways of 
reducing military aid packages to certain allies. More specifically, in India’s 
neighborhood, the president and a number of US officials had come to see the alliance 
with Pakistan as a “burden and a blunder.” Eisenhower would note frankly in early 1957, 
“our tendency to rush out and seek allies was not very sensible.” Finally, there was 
recognition that some allies were not as important as some neutrals—as Dulles made 
evident when he contended that he “would rather see us lose Thailand, an ally, than to 
lose India, a neutral.”43 
Indian policymakers were neither unaware nor unappreciative of the changes in 
Washington. Nehru detected a “variety of opinion” on nonalignment, approvingly noting 
that Eisenhower had “put in a good word for what is called neutralism.” He felt that there 
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was less rigidity in the US and “more understanding” and even appreciation of India’s 
nonalignment than ever before.44   
Overall, Nehru continued to believe that there was a better understanding of the 
Indian perspective in the Eisenhower administration.45 Later in his second term, the 
president would indeed go as far as saying that India was “wise” to be nonaligned.46 This 
fit in with Nehru’s assertion that nonalignment was not just a matter of principle for 
India, but, more importantly, one of practicality. For India, the benefits of staying outside 
an alliance outweighed the risks of not being in one. India had already seen advantages in 
terms of “enhanced” stature and a role in maintaining peace. There was another key 
advantage. Nehru stated that he did not want to “get into a position of bargaining for 
temporary benefits with one camp or the other.” What he left unsaid was that diversifying 
India’s portfolio of partners allowed India to be in a position of gaining benefits from 
both camps.  
Nehru, on his part, showed more tolerance of other countries’ freedom to choose a 
camp. He acknowledged that in some cases, it might be less risky to be in an alliance than 
out of it. He even acknowledged that some countries, which did not have the capacity to 
defend themselves, might want foreign troops in their country.47 
Nehru also showed less passion for a third way. While he rejected the alliance 
option for India, he also rejected calls for a commonwealth of Afro-Asian states, calling it 
“impracticable.” In the circumstances that existed even another Bandung-style conference 
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would not be possible.48 Publicly, he only said that it was not the right time for such a 
conference, but privately he asserted that the countries involved would not have the 
desired level of unity or common interests. Therefore, a political or economic conference 
would neither be desirable nor feasible.49 As for a “third force,” it had “no relation to 
reality.”50  
Furthermore, Nehru seemed to appreciate Eisenhower’s attitude towards partners. 
Eisenhower’s statement “that you cannot make friends by dominating them” reassured 
Nehru. The prime minister disliked larger powers not treating their smaller partners as 
equal—as he noted, “We are an independent nation, we want to be friends, we are friends 
with every country but when somebody tells us, join up, line up, I am not a soldier to be 
recruited in a regiment.”51 It was for this reason that Nehru believed that the situation in 
Hungary—and Soviet behavior—had “undermined” both national and international 
communism.52 In contrast, when he returned from the US he especially remarked that the 
US government “went out of their way in showing me honour.” On his visit, Eisenhower 
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and Dulles had not just listened to his viewpoint, but seemingly even acted on his advice 
in certain cases.53  
Indian officials also realized that there was a growing awareness in Washington of 
the risks of alliances. After a visit from Dulles, Nehru noted that the US came across as 
“a weary titan trying to do good to the world but being let down by [its] allies and having 
to go to their rescue repeatedly.” The prime minister continued to mention the challenges 
the US was facing with its allies, including Britain, France and Taiwan.54  
Eisenhower’s reaction to US allies’ actions during the Suez crisis had also made 
Indian policymakers aware that Washington could act on the merits of a case rather than 
just on the basis of alliance solidarity. When Egypt announced the nationalization of the 
Suez Canal, Nehru had believed that this was just going to add to India’s “headaches.” 
He did not want to take sides.55 Delhi and Washington agreed that a peaceful settlement 
was the best option. Nehru was, however, concerned that Washington would eventually 
agree with London’s belligerent approach. After seeing the American reaction to the 
Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, he was convinced that Washington did not 
approve of the invasion and appreciated the US attitude.56 Even Krishna Menon, who 
thought US anger at its allies was because of lack of consultation rather than on principle, 
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later acknowledged that the allies did not tell Washington because “they knew they 
would have been stopped.”57  
Eisenhower’s portrayal of the US as a reluctant warrior on the military front 
serving on invitation—even though it would rather focus internally—also made an 
impression on Nehru.58 The prime minister praised Eisenhower as a “great man” of 
peace. While lamenting the US emphasis on the military approach, Nehru stressed his 
belief that the US “could do a great deal of good in the world.”59 The US president, on his 
part, continued throughout his term to emphasize to Indian officials this reluctance to 
resort to arms. He also stressed his concern that “we might lose our free institutions in 
defending them.” Finally, he made clear that he was aware of the negative impact of 
certain US military actions on the American image abroad.60  
From the US perspective, Nehru, on his part, displayed more circumspect 
behavior on the international stage. Nehru was more restrained in offering up India for 
mediatory roles or participation in great power conferences. India did not need to get 
entangled at a time when it had its own “burdens.” He asserted that India did not want to 
go around the world telling others what to do with a “missionary zeal.” He also added 
that condemnation was not helpful. Nehru denied that the circumspection was in return 
for something. He himself, however, acknowledged that crusading and condemnation 
could have an adverse impact in terms of India’s influence and India needed to “win over 
the other side.”61  
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The greater tolerance toward the other country’s approach—and the 
acknowledgement that the other side meant well—was accompanied by a reduced 
emphasis on differences and a change in the way the two countries handled 
disagreements. The change was evident in the tone of the Dulles-Nehru talks in March 
1956, which both sides noted had much improved from previous Dulles-Nehru 
interactions. On points of disagreement, Nehru noted that Dulles did not reject his 
contentions, but merely pointed out differences and explained the reasons for them. When 
Nehru visited Washington, Eisenhower also did not contradict his contentions on certain 
issues, merely noting that the US emphasis was somewhat different.62 
Nehru acknowledged the differences, but noted that no two countries had 
“complete agreement.”63 In many cases, he thought the disagreement was exaggerated 
and often the difference was one of emphasis.64 Moreover, Nehru publicly pointed out 
that, beyond the differences between the US and India, “there are many basic similarities 
in approach,” which were being emphasized more.65 Even on issues like Hungary and 
Suez, privately, at least, there were indeed more similarities than differences. As Merrill 
has noted, during this period “the frequency and intensity” of disagreement between the 
two countries decreased.66  
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Differences did not disappeared, but the two countries seemed to handle them 
better. Differences over existing alliances, for example, remained. Nehru believed that 
SEATO and CENTO had exacerbated the problems they had been designed to solve. 
Even when he talked about them, however, he was careful to add that he was not “trying 
to run them down” or be “presumptuous enough to criticize,” but merely wanted to note 
that they were counterproductive. Nehru also made sure to include the Warsaw Pact when 
he discussed the downside of alliances.67  
This change in approach towards differences was also evident in the Indian 
government’s reaction to the announcement of the Eisenhower doctrine in 1957. Nehru 
internally expressed regret about the US emphasis on a military approach,68 also writing 
to Eisenhower to outline his concerns.69 He refused, however, to make a special statement 
on the doctrine, heeding a senior official’s advice that it would serve no purpose.70 
Publicly, Nehru resisted a strong adverse reaction, declining to get drawn into criticism of 
the doctrine. He added that there were “so many excellent things in that proposal,” 
praising its economic elements, while regretting their linkage with military aid. Overall, 
even when directly asked to make critical assessments of US policy, he started refusing.71 
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Delhi also gave instructions that before reacting to American policies, its officials should 
seek clarification.72 
In Washington, in turn, there was a realistic understanding that the US could not 
expect complete support from India. Some in Congress questioned whether the US 
should strengthen a country that did not agree with it. There was a strong sense in the 
administration, however, that it was in US interests to do so despite some differences 
between Delhi and Washington. Outgoing ambassador Cooper suggested that the need to 
aid India to develop into “a democratic counterpoise to China” was a “compelling reason 
for our accommodating certain of our objections to Nehru’s policies and views.”73 New 
ambassador to India Ellsworth Bunker also asserted that differences should not obfuscate 
the “overriding objective” of helping build India into a successful model.74 Despite some 
differences, assessments noted that India and the US also had common interests, 
including limiting communist expansion—especially Chinese expansion in South and 
Southeast Asia—and encouraging cooperation between Asian and African non-
communist states. The administration overall agreed that the benefits of a “stable and 
influential” India outweighed the costs of a “weak and vulnerable” one. India could serve 
as an alternative to China and, once it had developed more, provide itself the means to 
protect itself and South and Southeast Asia against China.75 
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The Development Race 
Nehru’s visit had seemed to consolidate the view in the administration that India, 
along with China, was the “leading political contender” in Asia.76 Concern about Chinese 
economic progress was evident in the administration’s revised statement of its South Asia 
policy in early 1957. It emphasized that it was critical that India’s momentum did not 
slow down. India’s development had domestic and international implications. Regarding 
the latter, if India lost the economic competition to China, this would have an adverse 
impact on the cause of the “free world” across Asia and Africa. As Merrill has noted, 
while the concept of a Sino-Indian race or a competition was not new, this was the first 
time it was mentioned in an official document and linked with US security.77 
Nehru sometimes criticized those who made comparisons between China and 
India, denying that there was a race between the two countries.78 He himself, however, 
consistently made such comparisons, admitting that in many ways China was the only 
country that India could be compared with. He noted that China and India were at similar 
stages of development and had some similar characteristics, but he contrasted Beijing’s 
use of autocratic means with Delhi’s employment of democratic ones. Nehru 
acknowledged the “great test:” if his government did not “deliver the goods…democracy 
will then be in peril…Then people may think of totalitarian methods…” Thus, his goal 
was that “India should become a stable and united country during the next 10-15 years.” 
He was “anxious” that it “become firm on its axis” or else it might not be sustainable.79  
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In early 1957, there was concern in Delhi that the government was not delivering. 
Nehru was already concerned that the economy was “giving us a good deal of trouble.” 
This concern only increased with the announcement of the spring 1957 general and state 
election results. Despite the overall victory for Congress, Nehru and other party members 
thought the results and “reverses” were “bad for India and bad for the Congress.” He was 
surprised by the Congress party’s losses in certain parts of western India. What concerned 
him about the election setbacks were not the defeats per se, but what they indicated about 
the perception of whether the party was delivering. Nehru felt that “Congress is losing its 
hold.” Worryingly, it was also losing the confidence of the “intellectual classes” that 
influenced the “masses.” Complacency, he fretted, would spell the death knell for the 
party. The consequences of Congress failure would, moreover, be disastrous for the 
country because there would be a “vacuum” that other democratic parties were incapable 
of filling.80 
In one state at least, the communist party filled the vacuum. In the southern state 
of Kerala, communists came to power. Nehru saw Congress party performance as 
responsible—the communists had not won, according to him, Congress had lost by not 
delivering.81 Internally, he asserted that there was little getting away from the fact that it 
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was a “very positive defeat for the Congress.”82 He acknowledged the “significant” 
aspect of the communist victory—it was the first time in the world that communists had 
come to power through democratic elections. Before the elections—when Nehru had 
expected the communists to get a majority in Kerala—and in their immediate aftermath, 
he resignedly noted that the country might as well experience such an “experiment.” 
However, soon, like some in the US, he came to worry that the communists would 
become a successful alternative model. He acknowledged that the communists seemed to 
have succeeded in connecting with voters in a way that his party had ceased to do.83 He 
also admitted that the victory could have “some effect” on international communism.84 
Indeed, communist reaction abroad seemed to range from cautious approval to triumphal 
predictions that the communists could expand from that foothold.85 
Confronted with continued criticism about the lack of government performance 
and how Indian development paled in comparison with that of China, Nehru took a few 
different steps. For one, he tried to create a sense of momentum in India. After the 
election setback, he directed officials to make a greater effort to publicize the 
government’s development plans.86 Rebuilding the country, he stated, was both a 
“tremendous,” as well as “exciting task.”87 He asserted that India had made progress and 
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compared well with other recently decolonized countries.88 From the “larger view,” India 
was not doing that badly. Moreover, India was respected globally because of its 
achievements.89 Publicly and privately, he argued that India’s problems were due to the 
progress India was making.90  
Simultaneously, Nehru highlighted China’s problems. When some asserted that 
next door in China, communism was delivering while his government was not, Nehru 
emphasized that all was not well in China, even if it seemed to be. He argued that “there 
are great complaints in China;” that Chinese leaders were having similar difficulties with 
their economic plans; and that sometimes these problems were even greater than those of 
India. Just like India, he asserted that China, too, was “pay[ing] the price” that came with 
industrialization and development even though it was an authoritarian country.91 
Eventually, he would also take point out reports that the statistics coming out of China 
were exaggerated.92 
Nehru asserted that China’s failures were not as evident because of the lack of 
openness and the pervasiveness of censorship and fear, but that only made it more likely 
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that “the lid” would come off and “terrible criticism” would emerge later.93 He admitted 
that industrially China had moved past India.94 He acknowledged that perhaps China paid 
less of a price for rapid development sometimes, but he said that was because Beijing 
could do things by “decree” in a way that Delhi could not. China, for example, could take 
strong measures to curb corruption that were not feasible for India because of 
“constitutional safeguards and civil liberties.”95  
On a related noted, Nehru suggested that India’s progress was better than that of 
China because even if it might seem slower, it was more sustainable. Unlike countries 
like China, he noted that India faced a dual problem: how to achieve a “peaceful socio-
economic revolution” after having established a democracy. Democracy came with 
certain disadvantages. It, however, also came with dividends. Overall, development 
might take longer, but democracy was “the sounder way of doing things.” The 
democratic way was the “best and safest method…[it] has the best chance of solving the 
problems of the world today.”96 
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Nehru and other officials tried to keep track of what China was doing. This was 
partly to see if Delhi could adapt some of Beijing’s policies.97 It was also to see how 
India compared with China.98 He made it a point to discuss Chinese economic difficulties 
with American ambassador. He also took special note of the Yugoslav vice president’s 
unfavorable impression of the Chinese economy after a visit there. Indian officials also 
reported signs of discontent.99 There was a short period during 1957 when Nehru was 
impressed at the industrial progress the Chinese leadership was generating while 
simultaneously liberalizing society and weeding out corruption through a rectification 
drive.100 Subsequently, however, Nehru received information about a reversal in Mao’s 
liberalization drive, and he asserted that the signs coming from China were not 
“impressive” and indicated a return to “the old rigidity.”101  
Ultimately, however, Nehru knew that his government had to deliver. This was 
crucial for the nation-building project, to save democracy and for domestic political 
purposes. Moreover, he pointed out, “Even as far as foreign affairs are concerned we can 
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be only as powerful as we are domestically strong.”102 Finally, development was also 
necessary in order to defend India—after all, invasion was not the only way India could 
collapse; internal weakness could be exploited.103 Nehru emphasized that “We must not 
allow ourselves to go under.” India was at a critical stage—“a difficult stage of crossing 
over from that kind of static economy to a dynamic, moving, progressive and self-
motivated economy.” In a “dangerous and turbulent” world, India had limited time to 
strengthen itself. Thus, like many US policymakers, Nehru did not believe that India 
could afford to slow down. He asserted that “In Asia…one has to make good quickly, 
otherwise one is swallowed up by other forces.”104  
For this reason, Nehru rejected calls in India that his government significantly 
“tone down” the second five-year plan. The plan had put an even larger burden on the 
government than it had expected. India was in a “very difficult phase” developmentally—
a phase expected to last for at least another two years—and suffering from a serious 
resource crunch. Two critical problems the government was facing were food and foreign 
exchange shortages.105 And there was only one country that could help in a substantial 
way: the US. 
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By summer 1957, admitting that India’s situation was “grave,” Nehru decided to 
seek assistance from abroad. He did not, however, want the decision made public.106 
Nehru spoke privately with the US ambassador, who had earlier recommended long-term 
credits for India. Bunker suggested that the Indian embassy in Washington also make 
direct approaches.107 
Who Delivers Wins 
The environment in the US seemed more conducive for aid to India. The 
discussions of the previous year had created a greater debate about foreign assistance. 
Senate and House groups, as well as an administration commission had been formed to 
study the US foreign assistance program. During the hearings on the Hill on the program, 
advocates of aid had emphasized that India was making progress with US help. They had 
highlighted, however, the greater rate of progress of the Soviet “showcase”—China—
compared to India. They had asserted that this made it urgent that the US aid India even 
more.108 
Despite their differences, each of the studies that emerged in early 1957 had 
highlighted the importance of meeting the communist offensive through long-term 
planning for aid and soft-loan packages. Within the administration, the State 
Department’s policy planning staff suggested the creation of a $2 billion soft-loan 
Development Loan Fund (DLF). An interagency group—created on Eisenhower’s 
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behest—recommended that the administration fund India through the DLF, as well as the 
Export-Import Bank. As Merrill has noted, India aid advocates’ case was strengthened by 
the communist party victory in Kerala that caused concern in the US by highlighting the 
consequences of the Indian government’s failure to deliver.109  
Testifying before Congress in 1955, Bowles, then ambassador to India, had 
confidently said that people had “never voted to go Communist in the history of the 
world, and I don’t think they are likely to if they have any chance or any alternative.” He 
had called the Indian structure “Communist proof.”110 Thus, the communist victory in 
Kerala, as well as the increase in communist vote-share from five percent in the 1952 
general election to ten percent in the 1957 one, caused concern. The administration saw it 
as not just an electoral victory, but also a psychological one for the communist bloc with 
repercussions beyond India. Moreover, it was anxious that the election had given the 
communists a respectable foothold in India from which they would try to expand. Like 
Nehru, officials continued to see the elections as a referendum on the Congress party’s 
ability to deliver in one of the most “economically depressed” states.111 Indian officials 
hardly played down the link. Finance ministry official BK Nehru, for example, noted how 
India’s economic vulnerability could impact its democratic nature, emphasizing that 
India’s “political requirements” called for a certain rate of development.112  
That summer, Eisenhower publicly stressed that a small amount of aid could 
“fatefully decide the difference between success and failure” in countries like India where 
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it was crucial to maintain momentum.113 Based on the policy planning staff’s report, he 
requested funding for a three-year $2 billion DLF as part of the administration’s foreign 
assistance request. There were still doubts about the feasibility of getting a larger aid 
request through Congress. Dulles noted congressional and budgetary constraints in tight 
economic times. Officials from treasury and the international cooperation administration 
wanted to keep costs contained. The State department still did not think it was possible to 
get long-term assistance packages through Congress. Others in the administration, 
especially in the defense department, also worried about the wisdom of aiding neutrals at 
the expense of allies. Treasury was particularly concerned about approaching Congress 
for special legislation for aid for India.114  
Bunker worried that since India was not at the point of collapse, there would be 
little appetite for aiding India substantially on the Hill. Nonetheless he was heartened at 
finding a “more sympathetic response” than expected in the administration with regard to 
India’s needs, including from the president.115 He assured Indian officials that the 
chances of most of the general aid package getting through Congress were “fairly 
good.”116  
As Douglas Dillon, deputy under secretary of state for economic affairs, had 
noted to Indian officials the question of aid to India was “one of amount and not of 
principle.” He had explained that a specific aid program for India was not feasible, with a 
lot more work yet to be done to get Congress to accept the desirability of development 
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assistance more broadly. American and Indian officials had subsequently discussed the 
possibility of assistance through other avenues—the DLF and Export-Import Bank 
funding.117 
To avoid the public back and forth that had followed the Indian request for wheat 
in 1950-1951—and the adverse impact that had had on the US-India relationship —
Bunker had recommended that the two countries have quiet informal discussions about 
the possibility of assistance before any formal request for aid. Senior US and Indian 
officials had concurred.118 The countries continued to agree that India should not make a 
formal request lest the two countries “be left with a situation in which many harsh things 
would have been said about India…but with no offsetting constructive results to show for 
our efforts.”119  
With the deteriorating situation already having forced India to scale the 
development plan back somewhat, however, Nehru made India’s need clear that fall. 
Even as Indian officials were holding discussions with Soviet officials in Delhi for $125 
million of credit, in what the New York Times called “his most pointed pronouncement,” 
Nehru stated that India would welcome $500-600 million of loans from the US. Asserting 
that the Indian economy was “fundamentally sound,” he also announced that the Indian 
finance minister, T.T. Krishnamachari would travel to Britain, Canada, the US and West 
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Germany in September and October 1957 to seek aid, credit and capital from these 
countries, as well as the World Bank.120  
In an interview before his departure, Krishnamachari warned that without aid, 
India would have to cut its economic plans drastically. He acknowledged the reluctance 
of the US Congress to sanction development assistance programs, but emphasized, “the 
battle here in India is a battle against communism too.” He used the communist victory in 
Kerala to highlight the consequences of the shortage of resources for development. He 
implied that domestic communists might call upon Beijing and Moscow to aid them in 
attacking the Indian state. Furthermore, he asserted that India needed to strengthen itself 
because communist countries that India considered friendly at that time would not 
necessarily stay friendly. In private, he was more direct, indicating to the American 
ambassador—presciently as it turned out—that the Chinese threat would reach its climax 
in 4-5 years.121  
Indian private sector leaders on a visit to Washington also warned of the 
possibility of a communist takeover if the development plan failed. GD Birla emphasized 
that India was “the citadel in Asia against the spread of communism” and it was crucial 
that it win the “silent race” with China. Nehru himself hardly played down the Sino-
Indian race. While noting that “we do not look upon it as a competition,” he admitted, 
“inevitably comparisons are made.” Just as US administration officials did, Nehru also 
highlighted that India was employing a different method than that of China.122 
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Krishnamachari’s implicitly and explicitly stated concerns about China and the 
Soviet Union created an uproar on the left in India, with accusations that the government 
was seeking to ally with the US. Publicly, Nehru did not defend Krishnamachari’s 
remarks, but he also did not repudiate the minister’s right to state his views. The prime 
minister merely noted that as far as he was concerned India had friendly relations with 
China and the Soviet Union. Asked about Krishnamachari’s comment that India was in 
practice closer to the US, Nehru admitted that economically that was the case. Privately, 
Nehru told his minister that such public advocacy created problems since it gave the 
communist party ammunition and caused potential embarrassment with Beijing and 
Moscow.123  
Privately and publicly, Nehru acknowledged that the US was the “only country” 
that could help India “substantially.”124 Bunker believed that many in India had come to 
see the US as the only real hope for assistance.125 Nehru had not been optimistic about 
the immediate results of Krishnamachari’s visit, expecting them to fall short of India’s 
needs. They were a start, however, and he expected more help.126 The minister’s trip 
report, which leaked at the end of October, made evident that the core of the plan could 
be saved, but only with the aid that looked like it could be forthcoming from the US, 
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Japan and West Germany. Krishnamachari subsequently acknowledged in parliament that 
India hoped to get “sizeable” aid from the US, West Germany and the World Bank.127 
The Indian government was aware of the importance of creating a positive 
atmosphere for aid to India in the US. Christian Herter, under secretary of state, had 
stressed to Krishnamachari the importance of the Congressional attitude and noted the 
negative impact of any public airing of differences.128 Indian foreign secretary Subimal 
Dutt subsequently remarked to Nehru that there were “special reasons” not to rock the 
boat in the US.129 The prime minister went on to censure those in India who were critical 
of the US for not helping immediately. He tried to create understanding of the US 
perspective, explaining the strained economic conditions in the US and UK. He asserted 
that it was not just the US that should understand India better, but vice versa. Nehru 
further noted that India would be grateful for whatever it received, but would not 
“quarrel” with those who could not or would not provide aid.130 Publicly and privately, 
Indian officials also continued to express gratitude for American aid and understanding, 
and welcome further assistance.131 Nehru, for example, publicly acknowledged that the 
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US was the largest supplier of aid. At a party meeting, he also highlighted how much 
Japan had achieved with American economic assistance.132  
Nehru was and would continue to be sensitive about appearing to moderate or 
change India’s foreign policy because of the US.133 Privately, however, he and others 
were cautious because of the potential impact of Indian actions and words on US 
attitudes. Thus, Nehru stalled a minister advocating for further Soviet projects, noting 
that India needed to be cautious so as not to complicate Krishnamachari’s efforts. He 
instructed the Indian representative in the ICC not issue to condemnations of American-
British-French proposals lest it cause a “definite breach with these Governments.” Dutt 
told other diplomats that Delhi generally wanted to stay out of most international 
issues.134 Nehru asked Krishna Menon, defense minister and head of the Indian 
delegation to the UN, to limit involvement as well. When Krishna Menon expressed 
concern that India was turning away from nonalignment because of economic necessity, 
Nehru disagreed, but asserted that he did not “want to appear as a crusader on the world 
stage.” India would not change its basic policy, but he did not want to engage in 
unhelpful criticism or global involvement.135  
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Nehru pushed back on criticism from the left and right that his government was 
involving itself too much or too little in global affairs. He pointed out that sometimes 
India could not help but get involved—not just because it was a member of international 
organizations, but, since “we are all neighbours,” because of global interdependence.136 
Nonetheless, India now had to be more careful about this involvement:  
Just taking up a brave attitude, the attitude of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, 
charging at windmills thinking that they were the brave knights in armour—that is 
past except that occasionally it appears on the Opposition Benches.  
Thus, India would express its opinion—because international security issues and India’s 
parochial concerns were linked137—but it had to be realistic about its role: “we must put 
our own house in order first before we try to advise others.”138  
Publicly, Nehru continued to acknowledge differences with the US on policy, but 
he stressed his appreciation for the improvement in “the basic approach” of the US 
towards India. Publicly and privately, he highlighted the positive change in the American 
approach. He asserted that it was important to stress similarities, rather than differences. 
Nehru acknowledged that the US was seeking to play a constructive role in Asia.139 He 
approvingly quoted Eisenhower’s speech at a NATO conference in which the president 
stressed, “there is a noble strategy of victory—not victory over any peoples, but victory 
for all peoples.” The Indian prime minister even likened them to Buddha’s words. 
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Privately, he favorably compared the rhetoric emanating from the NATO conference, 
which seemed more moderate, to that emerging from the communist parties’ meeting in 
Moscow.140 
The Glorious Gamble 
In the US, in fall 1957, two interdepartmental groups that had been created to 
assess Indian needs and US options to aid India’s economic development, indicated that 
the steps the US had been contemplating were insufficient. From Delhi, Bunker had 
argued that India was a “good long-term investment” for the US, as well as its private 
sector. Others had argued that economic setbacks could help communists make gains in 
the next Indian general elections, especially in Bengal and Bombay.141 
Dulles had publicly noted that the US would give—within budgetary 
constraints—“sympathetic consideration” to any Indian aid request.142 Privately, when 
Krishnamachari had formally requested assistance, Eisenhower and Dulles had both 
promised to “explore the possibilities.” Dulles had emphasized that there was no 
conceptual problem with giving India aid, but there was a practical one, with Congress 
and the treasury department noting public demands for tax cuts and highlighting 
objections to further aid.143 
Within the administration, there was discussion about the risks and benefits of 
aiding India over the long term. The key question highlighted was “whether the free 
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world can take the risk of letting India sink or swim on its own.” The China analogy 
seemed at the forefront of the arguments in favor of aiding India in both a negative and 
positive sense. The negative “fundamental” argument in favor of aiding India was that aid 
would help prevent a communist takeover of the country. China posed political, socio-
economic, psychological and military problems for India. Economic development could 
alleviate India’s problems on these fronts.144 The time was now: “Once a country, like 
China, comes under Communist control it is lost to the free world; no amount of dollars 
can buy it back.” The consequences: “[I]f India went so would go almost all of Asia.”145  
There was also a more positive argument: the administration could help India win 
or at least keep pace with Moscow-aided China in the development race.146 This was 
important as these administration discussions took place in the aftermath of the Soviet 
launch of Sputnik, which was followed by public shock and Democratic accusations of 
the administration allowing “various ‘gaps’” to develop between the “free” and 
communist worlds.147 Advocates for aid to India argued that it could “be a great force for 
stability in Asia.” They noted that internal development and sound leadership were key to 
India’s role as an alternative to China; aid would assist that development and also give 
the Indian government time to consolidate.148 
Based on these arguments, Operations Coordination Board and State Department 
suggestions about increased aid to India, and discussions with vice president Nixon and 
treasury secretary Anderson, Dulles recommended an India aid package to Eisenhower. 
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This recommendation was buffeted by an intelligence assessment of the grave 
consequences of economic failure in India—including the spread of communism from 
Kerala to “strategically situated” Bengal to the rest of the countries to Asia—as well as 
the previous NSC assessment that it was in US interests that India’s second five year plan 
succeed.149 Anderson, Dulles and Nixon laid out the problems for Eisenhower as well: 
Congressional opposition and the impact on allies such as Pakistan. Nonetheless, even 
Nixon—not known to be a fan of nonaligned nations—argued that it was important to aid 
India: “if we do not, the cost will be disintegration of India and its orientation toward the 
Communists,” which would have a deleterious impact on all of Asia. Eisenhower agreed 
to go big, but “to break the problem down into parts.” Rather than seeking special 
legislation, which Anderson and Dulles thought would be problematic, the administration 
decided to put together a package of Ex-Im Bank loans, funding from DLF and 
contributions from allies, while urging Indian economic reforms and reductions in 
defense expenditures.150 
In January 1958, the administration formally told the Indian government that it 
was willing to discuss extending India credit of $225 million through the DLF and the 
Ex-Im Bank. Anticipating criticism from some allies, Washington laid out the argument 
for the offer: that India was of such “major political and psychological importance in 
Asia” that it was “obviously in interest free world that India remain independent and free 
of Communism which would flourish if [the] economic situation deteriorates.”151 
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Nehru was “pleased and gratified” by the offer. He publicly expressed his 
appreciation.152 Indian officials repeatedly conveyed the government’s gratitude not just 
for the decision, but also for the terms eventually agreed upon that March, as well as the 
lack of major conditions.153 Taking on communist criticism about aid from the US, Nehru 
not only denied that India had “barter[ed] our soul,” but stressed that the US had not even 
asked it to do so.154  
The aid helped significantly, but India would need more. There continued to be 
calls in India for “pruning” the plan, but Nehru resisted major cuts on the grounds that 
India could not afford to lose momentum.155  There continued to be discussion of cuts, 
but the government decided against major pruning.156 Nehru, nonetheless, realized that 
the situation continued to be grim and worried that “If we do not come to grips with our 
problems soon, the problems may well break our economy.”157 India had miscalculated 
its balance of payments situation. The cabinet agreed that India needed more large-scale 
foreign assistance. Nehru did not like it, but India had no choice—it needed aid on a 
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“massive scale.”158 He admitted publicly that India would have to continue to seek 
assistance, especially from the US, which was in the best position to aid India.159 
That spring, US officials had avoided discussing specifics of additional aid.160 
Eisenhower had, however, emphasized the US commitment to India.161 There was an 
awareness that more would have to be done. Although American policymakers no longer 
doubted that the Indian leadership shared their attitude toward the dangers of communism 
in India, they continued to be concerned about the Indian leadership’s capacity to combat 
it. Development, in their minds, was the best deterrent to communism in India.162 
Officials repeatedly mentioned the China comparison not just to justify aid to 
India in Congress, but also in internal documents. As Merrill notes, India was special in a 
way—a place where, unlike the case of non-democratic allies, “strategic interests 
coincided with ideals.” By late 1957 and especially spring 1958, Merrill points out that 
aiding India in its competition with China had become a “cause célèbre” and “somewhat 
of an ideological crusade” in the US. The cause had gone mainstream. Newspapers and 
newsmagazines joined earlier advocates of aiding India to stress the importance of an 
Indian victory in “the race.” A resolution proposed by Sen. Kennedy (D-MA) and Sen. 
Cooper (R-KY)—and attached to the 1958 foreign assistance bill passed in the Senate—
had identified India as deserving of special attention: “India, like the United States, is 
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engaged in a struggle of coexistence—in its case with China, which is also pursuing a 
planning effort being put under consideration all over the world.”163  
The previous year, officials had decided to reconsider in 1958 whether to go to 
Congress with special legislation for India.164 The administration, however, decided that 
while congressional reaction had seemed “fairly satisfactory up to now,” it did not want 
to push its luck. Rather than special legislation that B.K. Nehru had been pressing for, 
further assistance came through World Bank president Eugene Black’s suggestion of a 
“creditors’ meeting.”165 The US took the lead in August to form what became the India 
aid consortium with Canada, Japan, West Germany and the UK. Working through the 
World Bank, it announced pledges of $350 million for India immediately and envisioned 
commitments of $600 million through the rest of the five-year plan. As Merrill has noted, 
this development took place within a broader change of approach in the US—one in 
which the administration unusually requested less money for military assistance than 
economic assistance for FY1959. As envisioned by the step-by-step approach decided 
upon in January, the administration also decided on more PL480 agreements for India 
that June and September and, working with the World Bank that July, it postponed the 
repayment of debts from the 1951 wheat loan to India.166 
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By fall, Dillon noted to B.K. Nehru, “In general…the leaders of both political 
parties are in favor of continuing foreign aid and the trend in public opinion is in favor of 
expenditures for economic development rather than for military programs. There 
continued to be a mix of hope and fear associated with the cause. Intelligence 
assessments worried about a “recent trend toward a weakening of the Congress Party and 
toward an increase in Communist strength” and emphasized the importance of aid in 
stalling and reversing this trend. This was especially crucial because Washington needed 
to start considering what a post-Nehru India would look like. Indian finance minister 
Morarji Desai, taking on statements that India’s plan was too ambitious, also stressed that 
communists would take advantage of any loss of economic momentum. He linked a lack 
of aid, as Bunker and BK Nehru had earlier in the year, with political instability.167  
At the same time, intelligence assessments linked Indian success to the 
availability of aid.  American advocates of aid like Bunker stressed that India was using 
aid effectively and the investment would “pay off.”168 Senior Indian policymakers like 
Desai emphasized that the Indian government was successfully combating domestic 
communists and economic development had limited the communists’ progress—
Congress, for example, was making gains again in Kerala. They also continued to assure 
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their American interlocutors that, overall, India would succeed and its success would 
have a positive impact on Asia.169 
CREEPING CONCERN ABOUT CHINA: THE INFILTRATION OF IDEAS, INFLUENCE AND 
INDIVIDUALS (1956-1958) 
Some developments in Asia meanwhile had had a negative impact on India’s 
attitude toward China and had helped pave the way for the improvement in US-India 
relations. Towards the end of 1958, intelligence assessments indicated the factors that 
would most affect US-India political relations: American military aid to Pakistan, the 
American approach towards alliances, and the two countries’ China policies.170 On the 
latter front, during this period, India’s attitude had already altered a bit. 
Changing Indian Perceptions  
The question of the Sino-Indian border, consisting of a western, middle and 
eastern sector, was a key element in the changing Indian attitude toward China. The 
“preservation of its frontiers” had been one of India’s major goals with regard to China. 
Chinese and Indian officials had not discussed their border in any comprehensive fashion, 
despite debate on the Indian side about the wisdom of doing so and doubts about the 
Chinese position.171 In May 1956, with new Chinese maps continuing to show swaths of 
what India considered its territory as part of China, “occasional petty raids,” and a 
communications and transportation infrastructure build-up in Tibet, Nehru expressed “a 
sense of disquiet.” According to him, his officials and he had repeatedly stated to their 
Chinese interlocutors that India considered the frontier as “firm,” but it seemed “China 
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never clearly accepted our frontier as it is.”172 Subsequently, he brought the subject up in 
a conversation with Zhou in early 1957. The premier said that in the eastern sector, 
though China had not recognized the McMahon Line that India claimed as the border, 
“now that it is an accomplished fact, we should accept it.”173 This left Nehru assured that 
the Chinese government had accepted in principle, at least, the status quo at the Sino-
Indian border. 
Doubts about the Chinese attitude, however, emerged over this period due to four 
reasons: border skirmishes, Chinese maps, the Sino-Burmese border dispute and Chinese 
road construction. The Sino-Burmese border dispute had flared up in July 1956. During 
subsequent negotiations, China called into question the validity of Burmese claim that the 
McMahon Line represented the international border between the two countries. Since, as 
far as the Indian government was concerned, the same line demarcated the Sino-Indian 
border, this Chinese contention worried Indian officials. Nehru especially noted that 
Zhou had told his Burmese interlocutor that China did not want to accept the use of the 
term McMahon Line because that would complicate the question with India. Nehru was 
not sure what the question was about: “…so far as we are concerned, this frontier...is not 
a matter of dispute at all and Chou En-lai has accepted it. It is true that his acceptance 
was oral, but it was quite clear and precise.”174 
Border skirmishes that had been taking place also concerned Indian officials. T.N. 
Kaul, one of the negotiators of the 1954 Sino-Indian agreement, had expected China to 
push forward on the frontier within five years. Differences over claims, albeit minor ones, 
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had been evident as soon as that year in Bara Hoti, but China and India had eventually 
agreed to discuss the issue.175 In fall 1956 and spring 1957, however, there were a series 
of incidents on the Sino-Indian border that resulted in skirmishes.176 What worried Nehru 
about the skirmishes were not the small bits of territory involved, but the “aggressive way 
on the part of the Chinese.” Furthermore, given that there had been no “formal 
acceptance” of the border by China, it raised the problem of the whole Sino-Indian 
border: “that this could not be treated as an agreed border…and the question might be 
raised at any time by China.” Adding to Indian officials’ concerns was the fear that 
tension with China would hinder India’s economic development.177  
Until fall 1957, there was still talk of potential cooperation. The Indian vice 
president on a trip to China told Mao that if the two Asian countries worked together, 
“the world would take note.” Despite the “modest” turnout for and censoring of 
Radhakrishnan’s speeches, a diplomat observed that the visit “could not have gone 
better.” Subsequently, however, Nehru noted Mao’s unsatisfactory response to the vice 
president’s observation that it was better to change someone’s mind in a “friendly way” 
rather than with suppression.178 That fall Delhi also received reports from its embassy in 
Beijing that China had announced the completion of a road connecting Tibet and 
Xinjiang that seemed to go through Indian territory. Lacking enough details, but 
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convinced that the road went through Aksai Chin, in February 1958 the government 
decided to send a reconnaissance team to the area.179 
In the meantime, more points of disputes appeared on the border, even as the 
government denied publicly that there was a dispute re the “international border” in 
November 1957.180 There continued to be no sign of the Chinese team of negotiators that 
Beijing had agreed to send to discuss the dispute at Hoti, which had left Nehru with the 
sense that, “So far as procrastinating tactics are concerned, probably no government can 
beat the Chinese at this game.”181 Then in January 1958 in a discussion with the Indian 
ambassador, Zhou mentioned “outstanding problems” between the two countries. 
Concerned about what those problems were, Nehru wanted the foreign secretary to stress 
to the Chinese ambassador that India was “anxious” to settle any problems. With 
continuing reports of Chinese activity on the border and some problems at the mountain 
passes that India thought had been settle by the 1954 treaty, India offered talks again 
without preconditions. The government wanted to figure out “how the Chinese mind is 
working in regard to the general question of Indo-Chinese border in this area.”182   
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In April 1958 China finally agreed to talk about Hoti. Occurring in the midst of a 
general hardening of China’s attitude abroad, the talks did not go very well. By June 
there was a stalemate and the talks were eventually suspended. To the Indian side, it 
seemed that Beijing accepted neither the northern border nor even the Indian position on 
the passes. Fearing that China would try to strengthen its claims, Dutt stated that India 
had to find a way to make clear to Beijing that its forces could not unilaterally occupy 
areas and treat them as settled.183 That spring and summer there were also concerns about 
Chinese propaganda in India’s northeast, indoctrination of Indian citizens in China, as 
well as allegations against Indian officials and the arrest of an Indian embassy official in 
China. Delhi subsequently decided to keep a closer eye on Chinese activities in China 
and India.184 Commenting on China’s “cooling off” towards India, and Indian official 
traced it to the “Economic rapprochement” between the US and India, speculations in the 
Indian press about a visit by Nehru to Tibet, and the Chinese sense that the Congress 
government was losing ground to the communists in India.185 
By July 1958, Nehru admitted to the home minister that relations with China were 
on the downswing—he believed it was mostly because Beijing suspected India on 
Tibet.186 That summer, the map problem flared up publicly when a Chinese magazine’s 
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publication of a map led to parliamentary questions about China’s attitude. Chinese maps 
had remained the same, continuing to show “considerable” parts of what India considered 
its territory as part of China.187 Nehru asserted internally that Zhou’s explanation that the 
maps were old no longer held water and the matter should be taken up with China. That 
fall, one of the reconnaissance teams sent in the summer reported that the Chinese road 
did indeed go through Aksai Chin—what India considered its territory—while the other 
never returned. The government decided that it could no longer stay silent. The previous 
few months had “revealed a suspicious attitude on the part of the Chinese.”188 
The Chinese response unsettled Indian policymakers. When Indian officials took 
up the Aksai Chin and maps issue, Chinese officials indicated that the road was in 
Chinese territory. They also noted that they had detained the reconnaissance team sent 
there and suggested that the Sino-Indian border had neither been surveyed nor settled. In 
December, Nehru wrote to Zhou, observing that in 1954, the premier had not raised any 
border questions and then, in 1956, had said that China proposed to recognize the 
McMahon Line. Now the negotiations on the minor problems, which Nehru himself had 
brought up in 1956, had stalled and Chinese maps continued to show large parts of 
India’s northeast as Chinese territory. He noted that it had left him “puzzled,” because he 
did not think there was a major problem.189 
A second reason for the changing Indian attitude toward China was concern about 
China’s growing relationships with India’s neighbors. Between March-November 1956, 
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China established diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and Sri Lanka.190 Furthermore, it 
seemed to be building relations with Pakistan.191 Over this period, China’s interactions 
also increased with a country of special significance to India: Nepal. Delhi wanted to 
limit foreign presence in Nepal because of that country’s “strategic importance” to 
India.192 Earlier in 1954, despite India’s closeness to China, Nehru had tried to dissuade 
the Nepalese leadership from establishing diplomatic relations with China. Eventually, he 
had given his assent to Nepal establishing relations with China, but asserted that Sino-
Nepalese discussions were best conducted in Delhi, rather than Kathmandu or Beijing.193 
In 1956, the Indian government learned from Zhou that China and Nepal were thinking of 
signing a Panchsheel-like agreement. The Chinese premier also indicated that Nepal 
wanted China to establish a consulate general in Kathmandu. Internally, Nehru objected 
to a Sino-Nepalese treaty, especially since it increased each country’s presence in the 
other. Moreover, he was particularly concerned that Kathmandu had kept Delhi out of the 
loop, not just on its interactions with Chinese officials, but also with Soviet ones.194 
Nevertheless, in September 1956, China and Nepal signed a trade and travel agreement 
and agreed to set up consulates general in the other country. Nepal also decided to accept 
economic aid and industrial equipment from China. Learning from Moscow that Nepal 
was also establishing relations with the Soviet Union did nothing to alleviate the Indian 
concern that it was losing influence in this key buffer state—especially over its foreign 
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relations. This was a sensitive area for India. Thus, Delhi instructed its representative in 
Beijing to push back on any references that suggested that China did not recognize 
India’s special relationships with Sikkim, Nepal and Bhutan.195  
The concern about growing Chinese influence in Nepal had an impact on US-
India relations. Initially, India had strongly resisted and objected to any other country 
exercising influence in Nepal. India had also had concerns about US involvement in 
Nepal, partly because Delhi believed that would increase Chinese interest in the country.  
Nehru had even suggested to the Nepalese king that he restrict American activities.196 
This attitude, however, changed once it had become clear in mid-1955 that China and 
Nepal were going to establish relations just as it was becoming harder for India to aid 
Nepal because of its deteriorating fiscal situation. Despite dissension from India’s 
ambassador in Nepal, India had subsequently accepted and even welcomed US 
involvement in certain crucial projects in Nepal. Officials like R.K. Nehru and T.N. Kaul 
had encouraged—and Nehru agreed to—coordination between Nepal, India and the US, 
but with care so that China would not become suspicious of India’s motives.197 Indian 
officials had also suggested that the US and India coordinate their economic aid programs 
to Nepal to keep Chinese influence to a minimum.198 
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Indian officials appreciated that Washington respected India’s “special position” 
vis-à-vis Nepal.199 Even before 1955, US officials had recognized the role India was 
playing in keeping Nepal out of the Chinese orbit and had reassured India that they had 
no desire to seek the removal of Indian influence in that country. India and the US 
continued to work together in Nepal. Delhi saw American help as assisting India’s 
interests, especially because Washington committed to consulting and working together 
with India rather than sidestepping it. Occasionally, Indian officials would hear reports 
that, in order to reduce Indian influence and play one foreign benefactor against the other, 
Kathmandu was trying to reach out independently to Washington. US officials would 
subsequently assuage Delhi’s concerns, making it a point to keep Indian officials 
informed of their activities.200 Indian officials favorably compared this American 
approach with the Soviet one—they disliked the fact that Soviet officials were not 
coordinating their activities with India. Soviet officials either did not inform India about 
their activities or informed Indian officials after the fact, sometimes even violating 
assurances about limiting their presence in Nepal.201 
A third subject of concern that re-emerged for India vis-à-vis China during this 
period was Beijing’s behavior in the Chinese areas bordering India. Indian officials grew 
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chagrined about the Chinese crackdown when uprisings broke out in Kham and frowned 
upon the way China was exercising control in Tibet, where the autonomy that had been 
promised never materialized. Furthermore, Zhou made clear to Nehru that China would 
“put down” any uprising in Tibet. He also criticized acts of omission or commission—
perhaps even in collusion with the US—on the part of Indian officials as they dealt with 
Tibetan sympathizers’ “anti-Chinese activities” in India.202  
To external audiences, Nehru stated that China might loosen its hold in Tibet, 
eventually granting it autonomy.203 Internally, he acknowledged that Tibet was under 
“forcible occupation of Chinese armed forces and that a considerable majority of the 
Tibetans resent this.” However, he stressed to Tibetan officials that India did not have the 
capacity to do very much: China could not be defeated “by armed force.” There was also 
another reason for Nehru’s reticence. As he stated to a cabinet colleague, “We have to 
move rather cautiously in this matter of Tibet, as Indian intentions are suspect in 
China.”204  
Thus, Nehru instructed his officials to keep Beijing in the loop on all matters 
Tibet, including contact with the Dalai Lama. He made clear that he did not want to get 
dragged into the actions of rebels in Tibet. Nehru also warned Tibetan sympathizers in 
India not to indulge in anti-China propaganda. Despite Chinese complaints, however, he 
refused to take any action against these sympathizers unless they broke the law.205 
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Over time, Nehru and his officials increasingly saw signs that disturbed them. 
They started receiving reports of the mistreatment of Indian traders in Yatung. Since this 
had implications for the 1954 treaty, India protested with Nehru having declared it a 
serious matter that needed to be taken up with Beijing in an “unequivocal” manner.206 
Indian policymakers also noticed that Beijing was trying to limit India’s links with Tibet. 
China was “evasive” about an air link that India was seeking to Tibet. This evasiveness 
belied Delhi’s expectation that China would welcome the improved connectivity.207 
Then, China asked India to remove its wireless station in Tibet.208 There was also a 
growing sense that China was increasingly unhappy with Indian trade agencies in 
Tibet.209 Finally, when Nehru repeatedly contacted Beijing about taking up the Dalai 
Lama’s invitation to visit Tibet, its response ranged from silence to waffling to letting 
Nehru eventually know that it did not think it was “advisable” that he go to Tibet at that 
stage.210 At home, as the situation in Tibet deteriorated, meanwhile Nehru had to deal 
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with calls for India to be less timid on Tibet—both from within his government, as well 
as outside it from the right and left.211 
Contrasting Approaches  
Chinese actions in Tibet raised serious questions about Beijing’s overall 
approach. Even before the situation in Tibet had deteriorated, however, Chinese and 
Indian differences on perception and approach had been evident in their reactions to the 
uprising in Hungary in fall 1956. Zhou had asserted to Nehru that the Soviet crackdown 
had been the only appropriate response to “control the situation.” The Indian prime 
minister had not believed that those who had undertaken the uprising were subversives, 
as Zhou contended, but nationalists who, like most Hungarians, did not want foreign 
control. For Nehru, it had been important for the people’s wishes to be followed; for 
Zhou the major priority had been ensuring that the socialist system would continue and if 
that called for Soviet intervention—even if it went against the Panchsheel spirit of non-
interference—so be it. And while Nehru had asserted, “Shooting down is not any 
solution,” Zhou had insisted that persuasion was fine to an extent, but pressure was 
necessary. A few months later, Nehru had lamented publicly that “peaceful coexistence” 
was much “bandied about,” but “not acted upon by even those people who use those 
words.”212 
Doubts about the Chinese approach only increased when it seemed that, after a 
short period of relaxation, there was a return to rigidity in both Beijing and Moscow. 
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Domestically, Nehru said China seemed to have gone from “Let a hundred flowers 
bloom” to “the flowers [have] become weeds to be pulled out.”213  
Externally, the Chinese reaction to two events in summer 1958 shocked Nehru 
and other officials. The Chinese and Soviet refusal to send delegations to the Yugoslav 
party congress and their subsequent propaganda offensive against Yugoslavia dismayed 
Nehru. Their condemnation suggested that various communist leaders’ earlier indications 
to him that there was tolerance for various paths to socialism were no long valid. 
Furthermore, he was concerned that this signaled a return to the “crusading attitude of the 
Communist Party which was one of interference.” Perplexed about Beijing’s reaction, the 
foreign secretary asked for a detailed study of it.214 Nehru, in turn, was especially 
concerned about Beijing’s reaction and its “language of violence.” He asked, “Where do 
the Five Principles or the Panchsheel come into the picture?” And he answered his own 
question, stating that they “have gone by the board.” This was linked to a parochial 
concern: “If the Soviet Union or China can do this in regard to Yugoslavia, there is no 
particular reason to imagine that they cannot or will not do so in the case of India.” Nehru 
pointed out that, as it is, the Chinese attitude toward India had “stiffened.” He asserted 
that, therefore, India had to be “particularly careful” about words and actions related to 
China.215 Things would only get worse. The subsequent execution of detained Hungarian 
leader Imre Nagy in June 1958 shocked not just the Indian public but also Indian officials 
who disapproved of the Soviet attitude and thought the Chinese celebratory reaction 
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“amazingly foolish.” The prime minister was left stating that these developments were a 
“shock to peace.”216 
These events also significantly affected views of the Soviet Union in India and 
consolidated Nehru’s discomfort with Moscow’s chosen methods. Soviet action in 
Hungary in 1956 had left Nehru with serious doubts. While he had hesitated from 
publicly criticizing the Soviet actions, privately, he had called them “deplorable.” Nehru 
had been sensitive to the domestic and foreign criticism that greeted the Indian 
government’s tepid public response.217 On the defensive, he had denied that he was 
toeing Moscow’s line and, eventually, had publicly condemned the Soviet action.218 
Privately, he had indicated to the Soviet leadership his disapproval of militarily strong 
countries coercing weaker ones.219 As time went on, his disapproval and concern had 
increased.220 By December 1956, with the arrest of Nagy, Nehru had thought of the 
Soviet stance as “patently wrong,”221 and was more willing—as was Krishna Menon, 
who had been hesitant earlier—to take a publicly critical attitude of the Soviet Union.222   
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Between 1956-1958, India’s thinking about the Soviet Union went through many 
ups and downs. Every time officials saw signs of hope that the atmosphere in Moscow 
was more liberal—post-twentieth Congress in spring 1956, a few months after the 
Hungarian uprising in spring 1957, when Molotov was expelled in summer 1957—they 
seemed to be followed by disappointing reversals.223 Hopes had risen again in spring 
1958 as the Soviet Union seemed forthcoming on the question of disarmament.224 In 
May, however, when Moscow suspended credits to Yugoslavia because of political 
differences, Nehru saw it as a “breach of an agreement.” He and other officials wondered 
about the implications for India.225 Later, when reports emerged that Moscow was cutting 
off imports to Finland because of political differences, the Indian foreign secretary 
sarcastically noted, “Soviet Govt profess that they give aid and do trade without any 
political strings.”226 These incidents leant credibility to Yugoslav leader Tito’s remark to 
the Indian ambassador in Belgrade that Moscow wanted “camp-followers” rather than a 
“fraternity.”227 The Nagy execution left Nehru even more shocked and “distressed” and 
he asserted his strong disapproval of Soviet methods.228 This disapproval did not stay 
private. In August 1958, the Congress party journal published an article by Nehru that 
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mentioned communism’s “rigidity” and “suppression of human freedom” and that “its 
unfortunate association with violence encourages a certain evil tendency in human 
beings.”229 
Concern about Sino-Soviet intentions and approaches also led to continuing and 
even increasing Indian concerns about external communist influence in the domestic 
political arena.230 Nehru asserted that India’s communists’ “thinking apparatus lives 
outside India.” Their loyalties lay with the external communist parties.231 He was 
thoroughly displeased about the bad behavior on the part of the communist party in 
Kerala. He continued to say that there was neither need nor justification for the center to 
intervene to dismiss the communist government, but he saw the situation as continuing to 
deteriorate.232 It did not help when the Soviet ambassador to China wrote an article 
responding to Nehru’s article from that summer, criticizing Nehru’s contentions and the 
Indian government’s economic policies vociferously. To make matters worse, the Soviet 
diplomat also included statistics to show that China was making greater progress than 
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India. It left Nehru agreeing with Dutt that the communists only seemed to be getting 
more rigid.233 
Mediating No More 
It was difficult for Indian policymakers not to compare the different ways the US 
and the Sino-Soviet bloc dealt with differences during this period. Differences between 
the US and India on China, for example, had not disappeared. Even in December 1956, 
however, then ambassador Cooper noted that the two countries had reached the stage 
where they could “agree to disagree.”234 This acceptance of differences with the US on 
China, along with Indian disappointments with China, aided the Indian relationship with 
the US in two ways. First, it made Delhi less inclined to mediate between Beijing and 
Washington—reducing the instances where it could be accused of siding with Beijing. 
Second, it made India more understanding of US policy toward China. This removed a 
key thorn in the relationship, at least as far as the executive branches were concerned. 
Despite contemplating another attempt in 1956 to get China and the US to settle 
the question of American prisoners being held in China, Nehru decided against getting 
involved again. Some Indian officials had suggested that the atmosphere in the US made 
success more likely on this front, and believed that a successful Indian attempt could give 
Nehru leverage in his upcoming talks with Eisenhower. The prime minister, however, did 
not think India could do anything more to convince the Chinese leadership to act. China 
had continued to resist India’s entreaties. Furthermore, Nehru did not want to make any 
promises about the US reaction to any potential Chinese steps or vice versa. He believed 
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that Washington, along with Moscow, had taken steps to lessen tensions and he sensed “a 
belief in the US of the failure of their Asian policy and a desire to change it.” He did not 
think, however, that Washington’s China policy would change till at least after the 
American election. Finally, mediation would let China and the US off the hook in terms 
of talking to each other directly.235 So Nehru decided against becoming an intermediary. 
He authorized his ambassador in Beijing to give Zhou a sense of the trends detected, but 
not to give any formal advice.236 
When Nehru travelled to the US that December, Dulles expected him to try to 
mediate between China and the US for the benefit of Sino-Indian relations. China indeed 
came up in conversations with both Eisenhower and Dulles. Overall, however, Nehru was 
less activist. Publicly, too, then and a year later he brushed aside the idea of India being 
“a bridge” between China and the US, stating that it was unnecessary and caused India 
too much embarrassment. He merely expressed “hope” that eventually the two countries 
would come to an understanding.237  
Meetings with Eisenhower, Dulles and Zhou in quick succession that winter 
seemed to change Nehru’s attitude in a key way that would benefit US-India relations. 
Before Nehru’s visit to the US, he had passed on to Zhou Krishna Menon’s observations 
from the US that releasing the prisoners would be in China’s interest and not be a sign of 
weakness. He asserted that their continued captivity was not pressuring the US 
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government as Beijing intended and instead made it seem like China was holding 
hostages.238 Zhou had dismissed his advice, noting that there was no point taking any 
such step since previous releases had borne no fruit and no progress was possible for a 
while anyway.239 
In the US, Nehru noted that China—especially its imprisonment of Americans—
was the only issue that really riled up Eisenhower.240 The president highlighted US efforts 
to come to agreement with China, a country he called “a number one priority.” He told 
Nehru that the existing state of Sino-US relations, marred by the legacy of Korea, was 
neither normal nor sustainable, but the prisoner question continued to be a stumbling 
block. Dulles reiterated the latter point.241  
Nehru had come to understand that this was a major subject of “controversy” in 
the US, even though China might consider it a small matter.242 In subsequent 
conversations with Zhou, he noted that he believed Eisenhower’s contention that he did 
not subscribe to the views of the China lobby, but was bound by the atmosphere that the 
lobby and Chinese actions had helped create. Nehru told Zhou that continued 
imprisonment of the prisoners only helped the China lobby. He did not think that the 
issue was important enough to hold a relationship hostage over; that “major 
developments are held up for this rather small matter.”243 Nehru seemed a bit fed up, 
noting that despite his pleading, Zhou did not “budge an inch.” He thought Zhou’s 
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explanations of the continuing imprisonment were not “adequate.”244 During another 
conversation with Zhou, after listening to the premier list American faults and China’s 
desire for peace, Nehru asserted that merely criticizing the other side would do little to 
achieve peace and only exacerbate tensions.245  
While earlier Nehru had seen the US as the intransigent country in Sino-US 
interactions, by spring 1957 he came to question the Chinese leadership’s desire for a 
peaceful relationship with the US. He especially perceived Beijing’s continuing 
imprisonment of Americans as “extraordinarily foolish.” On the one hand, since the US 
had long made it clear that no progress in the Sino-US relationship was possible without 
the release of the prisoners, Nehru wondered if the Chinese leadership really wanted the 
relationship to progress. On the other hand, the Indian prime minister had detected—even 
from Dulles who he saw as a hawk—a desire, even “anxious[ness]” to improve Sino-US 
relations.246 Later that year, when he expressed that “early reconciliation” between China 
and the US was not possible because of continuing difficulties, it was clear that he 
thought that on the American end at least there had been progress. He believed there was 
increasing acknowledgement of “the facts of the situation” in the US, which was more 
practical than before. Furthermore, he thought that people in the US were “realistic and 
businesslike” and would eventually come to acknowledge that they needed to recognize 
China.247 
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Between fall 1957 and the end of 1958, as Sino-Indian relations were on a definite 
downswing, for Indian policymakers the contrast between the American attitude and 
approach and those of the communists in general and the Chinese in particular only 
seemed to increase. In the note written in summer 1958 that was published in India and 
abroad, Nehru’s view of this contrast was evident. Communism, according to him, had 
become “too closely associated with the necessity for violence…Means distorted ends.” 
It had been “tainted.” As for the other bloc: 
Communism charges the capitalist structure of society with being based on 
violence and class conflict. I think this is essentially correct, though that capitalist 
structure itself has undergone and is continually undergoing a change because of 
democratic and other forces…Democracy allied to capitalism has undoubtedly 
toned down many of its evils and, in fact, it is different now from what it was a 
generation or two ago….Capitalism itself has, therefore, developed some 
socialistic features…248 
While Beijing’s attitude seemed to be more rigid and intolerant of differences with other 
countries, Washington’s approach continued to show improvement as far as Delhi was 
concerned. By early 1958, US officials were commenting on the “harmonious” nature of 
the relationship over the recent period. Later that year, analysts noted that—privately, at 
least—Nehru had seemed to be “somewhat more sympathetic” to the US.249 
DEALING WITH DIFFERENCES  
Differences had not disappeared between the two countries, even on China, but 
the two governments worked toward handling them better. This was evident in the two 
countries’ reaction to the second Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958. In the second half of 
August, China began shelling the offshore islands and subsequently, even after the 
shelling decreased, tried to blockade Taiwan. The Eisenhower administration believed 
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that the loss of the offshore islands would adversely affect Jiang’s government and, in 
turn, Taiwanese security and thus US credibility and interests. The American aim during 
the crisis was both to support and restrain Taipei. By backing Taipei with military assets 
and public declarations of support, Washington tried to pressure Beijing to back down. 
Subsequently, it also resumed talks with China at Warsaw. By mid-September the US 
was convinced that the crisis had de-escalated. By the end of the month, the Chinese 
blockade ended as a result of American efforts. American attempts to convince Jiang to 
withdraw from the offshore islands, however, were less successful. Eventually there was 
a ceasefire in early October.250 
Delhi always thought of the Taiwan issue as creating sticky situations for India, 
which felt stuck between China and the US. Indian policymakers did not believe Chinese 
accusations that the US would use Taiwan to attack China.251 The crisis, however, caused 
Nehru “grave concern” because of the potential for escalation. Internally, he contended 
that the root cause of the problem was the lack of American recognition of China. He did 
not, however, agree with the Chinese use of force.252 There had been continued Indian 
frustration with the US lack of recognition of China and Beijing’s lack of representation 
at the UN. Non-recognition only meant that China would not owe any “obligations” to 
the international community—this, Nehru had privately emphasized, was “dangerous.”  
Furthermore, he thought it kept China in Soviet arms.253  
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Publicly, during the crisis, Nehru only reiterated India’s position that Taiwan 
belonged to China, but China did not have the right to use force to take over Taiwan or 
the offshore islands. Krishna Menon’s more activist stance at the UN, pushing for a vote 
on Chinese representation and assigning blame to Taipei, however, created consternation 
in Washington.254 When the crisis had broken out, Dulles had actually liked the idea of 
potentially using Delhi to convey messages to Beijing. After Krishna Menon’s 
statements, however, others like the UN secretary-general and Norwegian foreign 
minister thought India was “too partial” to be a mediator. By this point, Dulles agreed 
that the US could not use India in that role. Subsequently, rather than railing against the 
Indian role publicly, US officials quietly worked to exclude Krishna Menon. Senior State 
Department officials also did not seem to assign much blame to Nehru for the vocal 
Indian position at the UN, noting that he was probably getting erroneous reports.255 On 
India’s part, embassy officials in Washington subsequently gave Dulles “credit” for 
restraining Jiang.256 
Another subject of difference between India and the US continued to be the US 
relationship with Pakistan. Indian concerns remained about the US military supply to 
Pakistan, the lack of awareness of the magnitude and type of aid Pakistan was receiving, 
the fact that US supply to Pakistan required India to divert resources from development to 
defense expenditure, as well as due to the sense that Pakistan was more intransigent 
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because of military aid.257 Nehru’s criticism of the US-Pakistan military supply 
relationship, however, was more measured in public. Furthermore, privately and publicly, 
he acknowledged that the US did not want these weapons used against India and that he 
did not mistrust American motives.258 While highlighting India’s concern about the 
implementation of US assurances regarding Pakistani use of US-supplied weapons, he 
also noted that he did not doubt the “genuineness” of the assurances.”259  
When news reports emerged of US military activity in Pakistan-held Kashmir, 
instead of reacting publicly, Nehru asked his officials to seek clarification from the US 
privately. The US ambassador, in turn, denied that there were US “installations” there. 
US policymakers also repeatedly reassured India about the guarantees they had elicited 
from Pakistan about not using US equipment against India. Furthermore, they noted that 
the US would not allow Pakistan to attack India. Finally, they assured their Indian 
counterparts that their estimates of US military supply to Pakistan were exaggerated.260   
There also continued to be Indian concern about who exactly the pacts that 
Pakistan was part of were directed against, but on this, too, the US offered signs of 
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Meeting with Bunker, October 23, 1957, NMML, SDP, SF No. 29. 
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reassurance. India approvingly noted reports that indicated that the US had specified its 
participation in SEATO as directed against communist aggression and had been cautious 
about Pakistan’s attempts to discuss Kashmir at a council meeting. Nehru pointed out that 
the US and the UK opposed Pakistani attempts to discuss Kashmir at a subsequent 
Baghdad Pact meeting. Later, when the Pakistani prime minister publicly called for 
CENTO countries to be equipped with nuclear weapons, Nehru highlighted the US 
assertion that it would not give these weapons to other states. He publicly stated that he 
was “gratified” that the US had turned down the Pakistani demand and “deserves to be 
praised” for doing so.261 
When the UN was scheduled to discuss Kashmir, American officials also 
discussed in advance with Indian officials the line that the US was going to take. Bunker 
told Nehru that the harsh public statements that Krishna Menon had nevertheless 
subsequently made were “gravely imperil[ing]” the goodwill that had developed in the 
US. Nehru assured the ambassador that “there was no question of our considering US as 
hostile to India,” which was itself “anxious” for American friendship. He asserted that he 
wanted to separate the issue of Kashmir from the broader US-India relationship. India did 
not like the subsequent US-UK proposal on Kashmir and Nehru wanted to oppose it 
unequivocally. Nevertheless, he reiterated to Krishna Menon that any statements he made 
should be “short and dignified.” Making clear of his disapproval of Krishna Menon’s 
behavior, Nehru also stressed that he should avoid hostile references “and attacks on 
motives of sponsors.” He noted that the US was indeed trying to moderate the US-UK 
proposal. He stated that there had been a negative reaction both in India and abroad to his 
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speeches and the government had to consider its interests outside the UN.262 Nehru also 
publicly stressed that he “regretted very much” Krishna Menon’s remarks.263 
There was American hope that India and Pakistan would reduce the strain in their 
relationship and even attempts to urge them to do so—both because it would allow them 
to focus on development and because it would make it easier to get aid for them through 
Congress.264 The US, however, refused to withhold aid from India to push it towards a 
settlement despite Pakistani calls that it to do so. Dulles asserted to Pakistani officials that 
it was in Pakistan’s interest that the US aid neutral countries like India. After all, “what 
this country was doing in India was needed to prevent India from going the way of 
China.”265  
Overall, it was clear that during this period both sides tried to deal with their 
differences in a better way. One was by handling them with care and, to the extent 
possible, privately. Nehru, for example, was careful to keep most criticism and concern 
private.266 If the government was going to express concern about any international issues 
publicly, his instructions were to do so “without going too far.”267 Nehru also tried to 
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temper public criticism. When there was criticism about Dulles’ reported lack of desire to 
invite India to a summit conference, for example, Nehru refused to criticize him and said 
that Indians should accept Dulles’ reasonable explanation.268 Overall, government policy 
as the foreign secretary laid out for Indian diplomats was to limit comment on 
developments in other countries and refrain from initiatives that did not concern India.269 
Nehru himself declined to participate in some joint declarations and nonaligned summits 
on the grounds that they were neither desirable nor feasible.270  
The second way was by de-emphasizing differences. In both governments there 
seemed to be a belief that the agreement they had reached that they were crucial to each 
other’s broader strategies trumped disagreements on most issues.271 Dulles bluntly noted 
that India’s success was so crucial that it “over[ode] any areas of difference.” Bunker 
noted his pleasant surprise that “Washington has somehow come to believe that as a 
matter of cold fact it is not in the United States’ interest to see India’s economy collapse 
notwithstanding divergencies [sic] in foreign policy and other irritants which from time to 
time are apparently bound to develop.”272 Eisenhower and Radhakrishnan concurred, “we 
had our differences but that they were not vital.”273
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Chapter 4: Semi-Detached Ally? (1959-1962) 
To say that the American attitude today is noticeably friendly to India in contrast 
to the past is to state the obvious. Our country seems to be on the uppermost level 
of consciousness of the internationally-minded section of Americans…It is not 
enough to say that India has gained favour in American eyes because there has 
recently been an upsurge of military authoritarianism in West and South Asia. 
This no doubt has been a potent factor in shaping American attitude to India, but 
it is made obvious to us here that the main motivating factor in this context has 
been fear of China. 
– MC Chagla, 19591 
What has moved India toward us in the last few years? Essentially it isn’t our 
policy or our increasing generosity in supporting India's ambitious five-year 
plans. It is the Chinese pressures on the northeast frontier. Over time, the conflict 
of interest between Peiping and Delhi will almost certainly grow rather than 
decrease. And sooner or later the Indians will come to realize that the arena of 
conflict is not only along the Himalayas but in Southeast Asia as well. 
– Robert Komer, 19622 
 
By 1959, there was already convergence in American and Indian views on the 
symbolic and psychological threat that China posed and the two countries had come to 
agree on how to meet the challenge. Two key developments in 1959—the intensifying 
Sino-Indian border dispute and an uprising in Tibet—would bring convergence in their 
views of China as a security threat as well. This convergence on China affected the US-
India relationship in two ways. First, it removed an obstacle to further improvement in 
the relationship. Second, in and of itself, it led to a strategic partnership, with joint efforts 
to contain China.  
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During this period American extended sympathy and support for India in its 
dispute with China. India would eventually also request—and the US would provide—
American military assistance and efforts to restrain Pakistan during the Sino-Indian war 
of 1962. Finally, the closer US-India ties involved increased US development assistance 
to India. When the question about whether India and the US have come together against 
China is asked, the answer is usually seen through a military lens and thus it is only with 
the 1962 war that the US and India are seen as coming together. Even before that point, 
however, China had brought the two countries together in a significant way on the 
economic plane. This engagement only increased between 1959-1961. In the few years 
before, there had been in the US both hope that India would succeed and fear that it might 
fail. By 1959, the former sense dominated, leading to discussions of whether the US 
should think beyond trying to help India become a successful democratic alternative to 
communist China to helping it become a counterbalance to that country. 
INDIA LIKES IKE (1959-1960) 
The Friendliest Feelings  
By 1959, US policymakers testifying in Congress noted that it was not even worth 
elaborating upon why India’s success was so crucial for the non-communist world since 
that fact had been already so well established. That spring, Sens. Cooper and Kennedy 
once again introduced a resolution outlining the importance of sending a study team to 
India to consider its needs further. This time they couched it in terms of South Asia, 
trying to address the previous year’s criticism in the House that they had focused too 
much on one country. At a May conference on India and the United States both Nixon 
and Kennedy spoke out vociferously in support of aid for India—each, as Merrill notes, 
vying “for recognition as India’s best friend.” Nixon asserted that as far as he was 
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concerned, “what happens in India…could be as important or could be even more 
important in the long run, than what happens in the negotiations with regard to Berlin.” 
There was a competition between “two great peoples in Asia.” The result would have an 
effect across the globe.3 
In the US, most of the talk of India was now in terms of it potential for 
achievement.4 There was enough confidence that there were debates at the most senior 
level on whether the American objective should “be something more ambitious.” 
National Security Advisor Gordon Gray laid out the question: “Was India to serve as a 
counter-weight to Communist China or was India to be a successful example of an 
alternative to Communism in Asia?” Eisenhower emphasized that it was not a “black and 
white” question. He hoped that some day India would be a “greater counterweight” to 
China, but did not think that the US could use India as a counterweight since Delhi did 
not want to play that role. Moreover, in the near term, the US would “bankrupt” itself 
trying to achieve that goal. Nonetheless, it was “obviously important for the U.S. to help 
India to prove itself.” There seemed to be agreement with Dillon’s assertion that it was 
not sufficient just to “prevent India from going communist.” The US needed to help lay 
the basis for long-term Indian success. If India succeeded, it “might well prove to be a 
counter-attraction if not a counterweight to Communist China.”5 
This was especially important in the context of what the NSC saw as increasing 
Chinese power that was changing the dynamics in South Asia and threatening “free 
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world” interests in Asia. Thus, it was essential to continue to invest in “developing in 
India a successful alternative to Communism in an Asiatic context.”6 Administration 
officials argued on the Hill that increasing Chinese economic strength meant that the US 
had to help India compete.7 In internal discussions, some like Gray wondered if the US 
could find a way to move to a multi-year basis for assistance exclusively in the case of 
India to achieve such a purpose.8 Overall, for the administration it was crucial that India 
not lose the momentum it had gained because “Asia and Africa will be watching and 
comparing” Delhi and Beijing’s achievements.9  
It was not just African and other Asian countries comparing India’s progress with 
that of China. As CIA Director Allen Dulles pointed out, there were fears in India about 
falling behind China as well.10 In Delhi, having seen reports of Chinese development, the 
foreign secretary indeed asked  
What lesson is one to draw from the phenomenal progress made by China? There 
is no easy answer. One might be prepared to sacrifice ‘the mechanism of free 
enterprise’ but are we prepared to write an obituary…on political liberties? At the 
same time, of what good are political liberties if they mean lack of the minimum 
necessities of life for millions?11  
Indian officials wanted to examine what India could learn from its neighbor. Then, 
however, reports of food shortages started to emerge from China. A few months later 
Dillon noticed that in India the previous concern about Chinese economic progress had 
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diminished quite a bit. The Indian finance minister told him that Chinese claims had been 
exaggerated.12 
In the US, there continued to be some concern about India’s comparative strength 
and some intelligence officials also worried about its political stability.13 Nonetheless, 
there was a sense that the Indian government understood the internal threat and the need 
to contain or combat it.14 That summer, Allen Dulles happily pointed out that the 
communists in Kerala were serving as a negative example. Earlier, US officials had 
believed that Nehru would not be inclined to act against the communists. They had 
predicted, however, that he might not be left with much choice. Sure enough, Nehru 
dismissed the communist government in Kerala that July. In the US, this boosted his non-
communist credentials. There was a sense that the communists’ actions in Kerala, along 
with the Chinese crackdown in Tibet that spring, had facilitated Indian understanding of 
the ugly side of communism in general and China in particular. When the communists 
were defeated in the subsequent elections in Kerala in early 1960, the administration 
sought subtle ways to use the defeat and the lack of effectiveness of the Kerala 
communists for propaganda. Allen Dulles pointed that it created hope since it was the 
first time communist rule had been overthrown. State Department official Livingston 
Merchant, however, saw it as a “reprieve” rather than a “victory.” Allen Dulles agreed 
and emphasized that it was crucial not to let the guard down.15  
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This meant a continuing need to strengthen India, one of the crucial “islands of 
development” in the “free world.” Discussions about the country’s third five-year plan, 
scheduled to start in 1961, made clear that India envisioned over $20 billion of 
expenditure.16 In earlier discussions, American officials had stressed the need for the plan 
to be “realistic.”17 Nehru, frustrated about questions at home about whether India’s next 
plan would be as ambitious as the second one, had also emphasized that he did not again 
want to have to ask for “big loans.” That hope, however, had not been realized. Earlier in 
1959, BK Nehru had asked about potential American support for the next plan. The 
Indian finance minister would note that “in order to reach self-sustaining point,” India 
needed a large plan and more foreign exchange. India also continued to need food. While 
Nehru had not wanted to continue to import food, as a government committee had 
emphasized in 1957, the country would continue to need to import food grains for the 
foreseeable future.18 
For Indian policymakers, a lot rode on American assistance. Beyond the aid itself, 
officials appreciated that the US was respecting the terms of previous agreements.19 They 
publicly continued to welcome aid.20 They appreciated the advocacy efforts of 
administration officials like Dulles and congress members like Cooper and Kennedy. 
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Pleased Indian officials noticed that even those who had been previously reluctant to aid 
India appeared to have come around to seeing the necessity to do so. Even Nixon seemed 
to have become a convert to the cause of aiding India on a large and continuing basis. It 
left Indian officials wondering whether his “metamorphosis” had anything to do with his 
presidential ambitions. If that was the case, it seemed to them that “advocacy of increased 
economic aid to India is, in the current mental climate of the United States, a politically 
popular move.”21 They realized that this support for India was because of the “race” with 
China. The military takeovers in Burma, Pakistan and Thailand had made the Indian 
democratic contrast even more important.22 Officials hoped that this support would 
translate to long-term funding, but realistically expected few changes in the foreign aid 
program in the near future.23 
Congressional sentiments and treasury’s concerns indeed continued to limit the 
administration’s ability to put aid on a long-term basis.24 Congress also controlled the size 
of the DLF, which remained key to US efforts to aid India.25 There had been, however, a 
change in the foreign aid debate on the Hill in a way that could potentially help India. 
Senators like Fulbright proposed thinking about a long-term DLF. He also emphasized 
that the administration should focus on aiding countries economically rather than 
militarily. It further helped that some representatives who had earlier been India skeptics, 
had come around to the view that it was important to aid India—even if it was neutral. 
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For FY1960, Congress approved close to $200 million.26 An American official noted that 
there was general consensus on the need for Indian economic development and the need 
for US aid to ensure that development. The public and congressional climate was also 
likely to continue to be favorable as a result of Sino-Indian differences becoming 
evident.27  
Some officials continued to be concerned about Moscow’s competing efforts and 
its intentions in India. There was a sense that seeing Indian momentum, Moscow had 
decided to help India succeed after all, but through public sector expansion. There were 
continued discussions of US attractiveness to and advantages in India versus those of the 
Soviet Union. British officials pointed out that the Indian government was wary of 
increased Soviet political and economic influence and had taken steps to limit it. Overall, 
most policymakers expected Delhi not to look too much to Moscow and to continue to try 
to diversify its dependence.28  
For the same reason, there continued to be little expectation that India would 
“align with” the US on all issues. Nonetheless, it was to strengthen India. The risks of a 
weak India were “far greater” than those of a strong, albeit neutral, India over the long 
run. At most, the administration could encourage “recognition of its community of 
interest with the Free World.”29 When Eisenhower travelled to India in late 1959—on a 
three-week multi-nation tour before which he admitted that he was “doing all this just to 
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get to India”30—he made clear to Nehru that the US did not want India to join any 
collective security arrangements. Washington just wanted Delhi not to “openly oppose us 
on this.”31  
Indian policymakers, in turn, continued to be concerned about the political and 
economic climate in the US and its impact on aid for India. They worried about the 
budget bureau and treasury’s desire to cut foreign aid. They also worried that advocacy 
for aid for other countries would decrease the amounts that India would receive. On the 
other hand, they noted with relief that some members of congress such as Sens. Fulbright, 
Mansfield and Morse were increasingly highlighting the benefits of economic aid relative 
to military aid. To help make India’s case, on a visit to the US that fall, the Indian finance 
minister repeatedly assured his audiences that India would not just welcome aid but 
private capital. He emphasized that India was trying its best “to consolidate our political 
freedom by economic progress.” Indian officials were hopeful that growing concern 
about Moscow moving ahead in the missile and industrial growth race and continuing 
concerns about China would drive calls for more aid for India.32 
Over the rest of the administration, there was indeed concern about increasing 
Chinese military superiority. Consequently, it continued to be important for India to beat 
or match China on the economic front—if India continued to progress economically, it 
would be the right kind of model for the rest of Asia.33 In May 1960, the administration 
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signed another PL480 agreement—the four-year $1.276 billion program was the largest 
of its kind. There was reportedly even consideration within the outgoing administration 
of proposing an increased amount of $300 million for India for FY1961.34 Even in the 
last few months of the administration, as Dillon noted, US interest in India’s economic 
development had “not slackened.”35 There was a sense of achievement. An intelligence 
assessment in October 1960 noted that “long-term” threats remained to India’s stability 
and unity, but highlighted the “considerable progress in constructing the foundations of a 
modern democratic state” that India had made. Furthermore, the assessment emphasized 
that India would continue to look to the “free world” rather than the communist world for 
further assistance.36 One of the many reasons for that was that the communist world did 
not look as friendly to India as it had in the past. 
From Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai to Chou En-lai Hai Hai 
In 1957, Nehru had commented, “All history shows us that friends and allies 
sometimes become enemies and enemies become friends, and even the history of the last 
ten years has shown us this.”37 The next ten years would show how China and India went 
from being friends to enemies. Two developments in 1959 hastened that process: the 
Sino-Indian border dispute and the uprising in Tibet. The result was evident the next year 
in the fact that six years after Indians had greeted Zhou with chants of “Hindi-Chini bhai-
bhai” (Indians and Chinese are brothers), they would protest his return in 1960 with 
shouts of “Chou Enlai hai hai” (down with Zhou).38  
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The first signs of trouble appeared on the frontier question. Replying to Nehru’s 
letter the previous year, Zhou asserted that China neither accepted the McMahon Line nor 
gave up the Chinese claim to Aksai Chin. He stated that the border had never been 
delimited formally and, in turn, complained about Indian maps. Nehru’s reply in March 
laid out the basis of India’s border claims. Furthermore, it agreed with Zhou’s 
suggestions that the two countries maintain the status quo at the border, but also called 
for the two countries to give up recently claimed spots—thus, in effect, suggesting a 
return to the status quo ante.39 
Even as Indian officials had been drafting that reply, the next sign of trouble 
appeared on the horizon. For the previous few months, the government had been 
concerned about differentiating between refugees and rebels trying to escape to India 
from Tibet. It had wanted to restrict the latter from entering India for three key reasons: 
the desire not to upset Beijing since Delhi thought India could help to moderate Chinese 
actions in Tibet; fear of escalation due to Chinese hot pursuit across the border; and 
concern that Beijing would question India’s claim to areas where the rebels were entering 
and sheltering.40 Then, on March 10, a Tibetan uprising broke out in Lhasa after rumors 
that Beijing was going to put the Dalai Lama under house arrest or forcibly remove him 
from Lhasa. As the situation deteriorated, the Indian government continued to deter rebel 
fighters from entering India. On March 19 the Indian government, however, sent a 
message to the consul general in Lhasa that it would give the Dalai Lama asylum if he 
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asked for it. The Dalai Lama had already left Lhasa at that point and subsequently he 
crossed over into India. Soon, he would be joined by thousands of refugees.   
Nehru wanted to help the Tibetans, maintain Chinese friendship and ensure Indian 
security—all while trying to avoid Tibet becoming a cold war issue and dealing with the 
fact that it had become a public issue in India, where parliamentary protests had 
pressured the government into admitting an increasing number of refugees. Very soon it 
would become clear that Nehru failed on at least one front: maintaining the friendship 
with China. Initially, Beijing called Kalimpong, an Indian town close to the Sikkim 
border, the “commanding center” of the rebellion. Then, there were reports that members 
of the National People’s Congress (NPC) were accusing India of everything from 
kidnapping the Dalai Lama to encouraging the rebellion to interfering in Chinese affairs.  
Nehru tried to reassure China about India’s intentions and his government advised 
the Dalai Lama and his advisors to steer clear of political statements or actions that might 
provoke China further. The inflamed public atmosphere in India, however, did nothing to 
help his attempt to convince the Chinese government of India’s intentions. In May, an 
article in People’s Daily condemned the Indian criticism coming from the left and right 
and alleged that a “counter-revolutionary ‘holy alliance’ of the Metternich type has bound 
together the US State Department, British colonialists, Syngman Rhee of South Korea, 
Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, Chiang Kai-shek of China and India's reactionary 
parties—the Praja Socialist Party and the Jan Sangh Party.” It alleged that the Indian 
prime minister had been “pushed by that alliance into an important role in their so-called 
sympathy with Tibet movement.” Noting that Nehru had been a friend of China, the 
article expressed surprise about the “different tune he was piping.” Furthermore, it 
criticized his “deplorable error” of blaming Beijing and sympathizing with “the little 
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Chiang Kai-shek.”41 Subsequently, what Nehru called “a wall of silence with muffled 
whispers occasionally” descended on the subject of Tibet.42 
The brief period of silence turned out to be the calm before the storm. In August 
in the astern sector of the Sino-Indian border, there were serious Sino-Indian clashes, 
which Nehru believed were “the culmination of progressive Chinese unfriendliness 
towards India.”43 By this time there were an increasing number of questions in parliament 
about the frontier, especially the road in Aksai Chin and China’s attitude towards the 
McMahon Line. As Raghavan has noted, parliamentarians unsatisfied with Nehru’s 
replies and the government’s response to alleged Chinese actions and border claims put 
significant pressure on the government. Subsequently, Nehru agreed to make public a 
white paper on the subject.  
Why did Nehru, who until then had emphasized the need to strengthen and state 
India’s position without provoking China, agree to lay the issue out so publicly?44 In 
1958, India had indeed agreed to a Chinese request to keep the discussions over Hoti out 
of the public eye. Later that year and in early 1959, the government had handled with 
great care and sometimes evasiveness questions that had been asked in parliament about 
the border and Chinese maps.45 
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Raghavan states that the reasons for the release of the white paper were a desire to 
“stem the tide of criticism, and to demonstrate that the government had not been 
complacent.”46 Some officials perhaps also saw it as a potential source of leverage with 
China. Earlier that year, while acknowledging that publicizing the dispute would allow 
the “foreign press” to “make much of” Sino-Indian differences, the foreign secretary had 
indeed stated, “there may be an advantage in our negotiations with China to let the 
Chinese feel that there is anxiety in our country about the border incidents.” In October 
that year, he would note that India needed to demonstrate to China both the strength of 
the feeling in the country and the support for the Indian government to make clear to 
Beijing that any further intervention would “do more harm than good.”47 Regardless, as 
others have noted,48 the release on September 7 of the first white paper—and 
subsequently additional ones—had the opposite effect: rather than giving India more 
leverage, it constrained Nehru’s freedom of action. Agitated public opinion became not 
just a factor, but also a potential veto point in India’s decision-making on China.49 
The release of the white paper also infuriated China. Zhou objected to the public 
pressure and publicly blamed India for the dispute. The document release might even 
have contributed to the heated atmosphere in the NPC standing committee whose 
members blamed “Western imperialist forces and their agents in India who wanted to 
create Sino-Indian conflict and “change India’s foreign policy of peace and neutrality.”50 
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There continued to be criticism that the US was inciting India. Dutt, however, 
approvingly noted that the American part of the “foreign press” had actually been “very 
discreet,” perhaps so as not to complicate things for India.51 
The situation only seemed to escalate. A September 8 letter from Zhou stated that 
Nehru had misunderstood his previous assurances about the McMahon Line. It also laid 
down a basis for delimitation for the whole border, which India would subsequently 
strongly dispute. The letter left Nehru flabbergasted and doubting previous Chinese 
assurances. Its claims on India’s northeast were especially troublesome. As Raghavan 
notes, Indian assessments of China’s motivations ranged from Chinese doubts about 
India’s Tibet policy to China’s expansionist ambitions. Overall, a sense developed that 
Beijing was not trustworthy. 
After the next major Sino-Indian skirmish took place in the western sector in 
October, even though Nehru had maintained privately that this section of the border had 
not been delimited, the prime minister’s public stance became even firmer. A Chinese 
statement that Nehru read as indicating that Beijing would hold India’s northeast hostage 
if Delhi did not make concessions in the west made him “defiant.” Raghavan has 
suggested that this tone resulted both from the pressure of public opinion and the desire 
to build a strong negotiating position vis-à-vis China.  
The situation only deteriorated throughout that fall and winter. India subsequently 
rejected China’s proposal of mutual withdrawals twenty kilometers from the McMahon 
Line in the east and from the line of actual control in the west, believing that it would 
strengthen China’s position and weaken that of India on the ground and at the negotiating 
table. Then, China rejected an Indian counter-offer. India considered various proposals to 
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put forth, including a “face saving” one accepting China’s de facto presence in Aksai 
Chin and a “barter” one that envisioned swapping India’s claims in the west with those of 
China in the east. These ideas went nowhere. Neither did discussions with Zhou in Delhi 
in April 1960 and three subsequent rounds of discussions between Chinese and Indian 
officials between June and December. During this time, the lack of trust in China only 
intensified within the government, as did anti-Chinese sentiment outside it.52 
Watching from Washington  
In early 1957, the Eisenhower administration had envisioned American 
exploitation of differences between China and India whenever it was feasible.53 
Washington watched carefully the situation in Tibet and the border dispute, both of which 
created an opening for the US.54 Administration officials did not just want to exploit the 
rift in terms of its relations with India. US officials also envisioned using the dispute for 
propaganda, for example, by pointing to it as a lesson for African nations thinking about 
recognizing Beijing hoping for benefits in return. The idea was to highlight the fact that 
India had not only recognized the regime in China but had also been friendly towards it, 
and it had been rewarded with territorial claims and incursions.55 
Furthermore, the administration hoped to use the Sino-Indian rift in favor of India 
at home. The policy planning director, for example, advocated “exploit[ing] the favorable 
public and Congressional attitude toward India which are likely to result in the next 
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several months from the border situation and the President’s visit to India,” to garner 
more aid for India.56 On the Hill, administration officials had indeed asserted that India 
had reacted “vigorously” to the Chinese crackdown in Tibet and stressed that Delhi now 
realized that China was an aggressive country that could not be trusted.57 The 
developments did have an impact on members of Congress. Some noted that “the best 
thing that has happened in that part of the world” was the loss of Indian illusions about 
China after its crackdown in Tibet. Others like Poage believed that, while there was 
insufficient understanding in India that communism could “destroy” the country, the 
Chinese actions could convince India of the problem and of the need to resist it.58 In 
public, too, there was much discussion of the impact on India’s threat perception, some 
skepticism of whether Nehru’s balancing act would work, continuing concern that Nehru 
would “appease” China, and the hope that India would lose its illusions about its northern 
neighbor.59 
The administration, however, was careful about its public response. It was aware 
of Indian anxieties about the developments in Tibet, the border situation and the potential 
for escalation. Initial US intelligence estimates had suggested that Beijing would “avoid 
drastic action” to avoid offending India. Once it became clear that this was a mistaken 
assessment, the administration felt that Chinese actions were having enough of an impact 
in India and the whole of Asia. Inflamed Indian public opinion, for example, had already 
forced Nehru’s government to take a more assertive stance on Tibet. An aggressive US 
response would only be counter-productive. The administration thus did not want US 
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officials or others like Jiang to make any moves that would suggest that the uprising in 
Tibet was a western or Taiwanese-instigated rebellion or take any action that would 
lessen the impact of Chinese behavior.60 
American officials did not want Delhi to have a veto on Washington’s Tibet 
policy. Nonetheless, India’s role and influence and the US-India relationship made Indian 
opinion an “important factor.”61 Thus, the US was cautious about dealing with Indian 
officials on the subject. Washington emphasized that American officials in Delhi take no 
action vis-à-vis the Tibetans streaming into India that would decrease the adverse impact 
Chinese actions were having. The US expected India to need help with the refugees, but 
even on this front it instructed that officials wait for Indian requests for that aid.62 Once 
the US was helping with aid, the administration also took care not to highlight a US 
government role.63  
Furthermore, Washington was careful about how it used the situation. Defense 
Secretary McElroy wanted more efforts to publicize the Chinese crackdown, but 
Secretary of State Herter advised caution.64 The US instead worked to get Taiwan to give 
up publicly its claim on Tibet and recognize Tibetan independence. Jiang had already 
pledged to recognize Tibetans’ right to self-determination. Assistant Secretary of State 
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for Far East Asia Robertson, however, believed the statement fell short because it was too 
“ambiguous.”65  
India’s actions also continued to fall short of what the US would have liked.66 
There were concerns about India’s position regarding the Dalai Lama. These were 
perhaps exacerbated by the views of the Taiwanese ambassador, who believed that Nehru 
would force the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet to appease China in exchange for a Sino-
Indian border settlement.67 The US was simultaneously receiving intelligence reports that 
Beijing was indeed seeking the Dalai Lama’s return. The Dalai Lama, in turn, wanted 
Washington to recognize a Tibetan government and persuade others to do so as well. 
Dillon worried that he would take hasty public action that would put Washington in a 
bind.68  
The US was indeed contemplating the question of recognition and even trying to 
get a sense of how Taiwan would react if the US recognized Tibetan independence.69 
There were inter- and intra-agency differences on the subject. While the near east and 
international organization bureaus at the State Department were more cautious, some in 
the far east bureau argued that the US should recognize a Tibetan government if other 
countries did. The Far East bureau stressed that the views of India and other neutral 
countries should not be decisive. The military leadership also hoped that the US could be 
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more proactive, arguing that India’s security itself was at stake. Others like Deputy Under 
Secretary of State Murphy, however, argued that if the US was too proactive, the issue 
would be seen as a cold war one, possibly giving Nehru an excuse to “wash his hands off 
the matter.”70 Eisenhower, meanwhile, insisted that the State Department, which 
remained cautious overall, keep the lead.71 
There was a sense that the US needed to do something. Allen Dulles explained 
Nehru’s dual problem of needing to “conciliate China,” as well as simultaneously factor 
in the great sympathy for the Tibetans in India.72 Nonetheless, the US was concerned 
that, without any sign of American support to the Tibetans, India’s continuing caution 
would lead the Dalai Lama to acquiesce to Indian demands and consequently lose his 
symbolic role and influence. Thus, Dillon recommended assuring the Dalai Lama of 
American financial support and finding an alternate asylum destination if necessary. He 
also suggested a UN appeal.73 Eisenhower, however, did not want the Dalai Lama to 
break with Nehru or the US to suggest an appeal to the UN. Moreover, he wanted to 
suggest only limited American support. As for the asylum question, as Allen Dulles 
pointed out, there seemed little interest in other countries to accept the Dalai Lama.74 
Overall, it was necessary to ensure that neither the Dalai Lama nor Washington 
take any action that would jeopardize the Tibetan leader’s presence in India. Thus, the US 
decided to offer aid to the Tibetans to submit their appeal to the UN, but also to tell the 
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Dalai Lama to defer the recognition question. The State Department also instructed the 
American ambassador in Delhi to continue to desist from establishing any formal 
connection with the Tibetans that might upset Indian officials. Furthermore, it instructed 
officials to keep their Indian counterparts informed of US interactions with Tibetan 
leaders in India, as well as general US plans vis-à-vis Tibet.75  
The State Department did not think that India would cooperate with the US on the 
UN appeal. There was a sense that Delhi, even while acknowledging that the Dalai Lama 
had the right to make an appeal, thought it would be ineffective.76 Indian officials had 
previously considered and dismissed the idea of taking the Tibet issue up at the UN.77 
That summer Nehru indeed declined to sponsor the appeal. Indian officials pointed out to 
their American interlocutors that one reason was to avoid making Tibet a cold war 
issue—if it became one, Moscow, which had remained neutral, would be forced to take 
Beijing’s side. Moreover, the Indian foreign secretary pointed out that an appeal would 
not result in any real action because “No one is going to war with China over Tibet.” 
Furthermore it would not really have any effect because Beijing was not even represented 
at the UN. Finally, it would only intensify the Chinese crackdown. Dutt acknowledged 
that the sentiment in India favoring a UN appeal meant that the Indian government would 
not oppose an appeal that was phrased right. Overall, India’s policy would be “firm” 
toward China, but careful since “we have to be friends with powerful country with whom 
we have border of 2680 miles.”78 The US, careful about the Indian government’s 
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sensitivities, subsequently urged Tibet to focus on the charge of human rights violations 
rather than aggression in any appeal.79 
Even as officials were discussing the question of a Tibetan appeal at the UN, 
Nehru went public with the border dispute that fall. Eisenhower conveyed his “distress” 
and “concern” to the prime minister and to Pandit who was visiting the US at the time. 
The president highlighted that this was another instance—like Chinese behavior in Korea, 
Southeast Asia and the Taiwan Strait crisis—of Beijing “abandon[ing] negotiation and 
conciliation in favor of force and strife.”80 Eisenhower told legislators that the situation 
had made Nehru more realistic, with “even [Krishna] Menon” accepting the possibility 
that Delhi had made a mistake regarding Beijing.81 At a NSC meeting, Allen Dulles noted 
that despite Indian doubts about China’s sincerity, Delhi would nonetheless try to settle 
the dispute through negotiations, even as it sought to defend the border militarily.82  
India was assured by the US response. Even among the US public initial “smug 
satisfaction” seemed to have given way first to fear that a weak India would give in to 
China and then to a determination to stand by India as it stood up to China.83 The Indian 
government was not so pleased, however, about front-page headlines later that fall that 
read “Herter Avoids Firm U.S. Stand on India Border.” At a press conference in 
November the secretary of state noted that while the US presumed that India’s claims 
were “valid,” it had “no objective basis for such a presumption.” He added, “I don’t think 
we have taken any sides in [the dispute] at all.” Furthermore, he went on to say that he 
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thought it was “probably correct” to say that the US “has no view whatsoever as to the 
rightness or wrongness of this issue.” American officials, reporters and Indians present 
seemed surprised and in the latter case “deeply disturbed.”  
News reports from India indicated that Herter’s statement was greeted with 
“puzzled surprise,” but not the vitriol that might have been expected. This was perhaps 
because India needed all the friends it could get, as well as the fact that the US had 
rushed to clarify Herter’s statement. Soon after his initial comments, Herter’s office 
issued a statement noting that the secretary had been talking about the legal aspect of the 
border issue and unequivocally condemned the Chinese use of force to press its claims. 
The next day Herter again asserted that the US in no way condoned Chinese action; 
instead it found “wholly abhorrent” the “aggressive armed action” against India.84 The 
US also rushed to reassure Indian officials in Washington and Delhi of its position. 
Furthermore, the embassy in Delhi ensured that a statement of US sympathy toward the 
Indian position was published in major newspapers in India.85 The Indian foreign 
secretary told the US ambassador that India had appreciated the correction, but there 
should be no “ambiguity” about the border.86 After conversations in Washington, Indian 
embassy officials laid out multiple possible reasons for the US position: not wanting to 
make the border issue a cold war one; not wanting to upset Taiwan; “genuine doubt;” 
general tradition of not commenting on the legality of claims; or the desire to give India 
maneuverability in case it had to give up some territory in the future. At the very least, 
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they noted quick criticism in the press for Herter’s “moral ambiguity about Peking’s 
aggressive thrust against India.”87  
Subsequently at a news conference, Eisenhower asserted that the exact points of 
the border dispute were not the major issue, “What is important and what is the issue is 
this: are nations going to settle their differences by negotiation, honest meeting, honest 
negotiation with each other, or are they going to move in with force and take that course 
in the settlement of these disputes?” Repudiating Herter’s comment, he asserted that there 
was little question which side the US was on.88  
When he met with Nehru at the end of 1959, the president against expressed 
sympathy. He pointed out that the question came down to whether to let “the matter slide 
or to get more severe” with China.89 The president asserted in parliament that US forces 
“serve not only ourselves but friends and allies who, like us, have perceived the danger” 
and to a million-strong audience that “we who are free must support each other.” These 
statements left observers scrambling to interpret whether that meant that the US would 
defend India in the case of a Chinese attack. Eisenhower’s staff subsequently had to issue 
a clarification that assistance had neither been requested nor promised. An American 
observer noted, however, that if China and India did go to war there was “no question 
that India would have to seek military assistance—and would get it from the United 
States at once.” In the meantime, he asserted that even if India did not want military aid, 
it certainly wanted Eisenhower’s “heavy moral support” on the question. Furthermore, it 
continued to want economic assistance for development, which Nehru continued to 
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assert, was the best way to deal with the long-term threat from China. Nehru indeed 
appreciated the moral support and publicly noted that Eisenhower, coming as he had at 
“this special hour,” had struck a deep chord.90  
India also appreciated the fact that the U.S. had also continued to take account of 
Indian sensitivities on the Tibet question, even as it realized that Washington would have 
to show Tibet some public support.91 Allen Dulles had noted that as the border skirmishes 
had increased and Indian public sentiment became stronger, the Indian government 
seemed to become “friendlier” towards the Dalai Lama.92 The Indian government was 
still, however, reluctant to be more active on the Tibet question at the UN. As the British 
foreign secretary explained, the border dispute—and Soviet neutrality on that issue—had 
only reinforced India’s desire not to give Moscow a reason to take China’s side. Soviet 
officials had indeed told their British interlocutors that a formal Tibetan appeal at the UN 
would only inflame the situation, especially between China and India. With British and 
French officials also calling for caution, to avoid playing a very public role the US 
instead got Ireland and Malaya to sponsor a resolution that kept the focus on human right 
violations.93  
As for recognition, in October, the Far East bureau recommended against it. It 
was unlikely that other countries would recognize Tibetan independence and this would 
lead to the Dalai Lama being associated exclusively with the US, which would do his 
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cause little good.94 Privately, Washington informed Tibetan officials, as well as Indian 
and Taiwanese ones, that the US recognized the “principle of self-determination” for 
Tibetans. The US could not, however, recognize a Tibetan government-in-exile at that 
point. Furthermore, responding to Tibetan pleas that Washington push Delhi on this 
question, American officials asserted that India would not extend recognition.95 Finally, 
given Indian concerns, the US turned down a request for the Dalai Lama to meet 
Eisenhower during the president’s visit to India. The Indian foreign secretary was 
relieved, since India felt a meeting would increase Chinese accusations of India-US 
collusion and consequently India’s security problem.96 
American officials did, however, move forward on another front. Allen Dulles 
and Herter concurred on continuing covert actions to support Tibetan resistance 
operations to harass Beijing and help the Tibetan and “free world” cause.97 While some 
have contended that India cooperated with the US on this front, available evidence 
suggests that, at the very least, India was aware of—and did not quite object to—some 
US activities. The Indian foreign secretary asked Bunker about US violations of India’s 
air space and US arms that had been found with Tibetan refugees. He accepted American 
excuses on the latter and expressed the hope that any future American airdrops would not 
cross Indian air space. Bunker interpreted this conversation as not disapproving of US 
                                                
94 Memo from Parsons to Herter, October 14, 1959, Ibid, p. 793. 
95 Memcon of Murphy-Thondup Meeting, Washington, October 29, 1959, Ibid, p. 797, p. 800. Also, see 
Memcon of Parsons-Yeh Meeting, November 3, 1959, Ibid, p. 801. 
96 Telegram from AmEmb India re Bunker-Dutt Meeting, November 2, 1959, Ibid, p. 804; Note from Dutt 
to DS(E) re Meeting with Bunker, November 21, 1959, NMML, SDP, SF No. 38. 
97 Memo for the Record by Gray on Discussion with the President on Tibet, February 4, 1960, FRUS 1958-
60 Vol. XIX, p. 808. 
 264 
actions, but stemming from concern that this might negatively affect Indian public 
opinion of the US and also weaken Delhi’s hand vis-à-vis Beijing.98  
The US continued to be cautious about public action, especially as the Sino-
Indian border dispute showed no sign of dissipating. By summer 1960, the intelligence 
community came to believe that there would be no early settlement and expected a 
stalemate with intermittent clashes. It worried, however, that the longer dispute lasted, the 
more dangerous it would be, especially if Nehru was no longer prime minister. It outlined 
a swap deal as the most likely solution, but even if that was achieved intelligence officials 
did not foresee any turning back the clock in terms of Sino-Indian relations.99  
This seemed evident in conversations that Nehru had with Eisenhower and Herter 
in fall 1960. Nehru outlined Indian uncertainty about Beijing’s intentions and worried 
about the Chinese “national trait” to be expansive whenever China felt confident. He 
stated that the Sino-Indian talks had stalled because of the very basic disagreement on 
facts. China was not being clear about its claims. India, on its part, could only accept 
“minor deviation[s].” He responded in the affirmative to Eisenhower’s query about 
whether giving up Indian claims in the east would not almost bring China into India’s 
plains. He expressed concern about China’s logistical advantages in the east. He also 
highlighted the pressure on him in parliament to go to war with China “as though one 
could go to war over those mountains.” Nehru expressed frustration that China was being 
unreasonable with India. On the other hand, China had reached border agreements with 
Burma and Nepal, which India had indeed encouraged them to seek. Nehru felt that 
Beijing had been “reasonable” with them in an attempt to create leverage with India. 
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Herter said that, at the very least, it was good that China and India continued to discuss 
the issue. Eisenhower noted, however, that communists tended to be “uncompromising” 
in negotiations.100 Earlier, in a conversation with US officials the president had also 
expressed concern that while China would not aggress against Taiwan or Korea, it could 
act against India or Nepal or Southeast Asia.101 
US intelligence assessments indicated that Chinese actions had “tended to create 
in India a more sympathetic view of US policies.” The Chinese threat, along with need 
for US aid and better understanding of the American approach, would only buoy the 
trend toward even better US-India relations. Nehru had also mentioned that Chinese 
actions had created anti-Chinese sentiment in the country. The assessments noted that 
they had also weakened the communist party in India.102 The previous year the dispute 
had indeed caused serious internal differences within the communist party, which would 
eventually split over the issue.103 
Possible Solutions 
Intelligence analysts, however, expected India to continue with its nonaligned 
path because of the need for Soviet aid and hope for Soviet restraint of China.104 As 
India’s relations with China deteriorated, Moscow’s relations with Beijing had become 
more of a subject of interest in India. Officials watched Sino-Soviet relations, especially 
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to detect whether there were disagreements between the two. After 1958, it seemed clear 
that there were differences because of Beijing’s greater orthodoxy, but the Indian 
assessment had been that the Chinese need for aid and the Soviet need for bloc unity 
would prevent a breakup. This meant that India had to be careful not to overestimate the 
likelihood of a split.105 
When the border dispute was first made public in September 1959, Moscow 
released a statement calling for China and India to solve the problem peacefully. Soviet 
neutrality surprised many and in India there was speculation about the cause and the 
extent of that stance.106 (Subsequently, it has been traced to Khrushchev’s desire not to 
jeopardize his forthcoming visit to the US and not to jettison the Soviet relationship with 
India, leaving the field to the US.107) Nehru came to believe that the Soviet Union, 
concerned about growing Chinese strength, saw India as “a balancing force in relation to 
China in Asia.” For this reason—and in an effort to keep India out of Washington’s 
arms—it would likely remain neutral.108  
Allen Dulles also believed that Moscow was not pleased about the dispute and 
would want it settled as soon as possible. He did not, however, think that Beijing would 
heed pressure from Moscow to settle because Chinese policymakers were annoyed about 
Soviet criticism of their economic progress and concerned about what message backing 
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down on an international issue would send regarding their domestic credibility.109 The US 
had already been receiving reports of “critical strains” between Beijing and Moscow and 
by the end of 1959 there was unanimity in the intelligence community about this. Like 
Indian officials, however, there was little expectation of a “serious weakening of the 
alliance.”110 Toward the end of 1959, an American analyst did note that the lack of easing 
of Sino-Indian tension indicated the onset of a period in which Beijing would resist 
Moscow on foreign policy.111 
While Indian officials might not have believed that Moscow could restrain 
Beijing, at the very least they hoped it would stay neutral. This hope had indeed been the 
reason to avoid internationalizing the Tibet issue and to limit overt cooperation with the 
US on Sino-Indian questions. It was also the reason that the government was concerned 
about press criticism of the Soviet Union.112 For a while, officials seemed to be 
succeeding. When Khrushchev visited India in early 1960 he told the prime minister that 
Moscow “took no definite stand” and would try to maintain this attitude. He noted the 
difficulty of the situation for him since Moscow did not want its relations with either 
Delhi or Beijing to “cool off.” The Indian ambassador in Moscow also reported that 
Khrushchev told him that even the border dispute had not darkened the prospects for 
India-Soviet relations. A subsequent statement from Nehru seemed to imply his belief 
that by staying neutral, Moscow was actually taking India’s side.113 
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American officials were not too worried about these Indian attempts to keep 
Moscow from giving up its neutrality. Allen Dulles happily noted the relative lack of 
public enthusiasm for Khrushchev’s visit in 1960—compared to both his last visit and 
Eisenhower’s visit. He also noted that attacks on the west by the Soviet leader had not 
gone down well in India and that Khrushchev had avoided mentioning the Sino-Indian 
dispute.114  
Senior Indian officials on their part tried to ensure that government statements or 
actions did not “hurt the feelings of the US government.”115 When the U-2 incident 
occurred in summer 1960, even as the Indian press criticized the US, the Indian 
government tried to avoid comment, so much so that China started playing up Indian 
“indifference” and lack of condemnation to try to create a wedge between Delhi and 
Moscow. Nehru merely expressed concern about the deteriorating situation and called on 
all sides to settle their problems peacefully. Dutt explained privately to Soviet officials 
the reasons for Indian silence, but, overall, India did not want to get involved.116  
The US, in turn, saw signs that Moscow was trying not to get involved in the 
Sino-Indian dispute—for example, the Soviet news agency office in Delhi excused itself 
from working on Chinese business. Then, in a move that suggested a lack of neutrality, 
the Soviet Union offered India helicopters despite their potential use in the north against 
China. Meanwhile, assessments in Washington continued to indicate strain in the Sino-
Soviet relationship.117 From the Soviet Union, it was receiving assessments that Moscow 
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was irritated about Beijing’s actions ruining its larger strategy in Asia, and that Beijing 
was upset about Moscow not taking its side on issues like the Sino-Indian dispute.118  
From Beijing, the Indian ambassador also reported continued signs of a Sino-
Soviet rift to Delhi. Nehru confirmed to Eisenhower the Indian belief that China and the 
Soviet Union were “not getting along.” Nonetheless, he noted that India could not take a 
split for granted since the two countries were still talking. Moreover, Soviet concern 
about Chinese power, which Eisenhower envisioned, was only likely to materialize in the 
long term.119  
Eisenhower was skeptical that Moscow would be an effective solution to India’s 
China problem—despite Soviet disapproval, it was clear, after all, that China continued 
to undertake incursions into India.120 There had been hope in Washington, however, that 
Pakistan could be part of India’s China solution. It arose in spring 1959 with the Chinese 
crackdown in Tibet. It only increased as the Sino-Indian border dispute became evident 
and intensified. In May 1959 Eisenhower instructed that the US make “special efforts” to 
bring Delhi and Karachi together to understand that their “true enemies” were Beijing 
and Moscow.121 Intelligence assessments indicated that a joint India-Pakistan effort could 
materialize if the two countries understood that China was directly threatening them.122 
There was skepticism among some US policymakers that anything but a step-by-step 
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approach to solving India and Pakistan’s problems would work.123 There was also 
recognition of the limits of US influence in getting the two countries to settle.124 
Nevertheless, Eisenhower’s hopes that the two countries could settle their problems 
increased when the two countries reached an Indus waters agreement in fall 1959.125 As 
an Indian embassy official noted there was a general sense that this agreement was a 
result of the Chinese threat.126 
When Eisenhower and Nehru met in Delhi in December 1959, Eisenhower 
stressed that the real threat came from the north. Nehru indicated that there had been 
recent progress in India-Pakistan relations. He, however, made clear—as his ambassador 
had before—that the American idea of joint India-Pakistan defense planning would 
violate nonalignment. He instead proposed a joint no-war declaration, which Eisenhower 
recommended to Pakistani leader Ayub Khan as a “great opportunity.”127  
Indian officials accepted that the threat from China made a settlement with 
Pakistan more desirable. Nehru had indeed told Eisenhower of his concern about a 
Pakistani “stab in the back” if and when India was acting against the Chinese threat. As 
the American ambassador noted, however, for domestic and precedent reasons, the 
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tension with China made Nehru less likely to concede India’s claim on Kashmir as 
Pakistan wanted.128 
Despite Ayub’s rejection of Nehru’s suggestion, through 1960 there continued to 
be hope in Washington that the China threat would lead India and Pakistan toward a 
settlement. Intelligence analysts believed that the threat meant an “about even” chance 
that India and Pakistan would settle.129 In the meantime, Eisenhower seemed pleased with 
the general improvement in India-Pakistan relations and Nehru’s realism. Later that year, 
his approval only increased when Nehru travelled to Pakistan to sign the Indus waters 
agreement.130  
India, on its part, continued to disapprove of US military aid to Pakistan, 
especially since the US and Pakistan signed another bilateral agreement in early 1959. 
From the Indian perspective, this aid resulted in increased Indian defense expenditure and 
a more intransigent Pakistan.131 The US, however, saw it as necessary to reassure 
Pakistan of the commitment and the benefits that came with being an ally. This need had 
only increased—especially in the minds of defense and intelligence analysts—after 
Pakistan agreed to allow the US to establish a facility at Badaber.132  
Both India and the US, however, tried to handle this situation with care. The US, 
for example, kept India informed of decisions to provide Pakistan with major equipment 
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(without revealing quantity). When the bilateral agreement was signed, US officials 
assured India that there was no secret coda and—even though Pakistan claimed and had 
wanted an expanded commitment that covered Indian aggression—that it applied only to 
communist aggression.133 Indian officials, on their part, showed the US ambassador the 
statement that the prime minister would make in parliament on the subject in advance. In 
parliament, Nehru highlighted American assurances that this was not a new or expanded 
commitment. He denied that India was toning down its criticism because of American aid 
to India, but asserted that he was not going to indulge in “fiery speeches” or “send 
aggressive notes.” The US, after all, had “the friendliest feelings for us, by and large.”134 
Thanks to China, these friendly feelings also became evident on the US-India 
military front, as the US slowly became part of India’s military solution to its Chinese 
problem. Before 1959, there had not been much focus in Washington on the defense sales 
and assistance potential of the US-India relationship. American officials trying to get 
development assistance for India had indeed wanted Delhi to reduce defense 
expenditures, arguing that it had more than enough military capability.135  
This view changed with the Chinese threat. By mid-1959, the Eisenhower 
administration was referring to the Indian military establishment as “relatively modest.” 
Treasury and budget bureau officials continued to be interested in getting both India and 
Pakistan to reduce their forces. However, while Dillon—who had earlier believed that 
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India should reduce its forces—and defense department officials suggested trying to get 
India to redeploy forces to the China border, they did not think India could or should 
decrease it forces. Given the increased threat, despite the consequences for the 
development program, overall, the administration believed that a reduction in Indian 
defense expenditures was not going to be feasible.136  
As the threat increased, India, on its part, worked to strengthen its military 
capabilities. Indian officials expected that the US would probably welcome an Indian 
request for military aid, despite the fact that the US was itself not reaching out to India on 
this front. Delhi was not ready to take that step, but it considered asking for payment 
concessions from the US for Indian defense purchases—this was a departure given that 
India had resisted this option previously on the grounds that it could be interpreted as a 
request for military assistance. Meanwhile, officials were relieved that the defense 
department had assured them that it would expedite delivery of Indian orders of arms and 
ammunition.137  
Some American officials wanted to be more proactive. Bunker recommended 
offering to sell India certain military equipment, arguing that if the US did not do so, 
India would have to balance out Pakistani procurement with more expensive acquisitions 
from Britain. This would have a deleterious impact on its defense strengthening and 
infrastructure build up efforts on the Chinese border and on its internal strengthening 
versus China. Eisenhower indicated that he had no problem with such an offer. 
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Eventually, the US agreed to sell India C-119s.138 There remained concern on the part of 
some, however, about the perception that the US was treating neutral India on the same 
basis as ally Pakistan. Thus, when India informally inquired about buying certain 
missiles, the US sought to encourage India to purchase them from Britain instead.139  
Officials, nevertheless, agreed that the US should sell India more equipment but 
preferred to do it discreetly on a case-by-case basis with a focus on equipment to meet the 
China threat. Bunker suggested offering India helicopters, aircraft and road building 
equipment for purchase.140 Such an offer could also help achieve the US goal of 
encouraging India to continue to rely on the west for it arms acquisitions. Furthermore, it 
would strengthen the hands of the Indian military, which the administration believed to 
be strongly non-communist and opposed to military purchases from Moscow.141 
The State Department believed that it was neither feasible nor desirable to get into 
a “sales competition” with the Soviet Union. The Pentagon’s concern increased, however, 
when it received reports that an Indian defense team had gone to Moscow. Senior 
military officials worried that the Soviet foot in the military sales door would lead to a lot 
more because Moscow could undercut Washington on price and prove itself a reliable 
supplier to India. They recommended making an offer to support India’s indigenous 
defense industry even if the US had to absorb some of the costs. In any case, they argued, 
these costs would be less than if the US was giving India military grants, which India did 
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not want anyway, or if Washington got into a sales competition with Moscow. India had 
already expressed some interest in such assistance in talks with American defense 
corporations. The proposal also had the benefit of decreasing India’s external 
dependence, assisting its economic development and conserving its foreign exchange. 
Overall, it was more of a “permanent cure.”142 
This proposal—as well as the near-term sale of helicopters that military officials 
wanted to undertake—however, left unanswered the question of how to finance the 
sales.143 The issue languished in the transition period between the Eisenhower and 
Kennedy administrations. 
IN CAMELOT (1961-1962) 
The Present Excellent Trends 
Many of the trends that became evident in the latter half of the Eisenhower 
administration only intensified in the Kennedy administration—including the emphasis 
on the uncommitted world and the need to fight indirect aggression. As Merrill has noted, 
there was more of a change in tactics rather than strategy. This change, nevertheless, 
proved important for India, since the incoming administration placed relatively less 
emphasis on establishing formal alliances and military assistance. Moreover, as 
Schlesinger has noted, of all the uncommitted countries, the president was “most 
interested” in India. When it came to India, there was also a difference in degree from the 
last administration, with Kennedy believing even more strongly in India’s role as a 
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counterbalance and contrast to China—a belief that he had made evident even before 
taking office.144 
The year before, Kennedy had indeed called for the non-communist world to 
devote more time and attention to “the struggle between India and China for leadership of 
the East, for the respect of all Asia, for the opportunity to demonstrate whose way of life 
is the better.” He had further highlighted why he believed “the outcome of this 
competition will vitally affect the security and standing of this Nation:” if India faltered 
in this struggle “its role as a counter to the Red Chinese will be lost, and communism 
would have won its greatest bloodless victory.”145  
India had not worried too much about the change of administrations. As Dillon 
had noted to the Indian finance minister before the 1960 polls, “whichever party won the 
forthcoming election would be sympathetic to continuing aid to India.”146 Indian 
officials, however, particularly welcomed Kennedy’s victory since they believed he and 
his advisers were “very sympathetic to India and will do their best.”147 Indian officials 
continued to make the case for aiding India to incoming administration officials. B.K. 
Nehru argued, “India, on a population basis and for compelling political reasons, had a 
good case for receiving ‘substantially more than one-third’ of total American aid.” He 
also noted the Soviet commitment of $500 million credit for the plan and consideration in 
Moscow of another $300 million. Nehru, in turn, highlighted his government’s challenge: 
                                                
144 Merrill, Bread and the Ballot, p. 170; McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, p. 272; Schlesinger, 
p. 522. 




146 Memcon of Morarji Desai-Dillon Meeting, September 26, 1960, FRUS 1958-60 Vol. XV, p. 555. 
147 IndEmb US, Annual Political Report 1960, NAI, File No. 50(8)-AMS/61; IndEmb US, Fortnightly 
Political Report (February 1-15, 1961), NAI, File No. 50(1)-AMS/61. 
 277 
“We have a politically-conscious mass of people who think that they deserve 
everything—and they do—but India is unable to supply it.” The prime minister 
simultaneously also emphasized the progress India was making and stressed that the 
trends were moving in the right direction.148 
Indian officials were preaching to the choir. Eisenhower’s last policy planning 
director had feared that a new administration would be “reluctant” to put together a large 
foreign assistance plan.149 The fact that a Kennedy transition task force had suggested 
annual aid of $500 million for India indicated that this concern was misplaced. The new 
administration formed a task force led by under secretary of state George Ball to review 
foreign assistance. It criticized the previous administration’s emphasis on military 
assistance, but it also recommended ideas that the Eisenhower administration had tried to 
implement, including long-term assistance packages and burden sharing with allies. In 
addition, it suggested a one-stop aid agency. Moreover, Kennedy argued publicly that his 
administration’s aid policy was not designed just to contain communism, but to assist 
positively in “an historical demonstration that…economic growth and political 
democracy go hand in hand.”150 
The case for aiding India in particular was facilitated by optimism about that 
country within the context of the administration’s general sense of optimism.151 Kennedy 
was impressed with India’s progress. He told Nehru that he was committed to aiding 
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India and trying to make the foreign assistance program more flexible and long-term.152 
There was also optimism about the bilateral relationship, with officials noting the 
“present excellent trend in Indo-American relations.” Taking on congressional 
contentions that the US was losing ground internationally, secretary of defense Robert 
McNamara cited India as one of the “bright spots” that proved that criticism wrong. The 
administration’s adoption of ideas (and personnel) that advocated that economic progress 
could support political stability only boosted the case for aiding India.153  
Thus, Indian officials were reassured by the administration’s attitude toward 
India. They were, however, concerned about the impact of the economic strain in the US 
on foreign assistance. They kept a close watch on government statements, as well as 
expert recommendations to detect the prevailing mood on assistance. They were 
heartened that, despite the economic problems, Kennedy, Johnson and other 
policymakers seemed committed to aiding India. Their statements and advocacy 
indicated “good intentions.” Officials knew, however, that implementation would depend 
on Congress, which might continue to pose a problem.154 
India had continued to struggle with not knowing in advance how much aid would 
be forthcoming over the next few years. The previous year Nehru had noted that even if 
liberals took the White House, aid would likely only come in “driblets” because of 
congressional difficulties.155 B.K. Nehru, nevertheless, hoped that the new 
                                                
152 See footnote 1 re Letter from Kennedy to JLN, May 8, 1961 delivered by Johnson on May 18, FRUS 
1961-63 Vol. XIX, p. 41. 
153 Letter from Rountree (US ambassador to Pakistan) to Weil (Director, OSAA), February 8, 1961, Ibid, p. 
8; Testimony of McNamara (SecDef), June 14, 1961, Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee 87th Congress, First Session on S-1983 Part 2 1961  (Washington, DC: GPO, 1961) [hereafter 
SFRC Hearings, 87-I Congress on S1983-2 1961], p. 675; Merrill, Bread and the Ballot, p. 171. 
154 IndEmb US, Annual Political Report 1960, NAI, File No. 50(8)-AMS/61; IndEmb US, Fortnightly 
Political Reports (February 1-15, March 16-31, June 1-15 and July 1-15, 1961), NAI, File No. 50(1)-
AMS/61; Letter from BK Nehru to LK Jha re Meeting with Harriman, Washington, February 22, 1961, 
NAI, File No. 73(37)-AMS/61.  
155 Record of JLN-Khrushchev Talk, Calcutta, March 1, 1960, NMML, SDP, SF No. 24. 
 279 
administration’s attempt to put aid on a long-term basis would be successful. Ball warned 
him that, while the administration was re-evaluating aid policy, congressional and fiscal 
constraints would continue to hinder major changes.156  
On the Hill, advocates of aid for India highlighted the positive. They argued that 
even if India was lagging behind China somewhat in terms of rate of growth, it was 
fighting the good fight of freedom. State Department officials pushed back against 
criticisms that US aid to India had not produced results and only strengthened 
government control of the economy. Advocates reiterating the “bases for optimism,” 
argued that India continued to be “critically important.” It was one of the “points of 
strength” in the underdeveloped world and in an “intense competition with the 
Communist system in China for recognized achievement.” Moreover, India’s agreement 
with Pakistan on the Indus waters treaty showed that it was willing to do whatever it took 
to keep its focus on development and China.157  
Indian officials tracked the continuing debate about various aspects of foreign aid 
in Congress: whether it should be given at all and, if it should, to whom, what kind and 
how much. They believed there was a “swing of opinion” in favor of the foreign 
assistance bill, thanks to indications of a renewed Soviet economic offensive, Ayub’s 
speech in Congress that advocated foreign assistance, and vocal support for foreign aid 
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from Eisenhower and Nixon. Nevertheless, they realized that the long-term provisions in 
the bill were not popular and unlikely to make it through.158 
As expected, Congress rejected the administration’s multi-year funding request. 
Despite cuts, however, the administration still got authorization for $4.1 billion. The 
administration had proposed $500 million of the total $900 million development 
assistance amount for FY1962 for India. After cuts in Congress, the amount came to 
$465.5 million—more than double the previous year. India had estimated that it needed 
$5.5 billion of foreign aid to meet its $24 billion third plan goals. When the India 
consortium met that spring and summer, there were pledges of $2 billion of aid for the 
first two years, including $1.045 billion from the US. In addition, the administration 
committed $1.3 billion in food assistance for India.159 
Nehru and his officials continued to express gratitude for US aid. He also 
acknowledged Kennedy’s efforts to work towards aid programs on a long-term basis.160 
Overall, he was pleased with the new administration’s approach. Johnson’s assertion in 
Delhi that “military force alone can never be a permanent bulwark against Communist 
activities” in Asia was music to Nehru’s ears.161 Kennedy’s public statements that he was 
going to make a special effort to reach out to nonaligned countries further pleased the 
prime minister.162 The president even seemed willing to sort out disagreements with the 
Soviet Union. Nehru also thought the administration’s attitude on the issues of Angola, 
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Congo and Laos showed a “marked change” in the foreign policy realm.163 India indeed 
worked with the US on Congo and Laos and, despite the fact that the experience was not 
without problems, it left a positive impression of the administration.164 
On their part, Indian officials tried to be careful about differences. Kux has noted, 
for example, the “relative[ly] calm” Indian reaction to the Bay of Pigs invasion.165 Even 
before the administration had come to office, Dutt had noted that India had to be careful 
not to get “drawn into” Cuba-US controversies. When it had seemed that India would 
have to pick a side at the UN in late 1960, Indian officials had informed their American 
counterparts in advance.166 In spring 1961, when reports of the invasion emerged, 
initially Nehru called the situation “distressing,” but refused further comment till he had 
more details. His government ensured that the issue was not discussed in parliament, 
despite communist party pressure. As pressure built on Nehru, in parliament he 
acknowledged that there had been an invasion of Cuba and he could not see how it could 
have occurred without American help or encouragement. He suggested that private 
concerns might be more responsible and welcomed Kennedy’s statement about not 
permitting American military intervention in Cuba. Nevertheless, his disapproval of US 
government actions was clear, with his major concern apparently the impact on the 
negotiations in Southeast Asia. Just a few days later, however, he seemed to have 
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“second thoughts” and expressed faith in Kennedy’s assurances and played down his 
previous criticism.167  
Administration officials hoped that Nehru would stay on that path, but 
developments that fall would take a bit of the sheen off the Indian bright spot for them. 
That summer, Ayub asserted to Kennedy that in return for aid, “at the back of its mind 
the U.S. surely thought India would support the U.S.” Kennedy asserted that he did not 
expect Indian support, even on some issues that were vital to the US. The US gave India 
aid not to gain support but “to help it stay free.”168  
Nevertheless, with a greater degree of interest and aid there seemed to be greater 
hope (and expectation) than in the previous administration that India would support the 
US—or, the very least, not oppose it on key issues. When India did not meet those 
expectations, there was disappointment. The administration accepted the principle that 
India would have an independent foreign policy, but sometimes its practice posed real 
problems. The problems started with Nehru’s public comment during the Berlin crisis in 
August that the west’s access to Berlin was a “concession” rather than a right. Then, there 
was disapproval of the Belgrade nonaligned conference and the related Indian reaction to 
the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests. This was followed by public questions about 
India’s continued insistence on supporting communist Chinese seating at the UN.  
Nehru’s comments on the crisis Berlin had varied. Initially, he had criticized the 
closing of the border. Then, there was his statement about access not being a right. Even 
Indian embassy officials in the US admitted that the “hysteric excitement” that followed 
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Nehru’s remarks were “understandable.” They explained to Delhi that Indian comments 
especially hit a nerve because the Kennedy administration had been actively trying to 
gain the understanding of nonaligned countries. In what one newspaper called a “switch,” 
Nehru subsequently clarified that he believed the communist bloc should not deny the 
west access to Berlin. US ambassador to India Galbraith, nevertheless, told the Indian 
foreign secretary that India needed to be careful, since its words or actions weakened 
Kennedy’s hand.169  
Nehru’s words had made the administration “nervous” about his attitude at the 
forthcoming nonaligned conference in Belgrade, since it had expected the Indian prime 
minister to be a “moderating influence” there.170 Nehru had shown little enthusiasm for 
convening a conference, which Egypt, Indonesia and Yugoslavia had been pushing.171 He 
had eventually, however, accepted it. It is not exactly clear why, but Indian concern about 
losing ground in the Afro-Asian world to China and the sense that Beijing was actively 
trying to isolate Delhi might have played a role in his acquiescence.172   
The conference took place just after the Soviet Union announced that it was 
resuming nuclear tests, blaming the west’s intentions for its decision. There was much 
public criticism in the US about the nonaligned reaction to the Soviet move. Indian 
officials noted that even supporters of India believed that the nonaligned countries were 
“soft” on the Soviet Union and “hard” on the west at the conference. Critics did not think 
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Egyptian leader Gamal Nasser and Nehru’s denunciations were targeted enough. The 
administration clarified that it was satisfied with Nehru’s behavior at the conference.173 
The prime minister had expressed deep regret about the Soviet decision, stating that it 
made the world a more dangerous place, and had resisted other nonaligned countries’ call 
to propose solutions for a host of global issues, including Berlin.174 American officials 
assured India that Kennedy’s statement when signing the foreign aid legislation that it 
was his “belief that in the administration of these funds we should give great attention 
and consideration to those nations who have our view of world affairs” was not directed 
at India. Then, however, Krishna Menon’s statements blaming the west for the Soviet 
decision and equating Soviet atmospheric tests with American underground ones really 
upset the administration. Indian officials worried about the review of foreign policy the 
administration announced and the media’s “cooling off” toward India. When 
administration officials publicly attacked Krishna Menon’s statement, observers in the 
US wondered if this signified a U-turn in the administration’s attitude toward India.175 
They awaited a visit by Nehru to find out. 
Schlesinger and others have identified Nehru’s visit in November as resulting in 
Kennedy giving up “hope…that India would be in the next years a great affirmative force 
in the world or even in South Asia.”176 Given the events leading up to it, Nehru’s visit 
probably confirmed that view rather than caused it. The Indian military of takeover of 
Goa after the visit would only reinforce the view. The American reaction, which 
condemned the Indian use of force but not the continuation of the Portuguese empire, in 
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turn, upset India.177 Indian officials had expected a negative reaction to the action, though 
one wryly commented that if India instead had “launched an offensive against the 
Chinese to regain our territory we would of course be applauded as heroes.”178 
The two countries, however, needed each other too much. On his visit, Nehru did 
some damage control. In the joint communiqué issued, India agreed that the west had a 
“legitimate and necessary right” to access Berlin. Speaking publicly, Nehru also called 
the Soviet nuclear tests “a very harmful, disastrous thing.” Seeming to repudiate Krishna 
Menon, he said that it was “obvious” that Soviet actions were the ones responsible for the 
new “phase” of tension. He stressed that their resumption of testing was “completely 
wrong” and acknowledged that there should have been stronger criticism from the 
nonaligned countries. Furthermore, he denied that there was a nonaligned bloc and 
seemed to distance India from other nonaligned countries’ statements. Privately, he said 
to Kennedy, “Non-aligned countries are so non-aligned that they do not agree even 
among themselves.” Finally, on the question of Indian support for a place for China at the 
UN, which had also been criticized, he explained that Delhi believed it would be “easier” 
to deal with Beijing if it was in the UN. The Indian embassy noted that after Nehru’s 
visit, at least, the “attacks on our motives are reduced.”179 
Despite frustrations with Nehru and Krishna Menon, for the US as well “India 
remained the key area in Asia” and, moreover, the “most reasonable” of the Asian 
developing countries. As Schlesinger has pointed out, while the vision of India and its 
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role might have shrunk, Kennedy still thought it was crucial to help India succeed.180 As 
far as he was concerned, “The independence of countries sometimes cause 
problems…We should simply have to live with those difficulties”—this tolerance was 
what made Washington different from Moscow.181 The reality was that India had enough 
influence that it could play serious spoiler or major facilitator when it came to US 
interests on various issues and the administration thought, overall, that India would play 
the latter.182  
Administration officials highlighted Nehru’s statements in support of the west and 
critical of the Soviet Union. The administration shifted the blame for the major 
differences that fall to Krishna Menon, portraying him as loose cannon.183 Outside the 
administration even Nixon came to Nehru’s defense, welcoming the prime minister’s 
“inspiring leadership.” In a tirade about neutral countries, he noted that “to his credit” 
Nehru was not one of the nonaligned leaders who tried to blackmail the US into 
providing aid by threatening to go communist. He pointed out that the Indian prime 
minister had been the only leader at Belgrade who had given the Soviet Union more than 
a “gentle slap on the wrist” for resuming atomic tests.184 
More importantly from India’s perspective, the administration moved forward on 
supporting India on both the defense and development fronts. Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk went beyond the traditional US position on the Sino-US border, stating at a press 
conference in December, “we support the Indian view with respect to their own borders. 
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Those borders have been well established in law if not in every locality demarcated 
exactly on the ground. But the McMahon Line generally is something that the rest of the 
world has accepted.”185 Furthermore, just a month after Kennedy had ordered a hold on 
aid to India because of the Goa takeover, he approved its release in early 1962. Even as 
Kennedy worried about the amount of aid going to South Asia relative to Latin America 
and emphasized the need to “tighten up” overall aid terms to make them more acceptable 
to Congress, he continued to support a large aid program for India.186 That aid program 
seemed under threat that summer in the senate. Sen. Symington (D-MO) led an effort to 
cut the proposed aid package for India by 25 percent. The lack of an India-Pakistan 
settlement, Krishna Menon’s statements the previous fall and India’s ties with the Soviet 
Union motivated him. Reports of a potential Indian defense deal with the Soviet Union 
only increased the size of the target on India’s back in Congress. Kennedy personally 
intervened to save the Indian aid program. The administration managed to limit the cut 
and received $400 million of the $450 million it requested for India for FY1963.187 
The signs, however, did not bode well for the future. Congress cut 20 percent 
from the administration’s overall request. Even though the cut to the India package was 
relatively less (at around 10 percent), it was the first time in years that the amount of aid 
appropriated for India was less than the previous year. From then on, this feature would 
be the rule rather than the exception. Moreover, even supporters like Galbraith had 
started worrying that India was taking western aid for granted. The “considerable help” 
he had envisioned getting from India did not seem to be materializing. He wondered if 
the US had been too “eager to help and…anxious to explain ourselves” and if, instead, it 
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should play “cooler” in terms of offering aid, which would have “a good effect here and a 
good ultimate effect in Washington.”188   
At that stage, however, from the Indian perspective the prospects of US-India 
relations seemed good. Nehru conveyed his country’s gratitude for America’s “friendly 
and sympathetic attitude, even more than the aid” and emphasized that this would persist 
no matter what differences emerged.189 American officials in Delhi detected a definite 
“Movement of India toward west during past five years.”190 As NSC staffer Robert 
Komer would later note, China had made—and would continue to make—a significant 
contribution to that movement. 
“Growls from Peking” 
The Sino-Indian border dispute had not dissipated. By 1961, Nehru was 
convinced that Beijing was the real danger to peace and to any US-Soviet détente. He 
told US officials that the situation with China was “dangerous,” with negotiations going 
nowhere. He feared that China’s internal problems were only going to increase Beijing’s 
assertiveness and lead it to “press forward wherever possible.” Nonetheless, he and other 
officials noted that they did not think that China would resort to major aggression in the 
next few years.  
Under Secretary of State Bowles told Nehru that the possibility of major Chinese 
aggression could not be ruled out for the next decade. He urged that India and the US 
discuss such a contingency, even if they could not jointly plan for it. He noted that in the 
long-term an Asian power balance—with India, Japan and Pakistan—could help contain 
China, with the US military “more unobtrusively in the background.” In the meantime, he 
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“assured [Nehru] that if China sought to expand into South or Southeast Asia by military 
power we would oppose this effort with whatever allies we could persuade to cooperate 
with us.”191  
Kennedy was uncertain about China’s overall intentions and actions and worried 
that the Sino-Indian border dispute would be a potential problem over the next year.192 
Like Eisenhower, he hoped that India would help alleviate this problem by settling its 
Pakistan one. Soon after he had taken office, Ayub and other Pakistani officials had 
started urging the US to use economic assistance to push India towards a Kashmir 
solution. Both Kennedy and Johnson told Ayub that the US did not have that kind of 
leverage with India. Furthermore, administration officials, including the president, 
continued to assert that the US would not stop assisting neutrals in general and India in 
particular. With Chinese pressure on India increasing, Ayub started arguing that 
Washington should use the Indian need for US backing as leverage, since Delhi was now 
“very relian[t]” on the US. Realizing that there was little appetite for this in Washington, 
the Pakistani president also tried another line of argument: that South Asia would not be 
truly secure without an India-Pakistan settlement.193 
This argument already held traction in the administration. In addition, officials 
believed that India-Pakistan reconciliation would make aid for India easier to get through 
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Congress, prevent the bilateral quarrel and arms race from cancelling out the benefits of 
US assistance and remove a thorn in US-India relations.194 Thus, as per Kennedy’s 
promise to Ayub, administration officials including the president discussed the possibility 
of an India-Pakistan settlement with Indian officials.  
Nehru eventually expressed a willingness to accept the status quo in Kashmir with 
some minor changes if necessary.195 As Galbraith had explained, there were limits to how 
far Nehru could go, however, given the Sino-Indian border situation and upcoming 
elections in India in February 1962.196 Nevertheless, in order to stop Pakistan from 
bringing Kashmir up at the UN and making things more difficult for everyone, 
Washington urged Nehru to take some visible action. In January 1962, the prime minister 
agreed to try to sit down with Ayub after the elections, but made clear that he neither 
would nor could accept mediation.197 
Some officials like Komer resented the constant Pakistani pressure, which was 
creating problems for broader American strategic interests such as with India. Komer 
asserted, “if we must choose among these countries, there is little question that India 
(because of its sheer size and resources) is where we must put our chief reliance…”198 
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American officials did not appreciate Pakistan’s formal request that the US use aid as 
leverage, terminate military sales to India unless India forsook “aggressive intentions” 
and agreed to limit use against China, and announce publicly the 1959 assurance that the 
US would aid Pakistan in the event of an Indian attack. Even the South Asia bureau at the 
State Department, which was urging that the US try to get India and Pakistan to talk to 
each other, did not believe that aid should be used to push India, even if that created 
problems with Pakistan.199  
The American frustration with Pakistan only increased over 1962 when it pursued 
the Kashmir issue at the UN despite persistent American advice and efforts with India 
that had resulted in Nehru inviting Ayub to India. The US refused to sponsor a UN 
resolution as Pakistan wanted, but found itself having to support one that summer 
because of previous commitments.200 In parliament Nehru expressed his disappointment 
with the US and UK, noting that on Kashmir and Goa the two countries would “almost 
invariably be against us.” Washington made clear to Delhi that this speech had an adverse 
impact on Congress and the president, especially given that the US had worked to 
moderate the resolution.201 Administration officials were, however, none too pleased with 
Pakistan either, resenting the fact that it pushed the US to take a public stand at the UN.  
Pakistan’s developing relationship with China had also upset the administration. 
In 1959, intelligence analysts had dismissed the idea that Sino-Pakistani ties would 
                                                
199 NESAA, “US Relations with South Asia,” undated (January 1962), Ibid, p. 186. 
200 Telegram from DoS to AmEmb Pakistan, December 29, 1961, Ibid, pp. 166-167. Also, see Telegram 
from AmEmb India to DoS re JLN-Bowles-Galbraith Meeting, February 23, 1962, Ibid, p. 213; Telegram 
from AmEmb Pakistan to DoS re Bowles Meetings with Ayub and MEA officials, March 4, 1962, Ibid, p. 
221; Memcon of Rusk-Zafrullah Khan (Pakistani PR to UN) Meeting, April 12, 1962, Ibid, p. 233; Memo 
from Cleveland (AS/S IO) and Talbot to Ball (Acting S/S), June 22, 1962, Ibid, p. 290. 
201 Reference to Telegram from AmEmb India to DoS, June 24, 1962 in Ibid, p. 291; Telegram from 
Bundy to Galbraith, June 24, 1962, Ibid, p. 291; Telegram from Rusk to Galbraith, July 2, 1962, Ibid, p. 
296. 
 292 
expand.202 In the Kennedy administration, however, the Pakistani government seemed to 
move toward a more neutral position, pursuing economic engagement with Moscow and 
border talks with Beijing.203 Earlier Ayub had publicly stated that Pakistan would not 
accept any Sino-Indian agreement that covered the border in the western sector because 
that area was in Jammu and Kashmir.204 By spring 1961, however, he had indicated to 
American officials that he perceived a greater Chinese threat and thought Pakistan should 
itself reach a border agreement with Beijing. Subsequently, Pakistani officials had told 
Kennedy that China had approached Pakistan for a settlement, probably because it would 
give them an advantage in negotiations with India.205 Then, Pakistan had indicated that it 
was normalizing relations with China and the Soviet Union and would settle with Beijing 
to protect its own interests. Ayub had denied that this was an effort to “embarrass India.” 
Ambassador-at-large Harriman, however, had questioned how any such agreement—de 
jure or de facto—could not trouble India.206  
Both India and the US saw Pakistan’s relationship with China as a problem. US 
officials doubted that Pakistan would jettison the US tie because Beijing and Moscow 
could not help Islamabad that much. Intelligence analysts basically expected Pakistan “to 
seek greater independence within the framework of its pro-Western orientation.”207 There 
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was concern, however, that Pakistan’s relationship with China could create trouble for 
American and Indian interests. Kennedy noted that Pakistan was no longer supporting the 
US on issues like Chinese representation at the UN, which were of vital interest to the 
US.208 In addition, as Nehru had told Kennedy, Pakistan’s “flirt[ation]” with China made 
Kashmir harder to solve because of public opinion.209 India and the US only became 
more upset when China and Pakistan made public their border negotiations in summer 
1962. Pakistan’s insistence that the initiative had come from China did not help; as 
Islamabad admitted the agreement only put more pressure on India.210 Kennedy seemed 
fed up. He nixed the Pakistani suggestion of US-Pakistan joint defense planning vis-à-vis 
India. When there was consideration of whether to restate guarantees to Pakistan to 
reassure it about US action in case of an Indian attack, he remained hesitant, noting that 
he was “extremely reluctant to give any new commitments.” He also questioned why the 
previous commitments were ever made. 211 
By summer 1962 intelligence assessments noted that US-Pakistan relations had 
“deteriorated.”212 Contributing to this was the US refusal to rule out supplying India 
militarily. A year earlier Kennedy had denied that the US was thinking about giving India 
military aid at that point, but told Ayub that if India asked for aid if the border situation 
deteriorated, the US would reconsider. He had assured Ayub that, in the event that 
happened, the US would talk to Pakistan about the reconsideration.213 
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In late 1959 and spring 1960, Ayub had acknowledged that India faced a “real 
danger” from China and thought it “natural” for India to increase its defense 
expenditures. At that time, however, he had been trying to lobby for more US military aid 
and had been generally playing up the communist Chinese threat.214 Ayub had continued 
to acknowledge a Chinese threat India through 1961 and early 1962, but he had argued 
that India was a lost cause because of its vulnerabilities—Pakistan would be the true 
firewall in the subcontinent. Ayub had also told Kennedy that India did not see China as 
its main enemy and it perceived the Sino-Indian disagreement as an “aberration.” 
Pakistani officials had told American officials that Pakistan would not object to aid to 
India if it was going to fight China, but that was unlikely since India would likely 
appease China. In a contradictory argument, however, Ayub had also said that the US 
should not aid Indians because they were “very trigger-happy people.”215  
As the situation with China deteriorated in summer 1962, the State Department 
expected that India might ask for military aid at some point and realized the US would 
need “flexibility” with Pakistan to be able to help India. This did not mean that Pakistan 
would get a veto, since “India is of such importance that little or no consideration can be 
given to a major retrogressive change in U.S. policy toward it.”216 Instead, American 
officials prepared the ground with Pakistan, arguing (to little effect) that Pakistan should 
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prefer the west to be India’s source of military supply because if India attacked 
Pakistan—which most US policymakers did not believe was likely217—the west could cut 
off that supply. With the prospect of western supply becoming real, Pakistani officials 
began asserting that India was exaggerating the Chinese threat. They told their American 
interlocutors that they had received Soviet reports that India was playing up the threat to 
elicit American aid.218 
American officials, however, had a different perspective on the China threat and 
consequently the military supply question. Initially, when Kennedy had taken office, 
policymakers had decided to delay any action on the Eisenhower defense department 
proposals to supply India till the administration’s larger assistance policy had been 
determined.219 Galbraith and deputy secretary of defense Gilpatric had reiterated the need 
to maintain the orientation of India’s military leadership toward the west. There had been 
concern that this would change with Krishna Menon’s continuing leadership of the Indian 
defense ministry, with the US potentially even being excluded as a military supplier. At 
the very least, the US needed to prevent more purchases from Moscow. Two major 
obstacles to selling major equipment to India had remained: Indian concerns about in-
country surveys that the supply of some military equipment would require, and the 
likelihood that if the US sold equipment on a competitive basis (for example, by allowing 
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payment in rupees) India would be classified as recipient of military aid (or an ally)—
which would raise serious concerns in Delhi.220  
Action had been deferred, but it had come up again because supply to Pakistan 
had renewed interest in American equipment in India. In August 1961, the US had 
delivered twelve F-104s to Pakistan. Pakistan had turned down an American request to 
inform India of the details of the purchase. With wild speculation in India about the 
magnitude of the delivery creating problems for the US (and Nehru), Washington had 
given Galbraith permission to reassure Indian officials that the quantity was limited.221 
The supply—along with the Chinese threat—seemed to spur some interest in India in 
acquisitions from the US. The Indian foreign secretary had asked the army chief who had 
been visiting the US if defense department officials had mentioned their willingness to 
give or sell military equipment to India; he had said no, but had also pointed out that in 
the past India had not viewed kindly suggestions of this kind.222 They had also, however, 
spurred Krishna Menon to look to Moscow for aircraft, as well as an engine for an 
indigenously developed supersonic. Indian military officers who preferred to look to 
Washington had approached defense department officials about how to get around the 
defense minister.223  
The question of military supply to India had not been discussed during Nehru’s 
subsequent visit to the US. Before he had arrived, however, the US had decided that it 
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would be prepared to consider requests for dual-purpose equipment against China. After 
his visit, when it became clear that a Soviet military sales mission was expected in India, 
there had been a push to make clear to Indian officials that the US was open for business. 
This effort had stalled, however, because of the Indian takeover of Goa.224 
In summer 1962 when it seemed that India was close to reaching an agreement to 
acquire MiGs from the Soviet Union, US officials tried to dissuade India from the 
purchase. Galbraith emphasized the adverse impact on US opinion and legislation and 
stressed that the rupee payment terms of the MiG deal made it military aid.225 (India had 
indeed previously turned down such terms on the grounds that it would be considered 
aid.226) In Washington, Komer argued that the US should protest “for effect,” but not try 
to match the Soviet offer at that time. Purchases from Moscow might actually give India 
some confidence of Soviet neutrality in the Sino-Indian dispute and make Delhi more 
resolute. Moreover, given that the UN was about to take up the Kashmir issue and the US 
needed to keep Pakistan from extreme action, it was not the right time to give Pakistan 
proof that the US was “shifting to a pro-Indian stance.” Finally, India was not going to 
turn to Moscow as its sole supplier, and would more than likely try to find a way to 
balance the purchase with a western one.227 
Galbraith, however, argued that the Chinese threat meant that India was going to 
buy modern equipment, even if it was just for prestige and morale. The US needed to try 
to find a way to check greater Soviet influence, especially as Nehru’s future was 
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uncertain and a new leader might move leftwards. India agreed to hold the purchase, but 
only on the assumption that the US would make alternatives available to it. The 
ambassador argued that the “pivotal position” of India justified offering it either 
American or British options.228  
The administration tried to get Britain to offer an alternative package with US 
financing in order to stall the deal (Congress was debating the aid bill at the time), even if 
the administration could not prevent it. There continued to be debate about whether an 
alternate offer would be effective, as well as discussion about Pakistani and 
Congressional reaction. Nevertheless, many wanted a “spoiling offer,” even if it was just 
for the record.229 
British officials said that the potential adverse US reaction was causing president 
Radhakrishnan and finance minister Desai to encourage Nehru to delay a decision on the 
MiGs. The US, nevertheless, encouraged London to help put together a package of 
Lightnings, an engine for the Indian supersonic and C-130s. It hoped India would end up 
choosing neither the western nor Soviet option, or delaying “indefinitely.”230 Even as the 
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Anglo-American discussions continued, by the last week of July it seemed clear that 
India was going to take up the Soviet option. Kennedy decided to back off. The State 
Department on its part hoped that India bought a few MiGs, but would not manufacture 
them.231   
Krishnamachari told Galbraith that demand for the planes in the cabinet had 
increased because of the linking of the China and Pakistan threats. Krishna Menon had 
earlier also suggested that India was purchasing the MiGs because of its China problem. 
Nehru had, however, told a British policymaker that Pakistan’s acquisition of F-104s was 
what had created the public demand for such aircraft in India.232 Rusk seemed to 
conclude that India’s decision was brought about—or at least sped along—by the sense 
that it needed protection on two fronts.233 
“Indians to Arms”  
The situation on the China front had indeed deteriorated by that summer. In early 
1961, the Indian defense minister had suggested a more assertive policy of “zigzagging” 
i.e. establishing competing posts wherever the Chinese seemed to be moving into areas 
India claimed. The Indian government had not initially acted on this, however, and later 
that year it had seemed that China was establishing more posts. That fall, an intelligence 
assessment had indicated that Chinese troops, however, seemed to stay away from areas 
where India had posts even if Beijing claimed them. Raghavan notes that this report also 
seemed to assume that the establishment of Indian posts in the eastern and western 
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sectors would not provoke an aggressive Chinese response. This assumption and the 
increasing pressure in parliament on the government had led to the decision at a meeting 
led by Nehru in November to implement a “forward policy,” which was “aimed at 
deterring further Chinese incursions by installing posts and ensuring patrolling.”  
In spring 1962, India had started implementing the policy. Contrary to Indian 
expectations, China had responded, resuming its forward patrols that spring in the 
western sector. What followed through that summer between China and India was a 
series of border clashes, settlement offers, rejections and counter-offers that only 
heightened the tension. The lack of trust in China and public opinion prevented any 
public concessions on the part of India that Beijing insisted upon.234  
American intelligence assessments that summer believed that the Indian forward 
policy would lead to some border clashes, but “odds are against any major military 
escalation.” In early August, a State Department assessment indicated that the stalemate 
would continue, but there were “no indications that either side wishes to start up full-
scale fighting at present.” Galbraith noted Nehru’s concern about “the number of men up 
in the mountains ‘who wonder who is going to shoot first.’” The prime minister, 
nevertheless, expected that further talks in September, while unlikely to bear fruit, might 
“calm” the situation.235  
As Raghavan notes, a key reason why Nehru continued to believe that China 
would not attack India was that this would lead to others getting involved and potentially 
a “world war”—an argument he repeated to the press, the party and parliament. In 
February 1962, the Australian envoy had noted that the prime minister saw the Soviet 
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Union as “the best insurance” against Chinese over-reaction.236 The American 
intelligence community believed that the most important Indian interest vis-à-vis 
Moscow had indeed become its ability to help (or hurt) India on the China question.237  
India also hoped and believed that the thought of potential American involvement 
would deter Beijing. Just as Indian officials had kept an eye on Sino-Soviet relations,238 
they had also continued to watch Sino-US interactions. In the later years of the 
Eisenhower administration Indian policymakers had detected a growing sense that 
isolating China was counterproductive.239 They realized that the Kennedy administration 
might contemplate a change because of the president’s belief that Sino-US relations were 
“irrational.”240 There had been some concern in India about a potential change and 
especially worry about reports that, given increasing Sino-Soviet differences, Washington 
might reach out to China. Overall, however, officials believed that a change would 
benefit India since a Sino-US rapprochement would probably lead to more restrained 
Chinese behavior. Regardless, the prevailing sense in India continued to be that any 
major change was unlikely because of Chinese actions, domestic opposition and Jiang’s 
sentiments.241 This meant that India would likely continue to have US support vis-à-vis 
China.  
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In some cases, the discussion about American support could be quite explicit. In 
summer 1962, General Kaul, chief of the general staff of the Indian army, asked Bowles 
“whether we would come to India's aid in event open ChiCom armed invasion.” The 
general went on to suggest secret joint contingency planning, even without the approval 
of Nehru or the defense minister. Bowles told Kaul to take the matter up with Galbraith, 
but said that he personally believed the US would come to India’s assistance if China 
invaded.242  
China had continued to allege not just US support but incitement. Thus, as the 
situation deteriorated, with a series of increasingly more serious border clashes after 
September 8, the US was careful about what it said publicly “so as to give the Chinese no 
pretext for alleging any American involvement.” Privately, the US conveyed its “natural 
sympathy for the Indians and the problems posed by the Chinese intervention.” 
Responding to Indian requests, it also helped India buy some military transport and 
communications-related equipment and supplied spare parts. The State and Defense 
departments also looked into “the availability on short notice and on terms acceptable to 
India of transport, communications and other military equipment in order to be prepared 
should the Government of India request such U.S. equipment to cope with the Chinese 
threat.” Rather than offer specific aid, the US waited for further Indian requests. It, 
nevertheless, made clear that it would be sympathetic to requests.243 
Mid-October US assessments indicated that neither “side desires the conflict to 
become more extensive than the present skirmishing on the border.” Analysts worried, 
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however, that public opinion or questions of credibility on both sides could exacerbate 
the situation.244 Even as Nehru was worrying about full-scale war breaking out245 and 
Kennedy was dealing with the Cuban missile crisis, on October 18 the Chinese central 
military committee formally approved a “self defence counterattack war.” Two days later 
on October 20, there was a Chinese offensive in “full strength” in both the eastern and 
western sectors.246 
The War 
Scholars have generally traced the outbreak of the war to some combination of 
two key elements: Chinese suspicions and insecurity about Indian actions, especially after 
the uprising in Tibet; and the border dispute and India’s forward policy.247 Within a week 
the Chinese offensive had given China control over large parts of what India considered 
its territory, which Indian troops had been unable to defend. During a brief pause in 
fighting, China put forth and India rejected a proposal that would have accepted Chinese 
gains in the western sector. In mid-November, the lull ended with a Chinese offensive in 
the eastern sector, where Chinese troops overran Indian positions. The Indian military 
position was dire in both the east and west. As Raghavan puts it, the troops in the east 
“collapsed,” leaving eastern India vulnerable, even as the position in the west remained 
ominous. Nehru sought expanded US military assistance. Before most of this assistance 
could be delivered, however, the war ended when China unilaterally declared a ceasefire, 
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keeping its territorial gains in the western sector, while restoring the status quo in the 
eastern sector.248 
The Last Best Option: The United States 
In the midst of the crisis, it became clear that India could not count on the Soviet 
Union. While earlier the Soviet had professed neutrality, once the crisis was underway, 
the Soviet Union “tilted” towards China. Khrushchev was “not happy with the situation 
in the Himalayas,” but by October 13, he was declaring to Chinese officials his support 
for his Chinese “brothers” rather than his Indian “friends.” He asserted that “[I]n relations 
between us there is no place for neutrality.” India might not have known about 
Khrushchev’s subsequent assurance to the Chinese ambassador in Moscow that he would 
delay the delivery of fighter jets to India in early October or about the Soviet Union 
giving China intelligence about India, but Nehru became aware of the change in the 
Soviet position early in the war. Letters from Khrushchev to Nehru on October 20 and 
October 31, and editorials in Pravda starting on October 25 made clear that the Soviet 
Union was backing the Chinese position.249  
India learned that it could count on the US. Before the war, when General Kaul 
had reportedly suggested that India look to the US for significant military assistance at a 
meeting in October 11, Nehru had rejected his advice. At that time, however, neither the 
scale of the war nor the lack of support from the Soviet Union was known. Even while 
they were told of military “difficulties,”250 there is little evidence that at the time Indian 
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policymakers thought there was an existential threat to India, as they did later. As of 
October 18, Nehru even “discounted” the significance of some key clashes.251  
Till October 25, the US embassy in India also believed that China had “limited 
objectives” in the east. It was only on that day with the reported fall of Tawang in India’s 
northeast that Galbraith said that the US must consider if Beijing had “graver ambitions.” 
He interpreted the continued lack of a formal request for US aid as driven by a hope that 
Moscow would restrain Beijing, as well as Krishna Menon’s reluctance. When he met 
with the foreign secretary and the finance minister on the 24th and 25th, however, both 
indicated a request was “inevitable and imminent.” Galbraith wanted to be prepared to 
respond promptly to such a request in order to assure India, deter China and create 
goodwill towards the US. He suggested contingency planning to supply India.252  
On October 26, Nehru sent Kennedy what the State Department considered a 
“circular communication” asking for US “sympathy and support.”253 That day, Indian 
officials also expressed the hope that the US would restrain Pakistan—which was making 
“pro-Chinese noises”—from taking any action to open a second front.254 By this point, 
Nehru was aware not just of the looming threat, but also of the possibility that the Soviet 
Union was wavering from neutrality and likely to back China. The prime minister knew 
no active support of India or restraint on China would be forthcoming from the Soviet 
Union—his foreign secretary acknowledged as much to Galbraith.255 An October 25 
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Pravda article calling for India to accept Chinese terms on the border dimmed any 
remaining Indian hopes of Soviet support.256  
Indian policymakers knew that the US option, on the other hand, was available. 
At the onset of the war, the US had announced that it would consider “sympathetic[ally]” 
any Indian request for aid. Without appearing overly eager to help, Galbraith had also 
continued to offer “quiet sympathy and encouragement to the Indians, let[ting] them 
know who are their true friends, be[ing] receptive to requests for aid.”257 Now, the US 
declared that it “recognized the McMahon Line as the traditional and generally accepted 
international border and fully supported India's position in that regard.” Furthermore, 
Kennedy responded to Nehru’s letter, making a “generalized offer of practical 
support.”258 
Nehru was soon ready to take up Kennedy’s offer. He had tried to diversify 
India’s dependence, but, as a former diplomat recently noted, turning to the US “was the 
only available option for him.”259 On October 29, he made clear to the US ambassador 
that India needed American aid.260 When he initially requested US assistance, Nehru was 
operating in the context of overall favorable political and public support for such a 
request. The decision to ask for American aid was approved with “broad consensus” in 
the cabinet.261  
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There was hesitation among some in his cabinet. Once it became evident, 
however, that a balancing Soviet option was not feasible, Nehru worked to overcome this 
hesitation, especially on the part of Krishna Menon (who would soon be removed from 
his position anyway), by using parliamentary and military opinion. There was some 
political opposition to US assistance, primarily in the communist party. Even the Indian 
communists were split on the war, however, with a pro-China group within the party 
taking a more hard-line stance. Furthermore, to restrict communist propaganda 
supporting the Sino-Soviet line and opposing the Indian government’s stance, the 
government invoked emergency measures.262 
The US commenced delivery of military aid in early November. It also moved to 
help India on another front—restraining Pakistan. Eisenhower had earlier assured Nehru 
that he would not allow Pakistan to “stab India in the back” if India was engaging China 
on the battlefield as long as he was president.263 Now Kennedy worked to ensure the 
same. Even before major hostilities commenced, he had met with the Pakistani foreign 
minister and discussed the issue. Responding to the minister’s statement that “my 
enemy's enemy is my friend,” the president said that the communists would threaten not 
just India, but Pakistan as well and it was important for “free world” countries to work 
together. As the Sino-Indian crisis mounted, the State Department had wanted to warn 
Ayub against taking any political or military action that would require India to divert 
focus and/or forces from meeting the China threat. Moreover, Washington had wanted 
Ayub to offer Nehru an agreement to keep the India-Pakistan border quiet while India 
was engaged in battle with China. When the US ambassador to Pakistan balked at being 
so blunt (he was especially concerned about making any statement implying that Pakistan 
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was seeking to take advantage of the Sino-India conflict), Washington had asserted that 
he could frame the issue as one involving a Chinese threat to the entire subcontinent. 
Nonetheless, the ambassador had to make clear that Pakistan do nothing to add to India’s 
problems. The State Department had instructed him to explore with the Pakistani 
leadership the steps that Pakistan could take that would ease those problems.264 
In Delhi, Galbraith continued to be concerned that Pakistan was not taking the 
Chinese attack “very seriously” and basically saw the attack as “great opportunity to get 
concessions from the Indians.”265 In Washington, the administration realized that the 
assistance the US was providing to India would create problems with Pakistan. Deputy 
National Security Adviser Carl Kaysen, however, noted that the US “must push through.” 
The US was not going to make concessions to Pakistan by backing its demand for a 
plebiscite in Kashmir, but it could minimize the damage to the US-Pakistan relationship 
by reminding Pakistan how valuable the relationship was to it.266 There was also public 
support in the US for aid to India. Of the people who had heard or read about the fighting 
between China and India, about two-thirds thought that the US should help India.267 
Rusk asserted to Pakistani officials that the US would not be forced by the 
vitriolic Pakistani reaction to US aid to India into giving Pakistan balancing aid or 
pressuring India. Responding to implied Pakistani threats that it might withdraw from 
SEATO and CENTO, he warned that all US military aid to Pakistan was linked to those 
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alliances. He was also annoyed by suggestions that US aid to India would lead to closer 
Sino-Pakistan relations. Rusk made it clear that the US saw the Sino-Pakistan border 
agreement in May 1962 as part of Chinese preparation to attack India and not as proof 
that Beijing was reasonable, as Pakistan stated. Furthermore,  
U.S. would not understand entente between two and such action would be viewed 
most seriously here. At time when Chicoms attacking subcontinent we do not 
expect nation which allied with us against communist expansionism give aid and 
comfort to Chinese. This would be a way of beginning to establish the dimensions 
of our tolerance of Pakistan flirtations with the Chinese Communists.268  
US ambassador to Pakistan McConaughy cautioned the Pakistani foreign minister about 
these flirtations.269 Even after the war Kennedy would instruct Harriman to warn Ayub 
about the negative consequences “[w]ere Pakistan to move closer to the Chinese at a time 
when we were assisting India to confront Communist China.”270 
That assistance had increased significantly as the war had gone on. The initial 
request from India was only the tip of the iceberg. When fighting resumed after a lull in 
mid-November and the Indian military situation became desperate, Nehru, in two letters 
to Kennedy on November 19 that had very limited distribution, made further requests. 
The first made clear that India would need “air transport and jet fighters.” Later that same 
evening, Nehru wrote to the president asking for “more comprehensive assistance.” He 
requested American-manned fighter squadrons and radar equipment to defend Indian 
cities, as well as bombers that would be flown by Indians trained in crash courses in the 
US. Furthermore, he requested the US air force to “assist the Indian Air Force in air 
battles with the Chinese air force” over Indian territory in certain instances. He 
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voluntarily attached a “string,” assuring Kennedy that India would only use any US-
supplied equipment against China.271 Galbraith interpreted this as a request “amounting 
to joint air defense.”272 This was a significant step—just five years earlier, India was 
sensitive about even agreeing to storing anything for the US navy or allowing the Indian 
navy to refit US ships in their facilities.273 
Kennedy moved to send a high-level mission to assess India’s needs, speed up 
delivery of essential spare parts to the Indian Air Force (IAF), expand the group of US 
military advisors working with their Indian counterparts, and send an aircraft carrier to 
the Bay of Bengal to deter China. Despite Galbraith’s concerns that the IAF taking to the 
air and US intervention would escalate the conflict, Washington was also “in the process 
of drafting a favorable reply to Nehru’s air cover proposal.”274 Before a reply could be 
sent, however, the Chinese declared a ceasefire on November 21. 
THE TILT 
As a former foreign secretary recently noted there continues to be debate between 
Nehru-baiters and Nehru-supporters on the question of whether nonalignment died in 
November 1962 or not.275 The answer depends on how one defines nonalignment. If one 
considers the refusal to seek military assistance as part and parcel of nonalignment—as 
many have—then policymakers did indeed violate nonalignment. If one strictly considers 
that some say that nonalignment meant not aligning against anyone, then, too, 
policymakers violated it. As even Nehru admitted at the time, “There is no nonalignment 
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vis-à-vis China.”276 BK Nehru’s later comment that “we had become in fact the allies of 
the United States in their confrontation at least against China” would indeed ring true.277 
On the other hand, if one takes nonalignment to mean the lack of participation in a formal 
alliance, then India did not give up nonalignment. Nor did it stop seeking to diversify its 
partnerships and its dependence. In November 1962, it just learned the hard way that 
diversification requires the availability of willing partners—and at that time, with the 
Soviet option unavailable, India had little choice but to tilt toward the US.  
One could perhaps argue that the fact that India had an option to turn toward was 
a benefit of its policy of diversification. One then has to admit that that still left the risk 
that the US might not have been willing to aid India. Even given American willingness, 
Komer later highlighted another risk of the lack of a formal commitment or at least “prior 
preparations” that allies regularly undertook: the danger that the US would have been 
unable to help in time.278 Furthermore, one can ask the question of what Nehru would 
have done had the US made its assistance contingent on an alliance. Finally, one can 
wonder if an alliance would have prevented a Chinese attack. Nehru believed that 
alliances dragged countries into war. Some have suggested, however, that the Chinese 
decision to go to war was facilitated by Beijing’s belief that the US would not intervene 
on behalf of India.  
Some have given Nehru credit for successfully “avoid[ing] entering into an 
alliance.”279 There were indeed calls in India to ally with the US.280 However, there were 
few, if any, such calls from Washington. Even before the war there had been little 
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expectation in the Kennedy administration that India would join an alliance and little 
desire that it should do so. Kennedy accepted that India would remain nonaligned, noting, 
like Eisenhower, that the US, too, had taken a neutral position in the early years of its 
independence. Bowles also noted to Nehru that the US did not believe that Delhi would 
ever agree to a “formal alliance” with the US. Intelligence assessments further noted that 
there was little likelihood that India would give up nonalignment. A South Asia bureau 
report’s assessment was that India would continue to stand “sometimes on the side of the 
Bloc, sometimes on our side and always on its own side.”281  
Once the war was underway, Kaysen expected a rethinking in India, but “Our 
military assistance is designed to help a friend, not win an ally…We can expect the 
Indians to redefine their nonalignment policy, but we do not expect India to abandon this 
policy.” As Roger Hilsman noted, the US understood the reasons India would maintain 
“good relations” with the Soviet Union; Kaysen indeed outlined at least three of them: 
aid, MiGs, a UN veto.282  
As for the US, Rusk had stated bluntly before the war, “we are not reaching out 
for additional allies.” During the war as the US sent aid to India some like Galbraith were 
concerned: “The Indians are busy worrying about the end of non-alignment. It is we that 
should be doing the worrying on this.”283 Rusk indeed was shocked at Nehru’s request of 
November 19 and wanted to ensure that Nehru realized the implications of his letters 
which  
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in effect proposes not only a military alliance between India and the United States 
but complete commitment by us to a fighting war…it is a proposal which cannot 
be reconciled with any further pretense of non-alignment. If this is what Nehru 
has in mind, he should be entirely clear about it before we even consider our own 
decision.284 
After the war, American officials indeed prepared to “head off” any British 
attempts to pull India into an alliance. When Soviet ambassador Dobrynin asked 
Harriman if the US had attached any conditions to aid, Harriman speedily clarified that 
the US had not asked India to give up nonalignment.285 Even when the US and India were 
discussing an air defense agreement months later Rusk noted that for very practical 
reasons India would not join an alliance. Furthermore, also for very practical reasons, “It 
was not in our interests to ‘compromise’ Indian non-alignment, lest we promote a Soviet-
Chinese rapprochement which would greatly up our bill.286 
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Chapter 5: Bread or Bombs (1963-1965) 
For what it's worth, my feeling (and Bob Komer's, too) is that we're the victims of 
an inevitable falling off in US/Indian relations from the high point of Winter 
1962. There's no use blaming ourselves unduly that neither Washington nor Delhi 
can sustain the high pitch of collaboration which emerged from the Chicom 
attack. We've had trouble on our side sustaining the momentum of our 
relationship, but the Indian slate is by no means clean either…These are facts with 
which we must live.1  
– McGeorge Bundy, 1964 
 
A common threat perception of China motivated the US and India’s continuing 
efforts to nurture a strategic partnership between 1963-1968. The two countries had a 
major shared interest—containing China, which both considered threat to India and thus 
to broader US interests in Asia and the world. While the countries’ agreement on ends 
might have laid the basis for cooperation, the US and Indian disagreement on means—
how to contain China—prevented the deepening of the partnership and eventually led to 
it unraveling. The two countries differed on whether China was a short-term or a long-
term threat to India, as well as whether it posed more of an external or internal threat. 
They also disagreed about the optimum balance of resources that should be devoted 
towards Indian development and defense to strengthen the country against China. 
Furthermore, while the US saw Pakistan as part of the solution when it came to meeting 
the China threat, India saw it as part of the problem. Finally, India’s strategy of 
diversifying its dependence—which the US had earlier accepted—proved to be an 
obstacle to deeper relations. The US saw the Indian political and military relationship 
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with the Soviet Union that was part of Delhi’s China strategy as counterproductive to 
Washington’s China strategy in Vietnam and even in India.  
Between 1963-1965, Delhi and Washington saw China as a major threat. For 
India, China was enemy number one. Even in Washington, by 1963, policymakers like 
Kennedy believed that while one could talk to Moscow, Beijing was the “long-term 
danger to peace.”2 This sense did not dissipate when Lyndon Johnson became president 
and as US involvement in Vietnam increased. Differences, however, appeared between 
American and Indian threat perceptions. The US saw China as a medium-to-long-term 
threat to India. Furthermore, while it did not rule out the external security threat to India, 
Washington, sounding like Nehru had in the early 1950s, worried more about the internal 
threat to India that China posed. There was now little hope for India’s potential and much 
fear of its vulnerabilities. Since policymakers worried that an internal collapse was more 
likely to bring this domino down, their prescription was development-heavy and defense-
light spending for India. On the defense front, they believed the US could provide 
implicit assurances and some explicit assistance. Furthermore, India could ease its 
defense problem—and thus the defense burden on its budget—by making Pakistan part of 
its China solution. It was important that India focused its resources on economic 
development and showed the US—especially Congress—that it was making a serious 
effort to meet the China challenge not just at its border, but within them. 
Indian policymakers, on the other hand, did not think they could again afford to 
underestimate the immediacy or the extent of the China threat. Development continued to 
be a key objective, but defense spending could no longer be ignored at its expense. This 
meant seeking military assistance from wherever it was available, including from 
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Moscow. Furthermore, policymakers’ experience with external benefactors reinforced 
their sense that it was best to reduce or diversify dependence to the extent possible. 
Soviet behavior during the war had made evident that external benefactors were not 
always reliable. After the war, American efforts to get India to settle with Pakistan—
which India saw as part of its China problem—while discussions about further military 
assistance were underway, reinforced the idea that dependence brought with it 
unwelcome demands. To ensure that India built up an independent capability and to deal 
with the opposition and public criticism—which was playing a larger role—that the 
government had not done enough to protect Indian security, the government wanted to 
spend much more on defense than it had before.  
During the rest of Nehru’s term and that of his successor, India continued to need 
the US for both its defense and development objectives. Delhi, however, saw 
Washington’s slow response, as well as its pressure to limit all defense acquisitions and 
make peace with Pakistan as counterproductive to its China strategy and general security 
objectives. During the rest of Kennedy’s term and that of his successor, the US, in turn, 
continued to need India not to fail. Washington, however, saw India’s defense spending 
at the expense of its development efforts, continuing conflict with Pakistan, different 
approach to Vietnam and growing defense relationship with Moscow as 
counterproductive to America’s China strategy and general security objectives. Over this 
period, while the defense relationship briefly deepened before plateauing, the 
development relationship found itself on a downward trajectory. The fall 1965 India-
Pakistan war during which China threatened to intervene reminded the US and India not 
just why they remained tethered to each other, but also that the other had not lived up to 
its billing. 
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THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF ALIGNMENT (NOVEMBER 1962-NOVEMBER 1963) 
In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Chinese threat loomed large in India. 
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Harriman found there a sense that 
“Red China was determined to destroy India's independence and way of life.” He noted 
that everyone he met “unanimously spoke of the emergency in long-range terms.3 
Galbraith indeed observed that if there was a “principal gain” of the war for the US, it 
was that India wholeheartedly acknowledged the Chinese threat. In addition, Indian 
policymakers feared another attack.4 Nehru believed that China had wanted to humiliate 
India. He was concerned that the ceasefire might just be a temporary Chinese tactic, 
while it prepared to attack India again or to press forward on its claims. To make matters 
worse, China seemed to have won the propaganda battle in the Afro-Asian countries with 
regard to these claims.5  
Externally and internally, India seemed vulnerable having suffered setbacks in the 
security and economic sphere. Along with the defeat—which Guha has called Nehru’s 
“most consequential failure”—there were food and foreign exchange shortages and the 
third five-year plan seemed to be faltering.6 Delhi was concerned that this economic 
strain would affect the government’s ability to strengthen India’s defense capacity. 
Furthermore, it might also make the government politically vulnerable to the charge of 
not delivering the goods and India internally vulnerable to subversion and communism. 
This atmosphere was in sharp contrast to that less than a year before, when Bowles 
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commented on an “overriding impression…of tremendously increased Indian self-
confidence, both in economic field and vis-à-vis China.”7  
The concerns about Indian vulnerability were not restricted to Indian shores. 
China was still considered a threat by the US—if anything a bigger one. At a time when 
India showed a willingness to contain China, however, the shock of the speed and scale 
of Indian defeat brought questions of Indian capacity to contain China to the fore in the 
US. Such doubts had preceded the war.8 But they reached a new level. Furthermore, from 
the mid-1950s till before the war, any doubts had been more than balanced by hopes for 
India’s potential. After the war, there was more fear about the country’s vulnerability and 
what its potential failure would mean for US security.  
Merrill has noted the loss in enthusiasm in the US for India. This was not just the 
case in Congress, where opposition to assisting India remained amidst broader skepticism 
about foreign aid. In the administration as well, there was disillusionment.9 Komer and 
Galbraith noted their shock at how quickly India had folded.10 External observers also 
compared India’s “indescribable poverty” and “will-less Government” unfavorably with 
“the intensity and unfathomable ambition of wild young China.”11 Some such as 
Galbraith and Bowles still believed that India was “the only Asian country which really 
stands in [China’s] way.”12 Overall, however, the hope that India could be built up as a 
contrast or counterbalance to China gave way to fear that India would collapse, causing 
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the non-communist world to suffer a major ideological defeat. Along with that came the 
replacement of the idea that the US should help cure India’s ailments with the focus on 
just stemming the bleeding. This meant helping India enough on the defense front that it 
was protected, but not so much that India focused only on military cures. 
Debating Defense 
Just after the war, defense department official Paul Nitze, who was part of an 
assessment team sent to India, assessed that it would take India at least a year, if not 
more, to get into a “good military position.”13 The State Department believed that China 
was unlikely to back down, especially in terms of its claims in Ladakh and its position in 
Tibet. For at least the next year there was going to be uncertainty about whether it would 
resume fighting.14  
There was desire in India for the US to help the country get into a good position. 
In a poll of a Indian legislators conducted between December 1962 and February 1963, 
surveyors found 96 percent of the legislators polled wanted India to accept military 
supplies from the US. Furthermore, 58 percent wanted India to cooperate very closely 
with the US—a significant increase from the 21 percent who had wanted to do so in 
1958.15 Pollsters also found a substantial increase in support for cooperation with the US 
in a poll of the public. From the summer of 1962 to the period just after the war, there 
was a 19 percent increase in support for India to cooperate “very closely” with the US 
and UK, with 94 percent of respondents endorsing such support. Comparatively, there 
was a 27 percent drop in support for very close cooperation with the Soviet Union.16  
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There was support in the US for aiding India against the China threat. Kennedy let 
Nehru know that the US, along with the UK, remained prepared to assist India with its 
defense needs.17 Outside the administration, Eisenhower called for “all-out American 
military assistance to India,” but only if the US was “determined to go as far as we must.” 
He was concerned that some would take a narrow “I told you so” view and argue against 
aid to India.18 There were indeed skeptics, with some like Sen. Richard Russell (D-GA), 
then chairman of the armed forces committee opposing military assistance for India 
because of doubts about its capacity and reliability.19 
Having been taken by surprise by the war itself, American officials remained 
concerned about China suddenly resuming hostilities.20 They believed, however, that 
there were limits to the responsibilities that the US could or should undertake—partly 
because of limited resources. Thus while Kennedy asserted that he US would continue to 
cooperate with India and give it advice and support, he made clear that the primary 
responsibility in terms of what course of action to take was Indian.21 In terms of military 
assistance, initially Washington was keen that the Commonwealth take the lead on 
questions like coordinated air assistance.22 
Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, along with other 
American and British policymakers, discussed the Chinese threat to India at Nassau in 
December 1962.23 The two countries agreed on what Kennedy called “a reasonable and 
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frugal program of military assistance designed solely to enable India to defend itself 
better should the Chinese Communists renew their attacks at an early date.”24 Each side 
agreed to provide up to $60 million of military assistance and, furthermore, explore a 
plan for air defense.25 The US also focused more intelligence assets on the Chinese threat 
to India. In addition, US special forces initiated a training program to help Indian forces 
combat potential guerilla operations in its border areas.26 
There had been concern in the administration that either India might take 
politically or militarily rash decisions, or give in to Chinese pressure due to lack of 
confidence.27 The latter seemed less likely as Nehru showed little initial inclination to 
accept a Chinese settlement offer extended during the war. US officials had advised him, 
at the very least, to make a counter-offer to sell India’s case and put China on the 
backfoot.28  As tempers cooled, the US worried less about rash action as well—officials 
believed that India would be careful not to provoke China in the near term.29 Soon, India 
indeed responded to the proposals put forward by six nonaligned countries, in a move the 
US saw as designed to “put ball neatly back in Peiping's court.”30 
That left a debate in the administration about what action China would take—
specifically what was the urgency of the threat from China? The answer to this question 
would differ from that of India, where the threat felt more acute, and would affect both 
the US view of the correct approach for India to take in dealing with the China threat, and 
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Indian views of the US. Different diagnoses led to either different prescriptions or, at the 
very least, similar prescriptions, but different ideas of the correct dose.  
Some US officials did not believe that there would be another Chinese attack in 
spring 1963—and did not think Indian policymakers expected one either.31 Kennedy, 
however, wanted a fresh intelligence assessment of the possibility, as well as “If there is a 
prospect of the Chinese resuming the offensive, are we doing enough to help India? If we 
are doing enough, are we doing it soon enough?32  
The US assessment was that, while there might be minor skirmishes, there would 
not be another major Chinese attack that spring. Beijing would not want to “risk 
triggering US/UK intervention,” especially when China had little to gain politically that it 
had not already. Beijing would also realize that the US would gain even more from 
another Chinese attack. Komer thought that the Indian government was “playing [the] 
threat up partly as a pitch for US aid, partly to keep Indian people alive to threat.” The 
US had already met Indian emergency requirements. With the additional change in the 
Indian defensive posture, he thought India was likely to be more militarily effective than 
before, and able to contain any Chinese advance into the Indian plains in the northeast. 
Thus, unlike Galbraith, Komer saw little need to speed up the rate of flow of aid to India, 
especially given limited Indian capacity to absorb the aid and the continued need to use 
the aid as “leverage on Kashmir.”33 McNamara, too, noted that for the next few years, the 
Chinese threat was “small.” CIA Director John McCone doubted even more that China 
would open two fronts on the east, as some feared, because of the logistical and political 
problems that fighting through Burma would entail.34 
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Parley with Pakistan 
The lack of a sense of urgency in Washington partly contributed to a US 
prescription that India had trouble digesting. Many in the administration believed that 
India could ease its threat environment vis-à-vis China by making peace with Pakistan 
and thus eliminating part of its overall defense problem. From a domestic political 
perspective, India-Pakistan reconciliation would also greatly facilitate the 
administration’s effort to get economic and military aid for India through Congress, 
which was increasingly frustrated about India’s capacity, as well as Indian and Pakistani 
diversion of resources towards fighting each other.  
Kennedy believed that the war had given Washington “a one-time opportunity to 
bring about a Pak-Indian reconciliation.” Accepting that the US could only persuade, not 
order India to do anything, he noted that he did “see the current situation as moving both 
parties toward the point where we can assist in a reasonable compromise involving some 
give by both parties.”35 After a debate about how much the US should get involved, and 
whether it should offer to mediate as Ayub was suggesting, Kennedy eventually ruled out 
playing a direct role.36 He did not want to “be left holding the bag if negotiations were to 
fail.”37 Komer laid out another risk—if the US got involved and failed, India would face 
repercussions on the Hill.38 The US did, however, “exercis[e]…influence from [the] 
sidelines.”39  
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On Harriman’s urging, despite reservations about public opinion and Pakistani 
reciprocity, Nehru agreed to hold talks with Pakistan on Kashmir without preconditions.40 
Ayub and Nehru then released a joint communiqué facilitated by the US and UK on 
November 30 that stated that the two countries agreed to try “to resolve the outstanding 
differences between their two countries on Kashmir and other matters.”41 Subsequently, 
between December 1962 and May 1963, the two countries conducted six rounds of talks. 
Kennedy acknowledged how hard it was for Nehru to move on this front at a time 
of continuing Chinese threat, but insisted that dealing with the question of Kashmir was a 
means to containing that threat. Reconciliation with Pakistan would allow India to 
concentrate its economic and military resources to defend itself against China. 
Eventually, it might also make India-Pakistan joint defense—or some sort of unified 
effort—possible. Furthermore, it would eliminate a complication from the US-India 
relationship.42 Finally, as Rusk noted, Indian efforts towards a settlement would better 
allow the US to plan for long-term military aid to India and improve Congressional 
sentiments towards India.43 
Was US military aid conditional on a solution? It was clear there was a link 
between long-term aid and efforts toward a solution. As Rusk put it,  “While there should 
be no question of linking between emergency phase military aid to India and progress on 
Kashmir, it should be made clear to Indians there [is a] definite relationship with longer 
                                                
40 See reference to this agreement in Memcon of Ayub-Harriman-Sandys Meeting, November 28, 1962, 
Ibid, p. 409. 
41 See footnote 1 re Telegrams from AmEmbs India and Pakistan, November 29, 1962, Ibid, p. 410. 
42 Telegram from DoS to AmEmb India enclosing Message from Kennedy to JLN, December 6, 1962, Ibid, 
p. 422 and Telegram from DoS to AmEmb India enclosing Letter from Kennedy to Nehru, February 6, 
1963, Ibid, pp. 490-491.  
43 Telegram from DoS to AmEmb India and AmEmb Pakistan, February 16, 1963, Ibid, p. 501. Also, see 
Telegram from DoS to AmEmb India, January 4, 1963, Ibid, pp. 464-465. 
 325 
run aid.”44 Kennedy also noted that the Indian “attitude toward Pakistan must inevitably 
be a factor in our long-term military aid plans.”45  
The US made the link clear to Indian policymakers. Harriman indicated to Nehru 
that “unless tensions [are] relieved [the] US position [is] untenable if it was asked [to] 
give aid [to] both Pakistan and India with part of aid being used for defense against the 
other.”46 While indicating to Pakistan that it would only get a “solution which likely 
fall[s] considerably short of achieving Pak objectives,” in India Rusk wanted to “ensure 
that [the] relationship between US capacity to aid India and resolution [of] Kashmir 
dispute is widely understood among key political leaders both at center…and in states” as 
well as among senior military.47  
Rusk realized that there was risk to such linkage, but felt India-Pakistan 
reconciliation was essential to strengthening the subcontinent against China and making 
aid possible.48 Macmillan noted that the US and UK needed to be careful about using the 
“important card” of Indian dependence on western military assistance: “if we overplay 
the hand we could easily destroy the favourable atmosphere which recent events have 
created. It will obviously be unwise for us…to threaten the Indians with the withdrawal 
of military aid if they fail to reach agreement with Pakistan.”49 Kennedy, too, admitted 
that it “complicates” US-India relations.50 
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There was another potential risk. In order to stop the US aiding India, Pakistani 
policymakers had been suggesting that the best solution was for India to reach a 
negotiated settlement with China instead.51 This suggestion seemed to have the opposite 
effect. Kennedy was already concerned about the possibility that “India would make a 
deal with the Chinese if we press India on Kashmir.”52 Galbraith worried that if the US 
made it seem like Kashmir was a bigger concern for it than China, the US would lose 
Indian willingness to confront China.53 Rusk, too, noted the risk that India would decide 
to negotiate with China if it felt it was being asked to concede too much on Kashmir.54  
The president also realized that the link might be counterproductive. He 
acknowledged, “no Indian politician could involve his country in negotiations with 
Pakistan if Indian opinion came to believe that the West was forcing India to give up 
Kashmir as a price for helping it to save Ladakh or even NEFA.” He worried that in a 
few months India would blame the US and UK for pushing India into a corner. There 
needed to be some movement, however, since “Whether we like it or not, the question of 
Kashmir is inescapably linked to what we can do to assist India militarily.”55  
There was a genuine sense of concern in the administration that it would not be 
able to get military aid or further economic assistance for India through Congress if there 
was no progress between the two countries or if India did not at least make a serious 
effort. Kennedy, Rusk, Harriman and Galbraith all shared this concern.56 Sen. Fulbright, 
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chairman of the SFRC, indeed noted his concern about increasing military supply to India 
in the absence of a Kashmir settlement.57 After it became evident that there was a poor 
chance of a settlement, Komer even argued that at the very least the US could try to get 
India to make a move so that the US could blame the failure on Pakistan—thus making it 
easier for the administration to move on an aid package for India.58  
There were limits to how far the US would take the linkage. Pakistani 
policymakers had wanted any further military supply to India to be conditioned on a 
Kashmir settlement. Moreover, they argued that further aid was neither necessary 
(because the threat was limited) nor desirable (because it would only encourage India to 
start a war with China or Pakistan.59 A British official noted the “disastrous” 
consequences for US-Pakistan relations if the US aided India without a settlement. 
Kennedy, however, demanded, “In return for the protection of our alliance and our 
assistance what do [Pakistan] do for us?”60  He told Ayub that the US would not make 
arms supply to India for defense against China contingent on a Kashmir settlement. A 
weak India would only invite further Chinese aggression, which would be dangerous for 
the entire “free world.”61 Kennedy and McConaughy told Ayub that if India was 
unilaterally intransigent on Kashmir, it might revisit the issue.62 The US, however, 
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disapproved of Pakistan’s attitude during the talks, labeling it “inadequate” at times,63 
and resenting Pakistani pressure on the US as “abominable” and “blackmail.”64  
Furthermore, there was displeasure about developments in the Sino-Pakistan 
relationship. The US was concerned about Pakistani “philandering” with China not just 
because of the impact in Washington, but also because it presented a “clear danger” to the 
India-Pakistan negotiations. It was entirely counterproductive to US goals.65 On 
December 26, the day India-Pakistan talks had begun, Pakistan had announced that it had 
reached a border demarcation agreement in principle with China. Indian negotiator 
Swaran Singh had called these developments unhelpful.66 Then, before another next 
round of talks, Pakistani foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Beijing to finalize 
the agreement, adding to the India-Pakistan tension. Rusk felt that Pakistan was playing 
into the hands of China, which seemed to time these developments to torpedo the talks. 
He asserted to Pakistani officials that if China attacked again, which Pakistan 
intransigence made more likely, the US “would feel compelled to provide India with 
further military assistance.”67 Kennedy also told Ayub that Bhutto’s visit made it very 
hard for any Indian leader to get his public to accept concessions on Kashmir. He made 
clear that if the Chinese threat increased or if there was renewed fighting, the US would 
have to consider helping India substantially.68  
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While the US had not committed any further aid to India, within the US 
government it was clear that the US would give India more aid. Kennedy noted that the 
US would have to move on air defense and other military aid fairly soon.69 Rusk admitted 
that regardless of whether the India-Pakistan talks failed or succeeded, the US “would 
still need to be in a position to give India some assistance against Chinese Communist 
pressure, tailoring this as best we possibly can to maintain our security interests in 
Pakistan.”70  
There was a debate about whether making this reality evident to India would help 
or not. Galbraith suggested that since the US was going to give aid anyway, it should try 
to get the most from it. He suggested that the US tell India that it would provide 
assistance in developing India’s indigenous defense industry, backup air support and a 
substantial long-term aid program (including high-performance aircraft) if India made a 
substantial concession on the valley.71 Rusk, however, thought this would go too far in 
giving India an “open-ended military commitment” for not even a settlement, but only 
concessions; it would increase rather than decrease India-Pakistan tension.72 Kennedy, 
who had earlier worried that India was not making concessions because it knew it was 
going to get aid, asked what was wrong with being more forthcoming on aid which the 
US would give India anyway in exchange for some concessions. Rusk and Talbot, 
however, noted that it would lead to a rejection by Pakistan.73  
By mid-April, it was clear that the talks had stalemated. Pakistan was unwilling to 
make concessions and Komer believed that the US—following Galbraith’s presentation 
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of a proposal—had pushed Nehru too far.74 In the aftermath of the failure of the talks, 
relations between India and Pakistan deteriorated with the countries expelling each 
other’s diplomats.75  
The idea that Pakistan could be part of the solution to India’s China problem—or 
at least help alleviate its defense problem—had not been absent in India. Nehru himself 
was not unaware that a Kashmir settlement could allow India to focus on the China 
front.76 Harriman believed that the acknowledgement of the long-term threat of China 
had brought with it serious discussion in India of settling with Pakistan.77 A senior British 
official had also thought that even beyond Nehru there was a realization among others, 
especially in the defense establishment, of the need to make some progress with 
Pakistan.78 The Indian defence minister indeed did not believe that India had the ability to 
meet a Sino-Pakistan threat and so had backed Nehru’s decision to talk to the Pakistani 
leadership.79  
Two factors, however, made the government unable and unwilling to make any 
major concessions. As Nehru noted, one was strategic: developing Sino-Pakistan 
relations, which made Indian officials and the public doubt Pakistani sincerity or 
reliability. The other was political.80 A weakened government in Delhi meant that there 
was little backing for any major concessions on Kashmir.81 Nehru’s reputation had 
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suffered in India. He was personally weakened—both politically and physically.82 There 
was “severe” criticism in parliament.83 US officials noted that “aroused Indian 
nationalism has made Nehru far less of a free agent in foreign affairs.”84 His need to deal 
with political pressure indeed led to statements on Pakistan that were not helpful in terms 
of the negotiations.85 
Even before the talks, Nehru had noted that public opinion constrained how far he 
could go: “India had been humiliated by ChiCom attack and public opinion would not 
stand for further humiliation in making concessions to Pakistan”—especially, he had 
added, since nothing but hostility had flowed from Pakistan since the war.86 This was 
perhaps also an attempt to use public opinion to limit US pressure. However, even 
foreign officials like Harriman and British official Duncan Sandys had noted that certain 
concessions would be “impossible” for Nehru, including a plebiscite and the transfer of 
the Kashmir valley “as such” to Pakistan.87 Komer, too, had observed that Nehru’s range 
of options was bounded by heated public opinion that was reluctant even to support 
limited proposals to resume Sino-Indian talks.88 The US had even discussed how to use 
the political and public pressure on Nehru for the benefit of their cause by trying to 
change the minds of others around him about a Pakistan settlement, since “events have 
indicated [that] Nehru is responsive to political groundswells beneath him.”89 Nehru did 
not appreciate this tactic and would later note that the pressure to settle with Pakistan had 
                                                
82 Guha, India after Gandhi, pp. 342-346. 
83 Brecher, Succession, p. 101. 
84 Memo from Komer to Kennedy, January 26, 1963, FRUS 1961-63 Vol. XIX, p. 485. 
85 Memcon of Kennedy-BK Nehru Meeting, December 17, 1962, Ibid, pp. 439-440. 
86 Telegram from AmEmb India to DoS re Harriman-JLN Talks (Nov. 22-28), November 30, 1962, Ibid, p. 
416 and Memcon of Kennedy-BK Nehru Meeting, December 17, 1962, Ibid, p. 439. 
87 Memcon of Ayub-Harriman-Sandys Meeting, November 28, 1962, Ibid, p. 410. 
88 Memo from Komer to Kennedy, January 26, 1963, Ibid, p. 485. 
89 Telegram from DoS to AmEmb India and AmEmb Pakistan, February 16, 1963, Ibid, p. 500. 
 332 
not alleviated, but rather accentuated India’s China problem. A settlement was not 
feasible and more pressure would only inflame Indian public opinion and 
“dampen…their ardour and keenness to face the Chinese threat.”90 
Nehru thought that another US tactic—linking military aid and the India-Pakistan 
talks—worsened the situation by increasing public pressure on him not to make 
concessions on Kashmir for aid.91 Earlier BK Nehru had predicted that linkage would 
make a settlement harder by also making Pakistan more intransigent.92 The linkage also 
led to resentment of the US. Though Galbraith had publicly denied that the US was 
pressing India on Kashmir, many on the Indian side had seen the Harriman-Sandys 
mission that arrived just after the war as, at best, persuading or, at worst, pressuring 
Nehru to accept talks.93 To those inclined toward the latter view, the US attempt and the 
dialogue with Pakistan was seen as the “political price” India had to pay for the aid it had 
received and hoped to continue to receive from the US and UK.94 The resentment only 
deepened when that aid did not seem as forthcoming. 
The Substance of Alignment? 
Noting the China threat, Nehru had complained that the US response on the 
military assistance front seemed too “studious and deliberate.”95 He did not just have to 
worry about the threat, but also criticism that his government was not doing enough to 
meet it. A correspondent had observed Nehru’s defensiveness at his first post-war press 
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conference, which was “marked by hostile questions concerning the state of Indian 
defenses.”96 There had also been criticism from Nehru’s left flank about the value or 
effectiveness of the move toward the US. There were questions about the reliability of the 
US, given the lack of speed of decisions on aid.97 
Galbraith had warned that the US would lose momentum in India as the sense 
grew that the US was reluctant to aid India because of domestic political considerations at 
home and Pakistani reaction abroad. He had noted that some in India were making the 
argument that there was no point making concessions on Pakistan because the US was 
unlikely to aid India anyway.98 The ambassador argued that the US needed to move on 
the long-term aid question. In the US there was agreement that the long-term threat from 
China was serious and Komer also urged consideration in the near future of steps to 
provide further military aid to India, defense production assistance, and support to rebuild 
the Indian air force.99 McNamara noted that cost-wise the US would not find it difficult to 
develop a package for air defense and short-term defense production assistance. He 
pointed out, however, a key problem: the US did not even have a clear sense from India 
of its long-term needs.100  
To meet the external and internal challenge from China—and to stay afloat—the 
Kennedy administration had wanted the Indian government to optimize the balance 
between defense and development expenditure. There was little doubt that India needed 
to improve its defense capabilities, but there were differences on how and to what extent. 
Delhi envisioned a total military assistance program of $1.6 billion over five years—
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which later even an Indian diplomat admitted was “totally unrealistic.”101 In the US at the 
time, there was consensus that this was too much. Even Komer and Galbraith only 
recommended a $500 million program over five years.102 McNamara thought that Indian 
defense projections and requirements—different from American and British estimates of 
Indian needs—were “quite unrealistic” and the country needed a better plan.  
At a meeting in late April, McNamara observed that the US and UK could 
provide anywhere from $150-300 million of military assistance over three years and 
thought India could be persuaded to see this as sufficient. The British did not want to 
contribute as much as the US would have liked. McNamara and Rusk thought the lack of 
British contribution would have negative repercussions in Congress, where there was a 
lack of enthusiasm for and even opposition to aiding India. McNamara believed that for 
the administration to get congressional support for military aid, “one of three conditions 
would have to be met: (1) a Kashmir settlement; or (2) a realistic program; or (3) the UK 
going along.” 
There were concerns in the administration about the Indian reaction to the delays 
and the quantity. Bowles emphasized the political rather than the military imperative to 
aid India, noting that India now recognized the Chinese threat, which had been the US 
hope for a decade. If the US did not help India, Delhi might look to make amends with 
Beijing or turn to Moscow. At the very least, “We should give the Indians an “emotional 
assurance” as soon as possible that we are with them; this would buy us a little time.” 
Kennedy also wondered if $300 million was sufficient to “get the Indians to take the 
same view of the [broader] Chinese threat,” especially since the Indians were thinking of 
military assistance of over a billion dollars. He asked: “How could we avoid a real clash 
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and disillusionment?” The president thought the US should move on further aid soon and 
not be held back by British reticence. Kennedy believed that “India is the important 
thing; not the UK.” It was indispensable to the effort to “stop Communist China.” He 
asserted, “Let's not be penny wise about India; let's not let them get into a position where 
they feel that they can’t cope with the Chicoms and Paks on top of their other 
problems.”103 
The discussion turned to a subject on which there had been more agreement: air 
defense. After the war, Harriman had let Nehru know that American, British and Indian 
officials would continue to discuss the air assistance option.104 The UK and US had 
subsequently sent a team to India to explore this option. Both Galbraith and Komer had 
suggested an Anglo-American “air umbrella.”105 Responding to American and British 
concerns about the risks of being dragged into a Sino-Indian conflict, Galbraith had noted 
that the US “was not running an appreciable risk” since Chinese air operations seemed 
very unlikely.106  
At the April meeting, McNamara expressed the view that an air umbrella had 
“great political value” and was more cost-effective. Bowles and Komer thought the US 
should move on this as well. Kennedy stated that “if the Chicoms bombed India [the US] 
would of course become involved, so he didn’t see too much risk in giving a prior 
commitment.” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Grant suggested that it would 
also buy time with India, in terms of showing US willingness to help India, while 
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American and Indian officials worked out a more realistic military assistance plan. Rusk 
expressed the concern that “shooting at Chicom planes in India would lead almost 
certainly to the Chicoms shooting at us elsewhere. It would immediately broaden the 
war.” He wanted to hold on a commitment till Sandys and he returned from a trip to 
India. In the meantime, to indicate US willingness to assist India, there could be military 
talks about the possibility of “sending the US/UK air defense squadrons” to aid India. 
Kennedy agreed, but did not want to wait too long. He emphasized, “We want the 
Chicoms to know what we are going to do so they won’t attack.” Furthermore, he wanted 
military assistance talks to continue and the State Department to stay away from them so 
that “we didn’t appear to tie the talks too much to political conditions such as Kashmir.” 
He noted that the administration should also prepare Congress for an air defense 
commitment. After all, “Congress would be much madder if India went Communist.” Air 
defense was cheaper and less likely to cause problems with Pakistan. If India did not 
want it to be too overt, “We could put the program under the guise of training.” Finally, 
he believed that the US should go ahead regardless of the British decision. If the US held 
off any longer, it might “jeopardize the developing relationship between the US and 
India.” His bottom line was “It is hard to see how we can stop the Chinese Communists 
without India.”107 
On a visit to India, Rusk tried to reassure Nehru, noting that “there was not the 
slightest reason to doubt US sympathy and support to India in its conflict with China…If 
India is again attacked by the Chinese, the US is and will remain India's friend.” The US 
knew it had responsibilities since such an attack would have repercussions for it as well. 
Nehru acknowledged that it was possible that China would not attack India over the next 
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few months, but he could not be sanguine about the threat over time. He noted to Rusk 
that he “continue[d] to feel the heavy pressure of further prospective Chinese 
aggression.” In the US, T.T. Krishnamachari, Indian minister of economic and defense 
coordination, observed to Kennedy that Beijing’s hostility toward India was unlikely to 
dissipate. India had concerns about potential Chinese subversion in Nagaland and 
encirclement of India through subversion or cooptation of the states on India’s periphery. 
He believed that China would use its air force if it attacked again. Indian retaliation 
would then lead to a Chinese attack on Indian cities, which he was not sure India could 
cope with at that stage.108  
Lobbying Kennedy for American aid, Indian policymakers highlighted the stakes 
for the US. Krishnamachari outlined the consequences for Indian security and political 
stability—and thus, by implication, the US—of the government’s inability to protect 
India’s cities. Radhakrishnan asserted that China was trying to send a geopolitical 
message to Southeast Asia, as well as an ideological message about the superiority of the 
Chinese “way of life” rather than the Indian “democratic way of life.” He emphasized, 
“The stabilizing factor in Asia is the success of India’s democracy, as it was India's 
weakness that tempted the Chinese to come in.” Thus, India needed to be strengthened 
and, in the meantime, supported—only that would strengthen India and its neighbors’ 
resolve, as well as deter China from another attack. 
Kennedy affirmed the US desire to aid India economically and militarily. An air 
defense program, along with the other assistance the US was providing, would signal 
China—the only thing that would deter China was the thought that the war would turn 
into a major conflict involving other countries. He believed that “The greater the 
                                                
108 Telegram from AmEmb India to DoS re JLN-Rusk Meeting, May 4, 1963, Ibid, pp. 573-574; Memcon 
of Kennedy-Krishnamachari (Indian Minister of Economic and Defense Coordination) Meeting, May 20, 
1963, Ibid, pp. 600-604. 
 338 
evidence of U.S. interest, it would seem the more restrained the Chinese Communists will 
be.” An air defense agreement would also minimize the negative reaction from Pakistan. 
Furthermore, the US was interested in ensuring that India had the ability to defend itself 
and air defense gave the US time to help India get to that point. Finally, It would “give 
the substance of alignment without the fact of it.”109   
On July 9, 1963 the Galbraith delivered to the foreign secretary a proposal for air 
defense that subsequently resulted in the Air Defense Agreement of 1963. The US agreed 
to provide India with two mobile radar installations, eventually to be manned by US-
trained Indian technical personnel, and subsequently six permanent radar installations. 
The proposal also envisioned joint air force training exercises and finally, that “The 
United States Government will consult with the Government of India, in the event of a 
Chinese Communist attack on India, regarding possible United States assistance in 
strengthening India's air defenses.”110 In internal administration discussions, Rusk had 
explained that the proposal “does not involve a firm mutual defense commitment” since 
India would not accept it because of the implication for its foreign policy. However, in 
response to a question from Kennedy, he confirmed, “‘consult’ actually means a 
commitment to defend.”111 The Indian government subsequently agreed to the 
proposal.112 Later that year, in November, the American, Australian, British and Indian 
air forces conducted a joint exercise.113  
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Nehru made evident in a letter to Kennedy in August 1963 that India would 
require more. He outlined not just India’s continuing view of China—alone and in 
combination with Pakistan—as a geopolitical and ideological threat, but also that Beijing 
would not stop till it either forced upon India a political settlement or caused its internal 
disintegration. This challenge required an Indian effort on both the defense and 
development fronts. The US had helped “handsomely and generously,” but India had 
much left to do. If the government did not take adequate measures, it would have to 
submit to China and would lose citizens’ confidence. Thus, the government could not 
meet the unhelpful and unfeasible US demands to limit or reduce its defense 
expenditures.114  
The US had continued to help India on the economic front, but this help would 
not be as “handsome” as before given decreasing support for foreign aid in general and 
aid to India in particular in Congress. In hearings while Bowles insisted that American 
aid had “allowed India to stand on her feet, succeed and stand up to Communist China,” 
there were questions about the effectiveness of aid. Even those like Sen. Carlson (R-KS), 
who thought India was “one country we have got to have in that area,” worried about 
whether India could take care of herself against China even with the help of the US and 
the UK. Sen. Sparkman (D-AL) noted that India and Pakistan’s continued spending and 
focus on fighting each other made it difficult to aid either of them. Others like Sens. 
Smathers (D-FL) and Lausche (D-OH) continued to find it hard to justify aid toward 
building a nation that they considered too friendly with the Soviet Union.115 
The head of a committee reviewing foreign assistance that Kennedy had 
appointed to assuage congressional concerns suggested that the proposed administration 
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request of nearly $5 billion was excessive. This led to a reduced request of $4.5 billion, 
but, later that year, Congress appropriated only $3 billion. In this context, aid allocated 
for India fell for a second year in a row. It went from $400 million the previous year to 
$337 million for FY1964. India did get another PL-480 commitment, but it was clear that 
there was decreasing support for aid to India.116 
A Lost Opportunity? 
In a chapter in his memoirs titled “A Lost Opportunity,” Bowles implied that if 
Kennedy had lived, India and the US would have had a much closer relationship because 
the military assistance would have gone even further.117 Having replaced Galbraith as 
ambassador to India, Bowles indeed discussed with the president a proposal for a five-
year military assistance program for India, preferably with $65-75 million of annual aid. 
Komer was skeptical of the administration’s ability to put aid on a long-term basis or 
commit to more than the $50 million of annual aid that the defense department had been 
envisioning. Nevertheless, he said that if the president decided to agree to propose a long-
term agreement to India, “why not see how much we can use this leverage to get some 
things from Delhi that we really want?”118 Before Kennedy could make a decision, 
however, he was assassinated in Dallas.  
Was there a lost opportunity? The kind of agreement that Bowles argued Kennedy 
would have signed cannot be taken as a given. As the ambassador himself admitted, 
before Kennedy’s death there was only “tentative” agreement on a five-year military 
package, that too in Delhi.119 Bowles contended that, despite State Department concerns, 
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at their meeting in November Kennedy “left no doubt in my mind but that he would go 
through with the agreement in any event.”120 Komer’s record of the meeting, however, 
only notes that the President  
was favorably impressed in principle with Chet's pitch that it might be possible to 
trade off a 5-year US military commitment…for at least a tacit understanding that 
the Indians would not exceed certain reasonable force goals, would limit their 
buys from the Soviets, and would take a more active role in our grand strategy 
against China. (emphasis added)  
While the record notes that Kennedy thought Bowles had an “interesting proposition,” 
Komer—hardly considered anti-India—at no point suggested that Kennedy had approved 
such a proposal. Instead the president had “asked that he be given a preliminary 
Washington view” before he met Bowles again.121 
Furthermore, it is not clear that India would have agreed to meet the US 
conditions. While the two countries might have reached an implicit understanding on 
force goals, the years ahead would show that India was unwilling to take on a more active 
role in US grand strategy against China in places like Southeast Asia. In the near term, 
India had also not agreed—then or later—to limit its purchases from the Soviet Union.  
For domestic political reasons—the potential reaction from Congress—as well as 
the concern that India would end up overspending on defense if both the American and 
Soviet stores were open to it, the Kennedy administration was not thrilled about India 
turning to the Soviet Union. As Bowles himself noted, Kennedy had asked him to look at 
the “possibility of a long range military understanding which would prevent India from 
developing military relationships with communist states and strengthen our political-
military ties with the Government of India against Chinese Communists.”122 
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For India, however, continuing to exercise the Soviet option allowed the 
government to return to its preferred method of diversifying dependence. The Soviet 
attitude during the war had only increased questions about the reliability of external 
benefactors. The Indian defense minister noted that other countries’ willingness to give 
India aid depended on their political attitudes, which were apt to change.123 US pressure 
on India to settle with Pakistan and limit its defense expenditures, in turn, highlighted the 
downside of overdependence on a single source.124 Both these instances reinforced the 
Indian inclination to diversify dependence as long as Delhi lacked the ability to eliminate 
it entirely.    
India’s “reluctant tilt” during the war had been the result of a certain set of 
circumstances, including the lack of availability of the Soviet option.125 In the aftermath 
of the war, the Soviet option became available once again. A few days after the war 
ended, Khrushchev expressed the hope that India would stay nonaligned and promised 
“strong friendship” and the commitment to “fulfil all our obligations.”126 He even called 
the Chinese attack “unnecessary.”127 
While some in India had blamed the diversified strategy for leaving India without 
friends during the war, most—in government and seemingly among the public—were not 
ready to jettison the strategy. Some argued that it had indeed worked. After the war, for 
example, Nehru stated his belief that because of the India-Soviet relationship, Moscow 
had exerted “some pressure” on Beijing for a ceasefire.128 And  
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It is, we think, of the utmost importance that the Soviet Union maintains this 
attitude [of support to India] in the Sino-Indian conflict…Even if there were no 
other valid reasons, our maintaining our policy of non-alignment is essential for 
this purpose.129  
Policymakers would feel vindicated when, in September 1963, Moscow made clear that it 
would not be obliged to stand by the Sino-Soviet treaty if China again attacked India.130 
India was more than happy to diversify with the Soviet option once again. 
Contrary to later contentions, India did not just turn to the Soviet Union after it became 
clear that a more comprehensive defense agreement with the US would fall through in 
1963.131 Its military relationship with the Soviet Union commenced before and continued 
through discussions with the US and UK.132 Moscow did “postpone…delivery” of the 
MiGs during the war.133 Nevertheless, British and Indian officials expected it to resume 
supply.134 Nehru even publicly asserted that Moscow would soon send India the MiGs.135  
The Soviet Union delivered a few MiGs that spring with more to come later. 
Meanwhile, India moved ahead with plans to manufacture the planes domestically and 
that fall also announced that the two countries had agreed to build India’s domestic 
capacity to manufacture missiles and radar equipment, among other defense deals. 
Moscow committed $130 million in military assistance between October 1962 and May 
1964 according to some reports.136 It helped to have multiple benefactors—a lesson 
brought home even on the economic front after it became evident that, despite the 
                                                
129 JLN to BK Nehru, January 5, 1963, quoted in Raghavan, p. 309. 
130 Highlights From Secretary of State Rusk's Policy Planning Meeting, October 15, 1963, FRUS 1961-63 
Vol. XXII, p. 400. 
131 Bowles, Promises to Keep, p. 483; Kux, India and the United States, p. 230. Kunhi Krishnan, Chavan, 
pp. 114-115 (he has suggested that India turned to the Soviet Union in November 1964 after its requests to 
US and UK were not satisfied). 
132 See Graham, pp. 823-832. Also, see Kunhi Krishnan, Chavan, p. 99. 
133 Memcon of Ayub-Harriman-Sandys Meeting, November 28, 1962, FRUS 1961-63 Vol. XIX, p. 412. 
134 Telegram from AmEmb India to DoS re Harriman-Nehru Talks (Nov. 22-28), December 3, 1962, Ibid, 
p. 417; Memcon of Anglo-American Talks, Nassau, December 20, 1962, Ibid, pp. 455-456. 
135 Selig Harrison, “Nehru Belittles China as Future Nuclear Threat,” WP, January 1, 1963, p. A10. 
136 Graham, p. 829; Kunhi Krishnan, Chavan, p. 99; Donaldson, p. 202. 
 344 
Kennedy administration’s support, the US would not fund the construction of a public 
sector steel mill at Bokaro because of Congressional opposition. Subsequently, Moscow 
financed the mill instead.137 
There was also a domestic reason for exercising the Soviet option. Nonalignment 
had staying power in the country. In the poll of Indian legislators taken after the war, 
surveyors found that neutrality continued to be “a very real concept for the legislators”—
83 percent did not want India to side with either the US and its allies or the Soviet Union 
and its allies.138 Tharoor has observed that over the years Nehru had conveyed his 
government’s foreign policy not as his foreign policy or that of the Congress party, but as 
the countries’ foreign policy. Moreover, he had “transform[ed] opposition to its 
fundamentals into opposition to India’s very independence.”139  
This transformation ended up tying Nehru’s own hands in some ways as well—
ironic for an approach that was designed to expand Indian policymakers’ options. It gave 
critics ammunition against him. Even those who had earlier criticized nonalignment 
exploited any move away from it to criticize the government. This was perhaps most 
visible in the reaction to the possibility that the US would set up a Voice of America 
transmitter in eastern India. Delhi had agreed to such a proposal in early 1963, partly 
because the plan helped India, designed as it was to transmit anti-China propaganda into 
China. When the news broke that summer, however, there was so much criticism that it 
was a violation of nonalignment that the government repudiated the agreement.140 Thus, 
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it is not clear that Nehru could or would have agreed to limit India’s relationship with the 
Soviet Union in exchange for a somewhat larger American defense deal. 
TETHERED, BUT NOT TIED (DECEMBER 1963-APRIL 1965) 
Narratives of US-India relations during the Johnson administration have tended to 
focus on the countries’ “divergent interests” and “asymmetric concerns.”141 But during 
the Johnson period, there was one major subject of agreement between Indian and US 
policymakers: that China was the main threat in Asia. As McMahon has noted, by this 
point in the eyes of US policymakers China “had become a near-demonic force in world 
affairs.”142 Johnson saw Beijing as “bellicose and boastful.”143 As Vietnam became the 
administration’s major foreign policy preoccupation,144 Johnson became increasingly 
concerned about the Chinese bellicosity and support behind Ho Chi Minh.145 He 
perceived the North Vietnamese leader’s efforts as a nationalist struggle, but as part of a 
“much more ambitious strategy” on the part of the communist bloc.146 To protect US 
security and credibility in the face of that offensive in Vietnam, it was crucial to prevent 
losses to that bloc.147  
Viewing Asia even beyond Vietnam through that prism, the administration could 
not afford to see India falling or failing in the face of Chinese aggression. The danger 
persisted. Many of the Kennedy administration officials who continued to serve under 
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Johnson had continued to believe through 1963 that China might still want to seek 
“political, psychological, or territorial gains through limited military operations” against 
India.148 Some had even refused to rule out the possibility of another attack.149 In early 
1964, Rusk disagreed with Pakistani officials trying to downplay the China threat in order 
to stop further US military aid to India. He noted that Chinese actions globally—on 
nuclear and boundary issues—and especially in Southeast Asia made clear that China did 
not have peaceful intentions.150 According to the State Department, potentially India was 
still “the only non-Communist country on the Asian mainland which by its size and 
resources may eventually add a substantial independent weight to the Asian power 
balance.” In the near term there was a bigger concern: India’s “loss to Communism 
would tilt the strategic balance of Asia sharply, if not decisively against us.”151 
US policymakers saw the Chinese threat to India as both internal and external. By 
1964, for policymakers and economists—in the latter case even in India—hopes that 
India would “take off” had given way to fears that it would collapse.152 The 
administration believed that the challenge from China called for not just India’s military 
defenses to be strengthened, but also India as a whole. To maintain, at the very least, the 
“strategic balance of Asia,” this required that India expend resources in—and the US 
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provide support for—both its defense and development sectors. While the protection of 
India’s territorial integrity required continued US military assistance, internal stability 
could be achieved with “a workable democracy and at least a politically effective non-
Communist government…[and] the development of a sound and expanding economy.” 
This required a US strategy to “strengthen Indian will and ability to defeat Communist 
military aggression and to resist the expansion of Communist influence in the 
subcontinent.” Additionally, the US could help by “encourag[ing] foreign policies which 
will improve India’s relations with its major neighbors,” as well as by “minimiz[ing] the 
likelihood that India will develop a nuclear device.”153 
The Indian defense minister noted that the US and India “were in substantial 
agreement on Chicom threat.”154 Indian policymakers continued to see China as a major 
threat, alone and in collusion with Pakistan.155 Beyond the more traditional geopolitical 
threat China posed, Indian officials were also worried about losing the ideological battle 
to China—at home and abroad. They watched with concern Zhou’s travels to many Afro-
Asian countries, anxious that he would convince others of the Chinese case.156 Domestic 
developments added to India’s sense of vulnerability. In January 1964, Nehru suffered a 
stroke. Over the next five months, as some of his cabinet colleagues took on more 
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prominent decision-making roles,157 India remained concerned about the Chinese 
threat,158 as well as the possibility of a joint Sino-Pakistan attack as Nehru remained in a 
weakened state.159 Overall, observers described a period of “crippling malaise of inaction 
and inertia” and “rudderlessness of the government” in India.160 
Nehru’s death did not change India’s perception of China. If anything, the new 
government was more hawkish on China. A contemporary biographer noted that on 
China policy, the government of new prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri was “disposed 
to show no quarter.”161 Addressing the nation when he took office after Nehru’s death in 
May 1964, Shastri asserted, “China had wronged us…by her premeditated aggression 
against us.” He noted that India had accepted a settlement on the lines of the Colombo 
proposals. If China had peaceful intentions, it could demonstrate them by moving on this 
front and ceasing its anti-India propaganda across Africa and Asia.162  
India seemed vulnerable both at and within her borders. Contemporary observers 
expressed concern that India’s democracy would not survive if there was “a massive 
external threat, which the civil government is incapable of meeting; and prolonged 
economic stagnation.” At the time, both seemed plausible fears. When Shastri came to 
power, some noted that the Indian economy was at its “lowest ebb” with food price and 
foreign exchange crises raging.163 The Indian economy continued to suffer with the 
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government admitting that the situation was “extremely grim.” India’s foreign exchange 
reserves were running low; inflation was rampant; there were food shortages; cuts in 
imports to conserve foreign exchange were affecting industrial production; and debt 
repayment obligations lay on the horizon.164 By spring 1965 domestic observers were 
comparing the situation that the Congress party found itself in with that the GMD had 
faced in China before the communists had taken over. External observers, too, echoed the 
view that India at the time resembled GMD China.165 
The Congress party was under pressure to deliver the goods. Joining the 
opposition chorus, there was criticism from some within the party such as Vijayalakshmi 
Pandit that Shastri was not doing enough.166 A party leader warned that people would not 
have as much patience with Shastri’s government as they had with that of Nehru if the 
government did not deliver.167  
The security realm did not seem any more promising between June 1964 and 
April 1965. The China threat showed no sign of dissipating.168 China conducted its first 
nuclear test, leading to calls at home for India to pursue a nuclear weapons program.169 
An Indian attempt to turn the test against China in the developing world went nowhere. A 
proposal by Shastri for the nonaligned states to act together to stop Chinese nuclear 
program got little traction.170 Nonaligned states did not seem as concerned about the 
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adverse consequences of the test and indeed seemed to admire the Chinese achievement. 
Overall there was a sense that China with its “revolutionary and self-reliant path” was 
getting more traction in the developing world than India with its “middle way of 
nonalignment and mixed economy.”171 Chinese propaganda continued to play up India’s 
military defeat and the foreign assistance it was receiving to keep it afloat. Furthermore, 
China took the lead in organizing a second Afro-Asian conference and successfully 
blocked Indian attempts to invite the Soviet Union to the conference. Some considered 
this period one of India’s “dwarfing by China.”172 
Furthermore, China and Pakistan seemed to be growing even closer.173 China 
offered Pakistan loans, as well as support on the Kashmir issue.174 A number of senior 
Chinese and Pakistani political and military leaders exchanged visits, capped off by visits 
by Ayub to China and Zhou to Pakistan in spring 1965. US officials noted that Ayub’s 
visit “represent[ed] significant consolidation of Pak-ChiCom relationship.”175 High-level 
Chinese leaders also visited Afghanistan and Nepal, offering aid and support to these 
countries in India’s neighborhood.176 Breaking protocol, China also communicated 
directly with the Sikkimese king rather than through India. 
Shastri did not expect a direct Chinese attack, but Indian policymakers feared 
Chinese intervention in what India considered internal issues. This concern was only 
exacerbated by indications from the US that China—in competition with the Soviet 
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Union—was taking more aggressive stances and was likely to focus on subversion.177 
Thus India was angry when, in the midst of an unfurling India-Pakistan crisis, Zhou met 
with Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah who had been talking about independence for 
Kashmir from India. Furthermore, Zhou invited Abdullah to visit Beijing.178 
Thus, few Indian policymakers would have disagreed with Bowles description of 
India's defense problem vis-à-vis China as “two dimensional: (1) an adequate military 
defense shield and (2) the building of vigorous, dynamic society which is impervious to 
covert Chinese Communist infiltration.”179 There was also little argument about the ends 
that the US strategy was designed to achieve—a contained China and a strengthened 
India with a sound democracy and economy—and a continued desire for US military and 
economic support, especially as Moscow seemed to be flirting with Islamabad.180 
Disagreements, however, emerged with the US over means. These differences on how to 
meet the China threat set limits to the US-India relationship, even as that very China 
threat kept the relationship from unraveling. 
Guns or Butter 
The elements of the US strategy for India were connected to each other and to 
other US interests. At best, US policymakers expected that a sound and well-prioritized 
Indian development strategy—aided by the US—would strengthen Indian democracy; at 
the very least, it would keep the communists in India at bay. Better economic 
development would also allow India to contribute a much larger share of the effort to 
build Indian defense capacity against China, thus reducing the burden on the US. 
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Furthermore, a politically, militarily and economically strengthened India would offer a 
less tempting target to China.  
A major emphasis in the US strategy was to encourage India to balance its 
defense and development efforts in a way that the latter did not suffer. US officials from 
the top down saw these efforts as linked. The US emphasis on India striking a defense-
development balance led in large part to the length of time it took to negotiate further 
military assistance to strengthen India against China. In negotiating a package, Johnson 
had instructed US officials in December 1963 to encourage India to try to do the 
following: limit its force levels, limit procurement from the Soviet bloc, limit diversion of 
foreign exchange from development to defense needs, and “exercise restraint” vis-à-vis 
Pakistan.181 Moreover, the US linked any military assistance agreement to the 
formulation of a five-year Indian defense plan that could lay the basis for more balanced 
expenditure on development and defense.  
While there was a sense that the Indian defense plan generated in the spring of 
1964 had not really “relate[d] the defense effort in much detail to India’s total economic 
and fiscal situation,” the US did succeed in eliciting a commitment to a ceiling on foreign 
exchange expenditure for defense procurement.182 In June 1964, India and the US 
eventually signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU). The US agreed to provide 
India military assistance worth $50 million over the next fiscal year for mountain warfare 
equipment, communications, and defense production. In addition, the US offered credit 
for purchase of military equipment worth $10 million in that fiscal year and $50 million 
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in the next one.183 The US conditioned the annual extension of military assistance for 
another four years on refinement of the Indian defense plan to reflect a more appropriate 
balance between defense and development. 
To help prop India up internally, the US continued to support India’s development 
strategy with economic assistance and food aid. In fall 1964, the US and India signed two 
loan agreements and a one-year PL480 sales agreement, providing India 4.5 million tons 
of wheat. For FY1965, Congress also authorized $265 million of economic assistance for 
India for FY1965 and the next year it would put aside $309 million.184 
At the time—and since—the MoU received more attention for what it did not 
contain than what it did. The deal left Indian officials disappointed—they had wanted 
(and expected) a five-year commitment, as well as high-end items like supersonics. But 
they were neither willing nor perhaps able to meet US conditions that might have made 
the US more forthcoming on these fronts. Indian officials recognized that they needed to 
balance expenditure in the defense and development realms, but they had a different idea 
of what constituted the right balance. There were divisions within the government on this 
question. The US saw the finance minister, for example, as an ally in its effort to get 
India to strike a more appropriate budgetary balance. The defense minister, on the other 
hand, saw the US insistence on a defense-development balance as just an excuse not to 
give India aid. Overall, the Indian leadership was acutely sensitive to the criticism 
directed its way during and after the 1962 Sino-Indian war for neglecting the defense 
realm and did not want to repeat its mistake. Through the spring of 1964, there was 
domestic press criticism of the continued lack of defense preparedness to meet the China 
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and Pakistan threats, with accusations that the government was not doing enough. Praise 
from Indian commentators that the five-year defense plan adequately reflected India’s 
needs made it hard to make further cuts as some in the US desired.185   
The sensitivity to criticism on this front only increased after Shastri took over as 
prime minister. Shastri had nowhere near the political standing that might have allowed 
Nehru to absorb and survive the political blows that would likely have been directed at 
the government had India made further concessions on this front. In his inaugural speech 
Shastri stressed that while economic development was his priority, the threat from China 
“left us with no choice” but to continue the defense expenditures that were putting a 
heavy burden on the economy.186 During negotiations for the military assistance package, 
defense minister Chavan asserted that Shastri neither would nor could agree to any 
provisions limiting force goals or further limiting foreign exchange expenditure on 
defense—partly because he would not be able to sell such restrictions to the Indian 
cabinet.187 He was also not in a position to give up the Soviet option. 
Diversification 
Beyond ability, there is little evidence that the government was willing to give up 
or even limit the Soviet option to the extent that would have been required for a major 
five-year military assistance deal with the US to go through. Military assistance 
agreements with the Soviet Union were indeed a major reason that the MoU with the US 
did not go farther than it did, especially on the question of supersonics. During 
negotiations on the MoU, senior Indian officials made it clear that India would not stand 
down from negotiations to acquire more MiGs from the Soviet Union. Shastri told the US 
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ambassador that, while there had been some internal differences over the MiG deal, 
Nehru had already decided to move forward with the deal in April—before final talks on 
the US-India MoU. Chavan clarified that India did not want American F-104s instead of 
MiGs; it wanted them in addition to the Soviet aircraft.188 
Across the board in the administration, however, it was clear that as long as India 
had a deal in play with the Soviet Union to acquire more MiGs no supersonic deal was 
possible with the US. To begin with, US officials did not see supersonics as necessary for 
defense against China. Moreover, given India’s more pressing needs (both defense and 
development) they thought that the money would be better spent elsewhere. Finally, 
officials believed that if both the US and the Soviet Union supplied India with 
supersonics, Pakistan would demand even more such aircraft from the US.189 
After Nehru’s death, in Washington there was again some consideration of 
offering India supersonic aircraft on the small chance that Delhi might have a change of 
heart. Although there was a sense that India was too far along with the purchase of MiGs, 
the idea was to get credit for the offer. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and 
Komer advocated making the offer, even on the off chance that India decided to forsake 
the MiGs and buy American. McNamara approved of the offer, if it was made to both 
India and Pakistan, but Rusk thought it would kill the glimmer of hope of an India-
Pakistan rapprochement generated by Ayub’s conciliatory statement after Nehru’s 
death.190 Nonetheless, Rusk outlined a package involving F-6As, engine development 
assistance for India’s domestic supersonic and the prospect that F-104s could be offered 
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in the future—conditioned on India not purchasing MiGs.191 Even while this was being 
considered, reports came in that the MiG deal had already been finalized.192 The Indian 
cabinet secretary said India was not likely to renege on the deal that was a follow-on to 
the one made in 1962. Assistant Secretary of State Philips Talbot confirmed that in that 
case the US would not consider an air package for India since that would mean even 
more diversion of development resources towards defense.193 
The Indian side was aware that the purchase from the Soviet Union was a 
stumbling block, but the government was not going to give up that option. Beyond the 
fact that the MiG deal was a bird in hand, Indian policymakers did not want to be overly 
dependent on the US as a military supplier.194 Senior Indian policymakers told the US 
ambassador that they already felt pressured by the US on a number of fronts.195 The 
Indian government believed that diversifying its dependence at least gave India the ability 
to resist that pressure somewhat. Furthermore, even if Shastri had wanted to put all 
India’s eggs in one basket, domestic political circumstances would have made it hard for 
him to renege on the deal. Politically, he was vulnerable on his left flank—leftists in the 
Congress party had even opposed him coming to power. He was also sensitive to 
criticism that he was deviating from Nehru’s foreign policy and pushed back against such 
accusations.196   
On the US side, domestic politics made it unlikely that an India that agreed to a 
Soviet deal would also be able to get greater American military assistance. As it is, 
Johnson had been concerned that any large military aid package to India would affect 
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congressional sentiments about the large economic assistance package India was 
receiving.197 Once it became evident that India was going to go the MiG route, 
administration officials expected a negative reaction in Congress.198 Aware of the 
potential reaction to an Indian military deal with the Soviet Union announced a few 
months before the presidential and congressional elections, Bowles sought to persuade 
Indian officials to limit the extent of the deal and keep it as “low key” as possible.199 An 
announcement in the Indian parliament in September put paid to that hope.200 
Bowles feared that with this, Indian policymakers shut the door to further 
negotiations in the defense realm with the US. As the India desk officer at the State 
Department predicted, however, India had no desire to put all its eggs in the Soviet basket 
either.201 Indian policymakers were not convinced that China and the Soviet Union would 
remain at odds. Bowles indeed tried to encourage such doubts about Soviet reliability 
versus China in the minds of the Indian prime minister and defense minister, indicating 
that Sino-Soviet rapprochement remained a key Soviet goal.202 There were also doubts 
about Soviet reliability on another front—the ability of Moscow to deliver. These doubts 
led to the Indian defense minister coming back to ask the US if it would be willing to 
supply India with F-5s. Bowles wondered whether this request was the result of delays 
with the Indian supersonic, the fact that the MiG domestic production line would not bear 
fruit for a decade, the developing Soviet-Pakistan relationship, or a desire to diversify 
                                                
197 Letter from Johnson to Bowles, January 21, 1964, FRUS 1964-68 Vol. XXV, p. 14. 
198 Letter from Rusk to McNamara, June 17, 1964, Ibid, p. 127. 
199 Letter from Bowles to Bundy, July 18, 1964, Ibid, pp. 140-141. 
200 See footnote 4 re Airgram From AmEmb India to DoS, September 23, 1964, Ibid, p. 159.  
201 See Letter from Bowles to Bundy, July 18, 1964, Ibid, pp. 139-142 and footnote 3 re Memcon of 
Meeting between Chavan-Lakeland (DoS India desk officer), July 7, 1964, Ibid, p. 139. 
202 Telegram From AmEmb India to DoS, August 27, 1964, Ibid, p. 150. Also, see Telegram From 
AmEmb India to DoS re Chavan-Bowles meeting, January 29, 1965, Ibid, p. 185. 
 358 
using the American option.203 The State Department received intelligence that Chavan 
was motivated by delays in MiG deliveries and a sense that the Soviet Union was 
shortchanging India on the commitment it had made vis-à-vis domestic production of 
MiGs.204 Shastri admitted that the “Soviets had not been fully coming through.” He 
hoped to discuss the acquisition of aircraft with Johnson on a trip to the US scheduled for 
spring 1965.205 
Bowles, the military attaché in India, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Peter Solbert believed that giving India the F-5s could help limit how much India turned 
to Moscow.206 In the State Department, Talbot argued for either giving both India and 
Pakistan aircraft or giving none.207 Harriman, too, was supportive of the Indian request.208 
Trouble on the India-Pakistan front, however, put paid to any prospect of the deal.209 
Pakistan: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution? 
Like its predecessor, the Johnson administration believed that continuing tension 
with Pakistan consumed Indian resources that were required to meet the external and 
internal threat from China. An improved Indian relationship with Pakistan could result in 
less diversion of Indian attention and resources from not just the China front, but also 
from development priorities that were critical to insulating India from Chinese 
subversion. US policymakers also believed that better India-Pakistan relations would 
stymie the developing Sino-Pakistan partnership—a relationship that continued to be a 
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major source of tension in the US-Pakistan relationship.210 Even though key officials 
thought India was “the major prize in Asia,” Pakistan, too, was considered a part of the 
Cold War framework that made India important.211 As Andersen has noted, this made 
keeping Pakistan on the “free world” side crucial.212 
In some ways, the US and India were not that far apart on Pakistan. For one, the 
Johnson administration, too, saw Pakistan as adding to its China problem. Rusk laid out 
the US perspective, noting  
We are determined to face squarely our responsibility for helping to maintain the 
security of free Asia against the Chinese Communists until the nations concerned 
are strong enough to preserve it themselves. Pak policy cuts across this grain. 
When we are trying to stop Chinese Communist infiltration in Southeast Asia, 
Paks in effect seem to be encouraging them to make hay in South Asia.213  
Furthermore, despite Pakistani calls for US pressure on India, most in the administration 
were disinclined to put too much pressure on India. On Kashmir, the Kennedy 
administration’s failed effort to get the two countries to reach a settlement seemed to 
have taken its toll. Some like Harriman still believed that the UK and US should continue 
to focus attention on a Kashmir settlement.214 Overall, however, policymakers thought 
Pakistan’s “pressure tactics” were “unwise” since the US could not offer the kind of 
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support Pakistan was seeking on the issue at the UN. They believed that India and 
Pakistan should sort out the issue on a bilateral basis.215 Rusk indeed told Bhutto it would 
be “mistake of lifetime” to believe that “India can be coerced.”216 Bundy and Komer 
thought that pressing a weak Indian government to negotiate on Kashmir would lead to 
instability that China could exploit.217 Talbot told the Pakistani ambassador that the US 
did “not see how outside powers can be helpful until disputants decide themselves to 
make such concessions.”218 As for Johnson, he did not think the two countries were ready 
for a settlement.219  
The Pakistani attitude towards China and India’s importance vis-à-vis China 
indeed prevented further US pressure on India. Administration officials rejected Pakistani 
calls for conditioning aid to India on a Kashmir settlement. Bundy sent a clear message to 
Pakistan that 
neither Ayub nor any other Pakistani should be under any illusion that leaning on 
the US or making noises toward China would change our determination to help 
India against China. This was a major aspect of our foreign policy. The Paks 
might disagree with our judgment as to the reliability of India and whether the 
Indians would ever fight China. But this was not the issue. We regarded India as a 
very important place and were determined to avoid the critical vacuum which 
would be created by India's collapse. This was also in Pakistan's interest.220  
Given Ayub’s reticence over supporting the US in Vietnam, Johnson had little patience 
for Pakistani suggestions that American aid to India would cause India’s neighbors to 
look to China, and perhaps lead to Pakistan reconsidering its alliance commitments. 
Johnson noted that that was Pakistan’s decision to make; given the Pakistani attitude, the 
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US would also “re-evaluate the condition of our relationship.” Johnson instructed 
McConaughy to make clear to Ayub how upset he was about the deepening Sino-
Pakistan relationship, especially in the context of the trouble China was creating for the 
US in Southeast Asia.221 Johnson also told McConaughy to tell Ayub that the US was the 
best judge of how it should go about helping India deal with China.222 
When Pakistan again called for pressure on India following India’s decision to 
integrate Kashmir constitutionally in December 1964, in a conversation with Pakistani 
officials, Harriman highlighted Shastri’s internal difficulties and also the US inability and 
unwillingness to pressure India on Kashmir. He noted that the “US ability to bring 
pressure to bear upon India is limited by our confrontation with Chicom threat and 
activities in area and elsewhere around the world.”223  
Even as the administration saw Pakistan as part of its own China problem, 
however, it still believed that India should make Pakistan part of its China solution by 
making “common cause” with Pakistan against China.224 Indian officials, however, 
increasingly believed that Pakistan was directly part of their China problem. The fact that 
the threat from Pakistan and China had become linked in Indian minds did nothing to 
make an India-Pakistan rapprochement easier. Indian officials saw China and Pakistan 
“united in a strange marriage of convenience” and thought this collaboration made it 
harder to deal with Pakistan on other issues.225 Indian policymakers also saw the US 
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“unfair” stance at the UN as increasing Pakistani intransigence.226 Indira Gandhi, Indian 
minister of information and broadcasting, even publicly admonished the US for its 
“favoritism” towards Pakistan when it came to Kashmir.227 As Gandhi wrote in a letter, 
the war with China and Pakistan’s continued hostility had “completely changed” the 
stakes as far as Kashmir were concerned.228 There were few takers for suggestions of 
concessions to Pakistan and China.229 By spring 1965, after a local crisis in Kashmir in 
December 1963, a refugee influx from East Pakistan through most of 1964, and India’s 
December 1964 announcement that it was taking steps to formally integrate Kashmir,230 
there seemed little hope that India would come around to the US view of Pakistan as part 
of the solution to India’s China problem. 
Moreover, the Indian government was unable to do what the US insisted could 
make Pakistan part of the solution. Shastri was not considered a hawk. While still a 
minister Shastri had stated in parliament that, even in the case of Pakistan, the door to 
negotiations should never be shut. 231 When, despite internal government dissension and 
opposition objections, Nehru had released Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah in April 
1964—as part of his effort to ease India’s Pakistan problem so that it could focus on 
China—Shastri had supported this release as well as Nehru’s efforts to talk with 
Abdullah.232 In his inaugural speech, Shastri left the door open to negotiations with 
Pakistan.233 In summer 1964 his government invited Ayub to visit India with a 
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preliminary ministerial beforehand.234 Shastri also heard out socialist leader Jayaprakash 
Narayan who went to Pakistan on a goodwill trip that fall. He also briefly stopped over to 
meet with Ayub in October 1964.235 
Shastri, however, had limited room for maneuver on Pakistan. There were doubts 
that even Nehru could reach a settlement on Kashmir.236 For a new prime minister who 
was sensitive to criticism that he was weak and indecisive, any settlement requiring 
concessions would only open him up to further charges of weakness. Even when he had 
stated as a minister that the door to negotiations should never be shut, he had followed it 
up by tempering and even backtracking on this view when criticized by the opposition 
and some other members of the government.237 As Narayan noted to Ayub in fall 1964, 
Shastri was unlikely to consider himself in a strong enough position politically to make 
the concessions that might be needed.238 Thus, while both the Indian and Pakistani 
leaders made conciliatory noises after Nehru’s death, border skirmishes continued and a 
Kashmir solution remained elusive.  
Why did all these disagreements on means not lead to a breakdown of the US-
India relationship? While it helped prevent an Indian tilt toward the US, Soviet assistance 
to India was not a deal-breaker in US-India relations. Most in the Johnson administration 
were quite realistic about India’s relations with the Soviet Union. A policy planning 
paper noted,  
Because of the special utility of the Soviet Union to India’s foreign and domestic 
policies, we cannot hope at present to achieve a major curtailment of the Soviet-
                                                
234 Telegram From AmEmb Pakistan to DoS, August 11, 1964, FRUS 1964-68 Vol. XXV, p. 146. 
235 Brecher, Succession, pp. 175-176. 
236 Guha, India after Gandhi, pp. 360-361. 
237 Mankekar, pp. 134-135, 138-139. 
238 Telegram From EmbOff Pakistan to DoS, September 19, 1964, FRUS 1964-68 Vol. XXV, p. 157. 
 364 
Indian relationship. However, there are steps which we can take to reduce to some 
extent the degree of intimacy and the risk of Communist political success.239  
In other words, the US goal when it came to Soviet involvement in India was not 
rollback, but containment.  
Similarly, the US-Pakistan relationship, while a sensitive subject in India was not 
enough to break Delhi and Washington up. On Kashmir, the Johnson administration was 
less activist than the Kennedy administration. By the early Johnson years, even the State 
Department, usually the US agency keenest to mediate the dispute between India and 
Pakistan, expressed doubts about the likelihood of a Kashmir settlement. Foggy Bottom 
also acknowledged the limitations of what the US could do and advocated “back[ing] 
off” in fora like the United Nations.240 Furthermore, India believed that there was one key 
benefit of the US-Pakistan relationship: Washington’s ability to restrain Islamabad. 
Finally, the US-Pakistan relationship was hardly at its peak at this point thanks to 
Pakistan’s dalliance with China—and, soon, with the Soviet Union. For all the talk of 
Johnson’s admiration of Ayub Khan, he found Pakistan and its leader exasperating. He 
later suggested the reason, stating: “I liked [Ayub] and thought he was the finest fellow in 
the world and the last man in the world I thought the Communists would take. But by god 
they just had him running all year long; when he’s not in Peking, he’s in Moscow and in 
both places he’s denounced us.”241 
Most of all, the China factor kept the two countries tethered. Developments on 
each of the fronts mentioned above in the spring and summer of 1965, however, would 
lead to disillusionment and disappointment and a fraying of that tether. Vietnam, the 
subject that Bundy noted was “in the forefront of all minds” in Washington would bring 
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to the fore differences in the two countries’ approaches to China, and highlight the 
different levels of importance the two countries placed on India’s relations with the 
Soviet Union.242 Increasing India-Pakistan tension led to Indian questioning of the 
reliability of US assurances. It also resulted in frustration in Washington about the lack of 
focus in India on the main threat—China—and made it harder to justify assistance to 
India when its defense-development priorities seemed to be skewed. Finally, Johnson’s 
decision to hold back—and then eventually suspend—both guns and butter from India 
made Delhi question the American commitment to helping it meet the external and 
internal China challenge. 
DUAL DISAPPOINTMENT (APRIL-JULY 1965) 
Vietnam: Dueling Approaches  
After a visit to India in spring 1965, Harriman wrote to the president with much 
optimism about the US and India’s “full agreement on such matters as aggressive intents 
of Red China, need to prevent Reds' take-over in South Vietnam and SEA.” But he 
added, “They are, of course, still suspicious and fearful of some of our policies and 
methods.” This was especially the case in Vietnam, where India worried that the Chinese 
threat was being exacerbated by the US military approach and Washington’s perception 
of the Soviet Union as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.243 The Johnson 
administration, on the other hand, thought that India was not pulling its weight on an 
issue on which the two sides should have agreed, given that it saw its own actions as 
designed to contain the Chinese threat. 
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Indian and US interests in Southeast Asia had not necessarily been divergent. 
Lawrence has noted that as early as the late 1940s India had exercised caution with 
regard to Southeast Asia because of its “conflicting priorities.”244 The desire to play an 
important role abroad, bolster political legitimacy at home and limit superpower 
intervention in India’s near abroad had competed with Indian interest in maintaining its 
relationships with Britain and France and preventing the expansion of Chinese influence 
in Southeast Asia.  
Over the 1950s, the “competing demands” had persisted, though India had 
prioritized them differently and accordingly “tailor[ed] its position on Vietnam.”245 In the 
second half of the 1950s Delhi had started worrying more about Beijing’s role in 
Southeast Asia. There had been concern that US policies would lead to an expanded 
Chinese role. For Nehru, the question of whether there was peace or war in Southeast 
Asia largely depended on China. He had believed that US isolation of Beijing would 
make conflict more likely and US pressure on local leaderships in countries like Laos 
would force them “to look to China for assistance.”246 
By the early 1960s, one demand became more pressing for India: keeping China 
out of Southeast Asia or, at the very least, limiting its influence there. With China seen as 
a looming threat, the other priorities had dropped down the list. India was more 
circumspect about seeking “a position of major importance in international affairs.” The 
Congress party’s claims to legitimacy were being judged not so much on the basis of its 
role in the Indian struggle against European colonialism anymore as on performance on 
                                                
244 Lawrence, p. 42 
245 Ibid, pp. 46-47 
246 JLN at the fifth meeting of the Commonwealth PMs’ Conference, London, June 28, 1957, SWJN SS 
Vol. 38, pp. 611-612. Also, see Note from Dutt to JS(AD) and DS(O&M), December 30, 1960, NMML, 
SDP, SF No. 45. 
 367 
defense and development. Furthermore, more than American or Soviet intervention, 
Indian policymakers feared a vacuum or instability in Vietnam that China could exploit. 
For these reasons, India had an “interest in avoiding over-hasty removal of Western 
influence from Southeast Asia.”247 
Key officials in the Indian government had come around to the view that North 
Vietnam was supporting the Vietcong and that this was having a destabilizing effect on 
the situation.248 India had still been neither as forthcoming nor as public in its support for 
the US position as Washington would have liked. In 1961, Nehru, for example, had 
remained reticent about publicly speaking out against the communist methods in South 
Vietnam as then vice president Johnson had urged.249 American and British officials, 
however, had been pleasantly surprised about Nehru’s non-hostile reaction to an 
increased US presence in South Vietnam in late 1961 and his government’s cautious and 
balanced approach in the ICC after the build-up—despite objections by some within the 
Indian government. Despite not going as far as Canada, the UK and the US wanted, in the 
ICC in 1962 India had taken a stance on North Vietnamese involvement in South 
Vietnam that the Canadian representative had interpreted as “a turning point in Indian 
foreign policy in direction of greatly increased firmness in dealing with the communist 
bloc.” Some have argued that this stance indeed led to the North Vietnamese jettisoning 
its neutral position on the Sino-Indian dispute towards a pro-Chinese one. Despite 
western fears that India would soon tilt the other way to display its neutrality, India had 
subsequently supported a policy of “masterly inactivity” for the ICC—an approach that 
                                                
247 Lawrence, p. 47 
248 Ibid, p. 48. 
249 Merrill, Bread and the Ballot, p. 180. Also, see Memcon of Johnson-Nehru Meeting, New Delhi, May 
18, 1961, FRUS 1961-63 Vol. XIX, p. 42.  
 368 
British officials had noted favored the west.250 Following that, Indian officials repeatedly 
told their US counterparts that they did not want the US to withdraw from Vietnam, not 
just in the Kennedy administration but also in the early Johnson years. Indian officials 
acknowledged American “efforts to keep communists out of Southeast Asia, and…hoped 
that this effort would be successful.”251  
Indian concern about the kind of US efforts, however, increased with US 
escalation in Vietnam in February 1965, and especially with the bombing campaign. The 
concern did not stem primarily from a desire to protect its “claims to non-alignment” and 
thus its international image and national identity (even though that was how it was seen 
in the US)—although Indian officials were concerned that China was winning the 
propaganda war in the Afro-Asian world because of this escalation. It was partly due to 
the need to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union, one of India’s largest aid 
providers. In addition, India feared that escalation would get in the way of détente 
between its two benefactors: the US and Soviet Union. Moreover, the Indian government 
believed that Moscow could be part of the solution. American officials tried to convince 
Indian officials of the differences between US-Indian and Soviet interests in Vietnam.252 
Shastri, however, believed that the Soviet Union was a “moderating influence” in 
Southeast Asia and was trying to “offset” Chinese influence.253  Furthermore, Indian 
policymakers believed that escalated US involvement in Vietnam would push the Soviet 
Union to come down on the side of China.254 This worried Indian officials who were 
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constantly concerned about the prospect of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Such a 
rapprochement would significantly change the balance in Asia and would undercut the 
very basis of India’s strategic approach by making the country more heavily dependent 
on the US. Finally, Indian policymakers believed that the US approach was 
counterproductive.  
This concern translated into criticism of the US in fora like the ICC.255 What 
grated more in Washington was public criticism. In June 1965 Gandhi, then a minister, 
spoke out against US intervention—more forcefully than Shastri. She was mainly trying 
to burnish her credentials and strengthen her position vis-à-vis Shastri, but many in the 
Indian government shared her assessment that escalated American involvement invited 
more Chinese intervention in Southeast Asia. Most Indian concern and criticism, 
however, was expressed privately. Shastri’s public appeals for negotiations, as Lawrence 
has noted, were “relatively balanced.” Furthermore, a number of “Indian officials 
continued to give Washington quiet support” through 1965. Most of the “sniping” from 
Indian leaders came after that time.256 
Rusk observed that “the Indian attitude regarding South Viet Nam has been 
generally helpful.”257 Bowles, however, outlined the problem as far as the administration 
was concerned: while India was trying to be helpful on Southeast Asia behind the scenes, 
its “failure publicly to recognize that we are in fact fighting their battles” was 
problematic.258 The criticism and lack of support for and understanding of the US 
approach especially grated on Johnson. He was upset about Shastri’s spring 1965 call for 
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a ceasefire in Vietnam.259 He asserted to the Indian prime minister, “To us, the Chinese 
Communist-supported aggression in Vietnam poses the same kind of threat to Free World 
interests as Communist China's attack on India in 1962.”260 The president was irked that 
while Washington was holding the line for the “free world,” countries like India 
threatened by communists did not appreciate US efforts. Indian officials needed “to 
recognize that we're fighting their war in Vietnam.”261 
Assets and Liabilities  
Johnson’s irritation about the lack of support on Vietnam from Pakistan also 
ended up affecting India adversely. Annoyed with Pakistan’s deepening relations with 
China and the Soviet Union, and its lack of support on Vietnam, Johnson indefinitely 
postponed the visit of Ayub scheduled for that spring. Rusk identified US-Pakistan 
differences on China as the main reason for postponement.262 A similarly scheduled 
Shastri visit became collateral damage, when Johnson simultaneously postponed it as 
well.263  
The manner of the cancellation of his visit left Shastri humiliated. Indian officials 
dismissed the explanation that Shastri would have been forced to speak out in Vietnam if 
he had travelled to Washington. They were not unaware of Johnson’s sensitivities on 
Vietnam. In the lead up to the trip, Harriman had indeed briefed Shastri on them.264 BK 
Nehru called the indefinite postponement a “colossal bloomer” connected to “the 
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annoying policy of equating Pakistan with India.”265 It also came at an inopportune time 
for Shastri.266 The prime minister was still fending off challengers domestically, 
including some who continued to accuse him of weakness. Earlier in the spring he also 
had to deal with major language riots in southern India and the related resignation of two 
ministers. In addition, Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah, on tour abroad, had been 
making statements unfriendly to India.267 Moreover, the cancellation came just as the 
Pakistani army—“armed with American weapons” from India’s perspective268—seemed 
to be challenging India in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965. 
Since the clash in the Rann followed Sino-Pakistan talks, Indian officials were 
concerned that the clash was a result of Sino-Pakistani collusion.269 What made matters 
worse from the Indian perspective was that Pakistan was using US-supplied equipment. 
Officials complained that the US was not living up to its promise that it would not allow 
this equipment to be used against India unless India inarguably attacked Pakistan.270 To 
many in India, the American inability to control usage called into question the reliability 
of US assurances about the use of such weapons, as well as whether the US could really 
be depended upon to restrain Pakistan in the case of a larger war between India and China 
or India and China-Pakistan. 
To Johnson, the skirmishes were a manifestation of what he thought was India’s 
misplaced sense of priorities in the face of the China threat. As US involvement in 
Vietnam escalated, so did Johnson’s frustration that instead of focusing on the main 
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threat in Asia (China), India and Pakistan, both of which the US was supporting, were 
fighting each other. Johnson was tired of India-Pakistan “bickering.”271  
US analysts acknowledged that given deepening Sino-Pakistan relations and the 
previous Chinese defeat of India, the Shastri government could not afford to back down 
against Pakistan.272 But Johnson’s patience seemed to have reached a breaking point as 
he questioned not just India’s performance, but also its priorities.273 These clashes were 
additional evidence that India was not quite living up to its billing. The president had 
never been as much of a true believer in India’s potential as others in his 
administration—Bowles, Komer, Bundy, Deputy National Security Advisor Walt 
Rostow—nor even a convert to the cause like McNamara or Rusk.274 He was, however, a 
true believer in the cold war framework, the China-India race and the fact that Indian 
success or failure could have not just a strategic, but possibly even a political impact.  
Komer dated Johnson’s “pulling back” from South Asia to that spring.275 Johnson 
said he was “terribly disillusioned by both” India and Pakistan. He began questioning the 
roles that they had been assigned in the US script for Asia, telling Bundy that he wanted 
someone to “really evaluate that part of the world for me.”276 He asked McNamara to 
assess for him the “military and allied value” of India and Pakistan before he made a 
decision about any more aid “allocations.”277  
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Adding to Johnson’s sense that India was more a liability than an asset had been 
India’s disappointing economic performance despite American aid. Bundy reported 
Johnson’s feeling that “we're spending biggest single chunk of our aid money on an 
enterprise which isn’t going anywhere fast.”278 At a meeting called to discuss aid for 
India and Pakistan in June 1965, Johnson instructed his officials that all aid decisions and 
announcements had to be approved by him till Congress passed the foreign aid bill. As 
Kux has noted the reasons for this decision with regard to India were its economic 
performance and congressional attitude towards foreign aid.279 Johnson cancelled 
advance program loans for both countries and asked for a review of aid allocations to 
assess “(a) whether the US should be spending such large sums in either country; and (b) 
how to achieve more leverage for our money, in terms both of more effective self-help 
and of our political purposes.”280 He made clear to his advisors, as well as officials in the 
subcontinent, that the policy review might result in a “substantial change” in those 
policies—or even “very likely a complete revision and a new policy that’ll require some 
negotiations.”281   
NSC and State Department officials recognized that these delays were causing 
concern in India about US reliability.282 With the foreign exchange situation as bad as it 
was, Indian officials were desperate for information on economic assistance and could 
not understand why Johnson was delaying. At that point, even Bundy was not quite sure 
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what condition the president wanted to attach to food aid. Komer also highlighted for 
Johnson the risks of stalling on the military supply front, noting that delaying a response 
on Indian requests for aircraft would lead Delhi to look even more to Moscow.283 
Johnson, however, wanted to continue to “hold up” military assistance.284  
As the summer progressed, a resigned Johnson declared to Sen. Russell (D-GA), 
“I got to give them something.”285 It was, however, not going to be business as usual. 
Eventually he agreed to let FY1965 military supplies continue, but deferred any 
commitment for FY1966.286 Toward the end of July, Johnson also approved a two-month 
extension of  food assistance to India instead of a two-year or year-long one that his 
advisors had recommended—the beginning of what came to be known as the short-tether 
policy287—but before any bilateral negotiations about long-term aid could take place, war 
broke out in the subcontinent between India and Pakistan in August 1965. 
THE STAKES MADE EVIDENT (AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1965) 
Some scholars have referred to the India-Pakistan war as a “watershed” or 
“turning point” in US relations with India and Pakistan.288 McMahon, for example, has 
argued that the 1965 war “radically” shook US assumptions about the subcontinent. It is 
perhaps more accurate to describe the crisis as a catalyst, crystallizing the sentiments that 
were already percolating. The war did not “induce,” but consolidated the US “shift” in 
thinking that had been festering for months.289 Nor did it bring US disillusionment and 
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disengagement with India, as scholars have argued. The disillusionment had set in earlier. 
The disengagement would take longer—despite the frustration on both sides, the US and 
India remained tethered, in no small part because of China. The 1965 war would make 
this evident. 
The previous winter and earlier that spring, US intelligence estimates had noted 
that it was unlikely that there would be “major hostilities” between India and Pakistan 
over the next 3-4 years.290 The Rann of Kutch clashes caused doubts about those 
estimates. The war that broke out in late summer proved them inaccurate. The first hint of 
trouble between India and Pakistan reached Washington on August 8.291 NSC officials 
confirmed to the president that the US had evidence of Pakistani infiltration across the 
ceasefire line (CFL) in Kashmir.292 By mid–August, Indian troops crossed the CFL but 
there was no sign of Pakistan backing down.293 On September 1, in a “thrust at the Indian 
jugular,” Pakistani regulars crossed the CFL to cut off access from Delhi to the Kashmiri 
capital.294 Despite urging from some of his officials, Johnson’s preferred course of action 
was to “get behind a log and sleep a bit.” The stakes did not seem high enough and he did 
not think that the US had enough leverage with the countries. He wanted to let the UN, 
which had called for a ceasefire, take the lead. Johnson instructed his officials to let each 
side know that the US was supporting the UN Secretary-General’s actions and was 
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“speaking equally strongly” to both of them.295 On September 6, with Shastri still 
smarting from charges that he had surrendered in the Rann of Kutch,296 India attacked 
across the international border, taking Pakistan by surprise.297 On his officials’ advice, 
Johnson suspended military and economic assistance to both countries. The suspension 
stemmed from his concern that inaction on this front would threaten the whole aid bill 
pending in Congress at the time.298  
The China factor changed the calculus. The White House had received 
intelligence reports that the Rann of Kutch skirmishes and the latest infiltration into 
Kashmir were part of a plan that Pakistani officials had discussed with their Chinese 
counterparts.299 Then, on September 4, the Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi had held 
talks with his Pakistani counterpart in Karachi and publicly expressed support for 
Pakistan’s actions—causing concern in India.300 Intelligence assessment indicated that 
there might be a “secret Sino-Pakistani mutual defense agreement of some kind” that had 
been rumored to be in existence since early 1964. Analysts believed that it probably left 
Beijing enough flexibility to decide whether or not to use force to aid Pakistan and noted 
that until then China had been somewhat cautious about its material support to Pakistan. 
They did, however, feel that such an agreement would lead Pakistan to throw caution to 
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the wind.301 When asked about such an agreement, Ayub responded vaguely.302 Around 
this time, in an effort to take the pressure off Pakistan, China rhetorically entered the fray, 
demanding that India remove its posts and withdraw its troops near some sections of the 
Sino-Indian border.303  
While before the war some US officials had questioned India’s importance, the 
potential Chinese threat made evident the consensus about India’s place in the US 
framework for Asia. The US kept a close eye on Chinese actions, uncertain about what 
Beijing’s declared support for Pakistan entailed.304 Johnson and McNamara discussed 
their concern that China would do more than threaten India. McNamara noted that the 
Defense Department was preparing for contingencies so the US would not be in “a 
terrible jam” if China intervened militarily.305 Rusk shared this concern about Chinese 
involvement, worrying that any escalation of the crisis would result in a setback to the 
American “effort to build [in the subcontinent] a viable counterweight to Communist 
China.”306 He believed that a Chinese victory against India would affect the balance in 
Vietnam, and Japan and the Southeast Asian countries would see it as a Communist 
victory over the US. The NSC concurred, with Komer asserting that if China did get 
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involved militarily, the US too would have to intervene since “the whole Western power 
position in Asia may be at stake.”307  
With Chinese condemnations continuing, along with Chinese accusations that 
India could not have taken action without US “consent and support,”308 Johnson took a 
more active interest, concerned that “the stakes were far bigger than Kashmir.” He 
stressed that the US “must find a solution” but maintained that he still saw this being 
achieved through the UN.309 China’s threats persisted, as did Johnson’s concern.310 With 
Vietnam on his mind, his major preoccupation vis-à-vis the crisis seemed to be expressed 
in his question to McNamara: “What about the Chinese?”311 US intelligence did not think 
that China would do more than provide political and token military support to Pakistan or 
instigate smaller skirmishes unless Pakistan’s defeat became imminent.312 As Pakistan’s 
situation deteriorated, however, on September 16 another Chinese ultimatum to India— 
this time with a deadline—ratcheted up the fear of Chinese military intervention.313  
The Chinese ultimatum did not catch the Johnson administration “off-guard.”314 
The Defense Department had been well on its way to evaluating its operational plans that 
included strengthening Indian air defenses and possible US air force intervention in case 
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China intervened; it was also planning to resume military aid to India for use against 
China.315 The US also privately indicated to China that any intervention would be ill 
advised.316 To pressure Pakistan to head to the negotiating table, despite objections from 
the embassy in Islamabad, Washington decided against making a new pledge of 
economic assistance for Pakistan and supported the postponement of a scheduled aid 
consortium meeting.317  
Washington took a tough line with Pakistan, which seemed to be trying to use the 
Chinese threats to its advantage. After initially asking for US intervention as a Pakistani 
ally,318 Ayub had started asking either for a US statement of support for Pakistan or that 
the US condition any support to India vis-à-vis China on a Kashmir settlement. He had 
suggested that if the US did not do so, he would have to move towards Beijing.319 The 
State Department conveyed Johnson’s message that such an American indication would 
not be forthcoming, especially as long as Pakistan seemed tethered to the Chinese 
position. Rusk also warned Pakistani officials, “President Johnson is not the sort of man 
who will ever give his approval to one thin dime for a country which supports or 
encourages the aggressive pressures of Red China.”320  
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While preparing in the background to support India against China, the Johnson 
administration was careful about promising India anything, lest its support delayed 
India’s path to the negotiating table.321 Another reason for the lack of public support was 
that intelligence assessments noted that if the US appeared to be getting involved on 
India’s behalf, it would make Chinese intervention on Pakistan’s side more likely.322 
Thus, in the early stages of the crisis, the State Department had demurred from 
restating US assurances in the event of a communist attack on India as Bowles urged.323 
When the Indian ambassador asked Johnson what the US would do if China intervened. 
Johnson agreed that this was a source of concern for the US, but gave no indication of the 
potential US response. He added that any public indication of US support would only be 
provocative.324 In Delhi Radhakrishnan asked Bowles the same question, but the US 
ambassador gave no commitment.325  
The Indian side continued to ask for assurances and pressure on China and 
Pakistan. Shastri requested that Johnson make clear to Pakistan that if third parties 
intervened on its behalf, the US would have to reconsider its neutrality.326 Subsequently, 
after another Chinese ultimatum, the Indian foreign minister instructed BK Nehru to ask 
the US to warn Beijing off formally as a deterrent. While he did not specifically invoke 
the Air Defense Agreement, he requested US assistance in the event of a Chinese attack. 
Rusk said he would refer the request to the president, but that it was more important for 
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the conflict to cease to render the question moot.327 The concern about Chinese 
intervention was real. It is one of the reasons India did not take action on its eastern 
border with Pakistan in case that gave China a pretext to attack.328 The next day, the 
prime minister’s senior aide LK Jha tried again, indicating that India had detected signs 
of Chinese troop movements. He asked that the US authorize military consultations with 
India for contingency planning.329 While Bowles recommended that the US agree to such 
consultations, Washington told him that Johnson had not authorized consultations.330 
Subsequently, Ball reiterated to BK Nehru that the US would not undertake pre-emptive 
joint contingency planning with India, noting that Washington would review the situation 
if China attacked. He also stated that the US believed that any public warning would be 
provocative, and thus would not be forthcoming at that stage.331  
With China extending the deadline for its ultimatum to India, lack of support from 
other countries, a deteriorating military position and the possibility of US military 
involvement because of China’s threats, Pakistan seemed ready to compromise.332 
Meanwhile, the concern about Chinese intervention, US ambiguity about its response and 
situation on the ground seemed to have brought India to the same point. On September 
22, India and then Pakistan announced that they would accept the UN ceasefire 
proposal.333 Jha outlined concern about China as a crucial reason for India agreeing to a 
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ceasefire.334 Subsequently, intelligence reports indicated that China also reduced its state 
of alert on the Sino-Indian border, thus defusing the immediate crisis.335  
The war made two things evident: first, that India still looked to the US for 
protection against China, especially since the Soviet Union showed no inclination to get 
involved. Secondly, the war made apparent that as long as US administrations remained 
caught up in the cold war web they had spun for Asia, for geopolitical, ideological and 
domestic political reasons they could not see India fall to China. During the war, the US 
had stayed neutral and fairly indifferent while India and Pakistan were dueling. The 
moment China had entered the fray, however, the stakes for the US had changed.  
On the other hand, the war also reinforced Johnson’s sense that India was not an 
asset that could be built up against China, but rather a liability whose weakness 
threatened US interests and his agenda. It also made Indian policymakers question the 
reliability of US assurances. Furthermore, given that the Soviet Union had, at least, 
refrained from suspending military assistance, it reminded India why it was good to 
continue to diversify its partnerships. 
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Chapter 6: Playing It A Bit Cooler (1965-1968) 
There is no difference in the object of containing China. The difference is only 
how we can achieve it. We feel America is going in the wrong way. 
– Indian foreign minister, 19671 
 
The 1965 war added to the growing disappointment on both sides. The mutual 
need kept the two countries tethered to each other for a while, but the bond frayed more 
and more over the next few years. Over the next three years the disappointment would 
turn to disillusionment and eventually disinterest and disengagement. As the US became 
increasingly involved in Vietnam, Johnson increasingly questioned India’s capacity—and 
eventually its willingness—to play the role that US policymakers needed it to play in 
Asia vis-à-vis China. Eventually, he seemed to lose interest in India. This lack of interest 
in India was reinforced by the fact that, while policymakers initially worried that it was 
too big to fail, by 1967 or so India seemed able to survive the stress tests.  
After the war Indian policymakers, on their part, increasingly questioned how 
much they could rely on Moscow and Washington in their effort to meet their external 
and internal China challenge. It strengthened their desire to continue to diversify India’s 
dependence, as well as their efforts to try and reduce it. Domestic political developments 
only reinforced this tendency. As this period went on, they found the demands of 
dependence increasingly heavy, but they still needed US assistance. It was not lost on 
them, however, that India was losing traction in Washington. This led policymakers to try 
to strengthen their domestic options, maintain their Soviet one, and also explore the 
nuclear, look east and even China options. 
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DEPENDENCE (FALL 1965-SPRING 1966) 
From the Indian perspective, the 1965 war had made evident that China continued 
to be a threat, whether alone or in collaboration with Pakistan.2 Indian policymakers did 
not expect the threat to abate. Since early in the Johnson administration, Indian officials 
had worried that 1966-1967 would be a “critical period” when it came to the China threat 
because of timelines related to road construction in certain strategic areas.3 Better 
military performance in the 1965 war than in the 1962 one had created a sense of 
confidence, but there was also recognition that India continued to need external 
assistance.4 The 1965 war, however, had raised serious questions about the reliability of 
India’s external benefactors. 
The British reaction during the war elicited the most public Indian criticism.5 The 
Soviet middle-of-the-road stance disappointed many who were used to Moscow tilting 
towards Delhi in India-Pakistan situations. There was also significant concern about the 
reaction and reliability of the US on four fronts. First, there was concern about the US 
response—or the seeming lack of it—to China’s threats. Years later, Indian policymakers 
like Gandhi would still reference the lack of US assurances or assistance during the crisis. 
Second, there were questions about the reliability of US assurances vis-à-vis Pakistan.6 
The use of American military equipment by the Pakistani military during the war had 
raised serious doubts about the US ability and willingness to restrain Pakistan. This was 
even more worrisome because India depended on the US restraining Pakistan in the case 
of another Sino-Indian conflict. Rusk’s comment to the Indian ambassador that “we 
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cannot control tanks from ten thousand miles away” did nothing to allay these concerns.7 
To make matters worse, there was a sense that military aid to Pakistan had led to “the 
desire to attack India” replacing “the fear of attack from India” there.8 This especially 
hurt in the context of India having agreed to limit its own arms acquisitions based on 
assurances from Washington that would not permit Pakistan to use US-supplied weapons 
against India.9 
Third, the US suspension of the military package that had been agreed to in June 
1964 left a sense in Delhi that India did not have much to show for all the negotiations 
and concessions it had made.10 BK Nehru later noted that the US had violated the 1964 
agreement when it suspended aid to India.11 The Indian defense minister felt that the US 
had left India in the lurch. He noted in parliament that between October 1962 and 
September 1965 the US had only delivered 45 percent of what it had pledged.12 
Furthermore, by suspending the delivery of spare parts, it had delayed defense production 
in India by requiring her to start from scratch with other countries.13  
Finally, on the economic front, the cut-off in economic assistance—required, 
among other things, for the nation building that would strengthen India against China—
reinforced doubts about US reliability that Johnson’s short-tether policy had created. In 
the aftermath of the war, the Johnson administration indeed made it clear that it was in no 
hurry to resume previous levels of assistance to India. A fed up Johnson asserted,  
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I don't know if we got an obligation the rest of our lives just to ship them 10% of 
what they eat. And not without even having agreement or discussions, or tying in 
any alliance, or to be sure of serving our national interests. They say if you don't, 
they'll go to Russia. Well, I think it might be a good thing if Russia did a little of 
it for a while. . .14  
Washington indicated to Delhi that it had no intention of resuming economic aid “until 
we are assured conditions exist on [the] subcontinent which make development feasible” 
and until it had a sense of the “effect of GOI’s proposed military expenditure on 
prospects for economic development.”15  
As a US assessment indicated, unlike Pakistan, India was more concerned about 
the resumption and continuation of economic rather than military aid from the US.16 
While officials in Delhi were peeved about the cut-off of military supplies during the war 
and its implications, they recognized that the cut-off had adversely affected Pakistan even 
more.  While India would have welcomed military aid and, possibly, the opportunity to 
buy American equipment, it had other sources to turn to, including the Soviet Union, as 
well as an indigenous defense industry. Furthermore, Indian officials realized that 
Pakistan would take advantage of any broader resumption to a greater degree than India. 
The cut-off of economic assistance had a greater impact on India. S. Bhoothalingam, the 
Indian finance secretary, noted that the continued suspension of aid was a “shock” to 
India and was contributing to feeling in India of being “let down by friends on whom 
they had counted.”17  
Responding to American criticism that the war had shown that India was too 
focused on defense rather than development, Bhoothalingam indicated that China was 
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still India’s main problem and the US needed to see Indian defense expenditure in that 
context.18 Within the government, if anything, US and Soviet behavior during the war 
had reinforced the Indian desire to ensure that it built an independent capacity to defend 
itself. The US, in turn, stressed that as long as it seemed likely that India was focusing 
expenditure on defense rather than development, economic aid would not be 
forthcoming.19 Instead of military spending, India could help solve its China 
conundrum—especially the Sino-Pakistan dimension of it—by settling its Pakistan 
problem.20 Indeed, if India and Pakistan did not solve their problems, China could exploit 
the situation, thus defeating the purpose of US assistance to India.21   
Bowles reported that public sentiment in India focused not on Washington trying 
to get Delhi to fix its priorities through an aid short leash, but on allegations that the US 
was using aid to force India to make concessions to Pakistan or to take a pro-US stance 
on Vietnam.22 The State Department worried that the public statements of policymakers 
like Shastri, Gandhi and Planning Minister Asoka Mehta implying that the US was 
linking food aid to Kashmir concessions was encouraging this sentiment.23 In the White 
House, even those like Bundy who had no desire to return to long-term food aid 
agreements became concerned that if India believed that the US was using food as a 
“blunt instrument,” it would push policymakers away from the west.24 The Indian food 
minister C. Subramaniam pointed out another consequence of the aid suspension. He 
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observed that while he was taking on internal critics to push through agricultural reforms 
that the US wanted, external i.e. American criticism about India not doing enough was 
counterproductive and was only weakening his hand.25 
Too Big to Fail 
In Washington, there was little interest in resuming military aid to India, but there 
was concern in the NSC about turning the economic tap off. Bundy believed that the first 
principle when considering future US policy toward South Asia should be that “India is 
more important than Pakistan and there is enough hope in India to justify continued 
support by food and economic aid if the Indians in turn are reasonable with us.”26 It was 
not “hope in India,” however, that drove Johnson to turn the tap back on again, but fear 
that the country would fail. While Johnson’s advisors had been selling India’s potential 
strength, he had become even more concerned about the country’s internal and external 
vulnerabilities, worrying “I don’t see how this country is going to survive.”27  
The logic of US involvement in Asia at the time did not leave room for 
disengagement. In 1949, Kennan had noted in that “no policy and no 
concept…will…stick in our government unless it can be drummed into the minds of a 
very large number of persons.”28 And the idea that there would be serious repercussions 
for American and administration interests if India collapsed in the face of China had been 
drummed into the minds of policymakers by this point. 
India continued to have a key place in the administration’s framework for Asia, an 
arena of increasing importance for the US as the war in Vietnam escalated and with it 
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concern about China.29 Laying out the case for continued and possibly greater US 
involvement in Vietnam in late 1965, McNamara argued that there were “three fronts to a 
long-run effort to contain China (realizing that the USSR ‘contains’ China on the north 
and northwest); (a) the Japan-Korea front; (b) the India-Pakistan front; and (c) the 
Southeast Asia front.” Furthermore, he asserted that “[d]ecisions to make great 
investments today in men, money and national honor in South Vietnam make sense only 
in conjunction with continuing efforts of equivalent effectiveness in the rest of Southeast 
Asia and on the other two principal fronts.”30 
Disillusioned though US officials might have been with India, because of the way 
India fit into the US framework for Asia, the war in Vietnam heightened the importance 
of ensuring that India did not fail. Deputy national security advisor Komer noted that one 
of the basic propositions that the US just could not get around was that “India is (with 
Japan) one of the two really key countries in Free Asia--so merits a comparable 
investment almost despite the Indians.”31 As Gaddis has noted, “fear of retreat” had 
become a great concern for Johnson as he considered his options in Vietnam.32 
Concerned about US credibility abroad and his political credibility at home, a broader 
fear of retreat meant that Johnson could not just let India go, no matter how annoyed he 
was about it getting distracted from its development and defense efforts against China. In 
the middle of a presidential rant about India’s performance, when US ambassador to the 
UN Arthur Goldberg suggested that the US should leave India alone and let it become 
communist, Johnson stopped him, noting “Well, I don’t know, that’s what they said 
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Acheson did with China.”33 As Logevall has noted in reference to the president’s reasons 
for not wanting to lose South Vietnam, Johnson believed that “Harry Truman and Dean 
Acheson had lost their effectiveness from the day that the communists took over in 
China.”34 India was the largest domino still standing in Asia; in Johnson’s view, its fall, 
too, would have repercussions beyond its borders.  
To prevent such a fall, US efforts in India now focused heavily on development. 
China remained a threat to India—the war had made that evident. While not ruling out 
the possibility that China would nibble at India’s borders, however, the assessment of the 
US intelligence community was that China’s preoccupation with the war in Vietnam 
made it unlikely that it would undertake any large-scale military action against India.35 
Moreover, it soon became evident that it was not in the security realm that India was 
most vulnerable, but in the economic one, leading to greater US attention to the latter.  
In late September, Johnson picked up the short-tether policy where it had been left 
off during the war, approving the resumption of food aid to India, but this time sending 
enough only for a month. He did so again in October. As the fall and winter of 1965 
progressed, however, a larger problem loomed that threatened India’s political and 
economic stability. The monsoons had failed in 1965, resulting in a poor crop yield; this, 
combined with the way food grains were stored and distributed in India at the time, made 
food shortages and famine likely. To some of Johnson’s advisors, the situation called for 
a loosening of the tether.36 The president, however, saw an opportunity to link aid to 
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performance and pressure India to do more to help itself and, by extension, to help the 
“free world.”   
At the time (and since then) there has been debate about the motivations for 
Johnson’s short-tether policy.37 Rusk later strenuously denied that the US had pressured 
India for political concessions, arguing, “We weren't asking any political quid pro quo in 
terms of Viet Nam, or a vote on Red China in the United Nations, or anything of that sort. 
The only quid pro quo we were asking for was things that the Indians ought to be doing 
for themselves, quite apart from the United States.”38 The Johnson administration was not 
the first one to consider the idea—the Eisenhower administration had thought about 
conditioning aid to Indian reforms as well.39 Johnson later noted that his policy was 
motivated by humanitarian reasons, as well as a desire to get India to improve 
agricultural performance.40 Indeed, the documentary evidence, as Ahlberg has noted, 
indicates that Johnson “elected to keep the tether taut in order to pursue America’s cold 
war policy objectives in tandem with his humanitarian goals.”41 Those cold war policy 
objectives had more to do with India doing its part in the development realm, than with 
India changing its policy on Vietnam—a change that most US policymakers did not 
really expect.  
Once again, Delhi would not have disagreed with the goal of strengthening India, 
but Washington’s preferred means would prove problematic. At the time Rusk 
acknowledged “[the] intrinsic importance of India to us,” but added that India needed to 
demonstrate “a. Actions to turn swords into plowshares… b. Actions to translate 
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economic promises to Indian people and to US into economic performance.”42 The first 
element called for India to make peace with Pakistan, so that China could not continue to 
take advantage of South Asian discord and so that India could keep its focus on 
strengthening itself. It did not, however, constitute US pressure on Kashmir per se. While 
some officials wanted the White House to compel India to negotiate on Kashmir, most 
US policymakers—including Johnson—continued to believe that there was little the US 
could or should do about Kashmir, other than encourage India and Pakistan to settle their 
differences.43  
The second element would become harder for India to achieve over the next year 
and a half when the monsoon would fail again in 1966, causing further food shortages 
and a major famine in parts of India’s most populated region. Throughout, however, 
Johnson kept up the pressure on India to make reforms in the agricultural and broader 
economic development realms. Bowles told Shastri that the “only reason” for the short-
tether policy was “concern that India was not doing enough to increase its own 
agricultural output.”44 Johnson held the reins himself and held them tight—loosening 
them every time just before his grip might cause fatal damage.45 Whether on food or 
economic assistance—the US would eventually also resume the latter—Johnson’s policy 
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was primarily designed to get India to move toward self-sufficiency.46 The US made clear 
that it was linking aid to performance and not changes in India’s Kashmir policy or its 
“basic outlook.”47  
There was a sense in Washington that the short-tether policy and the famine, 
along with the struggling economy, succeeded in leading India towards reforms. Indeed, 
Subramaniam had signed an agreement with US Agriculture Secretary Orville Freeman, 
committing India to agricultural reforms and to prioritizing agriculture in the upcoming 
five-year plan. The Indian planning minister had also reached an agreement with the 
World Bank to institute broader economic reforms. Furthermore, the Indian government 
did implement a number of the agreed-to reforms, though it probably did not move as far 
or as fast as some in the US would have liked. Even Komer, who had been skeptical of 
Johnson’s conditional aid policy, thought it was successful—in combination with India’s 
“desperate straits” and the fact that the US was its only real option in this realm—in 
getting Indian policymakers to listen. Thus, he felt that it should continue, noting, “If 
India is important, and it is, we must skillfully maintain this momentum by continued use 
of carrot and stick.”48 Freeman, in turn, was convinced that with US help, “India can 
make the grade… It will be slow and tough, but it can be done.”49  
Johnson sought buy-in from the US Congress and other countries for his policy. 
He ensured that Congress signed off on any assistance so that he would not be criticized 
for acting unilaterally at a time when foreign aid was under attack on the Hill. There had 
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been a “strong Congressional urge that we get out of South Asia” thanks to the India-
Pakistan fighting making clear that they did not have their eyes on the prize.50 
Administration officials bluntly told their Indian interlocutors about congressional 
difficulties over the foreign aid program in general and the South Asian program in 
particular as a result of the war.51 Rusk told Jha, Shastri’s senior aide, that further aid to 
India and Pakistan had indeed created a political “crisis” with Congress. He asserted that 
Indians had “a political constituency in [the] U.S. they have to nourish.”52  
Congressional difficulties were one of the key reasons to get other countries to 
contribute to the effort to aid India. Johnson was also fed up with the lack of support from 
US allies on Vietnam. He wanted them to step up to the plate on assistance to India—if 
India was so important for the “free world,” he believed that these countries should help 
prop India up, especially since they were not doing much to help in Vietnam.53 
Administration officials involved Indian officials in the effort to get others to contribute, 
emphasizing that this contribution would make it easier to get aid through Congress.54 
Later, Johnson would link US aid commitments to aid pledges by its allies. 
The president and other officials also recognized Soviet contribution to the effort 
to feed Indians and to Indian development more broadly. Washington and Moscow, after 
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all, shared an interest in containing China by strengthening India.55 While some like 
Bowles wanted to do more to keep the Soviet Union out of the subcontinent, most in the 
Johnson administration continued to accept that the Soviets would play a role in India. 
This acceptance was also evident in Washington’s reaction to Moscow taking the lead in 
post-war peacemaking between India and Pakistan in Tashkent in January 1966. The 
Soviet Union hoped to get India and Pakistan to resolve their differences and come 
together against China—an objective the US itself had tried and failed to achieve in the 
past. Thus, when Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin had pushed to act as mediator during 
and after the crisis, the US reaction was reflected in Komer’s sentiment: “let the Soviets 
have a try if they want.”56 Analysts expected India to continue to maintain relations with 
both the US and Soviet Union.57 They also realized that, in any case, improving Soviet-
Pakistan relations put a limit to India-Soviet relations. Overall, the administration’s 
attitude toward Indo-Soviet relations was to “keep…the Indians from unbalanced 
surrender to the Soviets,” but “Soviet help in itself [was] not intolerable.”58 
Too Important to Jettison 
India, on its part, had no intention of surrendering to the Soviet Union. 
Maintaining the Soviet option continued to be important since it was a source of 
economic and military assistance. Furthermore, unlike the US, Moscow had not 
suspended aid to India.59 Finally, India though that the Soviet Union, as a country 
bordering China, could potentially serve as an “antidote to Peking” in a unique way.60 
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Nevertheless, Indian officials had been concerned by Soviet behavior during the war. 
Even observers sympathetic to Moscow had noted its initial “vague” reaction and then 
pressure on India to accept a ceasefire.61 Thus, while the war had highlighted the 
downsides of dependence, it also reinforced the Indian inclination to reduce and diversify 
dependence—and that meant maintaining the US option.  
As mentioned above, China remained a threat and India still hoped that—when 
the rubber hit the road—the US would directly or indirectly help India. India’s internal 
situation also reinforced the need for the US. While the war had strengthened Shastri 
politically, it had only weakened the Indian economy.62 The finance and food ministers 
were indeed reported to have supported Shastri’s acceptance of a ceasefire because of the 
adverse impact of the war on the economy.63 Even the defense minister admitted that the 
war gave India “a good bit of headache in the economic field.”64 The drought that year 
had also made assistance critical.65 So did a political imperative—acting Prime Minister 
Gulzarilal Nanda worried about the viability of democracy in the absence of socio-
economic development.66 The need for the US indeed led India to agree even to strings 
attached with the commitment to undertake reforms in return for economic and food 
assistance.67 
The need to keep the US option available led to Indian efforts to reassure the US 
about Delhi’s continued desire for a good relationship with Washington. Even before 
accepting the Soviet offer of post-war mediation, Indian officials had solicited the US 
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reaction, explaining that India wanted to accept in order to get Moscow on India’s side if 
China attacked again.68 Indian policymakers also moved to temper the anti-American 
rhetoric that had followed the war. They realized that public criticism of the US did not 
just upset American officials, but could also tie their hands at a time when they knew that 
the US continued to be essential to their objectives. Thus, as Bowles noted, “there is 
evidence on every side of a desire to bring the situation back into balance.”69 Even before 
the US had expressed concern about Indian leaders’ public statements, an official 
government statement clarified that the US was not using food assistance to apply 
“political pressure.”70 When the US expressed concern about a Shastri speech that 
sounded belligerent, Jha explained that it was the result of needing to balance policy and 
political imperatives. He added that the US should not to pay too much attention to the 
public statements since they were for domestic consumption.71 After that protest, 
however, the statements did subside.72  
Indian policymakers were concerned that their harsh words had done a lot of 
damage. An anxious Shastri asked Bowles if there was a change in America’s India 
policy.73 Indian officials indicated that Shastri was keen to visit the US to clear the air.74 
Jha noted the Indian government’s concern about the state of the relationship. He pointed 
out the countries’ mutual dependence noting, “India badly needed the US and if there is 
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to be an independent non-Communist Asia with an effective block on Chinese 
expansionism the US also needed India.”75 
DISILLUSIONMENT (SPRING 1966-SPRING 1967) 
The Demands of Dependence  
Bowles more or less agreed, noting 
India's basic objectives and ours are very similar, i.e., India and America are 
equally anxious to block Chinese expansionism, and help maintain stability in 
Asia and Africa, to strengthen the UN, etc. The US also recognizes that a stable, 
economically viable, and democratic India with one-seventh of the world's 
population is absolutely basic to a stable and peaceful Asia.76  
Johnson, however, was increasingly unsure about whether India deserved a key role in 
his China strategy. Some of the president’s aides encouraged him to do much more on 
military and economic assistance in order to strengthen India, as well the fledgling 
government of Indira Gandhi who became prime minister following Shastri’s sudden 
death just after he signed the Tashkent agreement in January 1966. The president did not 
agree.77 India had not been living up to its billing for years, but now its performance was 
not even living up to the reduced expectations he had. He increasingly thought this was a 
“one-way deal.” He wanted to know, “What can they do to help us?”78  
Johnson eventually approved negotiations for the restart of economic assistance 
and case-by-case limited credit sales on the defense side. He instructed officials to try to 
ensure that India did not overspend on defense, which made India-Pakistan reconciliation 
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less likely and led to diversion from development.79 He clarified that in return he did not 
expect an alliance or total support for US foreign policies. What he hoped for, at the very 
least, is that “when the US is under attack in the UN or other forums it would be 
immensely helpful if the Indians could occasionally at least stand up and say ‘stop, look 
and listen--let's try to understand what the US is doing before we criticize it.’” 
Furthermore, “I don't say just rubber-stamp anything we do, but I don’t think they need to 
denounce us every day on what we're doing in Vietnam.” He hoped that India would 
make efforts with Hanoi.80 Vice president Humphrey reiterated to Gandhi in India that 
the US did not want Indian “endorsement” on Vietnam, but publicly throwing “dead cats 
at the US” was highly unhelpful.81 He also went a bit further. He stressed that the US was 
committed to India’s security, but it expected “the same commitment on India’s part to 
the US.” Humphrey noted that he also “pounded away at the interrelationship of 
Communist activities in the subcontinent and Southeast Asia” and pointed out that India 
needed to think about what India could or would do if China attacked the US in 
Vietnam.82  
On Vietnam, Shastri had told Johnson that India did not have enough influence or 
ties with North Vietnam to involve itself directly, but he had talked with Kosygin about 
the matter without much success.83 Like Shastri before her, Gandhi also expressed 
“appreciation” for Johnson’s efforts towards peace in Vietnam.84 Through BK Nehru, she 
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also conveyed her disappointment at Moscow and Hanoi’s lack of response.85 Indian 
officials further indicated that they would approach Soviet officials privately, but made 
no promises on public declarations of support, asserting that those would decrease Indian 
influence with Hanoi and Moscow.86 
In terms of what else India could do, Rusk had suggested that Johnson could get 
India to move toward further liberal economic policies and greater focus on agriculture.87 
Komer, too, expected India to agree to economic reforms. Overall, he did not expect 
Indian movement on Vietnam or Pakistan because of Gandhi’s domestic political 
situation. Nevertheless, even on these issues, he believed that the Indian need for the US 
could lead to a shift. He stated that, “we have a strong ally moving India toward us on 
these matters--Mao Tse-tung. Just as he forced the Soviets in our direction, he’s done the 
same with India. So the Indians are increasingly serious about China, and all we need do 
is nudge this trend along.” As Komer asserted, however, the US needed to calibrate 
pressure carefully.88  
Johnson recognized the domestic pressure on the new Indian prime minister. He 
assured the Indian ambassador that to help strengthen Gandhi’s position, the US would 
not pressure her when she visited Washington in March 1966, as her opposition would 
expect.89 During her visit, Gandhi on her part showed a willingness to act on various 
issues. She suggested a joint India-Pakistan economic project to improve relations.90 
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Furthermore, following her visit, Ayub and she exchanged messages.91 The Indian 
government also agreed to economic reforms worked out with the World Bank.92  
The administration was pleased since it wanted to get out of the business of 
pouring money into India to prevent an internal collapse (and in the case of the India 
optimists to build it up as a bulwark against China). Along with economic reforms, it 
continued to want to see progress on the Pakistan front. Johnson saw the two aspects as 
linked. He believed that as long as India’s attention and resources remained diverted 
toward Pakistan, it could not become “an indigenous Asian counterweight to China.” 
India-Pakistan tension did not just result in Indian defense resources being spread thin, 
but led to the diversion of funds from development activity towards defense. Since it was 
difficult politically for Indian policymakers to cut defense expenditures, if India at least 
moved to alleviate its Pakistan problem, this could limit that expenditure.93 He, in turn, 
made clear to Ayub that Pakistan’s deepening relations with China made an improvement 
in India-Pakistan relations harder.94 He also asserted to Pakistani officials that Pakistani 
friendship with China at a time that Americans were dying at the hands of Chinese 
supported-insurgents in Vietnam created serious problems for the US-Pakistan 
relationship.95  
After Gandhi had returned to India, reports came in of a sense of “euphoria” there 
about the visit. Rusk felt this needed to be tempered by maintaining some pressure.96 
Otherwise, India might regress in terms of reforms and reconciliation. Thus, the US 
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continued to make clear that it wanted India to decrease defense expenditure, including 
from the Soviet Union.97 To ensure that Indian policymakers translated their promises 
into performance, Rusk also wanted aid to continue to be doled out in phases.98  
However, doling out aid in phases—the preferred means for the US—caused 
problems for Gandhi. Indian officials felt the means were counterproductive to the ends 
Johnson was seeking to achieve since they weakened Gandhi’s hand. Rusk himself had 
earlier warned about the adverse impact the lack of food aid would have on Gandhi’s 
political position in an election year, rendering her unable to make the kind of economic 
reforms that the US wanted.99 Bowles reported that support for the US and the Indian 
government had initially increased after Gandhi’s visit. Since then, however, there had 
been Soviet-sponsored and indigenous left attacks on Gandhi’s government that 
highlighted US conditions and ambitions in India. The ambassador noted that Gandhi was 
defending the US-India relationship, but to sustain her position and policy, the US had to 
be subtler about pressure and deliver on promises.100 
The Downside of Dependence  
If India had not continued to need the US for internal strengthening and external 
protection, Gandhi might have sought to disengage from the US to relieve the domestic 
pressure and acquire some international maneuverability. She was realistic, however, 
about the need for the relationship. Even when she first came to office, she was aware of 
the country’s weaknesses. She realized that weakness meant dependence, which meant 
constraints on Indian action. Publicly, Gandhi might have insisted that India could “do 
without” aid, but she recognized the necessity of that dependence. As Mansingh has 
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noted, the view in the prime minister’s secretariat was that “India’s national interest 
demanded as much support as possible from both superpowers.” In that context, “the 
West could not be ignored.” The US was the only option for the kind of food aid that 
India needed. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had not shown the willingness or ability to 
aid India economically to the same extent.101 Finally, as the Indian foreign secretary 
noted, India was concerned about whether domestic developments in the Soviet Union 
might lead to a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.102 
Since she was aware of India’s dependence, Gandhi tried to be careful not to pick 
fights, verbal or otherwise, with either of India’s major benefactors.103 The day after she 
was elected Gandhi had told Bowles that she wanted to clear up the “gross 
misunderstanding” that she “leaned towards the USSR.” She had said she had “deep 
respect” for the US and “understood the importance of US assistance, and was 
profoundly grateful for what [the US] had done.”104 Directly and through her ambassador, 
Gandhi had asked for economic assistance to be restarted.105 In the lead-up to Gandhi’s 
visit to the US in spring 1966, her close aide P.N. Haksar had told her that the two 
countries needed to get back to “a stable footing.”106 Before her trip, Komer had 
approvingly credited government management with the lack of Indian press allegations 
about US pressure tactics.107 Before and after her trip to Washington, Gandhi had herself 
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been careful not to make critical statements about Vietnam.108 During that trip, she had 
told Johnson that India wanted a “good working partnership” with the US.109 After she 
had returned to India, Gandhi and the food minister had publicly defended US 
assistance.110 
As noted above, Gandhi made commitments when she was in the US, but there 
were limits to the concessions she could make. Like her predecessor, Gandhi knew that a 
certain level of defense expenditure was necessary, even while she recognized that 
development was an important component of national security. Some within and outside 
government argued that defense expenditure could contribute to growth and 
development.111 There were also political costs to appearing weak on this front. The 
critical reason to maintain that level, however, was that India had to meet a dual-front 
threat. While the US administration was more concerned about India’s internal 
vulnerabilities, the Indian government felt the need to ensure a certain level of external 
protection—especially given that there were questions about the reliability of the 
superpowers.  
Thus Gandhi’s planning minister—and subsequently the Indian ambassador—
made clear that there were limits to the concessions India could make on defense 
expenditures: “As long as [the] need to defend against China remains, India will not be 
able to reduce [the] level of its defense expenditures very much…if there should be some 
reduction in Pak defense outlay, India would be willing to match it. Such Indian 
reduction could not however be ‘mixed up’ with need for defense against [the] 
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Chinese.”112 For Indian policymakers, the China threat persisted—alone and in 
conjunction with Pakistan. Furthermore, Beijing’s support for liberation struggles had 
become a major source of concern for India.113 In February 1966, the prime minister had 
spoken of China’s propensity “to stir up trouble wherever it can.”114 India worried about 
this propensity in its northeast, which seemed more vulnerable than before. In spring, a 
Mizo insurgency had broken out. Talks with the Nagas had also stalled and soon there 
were indications that they were seeking Chinese assistance.115  
Even as India’s domestic socioeconomic vulnerabilities created a crucial 
imperative for the US-India partnership, Gandhi’s domestic political vulnerabilities set 
limits to that partnership.116 The precedent of prime ministerial responsibility in foreign 
policy and the lack of interest in the subject among other party leaders had given 
Gandhi’s foreign policymaking space and authority.117 It also allowed the further 
concentration of foreign policy decision-making in the prime minister’s secretariat.118 
That did not, however, mean that in this period others did not have an impact on her 
foreign policy options.119 Gandhi was aware of her own political constraints. As 
Mansingh has noted, she had come to power not because party leaders saw her as a strong 
leader, but because they had hoped and expected her to be a weak and pliable one.120 
Gandhi’s domestic political weakness made her sensitive to accusations that she was 
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yielding to external pressure.121 Even before Gandhi’s visit to the US, Subramanian had 
already been under attack from within the party for the reforms he had agreed to in late 
1965.122 Gandhi had told Rusk that the main question in India about her visit would be 
“have I sold the country?”123 After her visit, she acknowledged Johnson’s understanding 
of her political problem. She also noted that the attacks had already started on her 
government and she only expected them to increase.124 
Gandhi’s sensitivity to accusations of succumbing to pressure grew that summer 
after the devaluation of the rupee, which Tharoor has called a “turning point.”125 It made 
the political downside of dependence very apparent to Gandhi. Years earlier Nehru had 
dismissed as “fantastic nonsense” any suggestion that the rupee would be devalued.126 
However, a number of Indian policymakers had come to believe that it was overvalued. 
As part of the reform process, the US had been pushing for devaluation of the rupee. 
Even toward the end of the Shastri administration, Indian officials had believed that 
further financial assistance from the US and the World Bank consortium was contingent 
on devaluation. After Gandhi had taken office, a cabinet committee had recommended 
devaluation, but it had been put on the backburner because the prime minister had wanted 
to take another look.127 During her visit, India had agreed to devaluation as part of a 
package of reforms that the World Bank had wanted. After her visit, she indeed devalued 
the rupee.  
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Critics—especially but not solely—on the left blamed American pressure.128 
Within Congress, moderate-left nationalist party leaders used it to attack her.129 BK 
Nehru laid out for Johnson the “ugly mood” in India that prevailed because of allegations 
that the government had succumbed to American pressure. Critics targeted not just the 
prime minister but also Subramaniam, BK Nehru, Mehta and finance minister 
Chaudhuri.130 Gandhi later highlighted to Johnson how the “slightest suspicion of 
external pressure, whether from foreign countries or international institutions” resulted in 
domestic political upheaval.131 
BK Nehru was surprised that Gandhi had announced devaluation so far before the 
next World Bank consortium pledge meeting. He noted that it would “be good move only 
if India can “get a lot of money” to make it work prior to elections.”132 Noting the 
opposition to the move in India, National Security Advisor Rostow, too, urged action on 
the US end to help stabilize Gandhi’s position and allow her to undertake further reform. 
Most agencies agreed and Johnson subsequently approved the US commitment to the 
consortium to give Gandhi something to show for her efforts.133 The domestic political 
damage, however, had already been done. 
In India, Gandhi tried to explain that devaluation was necessary for the country 
and that she had no choice.134 She denied that US aid came with strings attached and said 
that there was no harm in getting aid and advice from friends.135 The whole situation, 
however, forced her to be much more aware of the necessity to appear not to give into 
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external pressure. She came to see a political imperative in limiting the dependence that 
India’s strategic imperatives required. She also saw the need to demonstrate that her 
portfolio of partners remained diversified. American assistance was useful, but appearing 
to tilt too far toward it (and away from Moscow) held danger for her political survival 
and her freedom of action at home.136 
Vietnam: Force or Diplomacy? 
The need to correct the appearance of imbalance and alleviate that danger led to a 
move that would exacerbate difficulties in the US-India relationship. In early July there 
were calls on her to do something about Vietnam after the aerial bombings of oil 
installations in Hanoi and Haiphong. Her critics, who had been accusing her of moving 
away from socialism and nonalignment for aid from the US, pointed to her general 
silence on Vietnam as further evidence of this shift.137 Initially Gandhi said, “what can 
we do?” Subsequently, she proposed the immediate convening of a second Geneva 
conference. She did not, however, suggest the cessation of bombing as a pre-condition for 
talks. As a news report commented, she was also “careful to spread the blame for the war 
as evenly as possible.” Her call for the withdrawal of “all foreign forces” was indeed seen 
as an improvement on a previous call for the withdrawal of American forces from 
Vietnam.138 Beijing saw it as biased and rejected the call.139 At home, it gave her critics 
further ammunition.  
Just a few days later, on a visit to the Soviet Union, her contention that an 
American bombing cessation was a precondition for the convening of a conference 
indicated a volte-face on her part. The resulting India-Soviet communiqué also called for 
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the immediate cessation of bombing.140 Furthermore, at a joint event at which she was 
present, Soviet premier Kosygin attacked US “vandalism and barbarism on an 
international scale.”141 When she returned home, following communist pressure, she 
recalled the Indian consul general in Saigon who had publicly explained the US rationale 
for the bombing.142 To some observers the announcement of Moscow’s promise of $1 
billion in credit for India’s fourth five-year plan seemed a lot like a reward for her U-
turn.143 The argument and assessments that on her trip Gandhi did not criticize the US to 
the extent that the Soviet Union wanted did nothing to temper the Johnson 
administration’s adverse reaction.144 
Indian officials had been aware of Johnson’s focus and sensitivities on 
Vietnam.145 Indeed, that was partly why Shastri had been “relatively inactive” on the 
question and why till July 1966 Gandhi was relatively silent as well.146 Just earlier in 
1966, she had tempered her criticism of the US on the issue. The problem she faced was 
that just as Johnson said her statements on Vietnam gave his critics ammunition, her 
critics got ammunition when she seemed to hold back from criticism of the US.147 That 
summer, she had been on the defensive, denying that the quid pro quo for aid from the 
US was a Vietnam policy that was more amenable to Washington.148 By that fall, 
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however, calling for the cessation of American bombing gave her a way to assert her 
independence from the US and take on her critics.149  
The perils of multiple audiences were not lost on Indian policymakers. In 
Washington, in an attempt at damage control, BK Nehru indicated that the communiqué 
was the result of a “staff snafu.” Gandhi, too, realized that the reaction in Washington 
would not be good. She wrote to Johnson, regretting any misunderstanding. She also 
noted that she had subsequently made statements to clarify the Indian position. 
Furthermore, she highlighted the importance of visible nonalignment since that gave her 
the domestic political credibility to carry on the economic reforms that the US wanted. 
Finally, she reiterated that India believed that the best way to deal with the situation in 
Vietnam—and limit Chinese influence there, which was a goal India shared with the 
US—was for the stakeholders to find a solution peacefully.150  
Publicly, an unhappy Johnson indicated, “we can’t talk about just half the war. 
We should talk about all the war, and we have not the slightest indication that the other 
side is willing to make any concession, to take any action that would lead to the peace 
table.”151 Privately, he responded to Gandhi’s assessment that Kosygin shared the US and 
Indian view that the Vietnam solution should be found at the conference table rather than 
the battlefield. He asserted, “The crucial question, of course, remains how this objective 
can be brought about.” If Delhi had the answer, it should work with Hanoi and Moscow 
to get them to yes.152 
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More than other officials, Rusk had hoped for more support for Vietnam policy 
from India because he saw it as serving an Indian interest as well: “thwart[ing] China’s 
ambitions.” He had been frustrated that India would not make any public statements of 
support or common interests with the US—he had believed they were not forthcoming 
because of India’s relationship with the Soviet Union.153 Now he saw downright 
opposition. He was furious and called Gandhi’s shift an “outrageous departure from non-
alignment.” Rusk doubted not just India’s ability but its willingness to stand against 
China, noting “Do you really think that there is one chance in a thousand that India would 
take any action to be a counter-weight to Communist China in Asia unless India itself 
were attacked?”154  
Indian officials did worry about “great Chinese pressure and influence in 
Vietnam” and the consequences of a hasty American withdrawal, albeit privately. Even 
senior officials like TN Kaul, who were not supporters of an American presence in 
Southeast Asia, outlined the Indian concern noting, “Even if the Americans leave, will 
the Chinese leave?”155 Two key differences remained on approach: Delhi believed that 
Washington should make Moscow part of its Vietnam solution and focus on diplomacy 
rather than force. Foreign minister MC Chagla told Rusk “that so far as China was 
concerned there was a coincidence of interests of the Soviet Union, United States and 
India.” When Rusk asked why then India did not support the US position in Vietnam, 
Chagla noted that India was  
against bombing and against the continuation of war in Vietnam because it had 
precisely the opposite effect to that intended. The Vietnam war merely helped 
China and gave her a footing in North Vietnam which, left to themselves, the 
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North Vietnamese would, in the context of their historical relations with the 
Chinese, not permit.156 
Moreover, Indian officials thought the US had exaggerated concerns of a united Vietnam, 
which India thought would most likely help counterbalance China.157 
As fall 1966 progressed, the US felt that public Indian pinpricks continued on this 
front. In October after Gandhi, Nasser and Tito met in Delhi, they issued a communiqué 
repeating the call for bombing to cease without preconditions. They called for the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Vietnam, but also identified the Viet Cong as a 
necessary participant in any negotiations.158 Harriman subsequently reported that Gandhi 
privately also reiterated that the US should agree to a bombing cessation in North 
Vietnam unconditionally.159 
By late spring 1967, Rusk, who had wanted India to play supporter, just wanted 
India to keep out so that it would not play spoiler. His frustration and sensitivity about the 
issue was evident in an “edgy” tirade about a birthday greeting from Gandhi to Ho Chi 
Minh. He asserted, 
those who pretend to be non-aligned should in fact be non-aligned and stay away 
from questions on which they are not prepared to take any serious responsibility. 
Mrs. Gandhi has no constituency in North Viet-Nam and Ho Chi Minh has no 
constituency in India but Mrs. Gandhi surely does have a major constituency 
among the American people and she had better give some thought on how to 
nurse it from time to time. 
He emphasized, “No one is carrying a greater burden in serving one of India's vital 
interests, namely, in organizing a durable peace in Southeast Asia” and warned, “If she 
feels that she must slant her “non-alignment” in favor of the Communist world in order to 
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keep her credentials clear with Moscow, she cannot maintain her credentials with the 
US.”160 
Pakistan: Pressure or Persuasion? 
By the time he would make that statement, India’s credentials with the US would 
already damaged. In late summer and fall 1966, unhappiness with India on its approach to 
Vietnam affected the US view of the approach to take towards Pakistan—specifically on 
the question of whether or not to resume the supply of lethal military equipment to that 
country. Rusk’s frustration with India on Vietnam seemed to translate to an inclination 
towards favoring resumption. Responding to concerns about the potential adverse impact 
on US relations with India. He stated, “I doubt that we should move toward reliance upon 
India as our sole partner in the subcontinent because I do not believe that India would 
accept or play that role.”161 
Initially, there had been little support for a resumption of supply of lethal military 
equipment to either country.162 The senior military leadership was an exception—it 
wanted to resume sales and possibly grants to both India and Pakistan.163 Following 
Gandhi’s statement on Vietnam in July, however, there seemed to be a change in the 
mood in Washington.164 The State Department’s argument became that if the US did not 
resume supply, especially given the level of Indian defense expenditure, Pakistan would 
turn increasingly to China.165 While the administration was still debating the matter, the 
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Washington Post reported in late July that the administration had taken a “guarded first 
step” towards resumption of the supply of spare parts for lethal equipment to Pakistan.166  
This was met with howls of protest in the Indian parliament.167 It also left Indian 
policymakers concerned that the US would make not just their Pakistan problem harder, 
but also their China conundrum. When the subject of possible resumption of military 
supply to Pakistan had come up earlier that summer, senior Indian policymakers had 
asserted that this would only make India-Pakistan rapprochement—a US objective—
harder. They had also highlighted close Sino-Pakistan ties, noting that just as China was 
using North Vietnam as an instrument of its policy, it continued to do the same with 
Pakistan.168 While India, like the US, did not want China and Pakistan to move even 
closer to each other, its policymakers did not think the US resuming the supply of parts 
would prevent this.169 1966 seemed to be the year of Sino-Pakistan friendship. India had 
watched with anxiety as senior Chinese policymakers, including Zhou, as well as 
advisors had visited Pakistan. China seemed to be helping Pakistan re-equip her military, 
with the supply of aircraft and tanks and assistance for new Pakistani divisions.170 India 
also received “hints of nuclear cooperation” following a Pakistani leader’s visit to 
China.171  
Johnson continued to argue that Delhi could help stem further Sino-Pakistan ties 
by improving relations with Islamabad.172 He told BK Nehru that India needed to “do 
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better” on this front.173 Their bilateral talks had stalled, however, with Pakistan insisting 
on a Kashmir solution first.174 The US realized that a Kashmir settlement was unlikely. 
So Rostow and Rusk wanted instead to urge India to negotiate an arms limitation 
agreement with Pakistan and “be prepared to listen to the Paks on Kashmir.” Himself 
upset with Pakistan about its parleying with China, Johnson decided to postpone the spare 
parts supply question and instead approved Rostow and Rusk’s proposal.175 
Food: With Strings or Chains? 
The postponement of the question of military supply should have pleased India. 
At that time, however, India was concerned about the US approach to food supply—this 
approach would make India seriously question US reliability and thus India’s dependence 
on it. With the monsoon failing for a second year in a row in 1966, there was another 
serious food shortage in India.176 In the US, the kind of agricultural surpluses that had 
facilitated (and indeed led to) the PL480 program were no longer available; the wheat 
supply was “very tight.” Nonetheless, Freeman had noted that summer that India had 
“lived up to her commitments” made the previous year and recommended that the US 
should start negotiations on another PL480 agreement to meet the shortfall expected later 
that year.177  
At the end of August the NSC staff had again recommended that Johnson approve 
an agreement.178 However, the president, who seemed to have lost any enthusiasm for 
India because of its performance, priorities and policies, declined to make a decision at 
                                                
173 Memcon of Johnson-BK Nehru Meeting, August 17, 1966, Ibid, p. 715. 
174 Memo from Wriggins to Johnson re Gandhi Letter, August 19, 1966, Ibid, p. 717. 
175 Memo from Rostow to Johnson, September 28, 1966, Ibid, pp. 736-738. 
176 Guha, India After Gandhi, p. 415. 
177 Memo from Freeman to Johnson, July 19, 1966, FRUS 1964-68 Vol. XXV, p. 699. 
178 Memo from Wriggins to Johnson, August 24, 1966, Ibid, p. 723. Also, see Memo from Freeman to 
Johnson re his meeting with Subramaniam in Delhi, July 19, 1966, Ibid, p. 699. 
 416 
that point. In early September, in the context of the upcoming Indian election in early 
spring and a potential gap in food supplies, Rostow urged approval of the agreement, 
after having established that it would not adversely affect domestic US prices.179 Weeks 
later, having received no reply, he warned of the impact on “the high-level Indian’s view 
of our dependability.” He also said an indefinite delay would give Gandhi’s opposition 
ammunition against her.180 Johnson said he wanted to wait, pointing to Freeman’s 
recommendation that the US should do so till the domestic price scene became clearer.181 
A couple of weeks later, Rostow again brought up the reliability issue and noted that the 
“question is whether Mrs. Gandhi can show that US aid pays off or whether her 
opposition makes stick its charge that she's sold India's dignity for a mess of pottage.”182 
Johnson, however, still wanted to hold. 
Rusk explained to Bowles that India had been losing supporters even beyond 
Johnson as a result of its approach on Vietnam. The Gandhi-Nasser-Tito that fall had not 
helped: 
While we must avoid the overt impression of political conditions, the truth is that 
India has a political constituency in the US which it must nourish if it expects 
substantial concessional help. This is simply a political fact of life since the 
President has no resources except those made available by Congress and this in 
turn is affected by the general political atmosphere. I am sure you realize that the 
gratuitous departure of India from a position of non-alignment in Viet-Nam does 
not help at all.183  
By November, however, with the situation in India deteriorating Freeman and he joined 
Rostow in recommending at least the approval of a stopgap amount, while waiting to 
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make a larger commitment till the US had a better sense of the status of Indian 
reforms.184  
Bowles argued that independent observers, including from USAID, had already 
reported that India was performing better than ever and had especially made real progress 
on the agricultural front.185 The even tighter short tether had opened the Indian 
government to attack domestically; it was also counterproductive because it made it 
harder to plan economically for the long term. Bowles pointed out another problem: 
further delays would likely be evident in India through food shortages just before the 
Indian elections.186 
Upset about the Gandhi-Nasser-Tito statement, Johnson, however, pointed out 
that India did not seem to be concerned about “kicking us” before the US election.” He 
said he was going to take his time till Congress came on board. He instructed that a study 
group be sent to India to gauge its performance.187 Even after Freeman reported the study 
group’s positive assessment, however, Johnson stated that—because of budget pressure, 
domestic needs and costs of Vietnam—he did not want to go further than one-quarter of 
what Freeman was recommending without Congressional buy-in.188 
In India, aware of the socioeconomic and political implications of the intensifying 
food crisis, the prime minister instructed her officials to “avoid confrontation or debate” 
with the US on minor matters.189 Her government also cautioned the North Vietnamese 
representative in India against issuing a press release criticizing the US.190 There had 
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already been reports that Gandhi had tempered the nonaligned communiqué’s language, 
eliminating Nasser’s condemnation of the US.191 
Indian policymakers became increasingly upset with the US, however, as Johnson 
seemed to keep moving the goal posts. The situation was deteriorating so much that in 
desperation officials proposed purchasing grain from the US despite their constrained 
resources.192 The Indian government was under attack at home with even an 
establishment newspaper stating that “The Grimmest Situation in 19 Years” was the 
Congress party’s fault.193 Perhaps to divert criticism from the government, Gandhi 
publicly noted that November that there was a delay in US shipments. Denying that India 
was undertaking insufficient reforms, she said the delay meant that the country had to 
look elsewhere and might have to tighten food rations.194 While she did not identify 
India’s Vietnam policy as a reason for the delay, leaks from Washington were suggesting 
that issue as Johnson’s motivation.195 Internally, Subramaniam was losing patience. He 
asserted that he had contingency plans, but the US needed to make up its mind.”196 The 
Indian foreign minister also told Rusk that the US food policy was causing resentment in 
India.197 
Johnson told Rostow to tell the Indian ambassador that he could “make no 
commitment now but the Indians should keep quiet and have some faith.”198 A 
congressional delegation travelled to India and on its return noted that it had been 
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“impressed by the magnitude of economic progress, especially in agriculture, by the 
severity of the drought in northern India, and by the awesome prospect of human 
suffering which is certain to follow if no help is forthcoming.” It recommended that the 
US send India 1.8 million tons of food for its expected demand in February, March and 
April. Eventually, two and a half months after the Rostow memo, in late December 
Johnson approved a proposal but only for half that amount, which he thought could meet 
India’s requirements through February. Eventually, he decided that in a speech just 
before the Indian elections he would announce a commitment of 1 million tons of 
grain.199 Keeping in mind the US political calendar, he stated that then in February 
Congress could discuss and approve further aid.200 Sen. Jack Miller (R-IA), who had been 
part of the delegation that visited India, kept in mind the Indian elections and suggested 
that all hearings be delayed till after the Indian election.201 
Thinking about the Indian political calendar—especially the elections—Indian 
policymakers lamented that the approved amount was “politically dangerous.”202 US 
policy toward India did indeed open Gandhi up to criticism during the election campaign 
and put her on the defensive. In January, when the government agreed to further 
restrictions on trade with Cuba and North Vietnam because US legislation required it, 
critics alleged that Gandhi had accepted “humiliating conditions.” Krishna Menon 
accused her of continuously giving in to pressure and asserted, “This rot must stop.” 
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After initially trying to explain her policy on the basis of pragmatism—noting that India’s 
choice was to accept the conditions or refuse the food—she subsequently turned to 
denying that she was succumbing to pressure, asserting, “We would rather starve than 
sell our national honour.”203 
DISENGAGEMENT (SPRING 1967-WINTER 1968) 
Losing Traction  
On the basis of the Indian reaction, the possible adverse impact on the Indian 
election and economic reforms, support from other countries, Johnson eventually 
approved 2 million tons for an interim allocation as recommended by various officials. 
He also recommended in a message to Congress further aid to India and urged the 
multilateralizing food aid.204  
In early 1967, Rostow noted that Johnson’s approach on food aid had been 
“popular at home” and “educational abroad.”205 It certainly was educational to India, but 
not in a good way. The experience shook up Gandhi, as did the Indian election results 
that March. An American intelligence estimate in late 1964 had expected Congress to 
retain its dominant position.206 The party indeed remained in power following the 
elections, but it suffered a serious setback, with Gandhi acknowledging the results as 
“very bad.”207 The party went from having 73 percent of the seats in the Lok Sabha to 55 
percent—the first time its tally had gone below 70 percent. In the state assemblies, 
                                                
203 Lukas, “Indians to Limit Trade with Reds,” NYT, January 23, 1967, p. 1. 
204 Memo from Eugene Rostow to Katzenbach (Acting S/S), January 27, 1967, FRUS 1964-68 Vol. XXV, 
pp. 812-815. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts, February 2, 1967, FRUS 
1964-68 Vol. XXV, p. 817. 
205 Memo from Rostow to Johnson, January 2, 1967, Ibid, p. 790. 
206 NIE 31-64: The Prospects for India, December 10, 1964, Ibid, p. 168. 
207 “Setback in India,” NYT, February 27, 1967, p. 34. 
 421 
Congress went from holding 61 percent of the seats to 49 percent.208 Food shortages and 
economic stagnation were seen as key factors leading to the setbacks.209  
Adding to the government’s challenges was the fact that the China threat 
remained. Publicly, the foreign minister stressed that it was “a great menace to India and 
to all Southeast Asian countries.”210 Privately, the policy planning chief concurred, noting 
that, whatever the internal changes in China, “As far as India is concerned, the attitude 
remains the same – of hostility and promotion of dislocation and chaos.”211 Most 
policymakers did not think China would engage in a full-scale war with India, but did 
expect Chinese pressure on the border, occasional intrusions and border skirmishes, as 
well as—most significantly—subversion.212 
Concern about subversion increased with the growing sense of the government’s 
political vulnerability. The elections had made this vulnerability evident. Through those 
elections, the communist party of India (Marxist), the more ideological offshoot of the 
communist party, had also come to power in coalitions in Kerala and West Bengal.213 
Overall, the results were seen as a reflection of the electorate’s disillusionment with the 
Congress party and especially its ability to deliver the goods.214 The outbreak of a Maoist 
insurgency in Andhra Pradesh and the Naxalite movement in West Bengal that spring 
only increased the sense of vulnerability to any Chinese efforts at subversion. Radio 
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Peking’s declaration in support of the Naxalites and description of them as inspired by 
Mao in June 1967 did nothing to ease concerns.215  
Policymakers’ belief that the “stagnant” economic climate and the “critical” food 
situation made India more susceptible to Chinese subversion made maintaining the 
relationship with the US crucial.216 The Indian government tried to find out if and to what 
extent the US was willing and able to support India.217 Policymakers were aware that 
American agricultural surpluses were drying up.218 Indian officials worried that this, 
along with Johnson’s insistence on matching food aid commitments from other countries, 
suggested the beginning of the end of food aid from the US.219 Gandhi acknowledged, 
“the whole concept of food aid has changed.” Rusk had already indicated to Chagla that 
the American “tradition” of giving food assistance was “coming to an end;” the US 
would now expect payment. Gandhi, however, noted to political leaders that India did not 
have the foreign exchange to purchase enough grain from abroad; as it is, India had to 
divert resources from crucial sectors like defense towards purchasing food. Thus India 
needed to focus even more on developing “self-help measures and to mobilizing our 
internal resources so as to be less dependent on foreign aid.”220   
That would take time, however, so Gandhi defended the continuing resort to food 
aid from the US, noting that India had no other choice. The Soviet Union, after all, had 
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not been forthcoming about food aid.221 Furthermore, overall, the Soviet option had 
hardly been unproblematic—and definitely not an option that India could rely upon 
alone. There were concerns about whether a leadership change in Beijing might lead to a 
Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Indian officials also watched with concern Soviet efforts “to 
become increasingly friendly towards Pakistan, to reduce that country’s dependence on 
both the USA and China.” The best the foreign minister could seem to say about India-
Soviet relations was that they “had not deteriorated.”222  
Gandhi and Chagla believed that it was a critical time for the US-India 
relationship.223 The government recognized that India continued to need the US to 
alleviate these problems, but this recognition was now combined with the realization that 
the circumstances were changing in the US. So Indian officials tried to ensure that India 
retained some importance to the US. Indian policymakers were aware of changes in the 
way the US perceived India. They knew that US policymakers were questioning India’s 
value and capacity. Aware of the repercussions for India if the US lost interest, they 
continued to try to “sell” India vis-à-vis China. When Rusk, pointing out that the US had 
invested heavily in India’s success asked what India had done for the US lately, the 
foreign minister responded that “by standing firm against China [India was] contributing 
towards countering [the] Chinese menace and thus helping in the containment of China 
which was also the United States aim.”224 Publicly, too, the foreign minister reiterated, “It 
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was in the interest of the United States to keep India strong, for if India goes under then 
the lights of democracy will go out in the whole of Asia.”225  
The recognition of the China-India connection in the US also made Indian 
officials aware that a change in America’s policy toward China could also have an impact 
on India’s role in the US framework. At a foreign ministry meeting, the foreign minister 
noted the increasing sentiment in American business circles to do business with China. 
He said that China, on its part, might be motivated toward “getting closer” to the US 
because of its deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union. The foreign secretary 
conveyed Japanese reports that Chinese officials had indicated that they wanted to seek a 
rapprochement with the US. He thought that once the Vietnam war was over, a 
rapprochement would be much more likely. The policy planning chief was skeptical, 
noting that China might hesitate because any rapprochement with the US would 
“completely destroy the ideological claim and pretentions of China.” Even if there was a 
rapprochement, he did not think that it would necessarily mean a Sino-US gang-up 
against the Soviet Union or India. The foreign minister, however, agreed with another 
senior official who said that any rapprochement would have “serious repercussions” in 
Asia and that India had “to carefully watch trends in this regard.”226 
Losing Interest  
The US, on the other hand, was watching India less and less. For Johnson, whose 
focus remained on Vietnam, India was not being helpful and thus was becoming less 
critical for the US. Furthermore, the country looked like it would at least not fail. Thus, 
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over the last two years of his administration, India slipped down the priority list. 
Disillusionment started leading to disinterest and disengagement.  
In the case of food and economic aid, on the basis of congressional approval and a 
World Bank assessment that India was keeping up its end of the bargain on reforms,227 
the administration had agreed to multilateral economic and food assistance plans that 
spring.228 Later that year, Rostow laid out the case for further food assistance and thus the 
relationship with the Indian government. As he considered the request, Johnson’s desire 
for disengagement was evident in his response that his advisors get him “someone to 
argue the other side please.”229 He subsequently asserted, “it would appeal to him if some 
other nation would recognize their responsibilities in this nation, even the Russians.”230 
By the next summer, Congress was appropriating less funds for India than it had for 
about a decade.231 
By summer 1967, US officials believed that Indian defense preparations also 
seemed good enough. An intelligence assessment noted that India was not just likely to 
be able to win any war with Pakistan, but  
could also probably repel a Chinese attack before it could reach the Indian plains. 
We believe that India's armed forces would be able to prevent a major 
breakthrough by combined Chinese-Pakistani forces equipped with conventional 
weapons, though they might have to yield ground in Ladakh and northeastern 
India. 
This assessment contributed to the sense that the level of India’s defense expenditure 
could be curtailed if not cut.232 It had also contributed to the finding of a review earlier 
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that year of military supply to South Asia that the US did not need to resume military 
supply in any major way to India. In April 1967, the administration had outlined a new 
policy designed to “restrain military expenditures…and to encourage highest priority 
allocation of resources to agricultural and economic development.” The policy restarted a 
program to train some Indian and Pakistani officers, and opened up on a case-by-case 
basis the sales of spare parts for US-supplied equipment, but, overall, it signaled the US 
desire to disengage more generally. It withdrew the US military advisory groups in India 
and Pakistan, banned the sale of lethal equipment, limited credit sales, and required 
approval of third-country sales of equipment covered by US controls. The US would 
finish funding the ground radar system on the Sino-Indian border, because it directly 
“contribute[d] to US security interests.” Overall, however, Rusk said, “We are in fact 
reverting to a military relationship with both countries similar to the one we had in the 
fifties with India (when it was on friendly terms with Communist China and the Soviet 
Union).”233  
By 1968, when there was reconsideration of military supply policy, India no 
longer seemed likely to fall on Johnson’s watch. Thus, while US officials acknowledged 
that there was “a case for loosening up our military supply policy, especially within the 
context of the China-India relationship,” there was a sense that “in terms of Indian 
defense, the need does not now seem compelling.”234 
The administration had also continued to believe that India could alleviate the 
“more immediate threat of military pressure from China” by improving relations with 
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Pakistan. After having made some effort earlier that year to get India and Pakistan to 
reach an arms limitation agreement, however, the US seemed to disengage even on this 
front. While “Indo-Pak reconciliation remain[ed] an important U.S. goal,” the 
administration concluded that  
Experience has shown, however, that our resources and influence operate at 
maximum disadvantage when directed toward goal of reconciliation; in fact good 
historical case can be made that under present circumstances we cannot bring 
about reconciliation no matter how hard we try. It follows that our efforts should 
usually be directed more toward strengthening our bilateral relations with each 
country than toward bringing them together… 
This, of course, meant maintaining a relationship with Pakistan as well, which might 
irritate India. While India might think the US-Pakistan relationship exacerbated its China 
problem, the US believed it helped limit India’s China problem. Thus, Rusk asserted that 
Delhi should realize that it was in neither American nor Indian interests for the US to 
cede the ground in Pakistan entirely to China.235 
Reducing Dependence  
India needed less external help than before. In the arena of food grains, after 1967 
“the new agricultural strategy had begun paying dividends,” assisted by the weather.236 
The government was also better able to purchasing food grains commercially. On the 
security front, a creditable performance by the Indian military in skirmishes with Chinese 
troops in 1967 buoyed the government’s confidence. Domestically, after mid-1967 
Gandhi started moving towards the left—for her own pragmatic reasons, as well as 
inspired by her advisors’ principled ones—and continued to do so over the next few years 
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to strengthen her weak position.237 Despite these changes, however, India continued to 
need—and therefore seek—some international assistance and support.  
But, given the changing US attitude, Gandhi’s government realized that it could 
not afford to rely in the medium-to-long term, or perhaps even in the short-term, on the 
US to help India with its China problem. This led to Indian efforts on a number of 
different fronts.  First, India continued to develop its domestic capacity in both the 
defense and development realms.238 Second, in order to continue to diversify its 
dependence, the Indian government maintained its relationship with the Soviet Union. 
Third, India tried to develop a Look East policy. Fourth, it kept its nuclear option open. 
Finally, it contemplated a rapprochement with China. Not all these efforts met with 
success and some led to friction with the US, but India would persisted on all these 
fronts—as well as the US one—for the next few years. 
The Soviet Option 
India was grateful for the Soviet option. The Soviet Union continued to give India 
economic assistance; between 1955 and 1968, it provided $1.4 billion worth of credit to 
India. Furthermore, it was India’s second largest trading partner. On the military side, 
Indian defense officials considered the Soviet Union to be more liberal with assistance to 
building India’s indigenous defense production capacity and its navy. In May 1968, 
Moscow would also complete an agreement with Delhi to sell India a hundred Sukhoi 
aircraft.239  
Nevertheless, this relationship had its problems too. The Indian government 
resented Soviet criticism. In 1966-1967, the Soviet Union criticized India’s ties to the US 
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and the composition of the Indian government.240 It also critiqued India’s economic 
performance.241 From the Indian perspective, there were problems related to bilateral 
trade, as well as a number of Soviet industrial projects.242 There were also complaints in 
the defense ministry that the Soviet Union seemed to be delaying the supply military 
spare parts.243 
What really stung, however, were Soviet-Pakistan relations. While Sino-Soviet 
relations remained strained, Moscow’s relationship with Islamabad kept getting closer. 
The Soviet Union signed economic assistance agreements with Pakistan in 1966, 1967 
and 1968.244 In fall 1967, Indian officials reacted negatively to the Soviet suggestion that 
India, as the larger country and given the domestic situation in Pakistan, should be more 
accommodating to Pakistan—Haksar said this was Soviet “pandering” to Pakistan.245 
Then, Moscow welcomed Ayub Khan and the Pakistani leader subsequently indicated 
that Soviet leaders had promised him economic aid till 1975.246 It was his rumored 
discussions about arms supply, however, that caused concern in India.247 
In spring 1968, Kosygin, on the first visit by a Soviet premier to Pakistan, pledged 
economic assistance, as well as the construction of a nuclear power plant.248 He also 
agreed to sell military equipment to that country. In India, there were rumors about the 
latter agreement. There were also reports of potential Soviet aid for the construction of a 
naval base in Pakistan—the quid pro quo for the Pakistani announcement a few days 
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before that it was not going to renew the US lease for the Badabar base near Peshawar. A 
few weeks after Kosygin’s visit, Soviet navy vessels visited Pakistan.249 Then a few 
months later, in early July, a senior Pakistani military delegation travelled to Moscow.250 
Delhi soon received news from Moscow that the delegation was there to negotiate a 
defense deal, which was subsequently completed. Gandhi expressed to Kosygin her 
concern that the Soviet tie was making Pakistan more intransigent. She linked recent 
hostile statements made by the Pakistani president and foreign minister to Islamabad’s 
developing relationship with Moscow. Furthermore, she worried about Kosygin trusting 
Pakistan’s assessments of India-Pakistan dynamics over those of India. Implying that 
Moscow should not try to play third party, she suggested that it use its “growing 
influence” with Pakistan to encourage them to talk directly to India.251  
Internally, Haksar expressed a more serious Indian concern stemming from the 
Soviet “erroneous and misguided” decision. He worried that the Soviet decision raised 
questions about Soviet reliability and thus it had implications for India-Soviet relations 
more generally. Furthermore, it also strengthened domestic critics of the India-Soviet 
relationship and of nonalignment.252 Moscow’s explanation—which sounded a lot like 
Washington’s previous ones—that improving relations with Islamabad allowed it to 
undercut Sino-Pakistan ties was not very reassuring.253 Gandhi was unhappy enough that 
she considered asking Moscow to cease military supply to both India and Pakistan. 
Defense ministry officials would scotch this idea.254 Continuing Soviet pressure to talk to 
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Pakistan about Kashmir, however, only increased the Indian unhappiness about “diluted” 
support from Moscow.255  
Gandhi stated publicly that the Soviet plan was “fraught with danger.” Given the 
American experience with Pakistan, she doubted that any Soviet assurances about 
restrictions on the use of the supplied weapons would help.256 In parliament, Gandhi 
acknowledged that she shared the country’s “unease and anxiety,” which had people 
protesting against the Soviet Union in the streets. She saw Pakistan’s overtures to 
Moscow as designed to limit Soviet arms supply to India. She said that Soviet supply to 
Pakistan would add to regional instability and increase India’s defense burden.257 An 
observer commented that the development had clearly shaken up the leadership and 
“Indians were probably doing more rethinking last week of their place in the world than 
at any time” since the 1962 war.258 
Nonetheless, India had little choice but to maintain the Soviet option. So Gandhi 
and other government officials tried to calm sentiments. When some cabinet members 
wanted to cancel the Indian president’s scheduled state visit to Moscow in protest, others 
like defense minister Swaran Singh and finance minister Moraji Desai calmed them 
down.259 Gandhi also tempered her public criticism of the Soviet-Pakistan relationship.260  
When Soviet troops undertook a crackdown in Czechoslovakia that summer, the 
anti-Soviet sentiment in India only deepened, but, overall, the government avoided any 
harsh criticism of the invasion. Public opposition in India was vocal. There was also 
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opposition to the government attitude in the cabinet and party. A non-official resolution 
in the Lok Sabha expressed the country’s “support and sympathy” for the Czech people. 
A cabinet minister even resigned over the issue. However, as Tharoor has noted, Gandhi 
controlled her pronouncements on the subject so as not to upset Moscow. Her foreign 
minister supported this approach and, at the UN, India abstained from voting on a 
resolution condemning the invasion because the wording could not be changed from 
“condemn” to “deplore.”261 
The Look East Option  
Overall, however, with one benefactor losing interest in India, and the other 
showing a bit too much interest in Pakistan, Indian policymakers saw the writing on the 
wall. They continued to seek to decrease their dependence on the superpowers to the 
extent possible. This meant looking at other potential partners more closely. There had 
been criticism that India had not been doing enough in Southeast Asia, especially given 
that it shared the Chinese challenge with many countries in the region. Observers then 
and later criticized Gandhi’s “abdication of responsibility in Asia.” In 1966, Lee Kwan 
Yew complained that he had tried to get Gandhi interested in an “Asian regional 
arrangement to contain China.” Her lack of interest, however, caused him to comment 
that she and her advisers resided in a “dream world.” India had indeed been skeptical of 
regional organizations or coordination. It had previously demurred from joining ASEA in 
1961, the Maphilindo confederation in 1963 and 17-nation conference on regional 
economic cooperation in April 1965. Subsequently, it did not join the nine-nation Asian 
and Pacific ministers’ conference in June 1966 or the October 1966 conference on 
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Vietnam in Manila and then it went back on a decision to participate in the 1968 Jakarta 
conference.262   
After 1967, however, the Indian government did attempt to look east to a greater 
degree. Indian policymakers exchanged visits with Southeast Asian leaders and even 
gave aid to countries like Indonesia.263 This policy was based on the feeling that almost 
all the countries on China’s periphery shared India’s assessment of the Chinese threat. 
Chagla told foreign ministry officials that India could “play a big role in South East Asia 
towards the containment of China.”264 Unlike some others in the foreign ministry,265 he 
preferred enhancing bilateral economic and cultural ties between India and the various 
countries of South East Asia. He believed that if India proposed regional cooperation, the 
small countries might see this as an Indian attempt to seek dominance in the region.266 
Furthermore, he ruled out the idea of forming an anti-China political or military regional 
group since “military pacts…create more problems and complications.”267 Instead, he 
believed that the countries should focus on building their own and each other’s economic 
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strength because “only an economically strong and viable South East Asia…will be able 
to contain China and ward off its expansionist threat.” He believed such strengthening 
should be done in coordination with—or at least with the knowledge of—Japan, the 
Soviet Union and the US.268 
Finance Minister Desai also acknowledged that India needed to improve relations 
with countries in the Asia-Pacific more broadly.269 Gandhi herself travelled to Australia, 
New Zealand and Southeast Asia in 1968 in an effort to improve contacts with those 
countries.270 This effort would continue, as would complaints that India was not doing 
enough. Internal differences about whether to pursue a bilateral or a multilateral 
approach, as well as limited resources and capacity, however, seemed to play a role in 
limiting India’s efforts and success on this front. 
The Nuclear Option 
Thus far, limited resources had also played a role in limiting the Indian 
government’s desire to exercise its nuclear option. Many in the US had also not wanted 
India to acquire an independent nuclear weapons capability for this reason. When a 
Chinese nuclear test had seemed imminent in fall 1964, in order to deter India from going 
nuclear and investing heavily in conventional arms Bowles had proposed to Indian 
officials that they consider seeking an American nuclear umbrella. Bowles had also 
suggested to US officials that Washington play up the Chinese nuclear threat to gain 
leverage with India. Others such as McCone, however, had not wanted to highlight it lest 
it push India towards a nuclear weapons program.271  
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After China had tested on October 16 that year, the Indian ambassador had noted 
the immense pressure on the Indian government to nuclearize because of the relative fall 
in India’s power, as well as the “psychological advantage” China had attained. He had 
added, however, that the government had decided not to pursue a program. He warned 
that eventually it might not be able to resist the pressure.272  
The US had wanted to discourage an Indian program on economic and security 
grounds.273 There was a debate on what it might take to keep India from nuclearizing. An 
intelligence estimate had laid out three key factors that would likely play into any Indian 
decision to go for the bomb: cost, developments in the Chinese program and its impact on 
Chinese behavior, and “the importance the Indians attach to assurances from the US and 
other nuclear powers.”274 
One immediate impact of the Chinese program had been Indian concern about the 
rise in Chinese status with the nuclear test.275 On this, the US had been willing to 
consider taking steps to alleviate India’s “prestige problem.”276 Indian officials like Homi 
Bhabha, head of the Indian department of atomic energy, had indeed stressed that the US 
needed to take action to help highlight India’s other achievements in science and 
technology.277 Furthermore, to give India a realistic estimate of the Chinese nuclear 
threat, the US had shared information with India on the Chinese program.278 Finally, the 
US ambassador had made clear to the Indian atomic energy chief that he had 
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underestimated the costs—and perhaps even the time—of producing an Indian bomb by 
at least two-thirds.279 Bowles had hoped that this would contribute to the Indian 
leadership’s own concerns about costs that had been a deterrent in the past.280 
At that stage, however, the US had not wanted to provide more than a general 
non-specific assurance.281 In the aftermath of the test, Johnson had given a speech 
indicating American support for countries subjected to nuclear coercion or attack. The 
joint chiefs and the secretary of defense had agreed that the US should give “general 
assurances” to those threatened by the Chinese but, worried about their facilities in 
Pakistan, they had asserted that any specific talks with India should keep in mind the goal 
of not alienating Pakistan.282 A more overarching concern had been that any specific 
assurance would tie US hands. 
India had a dilemma on this front. On the one hand, the assurance contained in 
Johnson’s speech was too implicit to be considered reliable. The Indian ambassador had 
noted his skepticism of the reliability of such an informal assurance, especially in the 
absence of a formal US-India tie. He had noted his belief that “the United States would 
not come to our aid by attacking China if at the same time the Soviet Union said that it 
would assist China under such an attack."283 On the other hand, however, India had little 
desire to pursue an explicit assurance that would require it to make a binding 
commitment to the US. Shastri had made clear that India could not join a military 
alliance.284  
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That did not, however, mean that India had not wanted any assurance. Shastri had 
told British Prime Minister Harold Wilson to let the Johnson administration know that the 
only alternative to an Indian nuclear program that he perceived was a nuclear umbrella 
supplied by the nuclear powers, including the Soviet Union.285 Publicly, as well, he had 
urged that the nuclear powers find a way to assure nonnuclear nations about their security 
against a nuclear attack.286 He had reiterated in spring 1965 that the superpowers, at least, 
should guarantee the safety of nonnuclear states. He did not ask for an assurance just for 
India, asserting that it would be “unwise.”287 A general guarantee would not burden India 
with the appearance of having joined an alliance. Furthermore, a joint guarantee would 
not require India to tilt, would not provoke the Soviet Union or drive it back toward 
China, and, furthermore, would be a hedge against the uncertain reliability of one 
guarantor.  
Meanwhile, the US had received reports that the Indian cabinet had given Bhabha 
the go-ahead for the first stage of producing a nuclear weapon and would review the 
situation after a year. US officials had worried that India had been leaking such 
information in order to elicit a guarantee from the US.  Swaran Singh, however, had told 
Bowles that the prime minister’s position remained the same—India was not developing 
nuclear weapons—and India would let the US know if anything changed.288  
By spring 1965, however, US intelligence analysts had asserted that if India did 
not have an international security guarantee in this realm, it was more than likely that 
India would go nuclear.289 However, in Washington, concerns about giving India such a 
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guarantee, alone or with others remained. Ambassador-at-large Llewellyn Thompson had 
been concerned that Bowles had been indicating to Indian officials that the US was 
willing to offer India a specific guarantee.  He and others had reservations about such a 
guarantee, especially a joint one with the Soviet Union.290 Bowles had wanted 
Washington to think, at least, about “parallel action” with Moscow.291 Thompson had 
suggested offering some other kind of assurance, but something that kept “freedom of 
action” in US hands.292  
That attitude and the implication about US reliability, however, was another 
reason that India had little desire to pursue a guarantee solely from the US. The 1965 war 
did little to alleviate concerns about the reliability of external benefactors. At the onset of 
the war Rusk had indeed predicted, “if the Chicoms get involved or this conflict runs its 
present course…India, feeling let down by the West and its national prestige at stake, 
would almost certainly go for the nuclear bomb.”293US intelligence assessment indicated 
that the war had indeed strengthened the hands of the advocates of a nuclear weapons 
program. However, it had also strengthened Shastri, who did not want to nuclearize and 
his greater domestic political strength had allowed him to hold off these calls. 
Nonetheless, the assessment expected the policy to change and predicted, “within the 
next few years India probably will detonate a nuclear device and proceed to develop 
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nuclear weapons.”294 There was little expectation that India would give up its nuclear 
option.295 
“Keeping the Indians away from nuclear weapons,” however, remained a basic 
US interest.296 Rusk noted to Johnson that to be able to “head off” an Indian nuclear 
weapons program, the US would have to  
be more responsive to Indian security needs, preferably in some way that will 
minimize our own commitment. However, we must recognize that this response 
would almost certainly involve an increased and more specific US commitment in 
the subcontinent and would entail important costs in terms of probable reactions 
of other states. 
Rusk recommended against giving India a bilateral nuclear assurance at that time. He 
noted, however, that Johnson could tell Gandhi that  
if a growing Chinese Communist nuclear capability should ever pose a serious 
threat to India, you hope she would frankly discuss the question with us so that we 
could examine together possible means to meet that threat without nuclear 
proliferation and without Indian assumption of the heavy economic and other 
burdens of a nuclear weapons program.  
He could also offer to continue to share intelligence with her government on Chinese 
capabilities and remind her that the US was talking with the Soviet Union about how to 
ensure the security of non-nuclear weapons states.297 
On her trip to the US, Gandhi asserted that India did not want to produce nuclear 
weapons. Her close aide, LK Jha, however, added that without another option ensuring 
non-nuclear states’ security, this decision—already under attack in India—would not be 
politically sustainable. Rusk noted that some sort of joint US-Soviet action vis-à-vis the 
security of non-nuclear states was not “inconceivable,” but there was little interest in 
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Moscow even to talk about the subject. He suggested that the other option that could be 
considered was joint US-UK action, but that would probably require an alliance. The 
Indian foreign secretary confirmed that India did not want an alliance and that, as Shastri 
had previously mentioned, India did not want just a US-UK guarantee.298 
Indian officials were concerned that while China loomed large for Delhi, 
differences among the superpowers on obligations that a non-proliferation treaty would 
require of them in terms of cuts and verification were sidetracking the question of 
security of non-nuclear states.299 This concern only increased after another Chinese 
nuclear test in summer 1966. Gandhi laid out for Johnson the domestic calls in India for a 
nuclear weapons program and that “each fresh report of China's activity in this regard 
strengthens this demand and attracts new adherents to it.”300 
At a NSC meeting after the test, Johnson expressed concern about the political 
pressure on the Indian government to nuclearize. He believed it would negatively affect 
India’s economy and Asian stability. Participants considered various options to prevent 
an Indian nuclear weapons program, including economic pressure, a US-Soviet arms 
control agreement that could decrease the Indian need to get a bomb, or bilateral or 
multilateral security guarantees to India. Vice president Humphrey suggested UN 
assurances combined with private US assurances—that would mean the Soviet Union 
could join if it wanted to; India would not feel pressured publicly to attach itself to the 
US; and the Soviet Union would not have to object. There was little consensus on what 
route to take. Rostow noted that the US needed to “to buy time until the Indians came to 
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accept the necessity for Western assistance.”301 Johnson subsequently approved the 
further exploration of alternative courses of action.302 
That examination, however, came up with no answer, noting “we have been 
unable to devise anything dramatic which would not cost us more than any anticipated 
gain.” It recommended only further study while the US generated broader non-
proliferation steps.303 In the meantime, a State Department paper recommended sharing 
intelligence on the Chinese nuclear program with India, especially highlighting its 
deficiencies. Furthermore, it suggested emphasizing to Indian officials the costs of a 
nuclear weapons program, while simultaneously working with them to find ways to 
increase Indian prestige. It also recommended consideration of ways to link economic 
assistance to an Indian pledge not to go nuclear. In addition, the paper suggested working 
with Moscow to generate UN assurances to non-nuclear weapons states and come up 
with an arms control agreements. Simultaneously, however, the paper called for further 
studies on how to credibly assure India, what action to take in case of a Chinese nuclear 
threat to India, and what to do if India went nuclear.304 
India, on its part, continued to look for an assurance. One option considered by 
officials in spring 1967 was to get a declaration in association with a potential nuclear 
non-proliferation treaty (NPT). On a multi-country visit to explore the question Jha noted 
to Rostow that he had elicited Soviet agreement to such a declaration, which could be 
made in parallel with an American announcement when the NPT was signed. It would 
state that if non-nuclear signatories were at the receiving end of a nuclear threat or attack, 
the nuclear states would have a responsibility to act through the UNSC; furthermore, that 
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nuclear states would be allowed to act on this assurance without a prior UNSC vote. Jha 
wanted to gauge US interest in exploring with the Soviet Union the question of making 
such a parallel declaration.305 
Rostow called the option a “real breakthrough.” Johnson, however, merely told 
Jha that the draft of the potential Soviet declaration was “very interesting” and the US 
would study it. Subsequently, Rusk discussed it with Soviet foreign minister Gromyko in 
late June. He mentioned his concern that India seemed to be moving away from linking 
an assurance with the NPT. Gromyko assured him that for Moscow the two remained 
linked; something it had made clear to India. Rusk also laid out the problem from the US 
perspective: needing Senate ratification for any unilateral nuclear assurance. He believed 
it would be easiest to make an assurance through a UNSC resolution. Gromyko, however, 
noted, that India wanted a more “definite” assurance than a UN Charter-based 
assurance.306 
The government of India wanted an assurance from both superpowers not just to 
limit criticism at home that it was renouncing non-alignment, but as insurance against a 
change in either superpower’s relations with China. Concern about the impact of 
potential changes in attitude towards China, along with Johnson’s short-tether policy, the 
US response during the 1965 war, and deepening Soviet-Pakistan relations had reinforced 
the Indian sense that the country needed to have multiple friends rather than to rely on 
only one bloc.  
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Indian policymakers were realistic about the chances of getting a legal—as 
opposed to political—commitment from both countries, especially because the 
government was pushing for an assurance that covered non-nuclear states. It wanted such 
a guarantee for deterrence, to ensure that Washington knew where Moscow stood and 
vice versa, as well as to reassure its own public. In an internal memo, Jha also laid out 
why he thought such a legal commitment was unnecessary: “guarantee or no guarantee,” 
if there was a “Chinese attack on India in the near future, both the USA and the USSR 
would undoubtedly take the strongest possible action.” He said that this was also a reason 
India did not have to go nuclear. Furthermore, if India produced nuclear weapons, it 
would “greatly reduce the restraint on China using nuclear weapons against us and also 
weaken the political compulsions on the USA and the USSR to come to our help in such 
an eventuality.” In any case, India could not catch up with China. 
Jha, himself, however also noted that an assumption that Moscow and 
Washington would come to India’s assistance versus China meant “living dangerously.” 
India needed to “recognise that conditions may change.” Even if there was a guarantee, it 
would hardly be “fool-proof, because if the political factors are unfavourable, some 
excuse can always be found to delay action, to act half-heartedly and ineffectively, or not 
to act at all.”307 Doubts about reliability of external benefactors meant that even a 
guarantee “could be no substitute for its own defence. The implementation of such a 
guarantee, when the time arose, would necessarily depend on prevailing political 
circumstances.”308  
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Thus, for others such as the foreign minister questions about reliability meant that 
India needed to keep its nuclear option open. As Chagla said “We do not know what the 
alignments of power might be after four or five years.”309 To Indian officials this was also 
a reason not to sign the NPT, even if Moscow linked any guarantee to Indian 
participation in the NPT.310 The mood in India subsequently seemed to sour on both the 
NPT and an assurance. Critics stated that the government had not thought through the 
guarantee and what it would entail, including, potentially, military bases. Others 
questioned the reliability, criticizing the government for seeking “a nuclear umbrella 
without a handle.”311By the time the Indian deputy prime minister visited the US that fall, 
India’s lack of interest in a guarantee was publicly evident.312 In Washington, Desai 
“discounted [the] efficacy of security assurances.” He also repeated Indian objections to 
the NPT.313 Along with home minister YB Chavan, Desai repeated those objections in 
internal discussions that November as well. 314 
India’s continuing refusal to sign the NPT would lead to friction with the US. 
Haksar, however, caustically described the treaty as “born out of…a facile assumption 
that if you put a lid on a boiling cauldron, it magically stops boiling.”315 As far as Indian 
policymakers were concerned, not only were the superpowers not moving toward 
disarmament, but, in the meantime, China was “merrily exploding nuclear weapons.”316 
                                                
309 Foreign Minister’s Budget Speech in Lok Sabha, July 18, 1967, NMML, MCG, SF No. 92. 
310 Note by LK Jha on Nuclear Security, May 2, 1967, NMML, PNH (III), SF No. 111. Also, see Summary 
of LK Jha’s Discussions in London with the PM, FonSec (Chalfont), CommSec, May 5, 1967, NMML, 
PNH (III), SF No. 110. 
311 Tharoor, Reasons of State, p. 180. Questions about the credibility and desirability of any guarantee also 
came up at a meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party. See Note from MCC to PM, May 4, 1967, 
NMML, MCC, SF No. 91. 
312 John W. Finney, “Indian Indicates Shift on A-Pact,” NYT, September 13, 1967, p. 28.  
313 Telegram from DoS to AmEmb India, September 15, 1967, FRUS 1964-68 Vol. XXV, p. 888. 
314 Tharoor, Reasons of State, p. 121. 
315  Letter from Haksar to AR Gopal-Ayenger (BARC), April 6, 1968, NMML, PNH (I-II), SF No. 36.  
316 Lall, Emergence, p. 181. 
 445 
The NPT had emerged from a “coincidence of interest between USSR and USA,” but it 
was not in Indian interest. Lacking steps towards disarmament, the treaty would not  “add 
to the sense of security in the world.” Two of the five nuclear powers were not even 
signing it: 
This might not have mattered but for the fact that one of the non-signatories is our 
neighbour, namely, China, who is full of hostile intentions towards our country. It 
is not subject to the discipline which arises from membership of the United 
Nations; it accepts no generally accepted norms of international behaviour and 
accepts no restraint. It is imbued with an ideology which seeks to interfere in the 
affairs of the other countries.317 
Years earlier Nehru had asserted that no disarmament attempt would be effective if it did 
include China.318 Even before the Sino-Soviet split had become evident, India had been 
concerned that a China left out of the international system that developed “sophisticated 
weapons” would not even be subject to restraint from Moscow.319 Now with strained 
relations with both superpowers, China was still outside the international system and thus 
potentially dangerous. Thus while India’s representatives in the NPT discussions in 
spring 1968 had instructions not to underplay or overplay the Chinese nuclear threat, that 
threat—and the need to keep India’s nuclear option open—led to India’s decision not to 
sign the document.320 India could not close any option that could help it deal with the 
threats it faced. 
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The China Option? 
That even meant considering mitigating the China threat by reaching out to 
Beijing. The desire to reduce dependence—and prepare for a change in the superpowers’ 
relations with China—indeed led to discussions about a potential rapprochement with 
Beijing. The Chinese threat had not disappeared. The Chinese test of a hydrogen bomb in 
June 1967 served to increase Indian concerns further. The foreign minister noted that it 
added a “new dimension to our defence problem.”321 The internal situation in China 
might seem to be in flux with the cultural revolution, but he asserted privately that “if 
anything, the Chinese were becoming more bellicose in their relations with India.”322 The 
mistreatment of Indian diplomats by Red Guards in China that summer did not help. A 
sense of internal vulnerability remained as well.323 Policymakers believed that China and 
Pakistan were helping Naga and Mizo insurgents in India.324 Senior Indian officials 
worried about the “malaise” in India’s northeast. Indian domestic intelligence worried 
about the increasing communications between China and Naga insurgents. Army officials 
downplayed the significance of these contacts, but Haksar asserted that India had to be 
worried about the pattern of Naga insurgents coming to and from China.325 
The foreign minister asserted that there was “no doubt” that Sino-Pakistan 
collusion continued.326  The October 1967 Sino-Pakistan agreement for the construction 
of an all-weather road between Xinjiang and Pakistan-held Kashmir proved to be an 
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additional source of concern.327 When what have been called the “bloodiest Sino-Indian 
clashes since the 1962 war” broke out at the Sikkim border in September 1967, it just 
seemed to confirm India’s fears. As Garver has noted, by the end of the clash, Indian 
policymakers were “quite pleased” with the troops’ performance.328 As reports at the time 
indicated, India was better prepared to engage Chinese troops.329 This improved 
performance created confidence in the effort to depend on internal resources. It also 
perhaps gave Indian policymakers more confidence to signal China that the door was 
open to negotiations. 
India made some informal overtures to China in 1967, but they had not been 
reciprocated or welcomed.330 In spring 1968, Gandhi made a statement calling on China 
to establish better relations with states like India even if their governments had different 
political compositions.331 In September 1968, India again called for talks with China. 
Such efforts, if nothing else, served to show the Afro-Asian world that India was not the 
intransigent country.332 The prime minister’s office also briefed Gandhi to state later that 
year, “we do not believe that one can proceed on the assumption of eternal animosity and 
conflict.”333  
Given the lack of response, the foreign ministry continued to careful about any 
steps that might provoke China. While the 1967 skirmishes had been going on, Desai on 
a visit to the US said he favored a two China policy. After the skirmishes ended, the 
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foreign ministry had denied that this was official policy.334 Gandhi privately explained 
that, “In the present strained relations between India and China, any pointed departure 
from the present practice might be treated by Peking as an affront to their sovereignty and 
provide them with an excuse for causing additional strain along our borders.”335 Then, 
when the Dalai Lama visited Delhi in November 1968 and requested meetings with the 
senior leadership, Haksar asked Gandhi to consider turning down his request to see her 
and the deputy prime minister. He also asserted that the defense minister should 
definitely not see the Dalai Lama.336 This careful approach also aided the effort to keep 
the door open. The Indian foreign secretary pointed out that India had to keep trying: 
“We have at present very little leverage with China…Ultimately however we have to 
convince China that confrontation with us can harm its interests while, on the other hand, 
cooperation with us can be of much greater advantage than cooperation with any other 
power.”337  
The US response to these Indian efforts made evident how much changed. The 
prospect of Sino-India rapprochement no longer struck fear in the hearts of officials; 
instead they almost sounded relieved. Noting that “India, like us, has twin problems of 
defense and accommodation with China,” an official reflected the dominant US view that 
“[r]egarding the latter, the removal of a source of conflict between China and India—
conflict which could involve the US—[was] far more important than the effect a border 
settlement would have on the exact degree of Indian nonalignment.”338 
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Chapter 7: Fluid New World (1969-1972) 
Over the next phase of the relationship, the shared US and Indian view of China 
unraveled. At the start of this phase the state of Sino-US and Sino-Indian relations was in 
flux. By 1971, the situation changed to the extent that the US went from an 
administration having contemplated sending an aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal to 
defend and support India against China in 1962 to another US administration sending the 
same aircraft carrier to the bay to deter Delhi and demonstrate to Beijing that it was 
willing to oppose India.1  
At the onset of the period that this chapter covers, there were simultaneous but 
separate US and Indian efforts to seek a rapprochement with China. But the US initiative 
bore more fruit than that of India. This development had an adverse impact on US-India 
relations as US President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger 
came to perceive the Indian government’s attitude and actions—especially those related 
to the 1971 Bangladesh crisis—as a threat to their efforts to engage China. Once again, 
American and Indian perceptions of and policy toward China diverged, with a 
detrimental impact on the US-India relationship. Kissinger later noted that in Nixon’s 
world, there were arenas for cooperation and areas where interests clashed. During this 
phase India moved from the former to the latter.2 
The White House’s altered attitude and approach to China affected the US-India 
relationship in three ways. First, in the path to secure a rapprochement, Pakistan was a 
key facilitator—a crucial mean to a critical end. Second, Nixon and Kissinger came to see 
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India as a spoiler to their achieving a rapprochement. Third, a rapprochement with China 
considerably diminished India’s importance in the US strategic framework.  
The Indian government led by Indira Gandhi, on the other hand, continued to see 
China as a threat—alone and in collusion with Pakistan—especially as India’s efforts to 
improve relations with China did not yield significant results. This threat loomed larger in 
1971 when there was a real prospect of an India-Pakistan war, with China lining up on 
Pakistan’s side. During the crisis, Indian policymakers found that US protection against 
China, which they had implicitly counted on, was no longer available. To make matters 
worse, the White House did not stay neutral. Instead, Indian officials believed that post-
Sino-American rapprochement, the US lined up with China and Pakistan against India. 
This led to India signing a treaty with the Soviet Union as an insurance policy. During 
and after the crisis, the idea of a Beijing-Washington plan to use Islamabad to contain 
India and prevent its strengthening took hold in India. This feeling bled into every aspect 
of the relationship as the two countries seemed to disentangle from each other. Towards 
the end of the period this chapter covers, the state of affairs between Delhi and 
Washington left the Indian ambassador in Washington commenting to the US deputy 
national security advisor, “the present state of Indo-American relations could well have 
provided the plot for a farce by Moliere.”3 
REACHING FOR RAPPROCHEMENTS (1969-1970) 
US Views of China and India  
Candidate Richard Nixon had mentioned his interest in exploring engagement 
with China as early as 1967. A year after that, outgoing National Security Advisor Walt 
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Rostow noted to his successor that one of the “objectives…within [the new 
administration’s] grasp” was the “beginnings of normalizing our relations with 
Communist China.”4 Indeed, early in the administration, Nixon demanded of Kissinger: 
“How do we establish relations with China?”5 
China, as then Kissinger aide Winston Lord later noted, was important not only 
“for its own sake,” but also because of the Nixon administration’s other two priorities: 
the Soviet Union and Vietnam.6 At a time when US dominance and its strategic and 
economic superiority were under threat, Nixon and Kissinger directed their foreign policy 
efforts toward maintaining “America’s standing in the world.” Based on a “a realistic 
assessment” of national interest, Vietnam-era geopolitical and domestic realities, and the 
belief that a balance of power would produce global stability, Nixon’s foreign policy 
came to revolve around what was called triangular diplomacy—the “calculated 
management of policy on mutual relations between and among the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and China.”7  
Chinese hostility had not disappeared; nor had the threat. Nixon and Kissinger—
who would dominate foreign policymaking in the administration—perceived Beijing’s 
involvement in the Vietnam War as contributing to their Vietnam conundrum, but they 
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also saw China as part of the solution to that conundrum. Furthermore, they also believed 
that bringing China in from the cold made a potential China threat “more manageable and 
predictable.”8 Finally, they could use Beijing to out-maneuver Moscow. 
Early in his administration, Nixon expressed a desire to reevaluate US policy 
towards China. There were skeptics, including Kissinger initially, but the president 
persisted. Within the US, Nixon moved on two fronts. Inside the administration, in 
February 1969, Nixon directed the NSC to examine existing US policy towards China 
and Taiwan, as well as the costs and benefits of alternate approaches. That summer, 
senior policymakers discussed in an interagency forum the potential risks and rewards of 
changing China China policy. The NSC document presented to Nixon subsequently in 
August suggested three options: continuing the existing strategy of isolation, increasing it 
or reducing it.  
Externally, Nixon instructed senior officials to begin to create the right 
atmosphere among the public and policymaking community for a potential change in 
policy. The White House expected support from liberals, academics, and some in the 
business sector and in the State Department. Among the public, most of the vehement 
hostility toward “Red China” and communism had petered out by the time Nixon had 
come to office. The China lobby had lost traction by the late 1960s. The White House, 
nonetheless, expected opposition from allies abroad, from conservatives, including in 
Congress, as well as from some in the State Department concerned about the impact on 
relations with the Soviet Union. So Nixon directed Kissinger to discuss a potential 
change in approach toward Beijing with key legislators. 
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The strategy to make Beijing aware that Washington was interested in improving 
relations involved a two-pronged effort on the part of Nixon and Kissinger and a close 
circle of advisors. One prong involved public signaling through public proclamations. 
This included Kissinger’s speech in December that the US had no “permanent enemies” 
and would judge countries on the basis of actions and not ideology, as well the 
president’s foreign policy report. It also involved actions like suspending high-speed 
American naval patrols and eventually regular patrols in the Taiwan Strait. Following an 
NSC recommendation in summer 1969 that Washington move to improve relations with 
Beijing, the administration also eased trade and travel restrictions. 
The other prong involved secret diplomacy and linked the rapprochement effort 
with South Asia—not through India, which two decades before had played mediator, but 
via Pakistan. Nixon had worried about publicly showing too much eagerness for a 
rapprochement or offering negotiations only to be snubbed by Beijing—which might 
negatively affect US prestige abroad and his political prospects at home. There was also a 
lack of trust in most of the foreign policy bureaucracy. Thus, Kissinger and he preferred 
to move discreetly.9  
This meant finding a third-country intermediary. The White House tried to 
indicate its willingness to reach out to Beijing through a number of countries, including 
Cambodia, France and Romania. It was Pakistan, however, that developed into the crucial 
element in what Kissinger aide Helmut Sonnenfeldt called the administration’s 
“subterranean activity.”10 What had earlier been Pakistan’s greatest liability in US eyes—
                                                
9 Macmillan, “Nixon, Kissinger, and the Opening to China,” p. 107-121. Also, see Winston Lord and 
Helmut Sonnenfeldt’s comments in “The Nixon Administration NSC,” p. 16, pp. 18-19, p. 45. 
10 “The Nixon Administration NSC,” p. 17. Pakistani leader Ayub Khan had indeed suggested such an 
intermediary role during the Johnson administration. See note 2 re Telegram from AmEmb Pakistan to 
DoS, February 25, 1964 in FRUS 1964-1968 Vol. XXV, p. 49. 
 454 
its “natural all[iance]” with China—had become its greatest asset. From late 1969 
through summer 1971, Islamabad played a critical role in passing Washington’s messages 
to Beijing. Due to Pakistan’s role in the rapprochement effort, Nixon became adamant 
about the need “to do something” for that country. Subsequently, there was an increasing 
sense of urgency in the White House to “move” on a broader resumption of military 
supply, which Pakistan had been seeking.11 This would have consequences for the US-
India relationship. 
As Kux has noted, South Asia had not been a major priority for the incoming 
Nixon administration in 1969. It had by no means, however, been written out of the script 
entirely. Nixon intended to develop and maintain good working relationships with India 
and Pakistan, both of which he perceived as holding some significance—Pakistan in the 
short term as a channel to China and India over the long run.12 For Nixon, even looking 
beyond Vietnam, Asia was “where the action is.”13 In his view “[a]ny discussion of 
Asia's future must ultimately focus on the respective roles of four giants:” China, India, 
Japan and the US.14 Most of the president’s predecessors would not have argued with that 
statement. Nixon, however, envisioned different roles for each of the giants, especially 
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China. And this altered view of China would come to have a significant impact on US-
India relations.  
By the end of the Johnson administration, doubts about India’s capacity had 
considerably eroded its utility as a contrasting model to or bulwark against China. Like 
Johnson, Nixon found India “both challenging and frustrating: challenging because of its 
promise, frustrating because of its performance.” In 1969, this assessment of India’s 
internal efforts and US officials’ belief that India was most vulnerable to internal 
“fragility” kept the focus of the bilateral relationship on bolstering India economic 
development and political stability rather than its defense resources. An interagency 
group acknowledged that the US still had an “interest in India's ability to defend its 
borders against Asia’s one big Communist power,” but there was a sense that India 
seemed to be militarily capable enough to “defend itself simultaneously” against China 
and Pakistan.15  
The focus on development was not altogether unwelcome in Delhi. As the US and 
other aid donors noted, by the time Nixon came to office, the Indian economy had 
improved considerably. India still had a long way to go, however, and continued to need 
foreign assistance. Nixon assured Indian officials that development assistance would 
continue.16 And these Indian officials preferred the new president’s method of providing 
that aid. Gandhi’s closest aide P.N. Haksar noted approvingly that the new administration 
was not questioning India’s defense expenditures.17 In addition, unlike Johnson, Nixon 
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asked to review major economic assistance packages annually so that he could 
simultaneously consider food and economic assistance. On Kissinger’s recommendation, 
the president did not make a small piecemeal commitment—partly to make evident that 
his approach was going to be a “marked contrast” to that of Johnson’s short tether policy. 
In July 1969, Nixon approved a $300 million PL480 package and a $35 million loan for 
India even though USAID was not ready with a proposal for economic assistance. This 
was in addition to the $55 million worth of food aid he had initially sanctioned as part of 
a continuing program for India. The next year, he approved $193 million in economic 
assistance for India.18 All this aid was in keeping with the goal that the administration had 
outlined as being in the US interest—supporting the political and socio-economic 
development of India.  
Nixon’s changing assessment of China reinforced the emphasis on economic 
relations with India. While Johnson administration officials had doubted the feasibility of 
India playing a role vis-à-vis China, the Nixon White House also questioned the 
desirability of even seeking such a role. Anticipating Indian concern about any sudden 
normalization with China, US officials thus sought to prepare the ground.19 In May 1969, 
Secretary of State William Rogers—who himself was not aware of all the details of 
Nixon’s China plans—admitted to the Indian prime minister that the US was “seeking” to 
talk to China. Gandhi recalled her own overtures to China, noting, however, “[t]here had 
been no reaction.” Kissinger, in turn, told the Indian ambassador that “the US may have 
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an easier chance than the USSR to normalize relations with China.” Nixon subsequently 
indicated to the Indian foreign minister that he did not buy the conventional wisdom “that 
the way to solve the China problem is to ‘gang up’ on China.” He asserted that he neither 
had illusions about Beijing, nor was he apologizing for its actions, but “all Asia must 
eventually move forward together.” In words that echoed those of Nehru two decades 
before, Nixon highlighted the danger of “trying to isolate China.” The president indeed 
noted his belief that Gandhi shared this view, which they had discussed when he had 
visited Delhi in 1967. Later in summer 1969, during Nixon’s visit to India, Kissinger, 
too, noted to Indian officials that the US was “open to contacts” and had made some 
“symbolic moves” toward China.20  
Hints of a potential change in the US attitude towards China were not restricted to 
the corridors of power in India. On tour in Asia, Rogers also publicly suggested a more 
conciliatory US approach towards China. US officials noted that opinion leaders in India 
publicly speculated about American attempts to improve relations with China. Indeed, 
pro-Soviet “propagandists occasionally raised the bogey of a Washington-Peking axis.” 
Pakistan’s potential role as a channel to China was not entirely a secret in South Asia as 
well, with Pakistani newspapers stating in the lead up to Nixon’s visit to the subcontinent 
that “news reports in America and India have clearly indicated that Nixon will ask 
Pakistan to play the role of conciliator between China and the US.”21  
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A US interagency assessment indicated that non-communist Asia would likely 
have two “competing” reactions to any Sino-US rapprochement. Some in those countries, 
who thought Washington’s existing China policy was “totally unrealistic” and only 
increased the likelihood of war, would “welcome” a rapprochement. Others would “fear” 
it, assuming that this meant “the United States was withdrawing from Asia.”22 Both 
sentiments were evident in India. They were even apparent in Gandhi’s public contention 
that US “recognition of China as a world power might be helpful in creating a new 
environment in Asia. But that would still leave the question of what to do with their 
power.”23 With China still considered a threat, there was concern in India about potential 
US withdrawal and subsequent Chinese dominance in Asia. But, with parallel attempts by 
Gandhi to engage China underway as well, this concern was balanced with 
understanding. 
India’s Views of China and the US  
The Indian government’s efforts to reach out to Beijing preceded those of 
Washington. Some have argued that India designed these overtures to warn Moscow off 
its growing friendship with Islamabad.24 But they were not necessarily just designed to 
spur the Soviet Union. Indian officials had discussed their desire to seek a modus vivendi 
with Beijing privately with their US interlocutors as well. In a summer 1969 meeting 
with Nixon, India’s foreign minister acknowledged that Gandhi, too, believed that China 
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should be brought into “the world community.”25 Subsequently, Indian officials even 
sought to discuss “cooperation with China” with Kissinger.26  
The Indian government’s efforts to mitigate the China threat were partly 
motivated by the desire to reduce India’s overall dependence on external actors to the 
extent possible. India had more confidence than before, but it was still dependent on 
external assurance on the security front, especially since it had not yet exercised its 
nuclear option and indigenous defense production could not meet demand. The reliability 
of assurances from both Moscow and Washington, however, was questionable, given 
increasing Soviet-Pakistani interaction and the memory of American neutrality in 1965. 
A rapprochement with China could reduce India’s need for these external assurances.  
There was another internal reason motivating the government to seek improved 
relations with China. As Haksar noted, continued hostility from China “distorte[ed] the 
country’s economy by obliging [India] to maintain a high level of defence spending. This 
led to shrinkage both of the external and internal resources.”27 Rapprochement could thus 
also free up funds for India’s development needs at a “time of travail,” when India was 
economically vulnerable and Gandhi politically so.28 
Thus—despite little or no response from Beijing to earlier trial balloons—in 
January 1969, Gandhi publicly signaled that India was ready to dialogue with China 
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without preconditions in the hope that this would eventually lead to a settlement of the 
border dispute. A month later, she again indicated that India was open to talking to 
China.29 She maintained this stance even when China rejected her offer as “hypocritical.” 
The Indian foreign minister reiterated that India was open to negotiating with China, as 
long as Beijing showed India some respect. The government also publicly played down 
reports of Chinese border ultimatums to India in April 1969.  Privately, Delhi instructed 
Indian troops at the border to be prepared, but also careful not to take any action that 
could be misconstrued as provocative. Even as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated over the 
spring and India received reports of China moving some of its nuclear installations from 
Xinjiang to Tibet, the foreign ministry reiterated publicly that India was keeping the door 
open to talks with China. Later in the year, Gandhi made it a point to send greetings to 
Beijing on the 20th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic.30 
There were some signs of reciprocity—what Haksar called “slight changes.”31 In 
spring 1969, the Chinese deputy premier unusually did not mention India—or the US—in 
a speech at a Pakistani reception in Beijing. Indian policymakers observed that the 
Chinese chargé had started attending official functions in Delhi.32 With China still in the 
throes of the cultural revolution, however, the Chinese response was limited. Haksar 
expressed frustration that Indian overtures only seemed to be met with “rebuff and 
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discourtesy.” In this context, it was difficult to determine whether even the small signs of 
a change in Beijing’s attitude toward India “mean[t] anything.”33   
Uncertainty meant that Indian policymakers remained concerned about the 
external threat from China. Given the state of Indian defenses, even a “limited 
engagement” with China, would be “quite serious.”34 Policymakers watched closely 
Beijing’s attitude towards Delhi, as well as towards Moscow and Washington. China 
hands in India saw as a bad sign the Chinese cancellation in February 1969 of talks with 
the US in Warsaw and the clashes with the Soviet Union in March.35 In the aftermath of 
additional Sino-Soviet skirmishes in August, Gandhi was additionally anxious about 
Chinese troop movements in Tibet and Xinjiang, concerned that “having failed to make 
any impression on the Soviet Union, the Chinese might turn their thoughts towards our 
country and may find in Pakistan a ready response.”36 
Indeed, while Nixon was plotting a potential path to Beijing through Islamabad, in 
Delhi there was persistent anxiety about China plotting with Pakistan against India. The 
continued Sino-Pakistan construction and operation of a road linking Pakistan-held 
Kashmir and Xinjiang exacerbated these concerns. As Garver has noted, Indian officials 
saw this as part of “China’s effort to encircle India via cooperation with Pakistan.” The 
establishment of a Sino-Pakistan coordination bureau to coordinate training, financing 
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and arms supply to various insurgent groups operating in India’s northeast would have 
done nothing to alleviate Delhi’s concerns.37   
For Delhi remained worried about the internal threat from China, especially 
during a time of turmoil in India’s northeast. Senior Indian policymakers conveyed their 
anxiety about Chinese support for “hostile tribes” within the country to both senior 
American and Soviet officials.38 The arrest in India of Naga guerillas trained in China 
seemed to highlight Beijing’s role in this area. China also started to supply arms to Mizo 
insurgents that year. Chinese military leader Lin Biao’s reiteration of Chinese sympathy 
and support for revolutionaries in India at the ninth party congress in April only 
heightened Indian concerns. The formation in April 1969 of the extremist communist 
party of India (Marxist-Leninist) that looked to Beijing for guidance did not help, even 
though, at least initially, they did not receive the amount of assistance they sought.39 
Uncertainties in India’s relations with its eastern and northeastern neighbors only 
increased worries about India’s vulnerability vis-à-vis China. In 1969, Sikkim’s leader 
broached the subject of revising the 1950 treaty, which had established Sikkim as a 
protectorate of India.40 In addition, the Nepalese prime minister cancelled an arms 
assistance agreement with India and demanded that India reduce its presence in Nepal. 
He denied that Beijing was urging these steps, but Chinese reports, nonetheless, praised 
Kathmandu’s stance as one against the “aggressive designs of Indian imperialism.” 
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Gandhi believed that the Nepalese leadership, in turn, was “encouraging” Beijing.41 
Finally, Indian officials remained concerned about increasing Chinese influence and 
presence in northern Burma.42 
Indian concerns about China also persisted because of hostile rhetoric from 
Beijing. China issued protests about the intrusion by all things Indian—from aircraft to 
linoleum. Beijing also continued to accuse Delhi of colluding with Washington to exploit 
China’s vulnerability in Tibet. Furthermore, “try[ing] to take advantage of India’s 
dependence on western aid,” China seemed to be undermining India in other parts of the 
developing world.43  
With its efforts to engage China going nowhere, the Gandhi government engaged 
with other countries to contain and mitigate the China threat. It looked east where there 
were “serious apprehensions” about China, with Gandhi visiting Japan and Southeast 
Asia, and the deputy prime minister Morarji Desai also travelling to the region. 
Concerned about Southeast Asia’s vulnerability to China, a potential vacuum if and when 
the US withdrew, and its own relative neglect of the area, India made efforts to reach out 
to these countries with “high-level bilateral consultations.”44 Closer home, to assuage 
Nepalese concerns, India downgraded its military presence in Nepal. Nonetheless, to 
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maintain its influence—and not create a vacuum that China might fill—India rejected 
Nepalese calls for substantial changes in the broader Indo-Nepalese security 
framework.45 To reassure the Sikkimese, Haksar also suggested a critical reappraisal of 
India-Sikkim relations.46 
The Gandhi government even made an attempt toward rapprochement with 
Pakistan. Indian officials said Delhi was willing to offer “an unconditional commitment 
that [it] shall not transgress Pakistan’s territory.”47 In June 1969, Gandhi expressed the 
hope to Soviet officials—who had been urging an India-Pakistan rapprochement so they 
could “jointly tackle China”48—that Pakistan would attend a regional conference on 
transit, but Pakistan demurred. She then wrote to Yahya Khan urging a re-start of 
commercial, economic and cultural relations, and proposing the establishment of India-
Pakistan cooperative mechanisms. Subsequently, in July, an Indian minister travelled to 
Pakistan hoping for a resumption of trade and transportation links. Gandhi even sent a 
no-war proposal in 1969.49 But Gandhi found the response “disappointing.”50  
India also continued to look to Moscow for implicit and explicit security 
assistance against China. Despite hiccups in supply, the Soviet Union remained India’s 
main military supplier.51 Gandhi told Soviet premier Kosygin that China’s “unabated” 
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“malevolence” towards India and its “attack” on the Soviet Union in 1969 had only 
created a “new bond” between India and the Soviet Union. Kosygin, in turn, declared to 
Gandhi that the other nuclear powers would not “allow” the use of nuclear weapons 
against India.52 In addition to offering more military aid, Soviet defense minister Marshal 
Grechko assured Indian officials that if China attacked India, the Soviet Union would 
provide assistance. Moscow also suggested to Delhi that the two countries sign a treaty, 
with Soviet official Nikolai Pegov selling the treaty as “very good insurance against any 
possible aggression by China or Pakistan.”53  
The Indian ambassador in Moscow saw the Soviet offer of a treaty—put forward 
in March and April—as motivated by deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations. Kosygin 
brought the offer up again with Gandhi and tried to sweeten the deal by offering 
economic incentives. While some Indian officials were keen to act on the offer,54 Gandhi 
was hesitant because of the domestic and Chinese reaction. She worried that the treaty 
would be seen as a move away from nonalignment or “directed against a third party.” 
Nonetheless, she agreed to “exploratory talks.” At this stage the provisions discussed 
seemed more akin to those in the Panchsheel treaty. When Kosygin brought up the idea 
of including political cooperation in the treaty, Gandhi stopped him. She reacted even 
more strongly against Kosygin’s mention of the possibility of incorporating mutual 
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assistance provisions in the treaty, noting that that would make it “a military 
agreement.”55  
Some officials like Haksar urged Gandhi to strike while the iron was hot. He 
asserted that India needed to take advantage of “Soviet anxiety” vis-à-vis China at the 
time. The situation could change “overnight” and India could not “proceed upon the 
assumption…that India is of such vital importance to the Soviet Union that we can just sit 
back and relax and do stone walling.” India needed to consider the treaty “in the light of 
cold reason and self-interest.” The US was too distant and “can give us little comfort in 
such a situation.” Furthermore, India needed to consider the possibility of Indian “dilly-
dally[ing]” resulting in the Soviet Union signing “a Pact of perpetual peace and non-
aggression with Pakistan.”56 
Concerns about the Soviet-Pakistan relationship—and the resultant doubts about 
Soviet reliability—on the other hand also played into Indian hesitation about the treaty. 
Moscow’s attempt at a “new look” relationship with Pakistan had enhanced concerns 
about its dependability.57 Indian officials repeatedly warned Soviet counterparts about 
equating India and Pakistan, as well as about the consequences of militarily aiding 
Pakistan. Kosygin tried to play down the level and kind of assistance. He used the same 
justification that Indian policymakers had heard from Washington—that it was in India’s 
interests that the Soviet Union supply Pakistan lest the latter became too dependent on 
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other sources.58 Questions about Soviet reliability persisted in India, however, further 
fueled by concerns about whether the Soviet attitude towards China would change—
officials noted that, after all, Soviet attitudes towards various countries had changed 
rapidly during the Second World War.59  
Contrary to later assertions by her subordinates about her “enthusiasm,”60 for this 
reason and others Gandhi remained reluctant about the treaty. Along with concern about 
Soviet reliability and China’s reaction, Gandhi’s political position was vulnerable.61 A 
treaty would be visible written evidence of India’s move away from nonalignment, which 
remained popular. In spring 1968, 91% of Indian parliamentarians surveyed had 
expressed a strong preference for India staying as neutral as possible.62  
Furthermore, with the Indian public at least the US still had a higher favorability 
rating than the Soviet Union.63 Gandhi and the India foreign minister were indeed 
concerned about the impact of such a treaty on US-India relations. Haksar had earlier 
himself pointed out to Gandhi that India needed to factor in the global impact of the 
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treaty. He subsequently noted that India “can offer the same to the rest of the world, 
including the USA.”64 
Finally, despite Gandhi’s leftward turn in the domestic political arena, key 
members of her government had remained wary of the possibility of too much 
dependence on the Soviet Union and believed that some of the provisions of the draft 
curtailed India’s freedom of action. Thus, in early 1970, the government shelved even a 
later version of the draft that left “the commitment relatively vague.”65  
Some of these considerations also lay behind India’s demurrals from joining or 
supporting Brezhnev’s proposals for a collective security system proposed in June 
1969.66 There were some opinion leaders who argued that the China threat meant that 
India should take special note of the proposals and should debate the continuing viability 
of nonalignment.67 But Gandhi wanted neither to foreclose her options by leaning to one 
side too much, nor to provoke China by joining what was seen as an anti-China grouping. 
Thus the foreign minister publicly refused to endorse the Brezhnev security system and 
privately told Nixon that India would not join a military pact.68  
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Doubts about Soviet reliability and the desire to maintain flexibility by 
diversifying dependence meant that India continued to see the US as essential to its China 
containment strategy. As Kissinger put it to Nixon, “India sees Communist China as the 
main threat, and the US and USSR as major counters.”69 Delhi still believed it had a “less 
formal sense of commitment” from Washington.70 With persisting uncertainty about 
Chinese intentions, Indian officials continued to seek assurances from their US 
counterparts that if China attacked, they could count on US help.71 Haksar urged Gandhi 
to bring up the subject in talks scheduled with Rogers in May 1969, highlighting the “one 
area of the United States foreign policy which needs to be probed, namely, Sino-
American relations and the American view of Chinese aims, aspirations and postures.”72  
The Indian government was not just concerned about US policy vis-à-vis China, 
but also with regard to the whole of Asia. Delhi remained torn about the US role in Asia, 
especially Southeast Asia. On the one hand, India wanted an end to the Vietnam War, 
which it thought American involvement perpetuated. Gandhi publicly disagreed with 
Walt Rostow’s contention that the American intervention in Vietnam had strengthened 
India’s security versus China.73 Policymakers believed the continuing conflict prevented 
the establishment of peace, stability and regional cooperation in South and Southeast 
Asia, which could serve to limit Chinese influence and intervention.74 On the other hand, 
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Indian officials worried that “a precipitate [US] pull-out would hurt them.”75 The concern 
arose for two reasons—first, China could exploit the resultant vacuum; and second, the 
possibility that the US would further demote India in its strategic framework, leaving 
India without a key source of protection and assistance.76 
For India, US assistance remained crucial and thus the Gandhi government had 
little desire to upset the US by emphasizing differences. When it came to the Vietnam 
War, Gandhi noted that US and Indian differences had “narrowed.”77 The State 
Department indeed commented, “India no longer lectures us on the US role in Vietnam 
and has even indicated a desire to be helpful.”78 Even over reports that the US was 
exploring the establishment of facilities on Diego Garcia, the State Department noted that 
the India reaction “has been muted to date, despite their public stance against great power 
military activity in the Indian Ocean.”79  
On a visit to Washington, Dinesh Singh, the Indian foreign minister who was 
perceived to be pro-Soviet,80 hailed Nixon’s comments that the US was looking to play a 
role in Asia “far beyond Vietnam.” Singh welcomed US facilitation of socio-economic 
development, emphasizing the significant demonstration effect of democratic countries 
like India closing the expectations-reality gap. Nixon agreed, noting, “If India did not 
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make the grade, the lesson for the rest of the world would be disastrous.” He indicated 
that it was “vital” to support development programs and not underfund such programs.81  
There was also concern in Delhi of decreasing interest in India in the US. While 
recognizing that there was a sense in the US that India was “too big to tackle,” Gandhi 
publicly called for continued US help to India saying India was making “steady 
progress.”82 In the lead up to Nixon’s subsequent visit to India in summer 1969—part of 
what was labeled his reassurance tour to Asia83—senior Indian officials prepped Gandhi 
to make the case for the importance of India. Haksar stressed to Gandhi the need to 
convince the US that communist influence in Asia could be limited “only by 
strengthening or stabilising forces in Asia, which, they must see, inevitably depends on 
the stabilising influence of India.” This, and not military alliances, should be the means 
used to counter China—alliances would only lead to additional conflict with the Soviet 
Union and allow China to portray itself as the “champion of Asian nationalism.” Haksar 
acknowledged that this might prove a hard sell to the US because Washington now 
doubted “India’s stabilising capacity” and the country’s “viability.”84  
When Nixon travelled to India, Gandhi was preoccupied with domestic political 
struggles that would eventually lead to the Congress party splitting. The visit, however, 
went relatively well. Nixon left Gandhi worried about the outcome in Vietnam, but 
impressed with the president’s genuine interest in finding an honorable settlement.85 In 
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some other countries that Nixon visited there was concern.86 He left the Indian 
leadership, however, reassured that the US wanted to find a way to “register their 
presence in the Pacific and in South and South-East Asia,” but not through military 
alliances.87 
TRYING TO STAY ON AN EVEN KEEL 
China, on the other hand, did not reassure India. By fall 1969, Indian officials 
indicated to their American counterparts that they did not perceive many indications that 
China was “softening” its attitude—though they did believe that “Chinese respect for 
power” could lead Beijing to seek increased communication with Washington and 
Moscow.88 In spring 1970, an Indian request to the Chinese foreign office to meet in 
Beijing to discuss Cambodia “met with a rebuff” even though it was a subject of Chinese 
interest.89 The Indian foreign minister believed that, overall, Beijing was also indulging 
in “extremely hostile, false and tendentious propaganda against our country.”90  
Through the first few months of 1970, accusations continued to flow from China 
especially about India’s relationship with the US.  Chinese statements continued to term 
India a “lackey of US imperialism and Soviet revisionism in international affairs.” They 
accused India of “coordinat[ing] with US in carrying out the so called US ‘new Asian 
policy’ of using Asians to fight Asians” in return for “more rewards.”91 There were also 
charges that India was displaying its “reactionary nature and expansionist ambitions” in 
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Tibet. This left Indian officials concerned about the “implied threat” that China would 
retaliate by interfering in local Indian affairs.92 
Then, in May 1970, Mao’s greeting to the Indian chargé Brajesh Mishra at the 
May Day celebrations sparked hope that Chinese policymakers might be rethinking their 
India policy.93 Mishra reported that Mao told him, “We cannot keep on quarrelling like 
this. We should try and be friends again…We will be friends again some day.” The 
chargé reported that he responded, “We are ready to do it today.” He did not know 
whether Mao’s comments were premeditated, but, given the source, recommended that 
they be given “weighty consideration.”94 Subsequently, the head of China’s Asia 
department indicated that Mao had taken “the greatest concrete action on our side” and 
now India should take some steps since China was not responsible for the state of Sino-
Indian relations.95 Beijing, he said, had noticed the talk from India, but not seen “concrete 
action.”96  
Haksar believed the Mao smile to have “some significance,” but suggested to the 
prime minister that they “must not rush to any conclusions” and handle the matter “very 
delicate[ly] and tentative[ly].” He was reluctant to recommend—as the foreign minister 
did—that Mishra seek to meet with high-level officials in Beijing.97 Haksar was also 
hesitant about the foreign minister’s suggestion of a letter from Gandhi to Zhou 
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suggesting an exchange of ambassadors. He thought India needed to be more cautious.98 
Gandhi seemed to concur. After she discussed the issue with her advisors, Haksar told 
Mishra to follow a “cautious and step by step approach.” Delhi instructed the chargé to 
meet China’s Asia department chief to convey India’s “sincere and positive” response 
and willingness to “initiate a dialogue with the object of removing the state of tension and 
hostility” on the basis of “mutuality and reciprocity.”99  
The Indian chargé pressed for more, arguing that there were further positive 
signals from Beijing.100 He noted that Beijing had “displayed what for them is 
moderation” in rhetoric during a visit by the Pakistan Air Force chief, and furthermore 
seemed to have got the chief to tone down his vitriol.101 In July, Zhou conveyed his 
regards to Gandhi. Chinese officials also indicated to Asian diplomats that China was 
trying to normalize relations with a number of countries and intended to do the same with 
India. The North Vietnamese ambassador in Beijing told the Indian chargé that China 
was impressed with some Indian actions that seemed to indicate Indian independence 
from the US—parleying with deposed Cambodian leader Sihanouk’s representatives, 
inviting the East German foreign minister and boycotting the Jakarta conference on 
Indonesia.102 Furthermore, the Indian chargé noted that the Chinese reaction to India-
Japanese foreign ministerial discussions—reported at the time to have mainly focused on 
                                                
98 And assess whether Zhou would even agree to see the chargé and then decide what to propose and who 
to propose it to Note from Haksar to Gandhi, May 19, 1970, NMML, PNH (III), SF No. 153. 
99 Draft Instructions to the Charge in Beijing attached to Note from Haksar to Gandhi, May 25, 1970, 
NMML, PNH (III), SF No. 153 and Telegram from Mishra to Kaul, June 1, 1970 in NMML, PNH (I-II), 
SF No. 29. 
100 Chinese military official noted Chinese support for Kashmiri “self-determination” when the PAF chief 
visited. Telegram from Indemb China to MEA, June 1, 1970 in NMML, PNH (I-II), SF No. 29. 
101 Telegram from Mishra to Kaul, June 1, 1970 in NMML, PNH (I-II), SF No. 29. [They only referred to 
Kashmir and seemed to have got Pakistani official to tone down his vitriol—felt Chinese reticence might 
have been because Chinese officials not pleased with Pakistani position in Indochina. Telegram from 
Mishra to Kaul, June 5, 1970 in NMML, PNH (I-II), SF No. 29.] 
102 Telegram from Mishra to Kaul, July 14, 1970 in NMML, PNH (I-II), SF No. 29. 
 475 
“China’s growing power in Asia”—directed wrath towards Japan, rather than India. 
Mishra contrasted this with the vitriol that had been directed against India when Gandhi 
had visited Japan a year before. Even in reports in the Chinese news agency that were 
“clearly anti-Indian,” the chargé detected a “new trend.” He felt that there was “a 
quantitative as well as qualitative change” in China’s anti-India rhetoric—“more in line 
with China’s expressed desire to improve relations with India.”103 Mishra also pointed 
out that despite anti-American vitriol, China was also keeping the door “slightly ajar” to 
the US.104 This seemed to fit with Kosygin’s statement to the Indian foreign secretary that 
Chinese officials “are shouting against American imperialism yet they have their contacts 
with them.”105 
Delhi, however, was frustrated about the lack of action. It had made clear it was 
interested in “a concrete discussion” with China, but there was no direct response from 
Beijing.106 Skeptics like defence minister Swaran Singh publicly stated that there was 
little hope or evidence of response from China.107 On the one hand Chinese officials were 
indicating to third parties that they were merely waiting for an Indian initiative, but on the 
other hand, they were not responding to Indian indications that they were ready to have 
discussions.108 Furthermore, China was indicating to other countries such as Yugoslavia 
that India was the country that was not ready for talks.109 Finally, China had continued to 
complain about what they considered anti-Chinese activities in India.110 
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China’s regional behavior also continued to worry India. China continued arms 
supply to Pakistan,111 and promised $200 million in economic aid in November 1970.112 
Beijing continued Sino-Pakistan road construction and also set up an ordnance factory in 
East Pakistan.113 At the same time, Indian officials saw the Pakistani response to Indian 
overtures as “negative and extremely disappointing.”114 In Nepal, Indian officials 
believed that the king was “playing a dangerous game in playing India against China.”115 
Indian worries about Chinese “intrusions” into Bhutan had decreased but Delhi remained 
concerned about Beijing’s intentions there.116 In addition, stepped-up activity within 
India by the Naxalites—labeled “Indian revolutionaries with a Chinese accent”117—in 
summer 1970 did nothing to allay Indian anxiety about the internal threat from China.118 
There was increasing concern about Chinese efforts to supply the Naxalites with arms 
through Burma, East Pakistan and Nepal as well as via the Indian state of Assam.119 
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India left the door open to China.120 Despite even indications of growing Sino-
Pakistan closeness—including a visit by Pakistani leader Yahya Khan to China—Gandhi 
emphasized that Indian policymakers “should not colour our attitude to attempt to bring 
about a change.”121 Overall, however, as a contemporary report noted, while “one or two 
icicles have melted,” there was no “thaw.” An Indian official stated, “I don’t think 
anything is going to go very far very fast.”122  
Thus, India continued its efforts with its neighbors. India moved to demarcate its 
border with Burma despite potential domestic political objections, because of concern 
about the “Chinese fishing in troubled waters.”123 Vis-à-vis Nepal, Haksar noted that 
India should handle the situation with “firmness but…courtesy, selectively pressuring the 
King,” while clandestinely linking up with India-friendly Nepalese and probing the extent 
to which American, British and Soviet policymakers “share our concern at the way the 
King is opening the country to Chinese penetration and influence.”124 India also hoped to 
deepen its bilateral relations with various countries in South and Southeast Asia, as well 
as develop regional economic cooperation.125 
By fall 1970, fears of an imminent direct attack from China had receded in key 
Indian quarters, but for India the China threat—and the need to be prepared to defend 
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itself in case China did act against India—had not disappeared.126 To Gandhi, the major 
concern was that “if Pakistan attacks us, China may join them.”127 Indian intelligence also 
highlighted the negative consequences of Sino-Pakistan collusion” for India.128 
Given this assessment, India needed to maintain healthy relationships with not 
just the Soviet Union but—given deepening Soviet-Pakistan relations129—also the US. 
This was despite the consequences for the Sino-Indian relationship. Mishra asserted that 
Beijing saw India’s relationship with the US as a key stumbling block to Sino-Indian 
rapprochement. The Indian ambassador had the impression that what China was asking in 
return “is not so much coolness towards Soviet Union as opposition to United States 
policies in South East Asia and Far East and to Japanese militarism and expansionism.” 
He noted that Zhou blamed the US for China’s bilateral border conflicts, and Chinese 
officials had indicated that China had more of an issue with US “imperialists” rather than 
Indian “reactionaries.”130 
India was not willing to give up the relationship with the US. Even though India’s 
need for the US had decreased, that country remained important for India—and not just 
from the security perspective. Swaran Singh noted that the US was also India’s “most 
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important partner in the economic field.”131 Furthermore, neither the economic nor the 
military relationship with the Soviet Union was without trouble.132  
Thus, Gandhi had sent LK Jha to Washington as ambassador asserting, “India’s 
relations with the United States should be as good as they are with the Soviet Union.” 
Jha, however, worried about American “indifference” and whether and where India still 
fit in the US strategic framework. He felt that there was a “shift in emphasis from India to 
Indonesia”133—a shift that US officials did not deny. Assistant Secretary of State Joseph 
Sisco indeed admitted that US-India relations were at a “delicate point.”134 Harking back 
to an earlier age, the Indian foreign minister urged Jha to highlight the China-India 
contrast as “a common basis for India and America to work together.”135 
MAINTAINING BALANCE  
Those days, however, were gone. Washington continued to seek to establish 
relations with Beijing. With the various other channels stalling, toward the end of 1969 
on White House instructions the American ambassador to Warsaw Walter Stoessel 
conveyed to a Chinese diplomat the US desire to re-establish contact there. The two 
heads of mission soon exchanged a few visits and subsequently in January 1970 the two 
countries announced a resumption of the Warsaw talks. Nixon stated in his foreign policy 
report that spring that it was in American interest to “take what steps we can toward 
improved practical relations with Peking.” Even as administration officials debated the 
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wisdom of offering to send a representative to China, the American invasion of 
Cambodia led to a chill. After the US withdrawal from Cambodia later that summer, both 
sides took further steps that signaled the process was back on track. The Pakistan 
channel, which the White House had earlier used to send messages indirectly, was now 
used to send direct messages to Beijing that Nixon wanted to hold talks and normalize 
relations.136  
Nixon did not intend for US relations with China and India to be a zero-sum 
game. He wanted to improve relations with China without upending relations with India. 
His administration was indeed quite careful about handling potential irritants in the 
relationship. One such irritant, in spring 1970, had been the Indian closure of foreign 
cultural centers, which adversely affected US facilities more than those of the Soviet 
Union.137 Nixon’s initial reaction had been to take a “stronger line” on the closings and 
do something in return to “irritate” India.138 He eventually, however, decided to act in a 
manner that conveyed US displeasure but “avoid[ed] blowing up a major storm in US-
Indian relations.”139 Eventually, despite India offering what it thought was a compromise, 
the US shut down the centers. At the time, however, heeding Kissinger and Rogers’ 
warning, Nixon delayed any public, overt retaliation.140 
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The desire to limit damage to the US-India relationship also showed in the option 
the president chose to “do something” for Pakistan in the military supply realm in the 
short-term to help his China policy, but without upsetting India too much. Kissinger had 
presented the president with essentially three options: (a) one-time sale of tanks or 
aircrafts, (b) approval of a Turkish proposal to sell tanks to Pakistan, or (c) liberalizing 
policy to allow continuing sales of replacement equipment for Pakistan. While Pakistan 
would have preferred the latter, Kissinger recommended a combination of (a) and (b), 
along with some economic assistance since “on balance it seems more consistent with 
U.S. interests to minimize our military relationship.” In spring 1970, Nixon indicated that 
he wanted a policy that was “less provocative politically in the U.S. & for that matter in 
India.”141 Nixon further clarified that he wanted to “retain…the general embargo on the 
regular sale of lethal equipment” and only “mak[e] a one-time exception to sell Pakistan a 
few items.”142 
Nonetheless, the US announcement of the one-time exception in fall 1970 elicited 
strong protests from India. When Haksar had noted in early 1969, “The Sino-American 
dialogue will have its impact on Pakistan,” this was not quite what he had had in mind.143 
Indian officials had tried to prevent a resumption of aid to no avail.144 The Indian 
ambassador in Washington assessed the decision as brought on by pressure from the 
Pakistani lobby, as well as the White House’s “feeling that Pakistan could, perhaps, in 
certain circumstances serve as a middle-man to bring about rapprochement between 
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America and China.”145 The Indian foreign secretary dismissed the American hope that 
India should show “appreciation” for the restrained supply. India could not take US 
“assurances [about usage restrictions] at their face value.”146  
A US official, however, noted that the Indian government’s public reaction was 
not as angry or sustained as expected. Indeed, while Indian officials privately criticized 
the move, they had taken Jha’s advice about not trying “to stir up public controversy 
beyond that generated in the Parliamentary debate early in November.”147 The State 
Department noted that even that debate had been “relatively muted, and considerable 
attention was also given to Soviet arms sales to Pakistan.”148  
The reason for the relatively muted reaction was that India could not afford to lose 
all traction in Washington. Jha had pointed out to Delhi that a larger package for Pakistan 
had been considered. He stressed that the US motive was not “anti-Indian.” He argued 
that while expressing criticism, “we should not allow it to become generally anti-
American in tone or content.” If the Indian reaction was “generally unfriendly,” it would 
only further weaken the hand of those advocating for India in the State Department, 
Congress and the media—these advocates were already playing a weak hand because of 
India’s attitude on the Vietnam War.149   
This was also the reason that the Indian government tried to show some restraint 
over US actions in Southeast Asia. Officials had continued to make statements related to 
the Vietnam War that irked US policymakers. Jha asked the US for understanding, noting 
that when a government depended on left-wing parties and support from the left within 
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the party for survival—as Gandhi’s did—some of its “statements on issues of 
international concern have to have a tinge that sometimes seems in the U.S. not friendly 
enough.”150 Nonetheless, the Gandhi government tempered its criticism. India’s restraint 
was most evident on the question of the recognition of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (DRV). US officials had already warned India about the adverse US response to 
any potential Indian recognition.151 In fall 1969 India had considered establishing an 
embassy in Hanoi—a prospect that upset the Nixon administration.152 Realizing the 
potential impact in Washington, Haksar had been upset that not only had then foreign 
minister Dinesh Singh prematurely discussed the issue with Rogers, but there had also 
been public speculation about internal Indian discussions of the advantages and 
disadvantages of recognizing Hanoi.153 In large part because of the potential US reaction, 
at a time when India had been questioning Soviet reliability and the US Congress had 
again been questioning aid to India, Delhi had desisted from extending recognition to the 
DRV.154 In 1970, the caution persisted. India upgraded relations with East Germany, but 
while considering doing the same in the case of DRV, refrained from doing so.155  
In 1970, the US ambassador to India also noted that Indian criticism of US 
military operations in Cambodia was less harsh than expected, with Indian officials 
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refusing to “condemn” the move, only expressing “regret.”156 Indeed, that year, Haksar 
even suggested that Gandhi avoid a meeting with Nixon to steer clear of discussing the 
“uncomfortable” questions of Southeast Asia and the Middle East that might raise US ire. 
He explained, “we would not wish to be unfriendly” to the US.157 Delhi acted in a 
relatively restrained manner despite calls from some officials who wanted it to repudiate 
American policy even if it caused a “partial rupture” with the US. The Indian 
representative in Hanoi, for example, had asserted that India’s “timid[ity]” on this front 
left the field to Beijing.158  
Indian policymakers realized they could not stay totally silent on developments in 
Southeast Asia. Thus, foreign minister Swaran Singh suggested to Jha that he should note 
Indian differences with the US on the subject but “without causing any annoyance.”159 
Publicly, Jha explained that on Southeast Asia, the key difference between Washington 
and Delhi was that the latter believed US policy was “driving countries who would have 
preferred to remain independent and non-aligned into the Chinese camp.”160 Privately, 
the ambassador continued to suggest to Delhi that it not overreact in its criticism of 
Nixon’s Southeast Asia policy.161 Such criticism only made it harder for those lobbying 
for aid for India in Washington.162  
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Swaran Singh, perhaps inadvertently, acknowledged that India tempered its 
criticism of its benefactors, noting in parliament, “we must make a distinction between 
countries are friendly and those that are not.”163 Some in Delhi even tried to calm the 
storm that had risen due to allegations of US interference in Indian domestic politics. 
Gandhi pointed out to John Sherman Cooper who was visiting India that her government, 
for example, was “playing down” Home Ministry reports about the allegations.164 
Overall, the Soviet-Pakistan relationship, along with India’s continued need for US aid 
and protection, seemed to lead Indian policymakers to temper their criticism and try to 
keep US-India relations on an even keel.165 Soon, however, these attempts floundered 
when a crisis broke out in East Pakistan in early 1971. 
TRIANGULATION AND THE TILTS (1971) 
In March 1971, the Pakistani military launched a crackdown in East Pakistan on 
Bengali demonstrators demanding implementation of national election results and greater 
autonomy. The situation deteriorated over the next few months: the Pakistani leadership 
refused to yield; the ethnic Bengali Awami League (AL) party called for independence; 
refugees escaping the crackdown flowed into India; East Pakistani separatist guerillas 
backed by India commenced operations from India against the Pakistani military; China 
declared its support for Pakistan; and both India and Pakistan moved troops on high alert 
to their borders, where they started skirmishing in November, eventually going to war in 
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December.166 This crisis became the dominant issue in US-India relations in 1971. Nixon 
and Kissinger saw their evolving rapprochement with China threatened by Indian actions 
during the crisis. This led them to respond in a way that set off a chain reaction that 
culminated in US-India relations reaching a “nadir.”167 India, in turn, found that it could 
no longer count on US assistance against China. This led Delhi to respond by tilting 
towards Moscow. 
In a background briefing to Congress in the midst of the crisis, Kissinger refuted 
the notion that “US policy is motivated primarily by (a) considerations of China policy, 
or (b) a gut-loathing for the Indians.”168 The Nixon administration’s evolving triangular 
diplomacy, of which rapprochement with China was a part, however, was indeed a major 
determinant of the US approach toward the crisis, with personal inclinations playing a 
role as well.169 The US response to the crisis was a classic illustration of what Gaddis has 
noted as being the Nixon administration’s “insistence on dealing with [events] in global 
rather than regional terms.”170 Gandhi, on the other hand, saw the situation as a regional 
one that became a little too local for comfort as millions of refugees streamed across 
India’s borders from East Pakistan. Her government’s actions were determined by 
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calculations of India’s (and Gandhi’s) interests,171 with it perceiving the situation 
developing on India’s eastern flank first as a threat and later also as an opportunity.172 
Early Reactions  
Gandhi—newly empowered, as a result of a significant election victory in March 
1971—had initially been reluctant to support East Pakistani calls for independence.173 
While there was popular sympathy in India for the Bengalis in East Pakistan and even 
support in the circle close to Gandhi for the guerillas,174 the prime minister tried to 
dampen calls for greater Indian involvement.175 There were a few reasons for this – the 
military leadership had informed her that any successful action would not be feasible at 
that time.176 The monsoon season was imminent, there was a possibility of Chinese 
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involvement since the northern mountain passes were open,177 and the troops deployed in 
eastern India were only equipped for election duty.178 In addition, with different states in 
India such as Tamil Nadu, which had demonstrated separatist tendencies in the past, still 
calling for autonomy, 179 the precedent of a province breaking off from a country was not 
one Gandhi wanted to encourage.180 While it was doing nothing to stop East Bengali 
guerillas operating from its territory, the Indian government also did not see the point in 
getting more involved since it expected Pakistani military authorities to take back control 
relatively quickly and then return to the negotiating table with the AL.181 
The inability of the Pakistani military to re-establish control and a refugee influx 
into India soon brought increased pressure on the Indian government and a change in 
Indian calculations.182 The refugees were entering parts of the country where the political 
situation had already been tense.183 In West Bengal, Naxalites had been threatening 
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stability enough in the past few years that Indian paramilitary forces had been deployed 
to combat them.184 In the other states that the refugees were moving into, especially the 
tribal areas unused to outsiders, the ethnically-different refugees were creating a 
demographic imbalance, in some districts even outnumbering the locals.185 The additional 
economic burden in these areas was also a subject of concern, especially for a Congress 
party in power that had been elected on the slogan of garibi hatao (remove poverty) and 
would be facing elections in key states in a year’s time.186 Furthermore, as it became clear 
that Hindus were especially being targeted in East Pakistan – a fact that the Indian 
government tried to keep under wraps187 – the fear of communal riots breaking out in 
these recipient states was ever-present, especially in areas where a significant percent of 
the local population was Muslim.188  
Finally, influential assessments’ and the government’s calculations were that the 
longer the instability continued, the more likely that China-backed left-wing extremists 
would come to dominate the AL, which had temporarily set up a government-in-exile in 
India.189 Thus, India would be better off supporting the moderate AL and trying to ensure 
a solution as soon as possible. A related fear was that if extremists took over and led an 
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independent Bangladesh, they would collaborate with the Naxalites in West Bengal for a 
“Greater Bengal.”190 Thus, in late April,191 Gandhi instructed the Indian military to 
organize and train the guerillas, who had been operating from India, and prepare for 
possible military action as well.192 At this stage, this support was not for the creation of an 
independent state and India actively refused to recognize Bangladesh.193 India hoped to 
pressure Pakistan into political accommodation that would ensure an AL government in 
East Pakistan.194 To seek international pressure, India also went on a diplomatic 
offensive, with ministers fanning out across the world.195 
At the onset of the crisis, the White House’s major objective had been to 
“maintain Pakistan’s goodwill” in order “to preserve the channel to Peking.”196 In early 
April Beijing’s invitation to an American table tennis team to visit China had pleasantly 
surprised Nixon ad Kissinger. They were even more delighted when at the end of month 
the Pakistani ambassador conveyed Zhou’s invitation to Nixon or an emissary to visit 
China.197 With discussions and preparations underway for Kissinger to visit to China 
through Pakistan, Nixon instructed that nothing be done to “squeeze” West Pakistan.198 
                                                
190 A Congress MP reflected on this fear of the Indian government to a British diplomat. Note for the File 
by R.L.B. Cormack, April 23, 1971, NA, DO 133/194: General Political Situation in India, 1971, 
Document 17. Also see DP Dhar’s comments in Record of Discussions between Kosygin and DP Dhar 
(Gandhi’s Special Representative to Moscow), Moscow, August 5, 1971, NMML, PNH (III), SF No. 280. 
191 Lt. Gen. Jacob quoted as saying that on April 29 Eastern Command was “given the responsibility of 
assisting the Bangladesh force.” Sood, p. 158.  
192 Preparations detailed in Lt. Gen. J. S. Aurora, “The Liberation of Bangladesh-I,” in Mala Singh ed. 
Khushwant Singh on War and Peace in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Delhi, India: Hind Pocket Books, 
1976), pp. 46-51. (Aurora was in charge of Eastern Command of the Indian Army during the war). 
193 Rose and Sisson, p. 143. There were differences within the government. The defence and finance 
ministers wanted a more proactive policy in support of Bangladesh. The foreign minister, policy planning 
chief and the chief of army staff wanted a more cautious policy. Mansingh, pp. 216-217. 
194 Rose and Sisson, p. 186  
195 Ibid, p. 188  
196 Kissinger, White House Years, 1st edn. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 853-854. 
197 Macmillan, Nixon and Mao, pp. 177-181 
198 See Memo from Haig to Nixon, April 28, 1971, in F.S. Aijazuddin, ed., The White House and Pakistan: 
Secret Declassified Documents, 1969-1974 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 241 and Memo 
 491 
Despite congressional and media calls, Nixon and Kissinger thus initially refused to cut 
off aid to pressure Pakistan to accommodate East Pakistani demands for autonomy.199 
However, when State Department officials did not get a response to their queries about 
suspending military shipments to Pakistan, they went ahead and embargoed military 
exports.200 Congressional and Indian criticism of Nixon’s attitude increased in the 
summer when reports emerged that Pakistan was still receiving arms shipments from the 
US—these shipments in the pipeline had slipped through the State-engineered 
embargo.201 While Indian officials acknowledged the financial assistance the US and 
other countries were providing to help it cope with the growing influx of refugees, they 
questioned whether the US was an honest broker, doubting US promises that it was 
making efforts toward a solution. The Indian foreign minister was especially taken aback 
having returned from Washington believing that he had received assurances about such 
US efforts.202  
The reason for the limited White House effort was that while Gandhi’s concern 
was the implications of the crisis in Bengal, Nixon was concerned about the effect on 
Beijing.203 He resisted congressional calls for pressure on Pakistani leader Yahya Khan 
while Kissinger was in the midst of the July trip that would take him to Delhi, Islamabad 
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and Beijing. When the House of Representatives voted against sending economic aid to 
Pakistan, the White House found work–arounds to continue such assistance, asserting 
that terminating assistance would remove the only source of its leverage with Pakistan 
(though at other points it argued that it had no leverage with Pakistan).204 Furthermore, it 
took a liberal attitude toward Pakistani debt rescheduling, which allowed the country to 
conserve its depleting foreign exchange reserves.205 Finally, the administration also 
admitted that additional military equipment that had been sanctioned earlier would be 
sent to Pakistan.206  
This reluctance to push Yahya toward compromise continued after the White 
House had established direct channels to China. One reason for this was gratitude toward 
Pakistan for its role in establishing the channel.207 There was also concern that US 
pressure on Pakistan “might be misunderstood in Peking” and seen as a joint Soviet-
American action. Kissinger, therefore, in subsequent meetings with the Chinese 
leadership constantly reiterated American support for Pakistan.208  
It remains debatable whether the Sino-US rapprochement could have survived 
increased American pressure on Pakistan. China had its own motivations for the 
rapprochement. Furthermore, it was not clear that Beijing’s commitment to Islamabad 
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involved more than some military supplies, and rhetorical and political backing.209 As 
early as March, a US interagency group had assessed that Chinese military intervention to 
aid Pakistan was highly unlikely since they would consider it “high risk, low benefit.”210 
Explaining his perspective, Kissinger later noted that he believed that China was more 
seriously committed to Pakistan because of his interpretation of a statement that Zhou 
made to the effect that “China would not be indifferent if India attacked Pakistan.”211 
With this assumption, Nixon and he believed that China would see a “victory of India 
over Pakistan [as being] the same as a victory of the Soviet Union over China.”212 At a 
meeting in July, Zhou was indeed ambiguous about China’s position, stating “if India 
commits aggression, we will support Pakistan.”213 
The Indo-Soviet Treaty: “Calling in One Devil to Counteract the Other Two”214 
To ensure that India would be prepared if China went beyond supporting Pakistan 
diplomatically and politically, Delhi had been seeking assurances from the superpowers.   
In early June, Swaran Singh had discussed the potential role of China with Soviet foreign 
minister Gromyko saying it was a crucial issue for India, especially given Zhou’s “strong 
and belligerent statements” in support of Pakistan. He said there was a “good deal of 
circumstantial evidence which indicates a positive collusion between China and 
Pakistan.” Singh suggested to his Soviet counterpart that China’s opposition towards 
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India was due to her disapproval of India’s closer relationship with the Soviet Union. He 
noted, “A situation may arise, which may demand the entry of the Soviet Union into it in 
order to encounter the difficulties which may be created by the Chinese support to 
Pakistan.” Gromyko, however, was not willing to give something in return for nothing. 
He brought the previously proposed bilateral treaty out of mothballs. Singh thought that 
might take too long. In the midst of the crisis, India was looking for deterrents and 
needed some kind of “understanding” soon.215 He subsequently asked Kosygin for a 
statement in support of India’s territorial integrity and against any military attack, 
wanting Moscow to “neutralize” the possibility of Chinese intervention.216 Perhaps to 
urge India to reconsider the treaty, Soviet officials, on their part, played up such a the 
Chinese threat,217 as well as “Sino-Pak collusion and supply of arms by USA to 
Pakistan.”218 
Seeking to diversify its deterrence options, India had sought assurance from the 
US as well. On his trip to India in July just before he went to Beijing, Kissinger assured 
the Indian defence minister—who wondered about the US stance “in view of the present 
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situation between you and China, you and Pakistan and you, and Pakistan and China”—
that the US would take a very “grave view” of a Chinese move against India.”219 
The defence minister’s query reflected the continued Indian awareness of the 
changing US assessment of China even before Nixon’s announcement of Kissinger’s trip. 
The Soviet chief of mission in London had earlier told his Indian counterpart that the US 
was seeking an agreement with China.220 Contrary to later assertions by an Indian 
diplomat,221 when Kissinger met with Gandhi in Delhi that July, he had also indicated 
that it was Nixon’s policy to “gradually…establish a relationship with Communist 
China.” He added that there could be significant developments in the months 
ahead…that…derived…from [the administration’s] global policy.”222 Thus, while the 
timing and speed might have come as a surprise, at the most senior levels of the Indian 
government there was little “Nixon shock” about the direction of Nixon’s policy toward 
China.  
The announcement of Sino-US rapprochement did not make an India-Soviet 
treaty inevitable. As a US intelligence assessment subsequently noted, in general the 
senior Indian leadership believed that “cautious steps” to improve US-China relations per 
se were to the “net advantage” of India.223 Gandhi indeed “welcomed” the start of 
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normalization of Sino-American relations.224 Rather, the treaty was the result of a 
confluence of conditions: the crisis, Gandhi’s expanded domestic political capacity, the 
Indian need for deterrence and the Soviet desire for a treaty in return for providing that 
deterrence, as well as the lack of availability of the US as an option as a result of the 
Sino-US rapprochement.  
Coming in the midst of the crisis, the announcement of Kissinger’s trip caused 
anxiety at the lower levels of the Indian government and the military, and among the 
public. At the senior levels, the impact of the rapprochement on the role of the US in the 
crisis caused concern. At the onset of the crisis, an influential defense analyst had 
assessed the “probability of Chinese intervention” as “low.” Even if China intervened, he 
asserted “the chances of Super Power support to India appear to be fairly high in the 
current circumstances.”225 The altered Sino-US dynamic, however, made evident that—at 
least as far as the US was concerned—the circumstances had changed. Just as awareness 
of altered Sino-US dynamics had preceded Nixon’s announcement, so had doubts about 
the US role. In Delhi in early July, Haksar had been “puzzled” by Kissinger’s implication 
that if China intervened in an India-Pakistan conflict, India would “have to rely on” the 
Soviet Union.226 Kissinger’s indication to Jha that India would be on its own if it took 
action in East Pakistan and China intervened caused further concern.227 Soviet officials 
indeed played on Indian anxieties about the US, noting that Sino-US rapprochement 
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“must be a matter of concern” to India.228 The suggested absence of US support against 
China at a time when there was a real chance that India and Pakistan would go to war, 
with China possibly intervening to aid Pakistan made an India-Soviet treaty more 
desirable to India than before—as a morale booster, deterrent to China, and source of 
fuel, military supply and support at the UN.229  
The treaty had also become more feasible, since the American attitude had 
strengthened the hands of those in the Indian government who supported signing the 
treaty and tilting toward Moscow.230 The Indian ambassador in Moscow, DP Dhar, had 
been pressing Delhi to return to discussions on the treaty earlier in the summer, arguing, 
“In these difficult days, it is only the Soviet Union whose help and support you can count 
on with an assured degree of confidence.”231 Criticizing Delhi’s “lukewarm response” to 
Moscow, he had highlighted the possibility of Chinese intervention to argue in favor of 
closer Indo-Soviet relations.232 Now, Dhar found “a sense of urgency” in India for the 
treaty.233  
Indian foreign secretary TN Kaul—also an advocate of the treaty—emphasized 
the changed circumstances: “the possibility of Sino-American détente and the change in 
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attitude of US Government to the Bangla Desh problem…” He referenced Kissinger’s 
conversation with Jha, noting, “America would not intervene in any conflict between 
India and Pakistan even if China did so.” He added, “[t]his has changed the whole 
perspective in which the Soviet proposal has to be considered…[since] there is no other 
alternative left to us but to have a reliable friend in case of necessity.”234  
Along with the strategic circumstances, advocates of the treaty were also aware 
that the domestic political conditions were more favorable. In Moscow to discuss the 
treaty in August, Dhar noted that with the 1971 elections “the progressive policies of 
Mrs. Gandhi and her party were given an overwhelming support by the people of our 
country.” With the crisis additionally looming, “the climate was [now] suitable.”235 
Furthermore, by August, the Indian public attitude towards the US had deteriorated, with 
those having a favorable opinion of it in India dropping from 49 percent from the year 
before to 17 percent. Negative opinions of the US rose from 9 percent to 28 percent. 
Favorable opinion of the Soviet Union, meanwhile, had risen somewhat to 59 percent. Of 
those surveyed, 60 percent identified the Soviet Union as friendly towards India, 
compared to 40 percent who thought the US was friendly towards India.236  
Kaul argued internally that “[a]t the present psychological moment” with war 
imminent and US unwillingness to cease actions that could be harmful to India, most, but 
not all political parties, would support the treaty. There would be some political 
opposition, but Kaul asserted that the treaty would have popular support because it would 
give India a “reliable and powerful friend” in a time of crisis.237 Indeed, when the treaty 
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was announced, even Jan Sangh leader Atal Behari Vajpayee—usually a critic of Mrs. 
Gandhi’s government—acknowledged that India now had a much-needed “friend at a 
critical juncture.”238 
British officials saw the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation 
signed in August as India “taking out [an] insurance policy with [the] USSR.”239 Some on 
the Soviet side later identified it as “primarily a geopolitical move to offset Nixon’s 
rapprochement with China.”240 Kissinger described the treaty in his memoirs as a 
“bombshell.”241 At the time privately to Nixon, however, Kissinger, too, assessed it as a 
response to the Sino-US rapprochement and also the Soviet Union’s way of deterring 
India from making any rash moves related to the crisis.242 
Indeed, even in the final stages of the treaty discussions, senior Soviet 
policymakers urged Indian restraint.243 Indian policymakers agreed that the first step 
would be to consider what steps India and the Soviet Union could take together “to 
prevent a conflict.” Nonetheless, if a conflict broke out, India wanted to assess what the 
two countries could do “so that India is enabled to emerge out of it successfully.”244 
                                                
238 “Praise of Soviet Voiced in India,” NYT, August 11, 1971, p. 7. 
239 Briefing for Mrs. Gandhi’s Visit - Cable from Sir Terence Garvey, British High Commissioner to India, 
to FCO, September 28, 1971, NA, Document 90, FCO 37/825: Visits of Prime Minister of India from India 
to United Kingdom, 1971. A British assessment noted, “the signing of the Indo/Soviet Treaty was forced 
upon [Indira Gandhi] by the East Pakistan crisis; in more normal times she might well have refused to 
entertain it. She does not wish to see India become a Soviet satellite and her forthcoming round of visits is 
no doubt partly aimed at demonstrating India’s continued independence.” “Mrs. Gandhi’s Visit: 
Biographical Note on Mrs. Gandhi, Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs,” October 15, 1971, NA, 
FCO 37/814: Political Situation in India, 1971, Document 25.  
240 Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), p. 217 
241 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 866. 
242 Memo from Kissinger to Nixon, August 24, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976 Vol. XI, p. 363. 
243 Record of Discussions between Kosygin and DP Dhar, Moscow, August 5, 1971, NMML, PNH (III), 
SF No. 280. 
244 Haksar, Points for PM’s Conversations with Gromyko, August 8, 1971, NMML, PNH (III), SF No. 
170. 
 500 
Indian policymakers continued to be concerned about Soviet reliability—especially now 
that the US option was no longer available. There were persisting questions about the 
status of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Indian officials also disapproved of Gromyko’s 
mention of a potential visit to Pakistan. Thus, after the treaty was signed, Haksar 
suggested to the Indian foreign minister that he make clear to his Soviet counterpart that 
the Indian people would expect help in the crisis.245 From Indian policymakers’ 
perspective, Moscow’s public underplaying the security provisions of the treaty 
continued to rankle.246  
At that stage, there was little expectation that the US would join up on the other 
side. There was more of a sense that US policymakers “might act in the same manner as 
they did in 1965”—sitting back.247 But there was a feeling that “Pakistan’s intransigence 
has been further strengthened by the help rendered by them in facilitating Kissinger’s 
visit to China.”248 Furthermore, there was concern that Yahya would go to war “egged on 
by China, and general support of the United States.” Haksar saw China’s motive as “the 
economic and political disruption of India without firing a shot.” Thus, Indian officials 
received with concern reports that there had been Chinese troop movements in Gilgit.249  
There were questions in India about whether China would indeed intervene in any 
potential conflict—the Indian government was aware of Pakistani doubts on the matter.250 
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Thus, India aimed “to probe [Beijing’s] intentions” and “refrained from making any 
statement which might even remotely irritate them.”251 There were some attempts to 
reach out to Beijing. Even in 1971, Gandhi had continued to be open to an improvement 
in Sino-Indian relations. In spring, Dhar had noted that with her new electoral mandate, 
Gandhi was in an even better position to normalize relations with China, but “we cannot 
argue before a stone wall.”252 Nonetheless, in July, Gandhi had written directly to Zhou, 
urging China to use its “undoubted influence” with Pakistan.253 A letter from Gandhi to a 
member of parliament drafted by Haksar noted that India was “not insensitive” to the 
need for re-establishing relations with China and was trying to develop contacts with 
China through its embassies.254 As a confidence-building measure, Gandhi also approved 
approaching Beijing to establish a bilateral “wireless communication” link.255 Gandhi’s 
general attitude towards China—as well as the exclusivity of the Indo-Soviet treaty—was 
evident in her suggestion that India approach China for a treaty as well.256 
The Crisis and US-India Relations Deteriorate  
There seemed little progress on that front or any other. As the monsoon season 
wound down over September and October, opportunities for a peaceful resolution of the 
crisis seemed to dissipate as each of the actors involved became increasingly inflexible. 
The Nixon administration continued to resist calls for pressure on Pakistan, and instead 
pressured India, asserting that India needed to take the first steps to de-escalate the 
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situation. Prodded by Nixon, Yahya eventually became willing to make concessions on 
the military front to get India to back down, agreeing to withdraw troops from the West 
Pakistan-India border if India would do the same.257 By the fall, however, India seemed 
to have decided the situation represented not just a threat, but an opportunity as well. As 
part of the government’s second diplomatic offensive that year, Gandhi set out for what 
many later saw as a preemptive justification tour.258 
In November even as Gandhi was visiting Washington, Kissinger insisted “We 
are willing to do anything if the Indians will give us 6 months to turn around in.”259 The 
president’s upcoming trips to Moscow and Beijing drove Kissinger’s timetable. Nixon 
and Kissinger remained concerned about China’s reaction to the US approach to the 
crisis, even though a surprised Kissinger had noticed that by the fall Zhou had ceased to 
be interested in discussing the South Asian situation despite China’s public pledges of 
support for Pakistan.260 State Department and allies’ assessments had also been noting 
Chinese reticence, which they expected would persist.261 Gandhi, too, commented on the 
fact that till that point Chinese support to Pakistan had fallen short of the level extended 
during the 1965 India-Pakistan war.262  
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India kept a close eye on Sino-Pakistan interactions. The Indian chargé in Beijing 
reported some signals indicating that China did not want war and its support might not go 
as far as Pakistan wanted. When Pakistani foreign minister Bhutto visited China in early 
November, Mishra noted that, unlike Pakistan, China omitted reference to Chinese 
support for Pakistan in 1965 in speeches. He reported the official Chinese news agencies 
as deleting or moderating Bhutto’s remarks on India and on the extent of Chinese support 
to Pakistan. Mishra assessed the Chinese motivation as wanting to “keep its options 
open.” Mishra said his “overall assessment is that China has adopted an attitude of 
restraint and is advising Pakistan to do the same.”263 He noted that other information 
suggested that China had promised Pakistan support at the UN and military equipment, 
but declined to intervene because of a “desire to avoid clash with Soviet Union.”264 
Gandhi’s timetable was driven by factors different from those motivating that of 
Kissinger. The military window of opportunity loomed for India. Serious skirmishes 
broke out in late November and Gandhi gave General Manekshaw, the Chief of Army 
Staff, the go ahead for major action on December 4. The Nixon administration 
spokesperson announced that “the U.S. plans to remain neutral,”265 but as Nixon said 
privately to Kissinger, “[o]f course, we’re not neutral.”266 The US held India responsible 
for the outbreak of the war, cancelled loans and sales of military spares and delayed 
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approving food aid to India. Simultaneously, the White House suggested to America’s 
Middle Eastern allies that while the US could not sell, or permit them to sell, American 
equipment to Pakistan, it would be “obliged to protest, but…will understand” if they 
supplied Pakistan with American arms.267 
As the war progressed, Kissinger remained concerned about the impact of the US 
response on China’s thinking:  
if it turns out that we end up with the complete dismemberment of Pakistan, then 
they will conclude, ‘All right. We played it decently but [the US is] just too 
weak.’ And that they have to break their encirclement, not by dealing with us, but 
by moving either [unclear] or drop the whole idea.268  
With the Pakistan Army’s defeat in the east imminent, Nixon and Kissinger became 
convinced that India would try to destroy West Pakistan next, despite substantial contrary 
analysis within the US government.269 Kissinger claimed to skeptical allies that he had 
received reports that the Indian cabinet had made such a decision.270 Indian assurances, 
directly and through the Soviet Union, as well as doubts about military feasibility failed 
to dislodge this belief.271  
Did India intend to take parts of West Pakistan? At the time, Haksar wrote to Jha 
that India had “no claims against the territory of West Pakistan.” Moreover, he asserted 
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that even though Pakistan-held Kashmir “legally belonged” to India, Delhi had said 
repeatedly that it would not “alter the status quo by force.”272 After the war, Haksar 
commented to Jha on the CIA report about the cabinet meeting:  
at no time PM ever made a statement even remotely resembling what the CIA 
agents have reported. You should also know that there was no occasion for the 
Cabinet to discuss the question. The only time when this matter was discussed 
was on the evening of 16th December, first in the PAC of the Cabinet and later on 
in the Cabinet as well as with the leaders of the Opposition. At these discussions 
no one suggested that we might continue the war.273 
India might not have had time for expanded operations on the western front. Even in 
1967, when considering India-Pakistan war scenarios, Haksar had noted that whatever 
India’s objective, it would have a “short space of time allotted to us between the 
commencement of hostilities and the activisation of international pressure, including the 
UN, for the cessation of hostilities and cease-fire.”274 As the war was underway in 1971, 
Soviet and Indian officials agreed that India had around a fortnight to complete 
operations. After that, Soviet patience and support would run out, even as pressure at the 
UN from China and the US would grow.275 After that, some Indian officials also believed 
that the pressure on China to intervene would increase.276  
Despite the risks involved, after discussions with Nixon, Kissinger suggested to 
the Chinese permanent representative to the UN that in order to prevent West Pakistan 
going the way of East Pakistan, India needed to be “intimidated.” He urged a concerted, 
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coordinated China-Pakistan-US effort to confront the India-Soviet action. Encouraging 
China to increase its military commitment, Kissinger passed along Nixon’s message that 
if China “were to consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent a threat to its security, 
and if it took measures to protect its security, the U.S. would oppose efforts of others to 
interfere with the People’s Republic.” The permanent representative reiterated that China 
was prepared to defend itself if attacked. But, concerned that taking any action against 
India would give the Soviet Union an excuse to attack China, he repeatedly emphasized 
that China wanted to persist with efforts underway at the UN to resolve the situation.277 
Hoping to convince China of US willingness to provide back up if China made any 
military moves, Nixon had authorized the dispatch of a naval task force into the Bay of 
Bengal. Nixon claimed later that this deployment resulted in India announcing a ceasefire 
on all fronts when Pakistan surrendered in the east in mid–December. Contemporary and 
later assessments question this claim.278 The result that was unquestionable was that US-
India relations reached their lowest point. China, in confluence with a crisis, had once 
again cast a dark shadow on the US-India relationship. This time around, however, this 
was a result of Washington’s—rather than New Delhi’s—efforts to engage Beijing. 
Did Washington’s pressure on Moscow result in the ceasefire? Soviet calls for 
restraint had preceded US pressure. Since the beginning of the crisis, Moscow had urged 
Delhi and Islamabad to find a peaceful solution. It had been concerned for a few years 
about Beijing taking advantage of any instability in the subcontinent.279 The signing of 
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the treaty did not result in Soviet officials changing their approach on this front—if 
anything, they were more concerned since they would inevitably be involved in any 
conflict. When Gandhi had visited Moscow in fall 1971, Kosygin had continued to 
encourage her to find a peaceful solution for this reason.280 Nevertheless, it would be hard 
to argue that Moscow’s concerns about the crisis were insulated from its desire for 
détente with Washington. 
A VICIOUS CIRCLE (1972) 
In the aftermath of the crisis, Kissinger predicted that India would want to re-
establish a working relationship with the US, because Gandhi would not want to become 
overly dependent on the Soviet Union and India was still in no position to do without 
external assistance.281 In January 1972, Kissinger felt vindicated when Keating reported 
that Kaul had suggested that India wanted to improve relations with the US.282 
Kissinger’s prediction that US-India relations would soon be better than before the 
Bangladesh crisis, however, proved wrong.283 The crisis left a “critical strain” in the US-
India relationship.284 
Observers saw India’s first major foreign policy step in 1972—upgrading its 
relations with North Vietnam, which had earlier been “deferred out of deference to US 
sensitivities”285—as retaliation for Washington’s actions during the war.286 Furthermore, 
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the Indian ambassador asserted that while he thought the relationship needed to “get back 
on more even keel,” it would be “more difficult for GOI to take any initiatives.”287 
Gandhi herself “welcome[d] efforts to make a new start” but made clear that “the ball 
was in the US court.”288 
What followed were months characterized by what Keating called a “vicious 
circle of actions and counteractions,” leaving US-India relations in a “state of limbo and 
drift.”289 The ambassador to India noted that the US and India had a “tendency to place 
[the] worst possible construction on other’s acts of commission or omission.”290 This 
tendency was only reinforced by Delhi’s post-crisis conviction that the overall American 
objective—in collusion with China and Pakistan—was to contain India. Post-crisis, the 
Soviet Union’s position was enhanced in India since it was seen as having stood by an 
India faced with a potential two-front war. On the other hand, the US—traditionally the 
country India had looked to for aid against China—had left India without support.291  
Gandhi traced the change in America’s India policy to “when your policy toward 
China changed.”292 In the aftermath of the war, India remained concerned about the 
influence of the China and Pakistan factors on US policy. Some US diplomats reinforced 
these concerns by their suggestions to Indian counterparts that China and Pakistan had 
been the reason for Nixon’s “anti-Indian attitude” during the war.293 Indian policymakers 
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asked their British counterparts about the US attitude. The foreign minister asked whether 
there was “any parallelism” between American thinking about the subcontinent and 
China. The Indian foreign secretary asked if China or the US were “egging [Bhutto] on in 
adopting his present posture?”294 
Contrary to British assurances to Indian officials otherwise,295 China continued to 
cast a shadow on the relationship from the US perspective. Though Kaul had opened the 
door to an improvement in relations, Kissinger was adamant that, given the president’s 
upcoming trip to China in February, it was not the time for the US to respond positively. 
The US could “not do much now before we go to China because the Chinese are 
psychopathic.” Nixon agreed, but noted that the US should move towards improvement 
before the elections “for American consumption.” Kissinger assured the president that 
“by July we will have them improved.” For domestic consumption, Nixon and Kissinger 
decided to leak the information that India was seeking an improvement so that they 
would not get blamed for “driv[ing] them toward the Soviets.”296  
On the US side, there was agreement that India would be open to an improvement 
even later in the year. Keating believed there would be limits to Soviet influence in 
India—partly because neither the Soviet Union nor India would meet the other’s 
expectations.297 Rogers, too, predicted that to offset its “increased indebtedness to the 
Soviet Union”—the “price” of its victory—India would “try to restore more balanced 
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relations with Moscow, Peking and Washington over time.”298 The NSC staff noted that, 
while exploiting the Soviet need for India in its effort to contain China, “India will also 
presumably continue to have some interest in a reasonable relationship with the US as a 
balance and even in lessening the strain in its relations with China.”299 
Soviet influence in India, nonetheless, was a matter of concern to some US 
officials. Keating argued that the US should remain involved in and with India—not just 
to limit the Soviet role in India by providing an alternative, but also to limit the “spoiler” 
role that India could play vis-à-vis US interests in Asia.300 The NSC staff also laid down 
this reason to improve relations with India: it was in US interests to see the Soviet thrust 
in India “blunted.” Since Moscow’s relationship with India was “motivated by the 
containment of China as much as anything,” the NSC felt that China, too, would share 
such an interest. Moreover, the US had to keep in mind that in the long term two 
competing factors would be at play:  
the US on the one hand shares with Pakistan and China an interest in curbing 
India's power insofar as it is seen as enhancing the global position of the USSR. 
On the other hand, the US also has an interest in maintaining influence of its own 
in India. India is an emerging middle level power bent on and capable of playing a 
pre-dominant regional role and establishing a strongly competitive position 
throughout Asia. 
At that point, however, Nixon and Kissinger’s sensitivities regarding China took 
precedence. NSC staffers asserted “the new US relationship with China requires that the 
US not appear to forsake Pakistan or reward India for its recent aggression.”301  
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The China imperative called for delaying a response to Kaul’s overture and any 
further steps till after Nixon’s scheduled visit to China in February. Kissinger noted that 
the choice was whether to normalize relations with India rapidly or “let India work its 
way back slowly.” The State Department and the White House agreed on a “go slow” 
approach until the end of February, letting India take the initiative and keeping the 
pressure up on it to see “what benefits we can get out of it.”302 The White House also 
dissuaded McNamara, then head of the World Bank, “from raising any new commitment 
to India on February 21. That would be the worst possible time for us to have to face the 
issue.”303 Any improvement in relations with India had to wait, according to Kissinger, 
because “we must go to China first in order to determine how we will play the triangular 
relationship in South Asia.”304  
The president went even further, asking McNamara “Is it worth normalizing our 
relations?”305 This question partly reflected the fact that India was no longer considered 
useful to American plans in Asia. At a time when shared bilateral interests seemed to be 
lacking, the US ambassador was left emphasizing “shared values” as the “bedrock.” The 
US went from having a specific interest in India to what Keating called a “general 
interest” in the country.306 
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However, India could still play spoiler—something the US needed to guard 
against. In early February, Kissinger met with the Indian ambassador, primarily “to keep 
India quiet while we were in China.” He suggested to Jha that India and the US had an 
opportunity for a new start and develop a relationship whereby “India would take the 
United States less for granted; the United States could give up its sentimentalization of 
India.”307 Jha, however, noted to Sisco that the Nixon administration came closer to 
vilifying than sentimentalizing India. He pointed to Nixon’s foreign policy report that 
year as an example, noting that it represented the first instance of “consistent, sustained 
and sharp criticism of India” by an American president.308  
Nixon’s China policy also affected US policy related to India’s neighbors in a 
manner that rubbed India the wrong way. The White House delayed any recognition of 
Bangladesh, a key priority for India. In the long term, Rogers pointed out that US and 
Indian interests vis-à-vis Bangladesh would converge; those of China and the US would 
diverge since China would seek to encourage a radical Bangladesh that could be used as a 
base to destabilize India, which Beijing looked upon “as a long range strategic and 
political opponent.”309 In the short term, however, Sisco stated, “we need a better feel as 
to how the Chinese will play it.” Kissinger agreed, noting, “I want to be sure that a move 
toward recognition doesn't jeopardize a larger objective with China.”310 The 
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administration even deferred decisions regarding participation in reconstruction efforts in 
Bangladesh till after the president’s China trip.311  
The White House also continued to support Pakistan in order to show China that 
the US was a credible partner. In the lead up to the China trip, Kissinger told Nixon that it 
was critical that Washington showed Beijing that it was “reliable enough to deliver on the 
commitments we make,” or else their initiative would be “stillborn.”312 These 
commitments included support to Pakistan—a country with which China was 
“exceptionally close.”313 Thus, while the administration wanted to defer any decision on 
economic assistance or debt relief to India till after the China trip, the president wanted to 
be “forthcoming” when it came to Pakistan. Kissinger had noted that the US also needed 
to find a way to restore “some degree of military assistance” to Pakistan.314  
During the visit to China, Nixon claimed credit for Soviet restraint of India and 
for saving Pakistan. He told Mao and Zhou that he had held steadfast despite the 
domestic political costs and bureaucratic opposition in the US.315 Nixon also assured 
Zhou that, while it might be difficult for domestic political reasons for the US to aid 
Pakistan militarily, it would provide substantial economic assistance—freeing up 
Pakistani resources to acquire military supplies from others.316 
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Before the trip, administration officials had reaffirmed to their Chinese 
counterparts that the US would not make any policy changes regarding South Asia 
without consultation with Beijing. In South Asia, it intended to follow “an approach 
which parallels that of the People’s Republic of China.”317 During his meetings with 
Zhou, Nixon repeated this assurance, indicating that he would keep Beijing informed of 
US policy in the subcontinent because “your interest here is greater than ours.” 
Furthermore, he indicated “it is essential to carry out the Prime Minister’s philosophy 
which is also ours, that no nation should establish dominance in that part of the 
subcontinent”—a statement that Indian policymakers, had they known about it, would 
likely have interpreted as evidence of Sino-US collusion to prevent India’s rise.  
Just as Soviet leaders had played up Sino-US collaboration in order to encourage 
closer India-Soviet ties, Nixon sought to play up India-Soviet collusion to encourage 
greater Sino-US collaboration. The president told Zhou that India alone was hardly a 
threat to China, but an India backed by the Soviet Union was a “present threat”—one 
which China had limited options against. Nixon assured the premier that the US would 
use its “influence to prevent Japanese or Indian attacks against China.” Furthermore, 
Washington would say nothing with regard to those two countries that could embarrass 
China.318  
The Shanghai communiqué that emerged from Nixon’s visit to China did more 
than embarrass India. Gandhi criticized its reference to India-Pakistan issues and 
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specifically Kashmir.319 Kissinger pointed out to Jha that “the U.S. formulation was much 
milder than the Chinese formulation.”320 The national security advisor did not mention 
that he had not objected to—or tried to change Chinese policymakers’ minds about—the 
Chinese formulation, while being open to Chinese views regarding changes to the US 
formulation.321 Indeed, Kaul later asserted that the US should not have allowed China to 
include its starker formulation.322 
The Indian ambassador noted that Delhi acknowledged that the US formulation 
on the India-Pakistan question was milder. However, he expressed other concerns—
specifically that the wording of the communiqué left open the door for US acceptance of 
Chinese hegemony in South Asia.323 This was a far cry from Kissinger’s assurance a year 
before that “if the Chinese seek to dominate areas outside their country, or, for instance, 
dominate India, we cannot connive at this.”324 The Indian ambassador did not express 
another concern that Indian officials worried about internally—the possibility that Nixon 
and Mao had reached a secret understanding.325 
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Essentially, the Indian concern was that that China and the US would work 
together to contain India.326 As the US was triangulating, an Indian observer noted to 
Gandhi, “India was calculatedly left out of calculations about the Asian scene. We were 
supposed to be at best naughty, clever boys, who could spoil a scene, but could never 
play a role in the drama.”327 Even some US observers commented on the sidelining of 
India. Walt Rostow wrote to Kissinger to express his concern about Nixon’s vision of a 
multipolar world that included China, but left out India.” He asserted that India needed to 
be brought “back into the equation of power in Asia.”328 
While Nixon was in China, Gandhi had asserted, “we will not allow China and the 
USA to decide what should happen in Asia.”329 During the election campaign in India in 
March, Gandhi implied that China and the US wanted to “create trouble” for India. She 
used the US as a “whipping boy,” criticizing it—alone and in conjunction with China—
for its support of Pakistan. She said the US was “sitting on China’s lap,” while China was 
getting whatever it wanted.330 She repeated publicly what Jha had indicated to US 
officials privately: that India did not oppose improved Sino-US relations per se.331 
                                                
326 Memo From Saunders and Hoskinson (NSC Staff) to Kissinger re CIA Office of National Estimates 
Report on India’s Foreign Policy, April 24, 1972, FRUS 1969-76 Vol. E-7 
(http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d257) 
327 Letter from Dharam Bir Sinha (Deputy Minister, I&B) to Gandhi, February 26, 1972, NMML, PNH 
(III), SF No. 217. Gandhi wrote that Haksar might be interested in the letter. 
328 Letter from Walt Rostow to Kissinger, March 13, 1972, NPM, NSCF, HAK Office Files, 
Administrative and Staff Files, Chron File July 1971-July 1972, Box 14. 
329 Quoted in Tharoor, Reasons of State, p. 200. 
330 Telegram from AmEmb India to the DoS, March 8, 1972, FRUS 1969-76 Vol. E-7 
(http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d232) 
331 Telegram From the DoS to the AmEmb India re Jha-Irwin Meeting, January 21, 1972, Ibid 
(http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d212). Haksar later reemphasized this in 
internal correspondence, noting to Gandhi that Nixon’s evolving relations with China and the Soviet Union 
(“we…rejoice at this”) were in fact validation of India’s views re peaceful coexistence. Note from Haksar 
to Gandhi on Some Stray Thoughts on India’s Foreign Policy in Contemporary International Situation, May 
31, 1972 in NMML, PNH (I-II), SF No. 52. 
 517 
Rapprochement between China and the US had been and was welcome, but not at India’s 
expense.332 
Indian officials were concerned that the way China and the US would choose to 
contain India was by rearming Pakistan.333 They indeed expressed this concern during 
discussions with Soviet defense officials that had been held while Nixon was in China. 
Discussing India assessments of the threat from China and Pakistan, Manekshaw had 
asserted that American and then Chinese military supply to Pakistan had resulted in 
Islamabad’s hostile posture.334 The Soviet defense minister had contended that India 
“overrat[ed]” the Pakistan threat; the “real threat” was from China.335  
Worried about the China threat and what might be transpiring in Beijing between 
Chinese and US policymakers, Indian officials had wanted to make sure they had Soviet 
support. As Keating had predicted, however, there was a limit to how far India would go. 
Just before the military delegation’s trip, Gandhi had publicly asserted that India 
remained nonaligned.336 During their visit, the Soviet defense minister had wanted to 
upgrade and operationalize the treaty. He had suggested that 
the two countries should arrive at a firm understanding which will involve a 
programme of cooperation, coordination and even structural inter-relation of 
strategy, tactics between the Soviet and Indian defence forces against a possible 
Chinese involvement in a conflict with us or the Soviet Union.  
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Dhar, however, had demurred saying that the two countries did not need to be “thinking 
in terms of any military alliance” since the treaty already provided for consultations.337 
Grechko had persisted, noting the potential benefits to India of “some form of a military 
alliance” with the Soviet Union. When Manekshaw said that India needed equipment to 
be prepared against China, Grechko replied that if they had an alliance “I shall earmark 
50 IBMs for your defence against China.”338 India, however, had remained reticent. 
The US-India relationship meanwhile remained strained. Even the response to 
American attempts to brief Indian officials on the president’s trip to China reflected the 
tension. On March 28, Keating tried to meet Gandhi to brief her on Nixon’s trip to China, 
but was told to try to meet the foreign minister instead—this was the first time she had 
refused to see the ambassador. The foreign minister, in turn, commented that everything 
Keating told him had already been made public. Other than asking if further trips were 
planned, he did not say much on the subject.339 He did, however, say more than enough—
from the US perspective at least—on another subject: Vietnam. Swaran Singh publicly 
condemned the US resumption of bombing of North Vietnam in statements that the US 
thought were “unbalanced” and stemming from “pique.” Gandhi herself called the US 
action “deplorable.”340 These statements came despite the fact that Indian officials knew 
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that such Indian statements on Vietnam had in the past negatively affected relations and 
aid.341 
As a sign of good will, at the beginning of the year, Keating had recommended 
that the administration restore the aid to India it had suspended the previous year.342 Even 
after the president’s China trip, however, the White House was in no hurry to resume aid 
and was not too concerned about the potential negative Indian reaction.343 Along with 
annoyance at Indian statements on Vietnam, policymakers also continued to be concerned 
about China’s reaction. One of the programs that had been affected by the aid suspension 
was the Peace Indigo program, a communication system designed to connect the early-
warning radar system that the US had provided India for use on the Sino-Indian border 
after the 1962 war. When the question arose of what to do about the program—because 
the suspension was driving particular US companies to the brink of bankruptcy—
Kissinger’s most pressing question was how the program “related to China.”344 
Senior State and Defense department officials agreed that the US should continue 
to “play it cool” with India. The administration did not need to do anything for India. The 
“best way” to get India to come calling was for Washington “to have a success in 
Moscow, to continue the normalization of our relations with China and to have a stable 
government in Pakistan.”345 
CIA analysts indicated, however, that the Indian government seemed disinclined 
to take the initiative and, regardless, was unlikely to respond to any US initiative. NSC 
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staffers suggested that given this assessment, “Perhaps what is needed first is a more 
gradual repair job with softer words on both sides and measured actions until we reach 
the point where the past can really be put behind us.”346 
Softer words and measured action, however, were not on the cards. After the US 
informed India that no aid would be forthcoming for the current year and there was only a 
provisional request for FY1973, India told the US to reduce USAID personnel in India.347 
Then, more Indian criticism of US actions in Vietnam followed. There was “formal 
condemnation” from the foreign minister.348 On a visit to Europe, Gandhi, too, criticized 
US policy in Vietnam—later she acknowledged that she had taken the unusual step of 
going as far as “condemn[ing]” US policy.349 India was also more critical of any 
American presence in the Indian Ocean than it had been before—while even a couple of 
years earlier Delhi might have seen this as a stabilizing development, it now insisted that 
it would bring more conflict to the neighborhood. Gandhi was also more vocal about her 
concerns about external political interference in Indian domestic politics. These concerns 
had dated back to 1967, but she was much more assertive on this front, convinced that the 
US was trying to weaken India and her government, and that such an approach also 
brought her political benefits.350  
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Indian policymakers saw the refusal to re-start the aid program as more evidence 
of a plan to keep India down. Jha said India needed to think about its development plans 
assuming no US aid.351 Soviet policymakers encouraged these Indian feelings. The Soviet 
ambassador in India played on Gandhi’s concerns about joint Sino-US action contrary to 
India’s interests, urging Delhi to work with Moscow to “frustrat[e] the plots.”352 Soviet 
officials reported that China had sent Pakistan tanks and fighter aircraft, as well as other 
military equipment that year, and that Nixon had agreed to supply Pakistan militarily 
through intermediaries.353 Despite the fact that India and Pakistan reached an agreement 
in Simla that summer, there was also a persisting sense in India that China and the US 
support of Pakistan increased Pakistani president Bhutto’s “intransigence.”354 
As Keating noted, however, while “India’s relations with the United States are 
bad, with few prospects for early improvement; yet India does not wish to close off 
indefinitely this relationship and option.” The reason for this was wariness of the 
demands that came with overdependence. These concerns came to the fore as India 
watched warily as Soviet leaders met with their American counterparts in Moscow that 
summer. Concerned about any partnership being at India’s expense, Gandhi and her 
foreign minister warned both superpowers off from trying to carve out spheres of 
influence in South Asia.355 Her government also continued to show little enthusiasm for 
                                                
351 Letter from Jha to IG Patel, April 27, 1972, NMML, PNH (III), SF No. 277. 
352 Letter from Pegov to Gandhi, June 27, 1972, NMML, PNH (III), SF No. 92 (a-d). Haksar noted that 
Gandhi had seen the letter. 
353 Note from GC Saxena (Deputy Director, R&AW) to DP Dhar, Haksar and Kaul, June 1972, NMML, 
PNH (III), SF No. 92 (a-d). Earlier, Soviet defence officials had told Manekshaw that China was planning 
to supply Pakistan militarily further. See Record of Discussion between Indian and Soviet Delegations held 
at the Ministry of Defence, Moscow, February 24 and 27, 1972 (dated March 3, 1972), NMML, PNH (III), 
SF No. 235. 
354 Telegram from Keating to DoS re Gandhi-Bhutto Summit, June 21, 1972, NPM, NSCF, CF-ME, India, 
Vol. V, Box 598. 
355 Telegram from Keating to DoS re Indian Reaction to Moscow Summit, June 2, 1972, NPM, NSCF, CF-
ME, India, Vol. V, Box 598. Interestingly, China had similar worries. Zhou commented on India’s 
 522 
Brezhnev’s collective security system. Soviet officials had brought it up once again in 
March, and, then in June, claimed that the India-Soviet treaty was among the first steps 
toward such a system. Some in the Congress party had suggested signing on to the 
Brezhnev plan.356 The government, however, did not support this idea. It asserted that it 
had not received any such proposal from Moscow and that the superpowers should leave 
Asians to sort out their own affairs.357 
The desire to reduce dependence altogether caused Gandhi to seek improved 
Sino-Indian relations. Two months after the crisis—and just before Nixon’s China visit—
Gandhi had said that India “would like normal relations with China,” pointing out that 
Sino-Indian relations were no worse than before.358An American intelligence assessment 
had predicted that India would continue to “welcome some improvement in their relations 
with China.”359 A Congress party resolution on international affairs especially mentioned 
China as one the countries India wanted to improve relations with.360 Foreign officials 
had told their Indian counterparts that China was insecure and uncertain about the India-
Soviet partnership.361 Thus, preparing Gandhi for an interview with ABC, Haksar’s 
talking points included reassurance  
It will be very short-sighted for any country to build its hopes and aspirations on 
setting China against the Soviet Union and vice versa. So far as India is 
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concerned, we have good and cordial relations with the Soviet Union and we hope 
that China too will realize that in the present day world there is no particular 
profit in assuming permanent postures of conflict and hostility.362 
In July, Gandhi publicly mentioned that the “slow improvement” in Sino-Indian relations 
before the Bangladesh crisis had stalled, and expressed hope that they would improve.363 
In her September Foreign Affairs article, Gandhi explicitly stated “we want better 
relations with China.”364 
It also likely reinforced Gandhi’s decision for India to take a key step on the path 
to exercising its nuclear weapons program option, which it had left open. Rostow had 
predicted that one of the results of the Sino-US rapprochement would be deeper Indian 
exploration of the nuclear option.365 Just after the 1971 war had ended, the American 
embassy in Delhi had suggested that it was possible that the Indian government while not 
moving forward with a nuclear weapons program, might decide to conduct an 
underground test to demonstrate to China, as well as its domestic critics that India had 
such a capacity. It, however, had noted that this was most likely a long-term possibility. 
After all Gandhi had publicly said it was unnecessary for India to go nuclear to deter 
adversaries.366 Some in the Defense Department had fretted that India might find it 
advantageous to “go…nuclear before the President's trip to Peking” and to reinforce its 
dominance vis-à-vis Pakistan in South Asia.367 INR had asserted that the risks 
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outweighed the benefits for India and it was likely to defer any decision to go nuclear for 
“several years.”368 In July, the president asked the NSC staff to explore the issue.369  
During the course of that examination, the embassy in Delhi would note, “there is 
no evidence GOI has decided to stage peaceful test blast.”370 State Department officials 
concluded that they “didn’t know” whether India would conduct a test.371 Intelligence 
analysis would suggest, “The chances are roughly even that India will conduct a test in 
the next several years and label it a peaceful explosion.”372 The NSC study would 
recommend that Washington discuss the question with Moscow and keep Beijing 
informed. It would conclude, however, that there was “no firm intelligence that Mrs. 
Gandhi has given a political go-ahead for detonating an underground nuclear device 
(which the Indians would undoubtedly label a peaceful nuclear explosion) or for 
developing nuclear weapons and a delivery system.”373  
Evidence suggests, however, that this was the period Gandhi that gave the formal 
approval for the final stage of work towards a PNE. Earlier that year, there had been 
many calls across most of the political spectrum for India to develop its nuclear program 
further.374 That summer Gandhi stressed that India’s policy was “to investigate the 
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possibility of peaceful nuclear explosions, but not to develop nuclear weapons.”375 There 
is some debate about when exactly the decision for a PNE in principle was made. There 
are arguments that the decision followed the death of India’s atomic energy commission 
chairman and the 1971 war and therefore was spurred by personnel or prestige factors.376 
Others suggest it preceded both those events.377 Whatever the exact date, most of the 
available evidence suggests that a decision in principle was made in late summer or fall 
1971. This indicates a time after it had become clear that India could no longer hope for 
US protection and might have to look entirely to Moscow for security assurance. Given 
that this was exactly the kind of over-dependence on one benefactor that Indian 
policymakers since the late 1960s had been trying to avoid, it is hard to make the 
argument that this did not play some role in affecting the decision to go ahead on this 
front. As an American intelligence assessment at the time noted the need to “hedge” 
against the questionable reliability and “durability” of the Soviet guarantee, as well as 
avoid over-dependence on Moscow were key factors favoring such a decision.378 
Concern about overdependence on Moscow also resulted in India welcoming the 
visit of former US treasury secretary John Connally in summer 1972. Nixon had decided 
to send Connally to India as a “modest gesture”379—the kind envisioned by the NSC to 
start the repair job. Nixon wanted his envoy to make sure, however, that Connally spoke 
and acted in a way that did not give the impression that he was on an apology tour to 
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India.380 Indian statements on Vietnam in the run up to Connally’s visit had tempered any 
hope that the visit would be a turning point. The White House instructed Connally to 
assert to his Indian interlocutors that their “gratuitous slaps at US policy” were 
detrimental to US-India relations.381 
During the discussions with Connally, Swaran Singh again welcomed Sino-US 
rapprochement, but indicated Indian anxiety that it “upset stabilizing forces in [the] 
Indian context.” He implied that Pakistan was more intransigent because of Chinese and 
US support.382 Gandhi, on her part, noted that the US needed to take the initiative to 
improve relations.383 Nonetheless, at a press conference she herself took a step, calling for 
better US-Indian relations.384  
The two countries still had a long way to go. The best the US ambassador to India 
could report was that Connally’s meetings had “helped to clear the atmosphere at least to 
some degree.”385 Less than a month later, after a “profoundly disturbing” farewell call on 
Gandhi, Keating himself questioned whether the atmosphere had cleared at all. He 
emerged stunned following Gandhi’s assertion that “everything the US does is against 
India.”386 Delhi saw delays over debt rescheduling as part of this containment effort—in 
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contrast to the US effort to help build India up against China. Jha, in fact, believed it was 
one of the reasons for Gandhi’s outburst.387  
The public and private Indian antipathy was heightened by the continued sense 
that China and the US were colluding, with Pakistan as an instrument, to contain India. In 
an article written in July for Foreign Affairs—published in September—Gandhi 
highlighted the dispatch of the USS Enterprise and the “extraordinary similarity of 
attitudes adopted by the United States and China” during the Bangladesh crisis. She noted 
that the US approach toward the Soviet Union and China was wise, but expressed 
concern that it could adversely affect India’s interests. She provided as an example Sino-
US cooperation in the UNSC.388 Jha also noted to Kissinger India’s concerns about the 
extent to which US “cultivat[ion]” of China would “encourage China to conduct a certain 
policy detrimental to our interests.” Kissinger explained that Beijing was concerned about 
India’s attitudes and actions because of its fear of the Soviet Union. He admitted that the 
US “would not do something deliberately to affront China when China feels its security 
directly threatened.” Beyond that, he asserted, “in the normal conduct of diplomacy, we 
see no reason to coordinate our policy with China.” Kissinger insisted that the question of 
improvement of US-India relations was “totally independent of China.”389 
India’s anxiety and antipathy would have only increased had its policymakers 
known that during Kissinger’s June trip to China, he had made a commitment to give 
Beijing “more detailed information on Indian armed forces, tank production, etc. through 
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private channel.”390 Furthermore, among the outstanding commitments to China, 
Kissinger noted that the US would consider supplying Pakistan with arms that China 
could not, and would consult with China regarding any “major change” in America’s 
South Asia policy.391 
At the same time, however, some Indian officials grew increasingly concerned 
about the intensifying public antipathy to the US in India. Jha worried that the longer the 
two countries delayed a dialogue, the harder it would be to improve relations. He had 
urged the US to take the initiative, even if it was just with minor steps. Deputy Secretary 
of State Irwin, however, pointed out that “regretfully whenever one side or the other 
seemed ready an event occurred which seemed calculated to create new problems.”392 
Indeed, in retaliation for Gandhi’s accusations against Keating, there was a US-inspired 
postponement of the debt-rescheduling meeting of the India aid consortium.393 Then in 
India, there seemed to be a coordinated effort to stoke anti-Americanism through 
allegations about CIA activities in India.394 Later in October, Gandhi tried to temper her 
CIA allegations. After a point, public antipathy became less useful to the leadership and 
more problematic. The genie, however, was out of the bottle and the Congress party 
president continued to make accusations against the US.395 
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Soon both governments seemed to conclude that the descent needed to be halted; 
it ceased to serve any purpose. Kissinger often said that the US and India had had a love 
affair. If 1971 was the year of the break-up—the year first the US and then India 
switched significant others—then 1972 was the year of the bitterness that followed the 
breakup. Throughout the year both sides were aware that they needed to get back to 
talking terms and deal with each other on a more “realistic basis,” but it took a year of 
vitriol and distance for them to get to that point. They seemed to reach that point by 
November 1972.
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Chapter 8: Looking Both Ways (1973-1979) 
The main ideological and political justification for aid was to build up democratic 
India on a counter-balance against China. With Sino-US rapprochement, this 
justification is no longer there. 
– Indian intelligence assessment, December 19721 
Kissinger: We are in a curious position. We have no major conflicts of interest, no 
major problems or issues, do we?... 
Kaul: What amazes me is that we have no conflict of goals, or interests. Perhaps 
the methods of (ensuring our) security are different. But our mutual interests, our 
mutual goals should be more important. Perhaps a dialogue on the highest levels 
is lacking. This perhaps is responsible for the lack of progress. 
– Meeting between the US secretary of state and the Indian ambassador to the US, 
19762 
 
During this period, the lack of dialogue or understanding was not what prevented 
closer US-India ties. It was not enough that the two countries had no major conflicts of 
interest. The problem was that they lacked a major common interest. Earlier, China had 
been that common interest. After Sino-US rapprochement, however, the US had little to 
no desire to build or hold India up in contrast to China. No longer useful to the US, India 
found itself overdependent on the Soviet Union. Delhi tried to correct the imbalance over 
this period. In 1970, Gandhi had said that India’s objective was to “strengthen our 
friendships, to change indifference into friendship, and to lessen the hostility where it 
exists.”3 Between 1973-1979, this describes the Indian government’s objective with 
regard to the Soviet Union, the US and China respectively. As this period went on, the 
                                                
1 Note from Kao to Haksar, December 3, 1972, enclosing a note on ‘Four More Years of President Nixon – 
the Prospect’ prepared by R&AW officer in Washington, NMML, PNH (III), SF No. 265. 
2 Memcon of Kissinger-Kaul (ambassador to US) Meeting, August 25, 1976, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1969-1976 Volume E-8: South Asia, 1973-1976 (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2007) 
[hereafter cited as FRUS 1969-1976 Vol. E-8] (http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-
76ve08/d233) 
3 Mansingh, p. 63. 
 531 
US and India indeed sought to re-establish and maintain a working relationship to limit 
the Soviet role in India, but, with China no longer looming as large for either, the US and 
India slid down the others’ priority list for rest of the Cold War. 
MAKING UP  
In summer 1969 as Nixon had prepared for a trip to the subcontinent, Kissinger 
had asked the president to emphasize to Gandhi that his administration sought good 
relations not just with Pakistan, but also with India, “recognizing India’s importance and 
position vis-à-vis Communist China.”4 After the Sino-US rapprochement, such a role was 
no longer as—if at all—necessary. For over two decades, the US had seen India through a 
China prism in a way that sometimes worked in India’s favor and at other times to its 
detriment. By 1973, as Washington continued to build its relationship with Beijing, it did 
not see India through the same lens. It did not expect that India could or would play too 
much of a spoiler in Sino-US relations. Nor did it need India to play a major role vis-à-vis 
China. This need had once made India important and useful. The lack of this need now 
resulted in relative indifference toward India. 
Nevertheless, the White House did not think there was much benefit in continuing 
to bicker with the Indian government. There was some benefit, indeed, in trying to get 
bilateral relations back on an even keel. With the Soviet Union seeming to spread its 
tentacles around the world in this period, the US had an interest in limiting Soviet 
influence in the subcontinent—a goal that American policymakers believed that their 
Chinese counterparts shared. Isolating Delhi would only leave the field to Moscow.5 
Furthermore, even as India did not have “that kind of influence” that it had previously, it 
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was just too big too ignore entirely. Thus, over the next few years, Washington worked to 
develop relations with India on a “more realistic” level.6  
The Indian government wanted to re-establish a working relationship with the US 
as well. By the end of 1972, India found itself relatively isolated. It was true that India 
had a close relationship with the Soviet Union, but it had hostile, estranged or indifferent 
relations with China, Pakistan and the US. This was not the kind of diversified portfolio 
of partnerships that India preferred. This period highlighted the downside of India’s 
diversification strategy. This strategy required options—others had to be willing to 
participate in India’s diversification for Delhi to achieve the benefits of balance. After the 
Sino-US rapprochement, however, the US option seemed to dissipate, with India 
becoming a “very low priority” for the Nixon administration that had won a second 
term.7  
Declining American interest in India constrained Indian policymakers’ choices. It 
meant overdependence on Moscow. It also meant the need to continue to invest in 
preparations for a two-front war at a time when the government had a lot of internal 
issues that needed resources and attention. It further meant that the US was not available 
as much of a potential source of food and economic assistance, as well as investment and 
technology that the Indian economy needed.8 Finally, despite Delhi’s denials, it meant 
that others no longer saw India as nonaligned.9 India’s diversified set of relationships had 
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given it not just more independence, but more status and influence—being just another 
partner of Moscow did not give India the same role or importance.  
India tried other ways of dealing with overdependence on Moscow. It broadened 
its relations with a number of middle powers.10 This, for example, allowed it to diversify 
its sources of military supply so that India’s import dependence on the Soviet Union in 
this realm fell from 70 percent in the early 1970s to 50 percent by 1977. India also 
continued to develop its nuclear program. Furthermore, it worked toward developing 
indigenous capability across the board. As an Indian diplomat had noted as he had 
watched the Sino-US and US-Soviet détentes: “The lesson to be learnt is that we must 
really be self-reliant.” Finally, during this period, India would also seek to reach out to 
China and Pakistan. However, the US option was still necessary. By 1973 the sheen wore 
off the Gandhi government. The economic and internal security situations were in bad 
shape, with the oil crisis and a bad monsoon having made the former worse. By 1974, 
from Delhi, the American embassy in Delhi would report, “This country is in trouble.”11 
India still needed American aid and approval, and the US to help it balance its 
dependence on the Soviet Union. So, India worked to correct the imbalance on that front.  
L.K. Jha, the Indian ambassador in Washington, had emphasized at the end of 
1972, “The question we have to ask ourselves is, first whether there is any need, and 
second if there is any desire in either country to improve these relations.”12 As far as 
India was concerned, the answer was yes. Indian officials did not think that the US would 
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go “out of its way” to improve relations with India, but they did believe that the Nixon 
administration’s pragmatism gave them an opportunity. After all there were some 
dynamics that might lead the US to seek an improvement of relations as well: 
Bad relations with India are not really necessary for its rapprochement with China 
or for any other of its foreign policy purposes. In fact, bad Indo-American 
relations might give China an eventual advantage over the United States…It 
would not do to leave the Soviet Union a large field of uncontested influence… 
No injection of strength from outside can make Pakistan an equal of India…In the 
context of a future US-USSR-China-Japan power quadrangle, it would be wise to 
jettison friendship with the next largest power in Asia…The Americans know 
through their own sources that India has not compromised its independence or 
non-alignment in its friendship with the Soviet Union.13 
Intelligence analysts believed that the prospects for improvement were “not bright” 
because the need for an improvement was a bit lopsided. They pointed out that “[t]he fact 
is that USA is much more important to India than vice-versa.” Thus, they noted, “the best 
that one can suggest is an assiduous effort to cool down the political tempers on both 
sides and to seek and develop cooperation in areas where we share common interests.”14 
Jha had pointed out that the most India could aim or hope for was the pre-1971 
relationship of “superficial cordiality and normalcy.”15 US officials noted that Indian 
policymakers in pursuit of that goal toned down their criticisms of the US and 
increasingly let Washington know that Delhi wanted better relations. The State 
Department noted that the Indian foreign secretary-designate on a visit to Washington in 
mid-November had “seemed intent on underscoring [the] positive and stressing hope for 
improvement in Indo-US relations.” The New York Times labeled the Indian foreign 
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minister’s subsequent public overture for better relations as the “Indian love call” and 
urged the administration toward a “warm response.” Privately, too, Gandhi indicated that 
she wanted to improve relations.16  
Nixon had been hesitant to do very much for India just before the 1972 election, 
thinking that any major move on his administration’s part would be seen as an admission 
that he had erred during the 1971 crisis. Once the elections were over, Kissinger told Jha, 
“The president is ready and anxious to normalize and improve relations with India…” Jha 
interpreted this as a genuine overture because the president wanted to “go down in history 
as the man who gave a generation of peace.” External observers pointed out that, with 
working relationships in Asia with China, Japan and the Soviet Union, one of the few 
countries that Nixon needed to make up with was India. Kissinger agreed with Indian 
officials that improved relations were important for “peace and stability in Asia.”17 The 
administration came to believe that, with increasing instability in other parts of the world, 
with a rapprochement with India, the US could reduce the likelihood that that the 
subcontinent would prove bothersome. This would allow the US to limit the resources 
and attention it would need to dedicate to the area. Thus over the rest of the Nixon 
administration and then the Gerald Ford administration, the two countries worked to 
improve relations. They sorted out some problems that continued to be irritants, such as 
the US holding of a significant quantity of rupees. They also established an annual 
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bilateral dialogue and agreed to focus especially on scientific, cultural and education 
cooperation.18 
The US and India also tried to react to other irritants in a measured manner. 
American officials appreciated that at a time when there seemed to be an increasing 
north-south divide, Indian official behaved in a relatively moderate manner in multilateral 
settings. The US government, in turn, reacted to the Indian nuclear test of 1974 in a 
relatively “low key” manner. The administration publicly expressed its regret and went 
along with congressional calls to vote against some multilateral loans to India. Privately, 
Kissinger told Gandhi that the US did not accept Indian explanations that India had only 
conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion. Nevertheless, he assured her that the 
administration was “not interested in recriminations but in how to prevent further 
proliferation.” Despite calls within and outside the administration to punish India heavily, 
Kissinger had indeed instructed officials not to make heated statements or take too many 
punitive actions. He believed that India was signaling China rather than using the bomb 
to threaten Pakistan and did not think vitriol would change the situation or Indian 
imperatives.19 India, on its part, joined the US in underplaying the significance of the 
test.20 The US government also took a “hands-off” policy when India took over Sikkim, 
even though American officials realized that greater comment or involvement on their 
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part would please China and Pakistan.21 Then, when Gandhi declared emergency rule in 
1975, overall the administration’s response was tempered.22 
For both sides, the task of cooling tempers was made easier by the fact that over 
the period this chapter covers some of the key irritants in the relationship were less of a 
problem. Once the US signed the Paris peace accords and withdrew from Vietnam, a key 
source of difference faded.23 US government involvement in the Indian economy kept 
declining. The US still indirectly helped assist India through its contributions to 
multilateral agencies, but bilateral economic assistance had significantly decreased. This 
meant that Washington was no longer strongly expressing its views on the balance of 
India’s defense-development priorities. India, on the other hand, had less expectations of 
US assistance. Indeed the two countries overall had fewer expectations of each other and 
American officials tried to keep them low. Indian policymakers realized that India no 
longer had much traction in Washington since US policymakers no longer felt the need to 
build India up as a contrast to China. Furthermore, they believed that, even if relations 
improved, economic assistance would remain limited because of legislative and 
budgetary limits in the US.24 This acknowledgement and the decrease in aid had the 
added benefit of Indian policymakers feeling less of a need to balance aid acceptance 
with anti-American rhetoric to emphasize their independence. There was also some 
easing of Indian concerns about the US “refusal to endorse…or to enhance” the country’s 
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status as a regional power or global player.25 US officials publicly and privately 
increasingly acknowledged India as at least the “strongest power on the subcontinent.”26 
Indian analysts also believed that Delhi’s relations with Moscow would worry 
Washington less. India had no desire to jettison its relationship with the Soviet Union—
after all it was the bird in hand and officials believed that the India-Soviet relationship 
helped restrain China.27 Nonetheless, the Indian government moved to correct the 
overdependence that seemed to have developed. Moreover, to ensure that US 
policymakers did not think India had totally tilted toward Moscow, Indian officials went 
out of their way to assert that this was not the case. American officials, in turn, noted that, 
with the developing US-Soviet détente and their belief that India would remain 
nonaligned, they were less concerned about India-Soviet relations. Kissinger even went 
on to acknowledge publicly that the US accepted Indian nonalignment.28 As for 
Pakistan—another irritant in the relationship—India was trying to work through its 
problems with that country and policymakers came to believe that the US was indeed 
urging Pakistan to settle its problems with Bangladesh and India.29 While the US 
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reassured Pakistani officials that the US would not allow India to swallow up Pakistan, it 
indeed encouraged Pakistan to persist with the Simla peace process and made clear that 
Chinese intervention in the subcontinent on Pakistan’s behalf would be 
counterproductive.30 When it came to Bangladesh, Kissinger continued to emphasize the 
potential for greater US-India common interests than Sino-US ones. US aid to that 
country was indeed aiding stability there, which India supported.31 As for China, while it 
was no longer the glue keeping the two countries together, it was also no longer the 
reason for conflict or even as much of a reason for the US and India to keep their 
distance. 
SINO-US RELATIONS  
The US rapprochement with China continued to develop over the rest of the 
Nixon and Ford administrations, albeit at a slower pace than some had expected. In early 
1973, Kissinger told Chinese policymakers that the administration would move to 
normalize relations fully after the mid-term elections the next year. He expected that the 
process would be complete by the middle of 1976. However, the Watergate scandal 
delayed substantial progress. When Gerald Ford replaced Nixon as president in 1974, 
Kissinger and he assured Chinese officials that the US would honor the commitments 
made under Nixon. The US did take some further steps such as completing the 
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withdrawal of all fighter aircraft from Taiwan. It also moved forward on offering China 
economic, defense, intelligence and technology cooperation. However, with setbacks 
abroad in Cambodia and Vietnam and domestic displeasure with détente growing 
especially on the right, the process stalled under the Ford administration. The Nixon and 
Ford administrations were aware of resultant Chinese frustration, as well as Beijing’s 
questions about whether the developing American détente with the Soviet Union was 
causing the delays.32 Chinese officials also continued to express concerns about growing 
Soviet influence in the subcontinent, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, holding the 
US lack of effort as responsible.33  
Given Chinese sensitivities, American officials were concerned about how 
Beijing might view their efforts to improve relations with India. Kissinger told Nixon that 
the US had to be careful about Chinese sentiments as its policy toward Delhi or Moscow 
evolved. Kissinger described for Nixon the “scolding” he received from Chinese 
policymakers for not doing enough about Soviet power. Zhou had asserted to him that 
Delhi and Moscow were “allied to each other.” Kissinger told the president that Beijing 
saw Delhi as Moscow’s “principal agent” and one of “two enemies in its pantheon.”34  
Nixon told David Bruce, who was designated as the head of the new American 
liaison office in China, that the “Chinese must be reassured,” including on the India front. 
The Sino-American relationship was “the key to peace in the world” and gave the US 
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leverage with the Soviet Union.35 Thus, the administration continued to discuss India-
Pakistan issues with Beijing. Kissinger assured Chinese policymakers that the US would 
make no overall changes to its South Asia policy without discussion with China, and 
would continue to find a way to assist Pakistan economically and help Islamabad acquire 
arms. He also kept Chinese officials informed of developments in US-India relations, as 
well as US-Soviet discussions regarding the extent of Moscow’s commitment to Delhi.36 
American policymakers used India to highlight to Chinese policymakers why it 
was important for them to have the US as a friend. Despite what he said to Indian 
officials, Kissinger did not really play down India-Soviet cooperation. Instead, for 
example, he highlighted it as a reason that China should not want too hasty an American 
withdrawal from Southeast Asia. Nor did he assuage Chinese concerns about India’s 
objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan, concurring that India would “encourage” breakaway 
movements in that country. American officials also noted that India was trying to create a 
“great imbalance” in terms of strength in the broader region.37 Kissinger asserted that the 
US would not accept this, but was left on the defensive when the Chinese foreign 
minister pointed out that Kissinger had been giving speeches acknowledging Indian 
leadership and strength in the subcontinent.38  
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The administration was aware that Chinese officials were watching the US 
interactions with India. Thus, while noting internally that the US was “anxious for steady 
improvement” with India, Kissinger emphasized, “We don’t want too high a visibility 
which might upset the Chinese who loathe the Indians...”39 Kissinger assured Chinese 
policymakers like Zhou that personally he had “never been an admirer of Indian policy.” 
However, he indicated that the US would try to improve relations with India slowly in 
order to prevent Delhi from getting even closer to Moscow. With Nixon and then Ford’s 
acquiescence, Kissinger continued to highlight that American efforts to improve relations 
with India were part of a strategy to “wean them away from the Soviet Union.” Given 
that Beijing had been pressing Washington to do more on both the economic and military 
fronts for Pakistan, US officials also emphasized that improved US-India relations would 
have the added benefit of giving the administration domestic flexibility to do more for 
Pakistan. Ford and Kissinger also noted that it would allow the US to restrain India vis-à-
vis Pakistan and Bangladesh and generally influence India on a variety of subjects of 
interest to China.40 
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Intelligence analysts expected Sino-US relations to be a potential problem in US-
India relations.41 In discussions with Indian officials, however, American officials made 
no secret of the fact that they were continuing to try to improve relations with Beijing. 
They did try to assure Indian officials that Sino-US rapprochement was not “directed 
against India.” Kissinger also told senior Indian policymakers that the US had “absolutely 
no interest to let China weaken India. Our relations with China were a marriage of 
convenience.” He noted that the US also had no interest in China acting in a way that 
would increase instability in the subcontinent. He further assured Indian policymakers 
that the US “discouraged any Chinese adventures” and any Chinese attack on India 
would be “look upon this with extreme disfavor.”42 What he did not to say to them, but 
admitted internally, was that as things stood during the Ford administration, “It is almost 
certainly true that if the Chinese attacked we would support India, but we don't want the 
Chinese to think we are dumping them for the Indians.”43 
SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS  
Indian officials realized that the US would take no steps on US-India relations 
that would “displease” China, but they did not expect that China would be a subject of 
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conflict between the US and India as it had been in 1971. They reiterated to their 
American counterparts that they “welcomed” Sino-US rapprochement, but hoped it 
would not be at India’s expense and that Washington might indeed be able to influence 
positively Chinese views of the subcontinent.44  
There was another reason that Indian officials no longer saw the Sino-US 
relationship as highly problematic: India’s efforts towards its own rapprochement with 
China, which the US could potentially facilitate. For Indian policymakers, a better 
relationship with China could somewhat reduce their need for dependence on the 
superpowers, which was especially important because of Indian overdependence on 
Moscow (this is why they persisted in trying to improve relations with Beijing despite 
knowing that Moscow would not be thrilled45). Furthermore, a Sino-Indian 
rapprochement could help ease what had been a source of strain between India and the 
US. Finally, it might limit Sino-Pakistan relations and neutralize Sino-Bangladesh ties.46  
Thus India once again made clear its interest in talking to China. Gandhi 
encouraged, or at least did not discourage, meetings between Chinese and Indian low-
level officials.47 Publicly, too, she asserted, “We obviously want friendship…We have 
always been ready to do anything on the basis of equality for reestablishing normalcy. 
                                                
44 Letter from Jha to Haksar, November 21, 1972, NMML, PNH (III), SF No. 277; Telegram from AmEmb 
India to DoS re Kissinger-Chavan Meeting, October 29, 1974, FRUS 1969-1976 Vol. E-8 
(http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d182); Memcon of Kissinger-Kaul Meeting, 
Washington, July 16, 1975, FRUS 1969-1976 Vol. E-8 
(http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d207) 
45 Mansingh, p. 58. 
46 Letter from Jha to Kaul with Note by Jha and Gonsalves on US-India Relations, November 16, 1972, 
NMML, PNH (III), SF No. 235; Interagency Intelligence Memorandum: India – Present Scene, Future 
Prospects, May 1976, FRUS 1969-1976 Vol. E-8 (http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-
76ve08/d229) 
47 Handwritten Comment by Gandhi on Note from A. Mitra (Planning Commission) to Gandhi, December 
14, 1972, NMML, PNH (III), SF No. 235. 
 545 
We welcome friendship with China. But it has to be a two way affair.”48 Indian officials 
used the US as a source of information about China, constantly asking American officials 
for their assessments of the Chinese attitude. They also repeatedly asserted to American 
officials their desire for improved Sino-Indian relations, hoping that the US would pass 
this message on to China. They also urged their US counterparts to indicate to Chinese 
officials that a Sino-Indian rapprochement was a good idea.  
Kissinger, in turn, told the Indian foreign minister that the US would welcome—
and not create problems for—a potential Sino-Indian rapprochement. He noted to Indian 
officials that the US had told Chinese policymakers that India was not a Soviet stooge 
and ready to normalize relations with China. He even agreed to encourage China toward 
better Sino-Indian relations, but warned that the US might have limited leverage on this 
front.49 
The secretary of state had two perspectives on how a potential Sino-Indian 
rapprochement would affect US interests. On the one hand, US policymakers believed 
that Sino-Indian rapprochement could limit Soviet influence in the subcontinent and Asia 
on the whole. Moreover, if Sino-Indian relations did not improve while Sino-US relations 
progressed, this would likely only push Delhi closer to Moscow. For this reason, 
Kissinger did indeed tell Chinese officials that India was “loosen[ing]” its relations with 
the Soviet Union and Delhi was not coordinating its policies with Moscow as closely as 
before.50 On the other hand, the US had been using the India-Soviet threat to highlight the 
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importance of Sino-US ties. Moreover, Kissinger was concerned about how Beijing, 
which remained suspicious of Washington’s intentions, would view American officials 
urging them to reconcile with India. He noted, “I don’t want to promote better Sino-
Indian relations in a way that makes the Chinese nervous. This is not particularly in our 
interest.” Thus, he instructed the designated US ambassador to India, “If you are asked by 
the Indians about their relations with China, say that we have absolutely no objection to 
an improvement. But I would avoid getting into this in public.”51 He also did not directly 
urge Chinese officials to patch up with India. He did, however, mention to them that 
Delhi had asked Washington to let Beijing know about their intentions, adding that he 
was sure that China and India could use their direct channels to communicate.52  
American officials also constantly advised Indian officials of the impact of their 
relations with Moscow on the likelihood of a positive Chinese response. They realized 
that “China is the most important determinant of Indian-Soviet relations. The worse the 
relations are between India and China the more need India feels for close Soviet 
backing.”53 They told Indian officials, however, that India-Soviet relations, in turn, 
increased Beijing’s distrust of Delhi. Indian officials asked why then Beijing did not give 
Delhi an incentive to reduce dependence on Moscow. US officials believed that Beijing, 
however, at that time saw “aloofness” rather than rapprochement as a way to keep the 
India-Soviet tie from becoming even closer.54 
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The Chinese attitude seemed to serve that purpose to an extent. Indian concern 
about the Chinese reaction was one reason that the Indian government continued to stay 
aloof from any Soviet collective security plans. Indian officials demurred when Brezhnev 
suggested in August 1973 that the India-Soviet treaty was part of the initial stage toward 
a collective security system. The government then refused to endorse related Soviet 
proposals when Brezhnev visited India in November 1973. During Brezhnev’s visit 
Gandhi furthermore publicly reiterated that India-Soviet “friendship is not aimed at any 
other country. There is no reason for our friendship with the USSR to exclude friendship 
with other countries…We too wish to expand the area of our friendship.” Subsequently, 
India equivocated on the subject or remained silent on whether it would commit to such 
plans. This approach, as well as denials that India had promised Moscow any base rights, 
had the dual benefit of signaling not just China but also the US that India was not just a 
camp follower of the Soviet Union.55 (Eventually, when India started to see signs of 
Chinese willingness to improve relations, policymakers indeed saw this as stemming 
from the Chinese desire to limit India-Soviet relations.56) 
Till the mid-1970s, there seemed to be mixed signals from China, with Beijing 
“blowing hot and cold.” Indian policymakers watched and waited for positive signs. They 
speculated about what might induce Beijing to react positively to Indian overtures: 
changes in Chinese domestic politics, Sino-Soviet rapprochement or even a China desire 
to show the international community that it was being magnanimous. After 1975, there 
seemed to be a few more signals from China. In another installment of ping-pong 
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diplomacy, Beijing sent a table tennis team to India in January 1975. In February at a 
stopover in Calcutta, the Chinese vice premier announced Chinese openness to a 
dialogue. That winter, officials noticed that China did not denounce India at the UN as it 
did routinely.57  
India still had concerns about China. Indian policymakers told US officials that 
they did not think that China would attack India. As US assessments indicated, however, 
Indian officials remained “wary and sensitive” about the possibility. As the Indian 
foreign minister explained, “Because of 1962 we have to be careful.”58 There continued 
to be incidents that caused concern at the border. Within the country, China continued to 
support Indian insurgents. Indian officials were also anxious that Beijing would move 
from exploiting difficulties between India and her neighbors to creating them. China 
continued to help Pakistan, including with its nuclear program after India’s 1974 nuclear 
test. India also worried about growing Chinese and Pakistani influence in Bangladesh, 
especially after their positive reaction to a military coup there that involved the 
assassination of president Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in summer 1975. India was further 
concerned about China’s influence in Bhutan and its non-recognition of the Indian 
takeover of Sikkim. China also continued to aid and support Nepal and conduct anti-India 
propaganda there. Even beyond the neighborhood, India watched with concern China’s 
efforts to woo other nonaligned countries.59  
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As Mansingh notes, there was no consensus on the importance of improving 
relations with China in the Indian government. There were also disagreements about how 
far to go. Some argued that China was expansionist; that India should not harm its 
relations with the Soviet Union by reaching out to China; that India could live with the 
border dispute; and that any rapprochement would require concessions to India on the 
border and recognition of Indian positions on Sikkim and Kashmir. Others argued that a 
rapprochement with China would allow India to reduce dependence on the Soviet Union; 
to settle eventually the border problem, which was an obstacle to growth and 
international flexibility and not something India had the capacity to settle by force; to 
help create a wedge between China and Pakistan; and to exploit the potential for 
economic interaction. Eventually, as Mansingh notes, the position that the Indian 
government took was “more or less a median one: cordiality without excess, talks without 
negotiation, normalisation without dramatics.”60 
DUAL DÉTENTES  
Indian policymakers had not seen a Sino-Indian rapprochement as an easy sell 
domestically. There had been opposition on the grounds that India would have nothing to 
show for it or would end up making unilateral concessions because of its weaker 
position.61 With the victory in the 1971 war and the 1974 nuclear test, however, there was 
more confidence in India. Among the public, at least, there seemed to be a desire to 
                                                                                                                                            
(http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d182); Memcon of Kissinger-Swaran Singh 
Meeting, Washington, October 29, 1974, FRUS 1969-1976 Vol. E-8 
(http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d180); Memcon of Meeting between 
Tomlinson (AmEmb India) and Bhutanese Embassy official, Delhi, November 8, 1974, FRUS 1969-1976 
Vol. E-8 (http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d255); Memcon of Kissinger-
Chavan Meeting, Washington, October 7, 1975, FRUS 1969-1976 Vol. E-8 
(http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d214) 
60 Mansingh, pp. 246-248. 
61 Ibid, p. 193. 
 550 
normalize relations with China even though people continued to have negative opinions 
of that country. In a poll taken in 1973, 84 percent of respondents said India’s relations 
with China were not so satisfactory or not satisfactory at all. 42 percent thought that India 
should continue to try to normalize relations despite China’s “unhelpful attitude.” 
Another 27 percent thought India should do so if China reciprocated. Only 20 percent 
said India should not pursue normalization.62 Gandhi’s political dominance allowed her 
some flexibility, as well, which only increased after the emergency. This allowed her to 
blunt opposition attacks that her government was weakening India by reaching out to 
China and Pakistan. It also allowed her to take on criticism from the left that she was 
hurting India-Soviet relations. Gandhi’s electoral and battlefield victory in 1971 had 
decreased the imperative for her to continue to move left.63 Some indeed detected a 
rightward shift in 1974-1975 because of economic necessity, the need to correct the 
imbalance in India’s partnerships, as well as the proclivities of Gandhi’s inner circle.64  
By late 1975-early 1976, there seemed to be more positive signals from the 
Chinese side, which also seemed apparent to American policymakers. Chinese vice 
premier Deng Xiaoping had earlier stated that the US improvement of relations with 
India was a “good move.” He had noted that India was not a major threat, since it did not 
have the capacity to attack or even encircle China, but he had agreed with Kissinger that 
Moscow might use India against China.65 By late 1975, he seemed convinced that India 
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was seeking good relations with China and believed that even the Indian public did not 
want too much dependence on Moscow.66 For a while, Chinese policymakers had been 
hesitant about a rapprochement with India because of their concern about the Pakistani 
reaction and Deng continued to worry about Indian pressure on Pakistan.67 However, 
even on this front, there had been positive developments from the Chinese perspective. 
India had worked to stabilize relations with Pakistan. The two countries had 
resumed talks in 1973 and, along with Bangladesh, had signed a tripartite agreement in 
April 1974. The subsequent nuclear test had stalled the improvement in India-Pakistan 
relations, as had India’s integration of Sikkim, its domestic preoccupations related to 
Gandhi’s declaration of an emergency, and the Sino-Pakistani reaction to the military 
coup in Bangladesh. However, by late 1975-early 1976, there again seemed to be 
progress with India and Pakistan moving to implement further steps envisioned by the 
Simla Accord of 1972 and sending ambassadors to the other country.68 
By late 1975, combined with this, Deng saw as a positive sign the developments 
in India-Soviet relations. Just as years earlier Nehru had been convinced that Sino-Soviet 
differences would grow over time, Beijing’s own experience with Moscow left Deng 
convinced that Delhi’s problems with Moscow would naturally increase.69 By 1976, both 
China and the US indeed saw a “cooling” between India and the Soviet Union.70   
Ironically, this was the period that Sino-US rapprochement seemed to stall a bit. 
Kissinger had noted to Ford that Sino-Indian rapprochement had a downside for the US: 
                                                
66 Memcon of Kissinger-Deng Meeting, Beijing, October 22, 1975, Ibid, p. 807. 
67 Memcon of Kissinger-Zhou Meeting, February 15, 1973, Ibid, p. 43 and Memcon of Ford-Deng 
Meeting, December 3, 1975, Ibid, p. 888. 
68 Mansingh, pp. 231-233. 
69 Memcon of Ford-Deng Meeting, December 3, 1975, FRUS 1969-1976 Vol. XVIII, p. 889. 
70 Telegram from AmEmb India to DoS, May 19, 1976, FRUS 1969-1976 Vol. E-8 
(http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d230) 
 552 
Beijing would feel less threatened. It was not Chinese desire for friendship with the US, 
however, that had decreased. Rather, Beijing was upset with the lack of movement on 
normalization on the US side. As their frustration grew, Chinese officials expressed it 
directly and through countries like Pakistan. When Kissinger informed the Chinese 
foreign minister that normalization would not be completed by the time Ford was 
scheduled to visit at the end of 1975, Chinese leaders were upset about being let down, 
especially since they were dealing with left-wing criticism of the Sino-US 
rapprochement. They rejected the language of a communiqué, leaving the US to consider 
cancelling Ford’s scheduled visit.71 
Kissinger was concerned about the slow down but the administration was unable 
to overcome domestic political constraints. He continued to seek Pakistani assessments 
about developments in China and Beijing’s attitude toward the US.72 Kissinger did not 
like what he heard. Pakistani policymakers noted that China was losing patience with the 
US.73 Even the Indian ambassador told the secretary of state that Chinese officials in 
Washington were indicating their disappointment with the administration.74 A frustrated 
Kissinger told Pakistani officials to convey to China that its criticism and anti-American 
propaganda was making it harder for the administration to sell China policy.75 With Ford 
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preparing for a visit to Beijing and China playing hardball, Kissinger felt that the 
president needed to show firmness. He thought Ford’s visits to the Philippines and 
Indonesia could be appropriate “jabs” at Beijing. When the president asked about adding 
India to make a point, however, Kissinger said no, that would be “too big a shock.”76  
In Beijing, to keep Chinese officials interested, the secretary of state tried to 
highlight India as a potential problem again, noting US disapproval of Indian actions in 
Tibet. Deng, however dismissed them as insignificant. What might have been more 
galling for Kissinger, however, was Deng’s insistence that the US seemed to be part of 
the problem in the subcontinent. Kissinger had asserted that the US expected India to 
attack Bangladesh and Pakistan within the next five years—even though few, if any in 
the US government, thought this was likely and Kissinger himself had told Pakistani 
prime minister Bhutto that India was not expansionist. Deng, however, argued that the 
problem was the US, which was not doing enough for Pakistan at that time, just as it had 
not done enough in 1971.77  
By spring 1976, China and India moved towards normalizing relations and 
exchanged ambassadors. That year Gandhi made it a point to sign the condolence book at 
the Chinese mission after Mao and Zhou’s deaths. The government also offered 
assistance to victims of the Tangshan earthquake.78 As for Sino-US rapprochement, there 
was little progress in an election year in the US. The administration’s frustration with 
Beijing’s behavior was evident. Kissinger told the Pakistani foreign minister that Chinese 
criticism was giving both conservatives and liberals ammunition. Frustrated, he said that 
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China was “tak[ing] a free ride” and “They can’t just take from it and put nothing into 
it.”79  
Leadership changes in Beijing and Washington in 1976 did not initially bring 
progress, but eventually they would. Initially, some in the new administration, including 
President Carter himself, believed that the Nixon White House had been too conciliatory 
to Beijing. Nevertheless, the president made clear early on that he hoped to normalize 
relations with China. The Soviet Union was the administration’s major priority. However, 
Washington’s desire to have a China card to play in its interactions with Moscow meant 
that Nixon’s China policy ended up having staying power. While some like secretary of 
state Cyrus Vance had concerns about Sino-US normalization jeopardizing détente with 
Moscow, others like national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and military and 
intelligence officials wanted to make full use of the China card, especially since Moscow 
seemed to be acting difficult around the world. By spring 1978, Carter concurred and in 
May Brzezinski travelled to Beijing where he indicated that the administration would be 
moving forward with normalizing relations. The two governments reached an agreement 
in December on establishing diplomatic relations in January 1979 and a visit by Deng to 
the US that same month.80 
Less than a month later, the Indian foreign minister (and future prime minister) 
Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Beijing—the first visit by an Indian foreign minister to 
China. A new leadership had taken over in Delhi as well, with a Janata Party coalition led 
by Morarji Desai taking office in 1977. The border problem and China’s support to 
insurgents had continued to rankle in India and there had continued to be a debate about 
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how far India should go to reach out to China. Indian officials had also continued to have 
concerns about Chinese actions in Tibet, Bangladesh and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, 
they had worried about whether a new Chinese leadership would lead to a Sino-Soviet 
rapprochement. Nevertheless, partly as a result of these concerns but also because of 
Chinese reciprocity, India had moved forward with rapprochement. The two countries 
had exchanged trade delegations, facilitated banking, credit and shipping interactions and 
had encouraged exchanges of language students. In 1978, Chinese assurances that it 
would not support liberation struggles had removed another source of discontent. Beijing 
had also seemed to ease up on anti-India efforts in Nepal. The new Chinese leadership’s 
efforts to ease the situation in Tibet had further helped, as had the establishment of 
contact between Beijing and the Dalai Lama in 1978.81 These developments eventually 
culminated in Vajpayee’s subsequent visit to Beijing. The trip was cut short because of 
the Sino-Vietnamese war, but, as a former Indian ambassador to China noted, this visit 
“marked a turning point in the new opening.”82 
The previous year American and Indian leaders had also exchanged visits, but 
they seemed to be heavy on style and light on substance. The US and India had continued 
to try to improve relations. Even in the last couple of years of Gandhi’s tenure, while she 
had criticized “general external forces” for political purposes, privately her government 
continued to seek to improve US-India relations.83 The Desai government with its 
emphasis on “genuine” neutrality also sought better relations. The Carter administration’s 
emphasis on democracy and the restoration of democracy in India in March 1977 bode 
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well for the relationship. The White House desire to encourage regional powers to take 
on responsibilities that the US wanted to shed also helped.  The Indian foreign minister 
welcomed the “sense of equality” in the relationship, which he called “an equal 
partnership based on friendship and a common will to cooperate both in bilateral matters 
and on international issues.” 1978 marked the first time that American and Indian leaders 
had exchanged visits within a year. By the end of the year, Brzezinski commented, “we 
have never had such a good relationship with India as now.”84 Nevertheless, as Goheen 
noted, below the “levels of broad principles and personal hardware of diplomacy,” 
relations were “thin.”85 This seemed to match intelligence assessments in 1975 that had 
predicted, “Although Indo-US relations are likely to be more stable than in the past, they 
will probably remain shallow and subject to uncertainties.”86 
While American and Indian officials had reiterated throughout this period that 
there was no basic conflict of interest between the US and India, it had been more 
difficult to find areas of common interest.87 China was no longer played that role. On 
some fronts the countries had continued to disengage from each other. The US gave India 
less aid. India asked the US to end the Peace Corps program in India. As Thornton has 
noted, India also seemed to have lost the support of American liberals after the Indian 
nuclear test, Gandhi’s declaration of an emergency, and restrictions that her government 
imposed on American scholars. There had also continued to be differences. Gandhi had 
resented American criticism of her declaration of the emergency even as the US 
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continued to try to build a relationship with China and other non-democratic countries. 
The US lifting of the embargo on arms sales to the subcontinent had not helped 
relations.88 The two countries also continued to have differences over fuel supply for 
India’s nuclear reactors.89 They further disagreed about policy in Southeast Asia. The US 
had said it was interested in Southeast Asian neutrality, but Delhi increasingly saw 
Washington as lined up with China there.90 Over the last year that this period covers, the 
impact of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan would only exacerbate differences.91 
By the end of this phase, the two countries’ feelings about each other seemed 
much as they had throughout the period. A common interest in containing China had 
disappeared. The US essentially believed that “our basic direct interests in the sub-
continent are not major.”92 As for India, it did not like it, but it learned to live with US 
indifference and did not expect much change in the near future. As Jha had presciently 
noted early on, any change would have to wait:  
any basic change in relations would depend upon our own strength, military and 
economic, as well as our role in world affairs and relations with our neighbours. 
The US would not particularly relish our emerging as a major power factor on the 
world scene, but to the extent that we do so its respect for us and willingness to 
deal with us on a basis of equality will go up.93 
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(http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d237) 
90 Memcon of Kissinger-Chavan Meeting, Washington, October 6, 1975, Ibid 
(http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d212); Mansingh, p. 80. 
91 Goheen, pp. 128-131.  
92 Minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff Regional Staff Meeting, Washington, April 10, 1974, FRUS 
1969-1976, Vol. E-8 (http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d35) 
93 Letter from Jha to Kaul with Note by Jha and Gonsalves on US-India Relations, November 16, 1972, 
NMML, PNH (III), SF No. 235. 
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Conclusion 
In scripts of US-India relations, China only appears in a major role in the later 
acts—the ones set after 1998. China, however, was a major part of the US-India story 
much before that. It played more than just a bit part and made more than just brief 
appearances in 1962 and perhaps 1971. Between 1949 and 1979 it was always there, if 
not an actual presence then lurking in the two lead characters’ minds. It affected how they 
interacted with each other, at some times pulling them apart, at other times bringing them 
closer. This dissertation has sought to restore China’s role, because doing so helps better 
explain not just the two countries’ estrangement that a number of scholars have written 
about but also their engagement.  
Today, when the effect of the China factor on US-India relations is discussed, the 
focus often tends to be on the question of whether China can bring the two countries 
together. This dissertation shows that it can; it also demonstrates that that does not mean 
that it automatically will—even when both the US and India see China as a threat. 
Indeed, China might do the opposite and keep them apart. In the period that this 
dissertation covers, India and the US did partner when China appeared to pose a threat. 
However, the two countries only partnered against a Chinese threat when they agreed on 
(a) the nature of the threat, (b) the urgency of the threat, and (c) how to deal with the 
threat. When they disagreed on threat perception, as well as on what approach to take 
toward China, the differences had an adverse impact on the US-India relationship, often 
driving the two countries apart. Differences on approach involved differing ideas of (1) 
how other actors such as Pakistan and the Soviet Union fit in to their China strategies, (2) 
what the best policy instruments were to deal with the China conundrum (eg. force, 
diplomacy, development aid, military assistance), (3) whether engagement could work or 
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whether hard containment was necessary, and (4) whether one should go it alone or turn 
to collective security or a diversified set of partnerships. 
Between 1949-1956, India believed that whatever short-term ideological and 
long-term geopolitical threat China posed could best be dealt with by engaging China, 
with an emphasis on use of diplomacy rather than force. Years later, the US government 
would come to that conclusion between 1969-1972. During both those periods, the US 
and India took opposite approaches with China to the detriment of their bilateral 
relationship. In the second half of the 1950s and the early 1960s China brought the US 
and India together on both the defense and development fronts. At this time, their 
perceptions of China as a geopolitical and ideological threat were similar. They also 
agreed on what to do about China. Finally, each saw the other as playing a key role in its 
China strategy. This agreement unraveled between 1963-1968. Even as the two countries 
agreed on the fact that China was a threat, they differed on the extent and urgency of the 
threat and what needed to be done to deal with the challenge. These disagreements led to 
doubts about the other country’s utility and thus the partnership and led to its eventual 
unraveling. Between 1969-1972, differences on perception of and policy towards China 
would lead the US and India to the nadir of their relationship, just about a decade after 
China had taken them to the zenith. Finally, between 1973-1979 China disappeared as a 
key raison d’être of the relationship. The fact that India decided to engage with China, as 
the US was already doing, helped alleviate a source of strain; so did the fact that the US 
no longer saw India as a major spoiler in its engagement of China. Simultaneously, 
however, the two countries slipped down each other’s priority list as they struggle to find 
major common interests. 
This dissertation also set out to contribute to the emerging debate on Indian 
foreign policy. In this respect, it sought to highlight a few key aspects: 
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India and the Cold War. Traditionally, India has been seen as a non-Cold War 
actor—a perception perhaps encouraged by Nehru and other policymakers’ rhetoric about 
the US-Pakistan agreement in 1954 having brought the Cold War to South Asia and 
dragged India into the superpower conflict. However, this dissertation has shown that 
Indian policymakers before that knew that they could not remain aloof from the Cold 
War even if they wanted to. As Nehru said the world was too interdependent and India 
could not be isolated. The Cold War created the geopolitical, economic and ideological 
climate in which India operated. The external dynamics did bind India’s options, but it 
also created opportunities for Indian policymakers, who did indeed use the Cold War for 
India’s benefit as well.  
Some have argued that India would have benefited more from a non-Cold War 
world, but as this dissertation shows India’s importance to both Moscow and Washington 
derived from Cold War dynamics. One cannot answer the counterfactual about whether 
India would have been as important to them had there been no Cold War, but this 
dissertation at very least shows that one cannot take for a given that these countries 
would have seen it to be in their interest to invest heavily in India absent a Cold War. 
Others have said that the US gave short shrift to India. Critics have asserted, “the 
Americans seldom regarded India as special. Their prior perceptions did not place India 
on the same plane as China. Few appreciated the value to American interests of a strong, 
independent and nonaligned India.”1 It might be true that India went up and down the US 
priority list, but this dissertation also shows that there was significant phase of time when 
the US did see India as special and helped build and support a strong and independent 
India. 
                                                
1 Mansingh, p. 85. 
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Rethinking nonalignment. Nonalignment is a term that is much used to mean a 
number of different things and to encompass various elements of Indian foreign policy. It 
has also been interpreted in numerous ways. It has been seen as either a defensive 
response or rejection of the Cold War bipolar framework, or an offensive reaction to gain 
leverage in the Cold War.2 Some see nonalignment as having been a strategy of isolation, 
noting “Nonalignment as a foreign policy was designed to keep India out of the way of 
the storms and stresses of the Cold War, allowing India to concentrate on its economic 
development.”3 Others see it as a postcolonial declaration of independence—“the 
ultimate expression of a newly independent nation’s reluctance to be bound by any other 
actor’s strategic needs and preferences.”4 
This strategy that has come to be called nonalignment had elements of both 
defense and offense. Early in independent India’s history, the ruling Indian National 
Congress party “agreed that India was to enjoy complete and uncompromising autonomy 
in its strategic decision-making process.”5 But, as this dissertation shows, Indian 
policymakers soon acknowledged reality i.e. that even if India wanted to, it could not 
isolate itself, and, moreover, it was likely to be dependent on others for a while; that 
much as India wanted to be self-sufficient and unaffected by others’ decisions, the reality 
was different. What emerged and evolved over time was a strategy that Indian leaders—
acting from weakness and operating under political, economic and geopolitical 
                                                
2 Itty Abraham, “From Bandung to NAM: Non-Alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-1965,” 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (April 2008), pp. 195-196. 
3 Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, “The Day India and the US Didn’t Ally,” Foreign Hand, November 25, 2010 
(http://blogs.hindustantimes.com/foreign-hand/2010/11/25/the-day-india-and-the-us-didnt-ally/) 
4 Rudra Chaudhuri, “Why Culture Matters? Revisiting the Sino-Indian Border Conflict of 1962,” Journal 
of Strategic Studies, Vol. 32 No. 6 (December 2009), p. 847. 
5 Ibid, p. 847. 
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constraints—employed to expand their options. Essentially, what they developed was a 
strategy of diversifying their portfolio of partners. 
As K. Subrahmanyam has asserted nonalignment should be seen as a “strategy to 
safeguard India’s security.”6 The dominant Indian concept of external security did not 
just envision protection of the country’s territorial integrity, but also protection of its 
autonomy to the extent possible. While this could partly be considered a post-colonial 
reaction,7 this dissertations shows that it has also in large part been the result of two 
other, more pragmatic, elements: (a) the desire to maintain the Indian leadership’s 
freedom of maneuver so that it would not just have to go along with others’ interests 
because it had no choice, and (b) questions about the reliability of other countries and the 
realization that their assistance came with strings attached. Thus, most Indian 
policymakers tried to reduce dependence on external sources as much as possible; at the 
very least, they strove to diversify it. They thought about nonalignment—or, more 
accurately, diversification—as a means to an end, not the end in itself.  
Tilting. This dissertation also shows that India’s decision-makers have had to 
move away from their instinct to diversify and increase dependence significantly on one 
partner. One can call it alignment, one call it leaning as Nehru did or one can call it 
tilting. It has described two instances when they did so, tilting towards the US in 1962 
and the Soviet Union in 1971. In both instances, Indian policymakers tried to resist tilting 
till absolutely essential, till they had exhausted all other options. Tilting was the Indian 
leadership’s last best option, but it was not a taboo. India tilted when four conditions 
were in place. First, there was a clear and present danger. In the case of 1962, the threat 
was the result of Indian reversals in the Sino-Indian war, with the fear of a larger Chinese 
                                                
6 K. Subrahmanyam, “That Night of November 19,” Indian Express, November 18, 2010. 
7 See Rudra Chaudhuri, p. 843. 
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invasion of India looming. During 1971, the tilt occurred in the midst of the Bangladesh 
crisis, with India and Pakistan facing off and the possibility of Chinese intervention on 
Pakistan’s behalf.  Second, tilting occurred when the Indian inclination to diversify its 
dependence on multiple partners is thwarted and it could not deal with the threat on its 
own. In 1962, the Soviet Union refused to back India (or even stay neutral) against China 
at a critical stage in the crisis. In 1971, the tilt occurred in the context of Indian doubts 
about the US coming to its aid if China intervened on behalf of Pakistan in the event of 
an India-Pakistan war. Third, tilting occurred when there was a willing partner to tilt 
toward—just as it takes two to tango, it takes two to tilt. In 1962, the US was waiting 
with open arms. In 1971, the Soviet Union stood ready. Fourth, the India leadership had 
to have sufficient political capacity to undertake a tilt. In 1962, Nehru had the political 
mandate and, indeed, there was sufficient support for asking the US for aid. In 1971, 
Indira Gandhi, who had been re-elected with a clear and large political mandate, led the 
Indian government. She used this mandate to quell concerns about the treaty India signed 
with the Soviet Union in August that year. 
 Diversification: Possibilities and Pitfalls. This dissertation also helps expose 
both the strengths and weaknesses of India’s diversification strategy. On the one hand, 
diversification allowed Indian policymakers to seek benefits from multiple sources. 
Having invested in multiple partnerships also gave Indian policymakers the ability to tilt 
when necessary. On the other hand, for a strategy that was designed to increase India’s 
flexibility, diversification depended a great deal on the willingness of others to participate 
in it. Their willingness depended on others’ strategic priorities and their perception of 
India’s importance relative to others in their own strategies. Thus, for example, India 
could use a diversified Soviet-US balance against China only as along as both the Soviet 
Union and the US sought to balance China with India. When Washington’s China policy 
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changed and it sought to engage rather than contain China, this option was no longer 
available to India. In crisis, India then had to tilt. There is always the danger that like the 
Soviet Union did in 1962 and the US did in 1971, a strategic partner will choose an ally, 
for example China, over a friend such as India. At other times of crisis, as this 
dissertation shows external actors chose not to participate in India’s diversification 
strategy because they did not want to take sides, or because they disapproved of an Indian 
course of action. This was the case during the 1965 India-Pakistan war, when India found 
itself needing external assistance and reassurance vis-à-vis China, but not getting them 
from either the Soviet Union or the US. 
************* 
Cutty: Game done changed. 
Slim Charles: Game’s the same, just got more fierce.  
      —The Wire 
Is an examination of the impact of China on US-India relations during the Cold 
War at all relevant to the contemporary or future world? Some might argue that it is 
not—that too much has changed: the Soviet Union no longer exists, China is far more 
powerful than it was, and the world is far more integrated. There are, however, elements 
that are not so different: for example, the importance of considering the US strategic 
framework—whether it is dominated by a Cold War prism or a counter-terrorism one or 
an international economic one—and the consequent strategic priorities and policies; the 
necessity then to consider where countries like China and India fit in to that framework, 
their relative importance to the US and how that affects US policies towards each of 
them. The same is true for the Indian side. Moreover, while the degree of interaction 
between the three countries has changed, an examination of the past shows that the 
contours of interaction between them that we try to assess today have existed before. 
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Even in the context of increasing interaction and growing interdependence between the 
three countries, there continue to be questions in India and the US about whether they 
should see China as a competitor or partner; whether it is best to contain it or engage it; 
whether the other can provide support for their strategy or play spoiler in it. Just as in the 
past, one country’s perceptions and decisions about China can affect the other’s options. 
Whether the US sees China as a strategic competitor or strategic partner has affected and 
continues to affect India and US-India relations. Similarly, whether India seeks to engage 
or contain China has and can play a role in supporting or spoiling US strategy. This 
dissertation has shown how the countries dealt with these dynamics in the past and can 
offer a glimpse of how they might do so in the future, taking into account the changes 
that the subsequent decades have brought.  
Analyzing the countries’ past interactions can contribute to understanding current 
and future interactions, if one can detect and factor in what dynamics have changed and 
assess how, if at all, those new dynamics might alter the triangular interaction. The past is 
not an exact guide, but it can provide a glimpse of how prisms, priorities, politics and 
policies can affect partnerships. The past can and does also shape current attitudes. 
Furthermore, at the very least, a study of the past shows that theory succeeds at 
explaining the triangular dynamics only under certain conditions, but not at all times. 
Scholars and policymakers have based and continue to base arguments and assessments 
about the future of the China-India-US triangle on realist or constructivist theories. This 
study shows that those assumptions based on theory, and the assessments based on those 
assumptions should be made with care. 
While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to conduct a detailed analysis of 
what past dynamics can suggest about the present or future of the US-India relationship 
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or indeed the China-India-US triangle, this section lays out some aspects that the 
dissertation has highlighted that can be explored further. 
On interests. Lack of dialogue and the lack of understanding are often identified 
as reasons for US-India differences. However, understanding and dialogue have not 
necessarily led to US-India engagement. Common interests have been necessary for 
that—though they might not be enough. When discussing US-India relations, along with 
common values, policymakers in both countries continue to highlight the two countries’ 
range of common interests in areas ranging from Afghanistan and Pakistan to counter-
terrorism to non-proliferation to climate change.8 Managing and shaping the rise of China 
has also found its way high on this list of common interests.9 These common interests are 
indeed laid out as the basis for and driver of closer US-India ties. As this dissertation 
shows, however, while interests might be a necessary basis for building and maintaining 
close bilateral ties, they are an insufficient one—the means they choose or prefer to 
achieve those interests matters as well. For the two countries to come together, it is not 
just necessary for their diagnoses to match, but also their prescriptions. 
On China. Both the US and India envision the other as part of their China 
strategies, implicitly or explicitly—as they did in the past. There are risks and rewards for 
both India and the US in envisioning a key role for the other in their China policies in 
particular and in their grand strategy in general. One risk is related to expectations. Great 
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expectations about the other can lead to great reward for it. It can also lead to great 
disappointment if those expectations are unmet.  
There is also a risk if the relationship becomes largely derivative. When India 
policy was derivative of China policy in Washington that sometimes translated to major 
benefits for India. However, if India’s China policy did not match with that of the US—
and vice versa—it could be a serious subject of disagreement between the two countries. 
Similarly, India’s role vis-à-vis China can and has made it important in US eyes. 
However, if India’s importance primarily derives from Washington’s view of China, this 
importance can change and perhaps even dissipate. Thus, it is crucial for both India and 
the US to nurture cooperation across a broad range of issues and not assume that China 
will naturally bring them together. Each country has to make itself important to the other 
side, but there is a risk to do so in just one realm.  
On the flip side, as this dissertation shows, the two countries cannot stovepipe 
their relations with other and their relations with China. Each is also likely to be affected 
by dynamics in the other’s relationship with China. The Sino-US relationship has 
affected India in the past. How China and the US perceive each other will continue to 
affect India’s options and the questions Indian policymakers will have to consider. If 
China and the US see each other as strategic competitors, should India play along with 
the US as willing foil or bulwark or subcontractor in Asia, deriving whatever benefits 
come with that role? Or should India continue to keep its options open vis-à-vis China? 
On the other hand, should Delhi see Washington’s attitude as destabilizing to India’s 
relations with China—as making India more insecure—and should it then tilt towards its 
neighbor to offer reassurance? 
If China and the US see each other as strategic partners, will they collaborate in a 
way that narrows India’s options? Should India jump on the bandwagon and seek to 
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participate in Sino-US collaboration, making the most of its relations with both? Or 
should it stay off the bandwagon, at the risk of getting left behind? As China and the US 
try to work together on a range of issues that are transnational in character, will India, 
which often is a key stakeholder, play spoiler or collaborator? Or can it be the swing vote, 
courted by both? 
If strategic reassurance is the dominant approach in Sino-US relations, will 
Indian policymakers see US efforts to reassure China as being at India’s expense? Can 
Delhi piggyback on Washington’s efforts to gain reassurance from Beijing to elicit its 
own assurances from China? Should India and the US act in concert to reassure China, 
and, in return, seek reassurances from China? Should the US and India coordinate when 
there is a lack of reassurance to pressure China? Or should India seek assurances from 
China, even at the expense of its relations with the US? 
Sino-Indian relations, similarly, can affect US options. This aspect gets less 
attention, but needs to be thought through as well. China in the past has not just been a 
subject and source of cooperation between India and the US, but also of contentiousness. 
Today, US-India relations are considered to be on more solid ground, and Sino-Indian 
relations can seem contentious. But, if there comes a point when Sino-Indian relations 
seem to be improving and the US relationship with China is deteriorating, the impact on 
US-India relations could be negative. Washington could come to see Delhi as unhelpful, 
and Delhi could come to see Washington as playing a destabilizing role that is not in 
India’s interests. This is not a far-fetched scenario, given Sino-Indian interaction, 
especially in the economic realm, and India’s desire not to provoke China. 
On diversification. Since the world is no longer divided into two blocs (or three), 
some have argued that nonalignment is an irrelevant concept. What this dissertation has 
tried to show is that in considering Indian foreign policy it is important to look at the 
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strategy of diversification underlying nonalignment rather than the concept of 
nonalignment itself. That strategy has been remarkably consistent across time. Despite 
shocks in 1962 and 1991, which observers highlight as key turning points in Indian 
foreign policy, diversification has persisted. Indian policymakers try to diversify when it 
is possible. They apply this approach not just in terms of developing and maintaining 
foreign policy relationships with multiple partners, but also, for example, in arms 
acquisition policy or international energy sourcing. Diversification requires options, 
however, and as this dissertation has shown India’s available options will be determined 
not just by how India sees countries like China and the US, but by how these two 
countries conceive of India’s role and relative importance in their broader strategies.  
Indian diversification, as this dissertation shows, has not been of the hub-and-
spoke variety—i.e. all countries have not been kept equidistant and bilateral relationships 
have not been treated equally. At different times, India has had closer relationships with 
some countries—the degree of closeness has been determined, among other things, by 
level of importance of the other country, India’s priorities and needs at the time, the 
willingness of the other country to engage with India, and India’s other options in terms 
of partners.  
There will be times when India has to make a choice between China and the US 
and tilt—tactically or strategically. India, indeed, tilted in the past to take out an 
insurance policy against China. Diversification has not precluded tilting towards certain 
countries when the circumstances call for it—in fact, it makes tilting possible.  
Tilts can either be tactical or strategic. Tactical tilts can take place in certain fora 
or to achieve sub-objectives—for example, China and India working together in climate 
change negotiations, or Chinese and Indian companies joining together to out-bid an 
American company for an energy asset. Discussion about strategic tilting has focused on 
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India moving towards the US to contain China. As this dissertation shows, however, one 
should not dismiss the potential of India tilting towards China, if that seems essential to 
achieve Indian objectives. 
On domestic politics and public opinion. US-India relations have been affected by 
policymakers’ political capacity—their domestic political ability to undertake a certain 
course of action either in the context of favorable political support and public opinion; or 
in the absence of clear political acceptability, the ability to shape and use public opinion 
and external circumstances to overcome domestic resistance. Domestic politics and 
public opinion can affect policymakers’ choices. In the past, for example, it limited the 
concessions the Indian government could make to China or the US. In the US, 
congressional views of India—in the absence of public support—restricted the amount of 
assistance the executive branch could give to India. Their impact is not, however, 
restricted to constraining options. It can help lead policymakers in a certain direction as 
well. For example, growing public support for India in the US at one stage both helped 
lead an administration to aid India, as well as allowed the administration to use that 
public support to overcome some political opposition. In India, domestic political 
opposition to India’s tilt toward the US contribute to Indian policymakers trying to 
correct the imbalance and finding ways to assert independence publicly.  
Domestic politics and public opinion can also affect the relationship in another 
way: it has affected and can affect rhetoric. The Indian government, for example, felt the 
need to make certain statements or take (or not take) certain actions publicly for public 
consumption domestically to give it more flexibility to make concessions in private. The 
multiple audience problem, however, led to these statements or actions having an adverse 
impact in the US.  
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Each government has the capacity to weaken—and perhaps even strengthen—the 
other government’s political capacity. US policy has weakened the Indian government’s 
hand in the past by giving ammunition to its opposition. However, in some cases the 
American approach strengthened the Indian government’s hand on the relationship by 
creating constituencies in India. This can work in other ways as well. If the US, for 
example, does not like the approach an Indian government is taking, it can give its 
opposition ammunition or try to create a groundswell to facilitate a change. Similarly, if 
India, for example, does not like the approach an administration is taking on India, it can 
try to create constituencies for a change or use existing constituencies for India in the 
policymaking community to call or press for a change. 
On style. Style matters. The manner in which the two countries’ policymakers 
dealt with each other, as well as each other’s policymaking communities did have an 
impact on the relationship. As this dissertation, shows agreement on substance can lead to 
a better style of behavior; so can the habit of cooperation. US-India relations worked 
better when policymakers undertook advance consultation and warning, when necessary. 
They benefited from policymakers’ dealing with differences privately, without assuming 
the worst of the other side. When differences became public, it helped if the two sides 
worked to temper the public discussion. It also benefited the relationship if each side tried 
to support—rather than undermine—the other in dealing with various domestic 
constituencies. The Indian government, for example, found it easier to accept US 
conditions attached to assistance when the US government helped make them look like 
strings attached rather than chains attached. 
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